


# KING AND COURT IN ANCIENT MACEDONIA

*Rivalry, Treason and Conspiracy*



Elizabeth Carney

VISIT...

LANZAROTE  
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KING AND COURT  
IN  
ANCIENT  
MACEDONIA  
RIVALRY, TREASON  
AND CONSPIRACY

Elizabeth Donnelly Carney



The Classical Press of Wales

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The symbol of the Press is the Red Kite. This bird, once widespread in Britain, was reduced by 1905 to some five individuals confined to a small area known as ‘The Desert of Wales’ – the upper Tywi valley. Geneticists report that the stock was saved from terminal inbreeding by the arrival of one stray female bird from Germany. After much careful protection, the Red Kite now thrives – in Wales and beyond.

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*For Emma,  
even though she wasn't around for the first ones*

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## INTRODUCTION

This is a collection of previously published articles of mine, articles that appeared over a nearly thirty year period, between 1980 and 2009, each followed by a brief essay updating bibliography and generally reconsidering the issues raised in the individual article. I have created a common notation and bibliography for the collection but, apart from this standardization of notation and spelling, correction of typos, and occasional superficial additions for clarification, I have not substantially changed the original text of these articles. As the title indicates, this collection focuses on Macedonian monarchy and the Macedonian elite.

Though I am very grateful to Anton Powell for giving me the opportunity to create this collection (and for his advice along the way), putting this compilation of past work together has proved a more complicated, interesting, and occasionally dispiriting task than, before I began, I would have guessed. Certainly, reconsideration of the topics of these articles has made me very conscious of how much academic work, mine and that of others, is the product of specific personal and intellectual moments.

The earliest articles included here, revised cuts from my 1975 dissertation on Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Aristocracy, were written before I had a computer and yet (thanks to the hard work of the Clemson history department staff) these texts became computerized; it was eerie (as in an alternate version of the past) to see a manuscript created on a typewriter reemerge in Microsoft Word and yet at the same time hard to resist changing things. The reappearance of those early texts proved oddly compelling but also a touch disorienting. I found myself recalling dinners with friends, and then my husband, and later my daughter as well, celebrating the publication of each article (which article was it that marked my first sighting of arugula on a South Carolina menu?).

Naturally, these publications enabled my progress from instructor to assistant professor, to associate, to professor, and finally to a named chair. As I reread these articles and rethought the issues they raised, I reflected on the nature of an academic career, at least as I experienced it in the U.S. in this past generation, and how the need to publish quickly in order to acquire tenure and promotion colored what I said and how much I revised to please an individual reader. These days, I'm often the reader who calls the tune (I see the wisdom of choosing people who have published on the

same topic as the readers of a manuscript submitted for publication – what else to do – but I do worry about the effect of the dead hand of the past, including my own aging hand.) I did not find it easy to publish work that disagreed with received opinion and, different though current received opinion may be, I suspect that untenured scholars currently attempting major publication feel much the same.

It mattered that I am a woman, the first woman in my history department to be offered a tenure track job (1973) and for a number of years the only woman in the Anglophone world regularly publishing on the political history of ancient Macedonia. Because this collection focuses on the Macedonian court and its dynamics, most articles included deal only briefly or peripherally with royal women, though a great deal of my other work has examined the role of royal women in Argead and Hellenistic monarchy. In many respects, however, my work on royal women has shaped and colored my understanding of Macedonian monarchy and court politics and the reverse. Like many female classicists of my generation, I became interested in the “new” study of the role of women in the ancient world. Then, when I began to examine Olympias’ career, I discovered an entire category of people and activities that had either been ignored or, more often, trivialized. Being the only woman in the room (often literally, apart from, perhaps, the ghost of Grace Harriet Macurdy),<sup>1</sup> whether that room was the site of a department meeting or an academic conference, occasionally turned out to be an advantage, but more often was the reverse. But the academic world of the seventies is long gone. Now I have a host of female colleagues and many more women work in various aspects of Greek and Macedonian political history, though political history (for all periods and cultures) remains a more masculine field of endeavor than many others.

As I began to publish, Ernst Badian reigned supreme in scholarship about a field still understood as “Alexander history.”<sup>2</sup> True, his demolition of W. W. Tarn’s implausibly noble king, the man who never had sex with anyone he shouldn’t and didn’t kill anyone at all, unless they deserved it, the fellow who conquered the world to generate universal brotherhood,<sup>3</sup> had commenced in 1958,<sup>4</sup> but such was Tarn’s impact on both scholarly and popular culture, particularly in the English-speaking world, that it was well into the 1980s before Tarn’s country gentleman disappeared from encyclopedias and western civilization texts. Badian’s well-written and well-argued articles made compelling reading, primarily, I think, because they understood power (and Alexander) as sinister. Some time passed before I consciously realized that the problem with Badian’s view was that he usually found only Alexander sinister and paranoid; his Alexander

conspired constantly but Badian did not really believe that much of anyone else did. Waldemar Heckel's work recognized this phenomenon sooner than others (I include myself) did.<sup>5</sup> I interpret the Macedonian elite as generally conspiratorial; this is a view that allows them agency as well as Alexander and recognizes what certainly seems to have been a widespread not simply royal interest in "whacking" as a way to resolve political problems.

In a way, experiencing a world in which, for a time, Hitler threatened to reign supreme, enabled Badian to see that Tarn's emperor had no clothes, but at the same time, it inspired a tendency in him to find parallels to the dictator where there were none. Hitler's "reign of terror" was in many respects unique. Historical writing has suffered from the insistence on parallels when really no one was very like Hitler (not even Stalin). A. B. Bosworth's works of political history, though painting a picture of Alexander that is nearly as sinister as that of Badian, focused on Alexander's painful impact on the peoples he encountered on campaign,<sup>6</sup> whereas Badian was primarily, though hardly exclusively, interested in internal Macedonian political dynamics. Of course, not everyone found Badian's view compelling; N. G. L. Hammond<sup>7</sup> and R. Lane Fox<sup>8</sup> produced a series of books and articles which preserved a more heroic, if less air-brushed Alexander and, in Hammond's case, an implausibly tidy version of how Macedonian monarchy worked.

A tremendous increase in information about Macedonia has enabled scholars not only to understand Alexander's Macedonian context, but also to engage in Macedonian history, not simply Alexander history. Hammond's multi-volume histories of Macedonia, with their consistent concern with material as well as political history, played a central role in this development.<sup>9</sup> Until 1977, nonetheless, Macedonian archaeology was underfunded and remained little known and was often ignored by political historians who continued to concentrate on Alexander. In November of 1977 M. Andronikos, excavating the Great Tumulus at Vergina, uncovered two tombs (and the next year a third), tombs he soon announced were royal and one of which (Tomb II), by late November of 1977, he pronounced to be that of Philip II, father of Alexander the Great. It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of his discoveries on the study of ancient Macedonia, archaeology in Greece, and modern politics in the Balkans.<sup>10</sup> The Vergina finds, further publicized by an exhibit, including many objects from the tombs and elsewhere in Macedonia, that toured internationally,<sup>11</sup> generated both popular and scholarly discussion,<sup>12</sup> and an immense surge in archaeological work everywhere in Greek Macedonia. Tourism to Macedonia increased significantly. After Yugoslavia fragmented and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia came into existence, the

material from the Vergina tombs, particularly the “Vergina star” that appeared on several items in the tombs, became part of nationalist political strife between Greece and FYROM.

Almost from the start, some scholars did not accept Andronikos’ conclusion that Philip II had been interred in the main chamber of Tomb II and preferred, if they accepted Andronikos’ conclusion that Tombs I, II and III were royal, to understand the male in the main chamber as Philip Arrhidaeus III (Philip II’s son and Alexander’s half-brother) and the woman interred in the antechamber of Tomb II as Adea Eurydice (wife of Philip Arrhidaeus and granddaughter of Philip II). Though the controversy has endured and produced a bibliography of vast length and Byzantine argumentation (see Hatzopoulos 2008 and Borza and Palagia 2007 for overviews of the dispute, with opposing conclusions), the basis for both these identifications has changed over time. (See further discussions in chapters four and five and the afterword of each.)

A number of factors have contributed to the persistence of the controversy. Four different scholars or sets of scholars (Xirotiris and Langenscheidt 1981; Musgrave and Musgrave *et al.* 1985, 1991, 2010; Bartsiakos 2000; Antikas 2014a, 2014b) have examined the bones of the male (and some of them also examined those of the woman in the antechamber, as well as the remains in Tombs I and III). These examinations have produced general agreement on the age of the male in Tomb II but disagreement about whether or not the bones offer conclusive evidence for Philip’s eye injury.

New findings have altered some initial arguments, if not their conclusions. Those who believed that Philip II was the occupant initially assumed that Cleopatra, his last married wife, had accompanied him to the afterlife, but subsequently came to prefer Meda, his penultimate wife. In 2014, returning to a suggestion of Hammond’s, Antikas argued that the woman in the tomb was the daughter of a Scythian king, primarily because he concluded that this woman was nearly ten years older than previous estimates of her age at death. Also in 2014, Antikas announced that, in Tomb I at Vergina, he had found the remains of five more individuals, in addition to the three individuals previously recognized. The excavation of the “Tomb of Amphipolis” began in August of 2014 and, because the tumulus in which it was inserted was considerably larger than the Great Tumulus at Vergina, the new tomb has complicated consideration of what might be considered distinctively royal in Macedonian burials. (See further discussion and references in chapters four and five and their afterwords.)

The dispute about the identity of those buried in Tomb II at Vergina literally compelled political historians to engage with material evidence

from ancient Macedonia, if only in the context of argument about the identity of the dead. This engagement has had consequences. Despite the fact that, almost from the start, some scholars did not accept Andronikos' belief that Philip II was the occupant of tomb II at Vergina, the discovery of the tombs generated much greater attention for Philip II and his role in transforming Macedonian monarchy.<sup>13</sup> Hammond, who had argued not long before the discovery of the tombs, that Vergina was ancient Aegae, the older capital of Macedonia,<sup>14</sup> had, as we have seen, built a foundation in material history for understanding ancient Macedonia. Borza's history of Argead Macedonia<sup>15</sup> not only paid more attention to Philip than to Alexander, but included a long chapter on the material culture of Macedonia that consistently attempted to put Macedonia's political history in the context of its material culture. As a result of these developments, by the end of the 1970s I had begun to think of myself as a Macedonian historian, not as an Alexander historian. I found myself less and less interested in Alexander himself and more and more intrigued by the culture and monarchic institutions that had produced him.

Despite the continuing accumulation of vast amounts of archaeological information, Zosia Archibald recently complained that historians of Macedonia do not pay enough attention to relevant material culture evidenced from archaeology.<sup>16</sup> She's probably right. Miller Collet, Palagia, Barr-Sharrar, Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, Cohen, Schultz, Franks,<sup>17</sup> art historians and archaeologists, have all produced work relevant to political history. Archibald herself, Nicgorski, and Castor<sup>18</sup> have employed Macedonian objects, largely jewelry, to reach conclusions about Macedonia of interest to political historians.

The reasons why the majority of political historians have paid relatively little attention to material history are many. The bitter controversy about identity of the occupants of the royal tombs has frightened people off and left them without a clear chronological context that would help in any effort they might make to employ a broader field of evidence; Archibald is comfortable with "long-term cultural patterns"<sup>19</sup> whereas political historians can be less so. The long delay in full publication of much of the material from the Vergina tombs (and other Macedonian archaeological material, despite the now comparatively rapid appearance of annual reports on archaeological work in Macedonia and Thrace)<sup>20</sup> certainly contributes. Archaeological publication from sites around Macedonia appears in Greek and far fewer ancient historians have good modern Greek than archaeologists. Access, despite the vast improvements the electronic world has brought, to these journals is not easy. No universal system of numbering has developed for Macedonian-type tombs.

Since the 1970s, the ethnicity of Macedonians ancient and modern has increasingly been contested, sometimes in ways that play into how we read political history and material culture. It is not simply a question of whether Athenians thought the Macedonians were Greeks or barbarians or whether the Macedonians thought of themselves as Greek (the answer to both questions is probably sometimes yes, sometimes no). I find Jonathan Hall's views particularly persuasive in this area.<sup>21</sup> Nor is it just a problem about language; little of ancient Macedonian survives, but it appears to be a Greek dialect, albeit with non-Greek elements.<sup>22</sup> Language, however, is simply one possible ingredient in the construction of ethnic identity.

Just as problematic as these abstract issues is the problem of how to talk about Macedonians and the culture in relation to other Greek and non-Greek cultures. For instance, the most important monarch of Macedonia before Philip II was surely Alexander I, known since at least the second century AD as "Alexander Philhellene."<sup>23</sup> Can one be philhellenic if one is Hellenic? Perhaps,<sup>24</sup> but more worrisome is how to refer to the policy of Argead kings that involved the importation of intellectuals and artists from elsewhere in the Greek world. Are those kings "Hellenizers"? Often, but not always, the usage really signifies that they are Atticizers. Our students have problems with the idea that Athenians are Greeks but not all Greeks are Athenians, but they aren't the only ones. The world described in the Homeric poems was of vital importance to Macedonian culture, particularly that of the kings and the elite and yet, somehow, Homericizing is rarely understood as an aspect of Hellenizing but rather as a different category entirely. The observant reader will note that I often speak of "southern Greece" in a way that includes Athens, though from a physical geographic point of view, it is located in central Greece. I prefer this region-specific terminology because it looks at the peninsula, at least politically, from the point of view of Macedonians. Moreover, there are times when ancient Macedonian ways seem simply a subset of broader Greek patterns and other times when they seem distinctive or more similar to the practices of peoples to their north.

When I first started reading scholarship about Macedonia and Alexander, scholars spoke of "orientals" in Alexander's army or government or of his "orientalizing" policy.<sup>25</sup> Nobody, especially not post Edward Said, uses that term anymore, one that used to refer to adoption (by Philip II, Alexander, the Successors) of some aspects of non-Greek (usually Persian or Egyptian) customs, often ones connected with the tradition of monarchy in these regions. Lane Fox's early work<sup>26</sup> paid new attention to the intersection of Macedonian and Near-Eastern culture. Pierre Briant, who began his career examining matters Macedonian,<sup>27</sup> has played a large role in our vastly



expanded knowledge of the Persian Empire and the survival of many of its practices (and peoples) long after the empire's political demise.<sup>28</sup> Thanks to his efforts and those of many other scholars,<sup>29</sup> we now have a better understanding of the traditions and symbols of Persian monarchy (and its implementation of aspects of much earlier monarchies in the region).

This in turn has led to a host of readings of Macedonian culture and kingship as profoundly influenced by Persian culture, particularly in the reigns of Philip II and Alexander.<sup>30</sup> Our extant sources understand Alexander to have Persianized and the Macedonians not to have liked it, but Kienast<sup>31</sup> was the first to argue that Philip II in a very general way recreated his court on an Achaemenid model. It's undeniable that Macedonians and Persians had a long history of contact: Macedonia had once been part of the Persian Empire – Alexander I fought on the Persian side in the Persian War – and there were personal and diplomatic contacts of many sorts (at least one royal daughter married a Persian and elite Persians spent lengthy exiles in Philip's court) and Macedonian material culture certainly includes objects that imitate Persian models. This shared history means that dating the adoption of Persian custom is difficult because influence was continuous if, perhaps, more intense at some periods than others and greeted at some times and by some groups with more hostility than at others. More worrying is the assumption – central to Kienast's arguments – that similarity of custom or practice demonstrates influence. Similarity demonstrates only similarity,<sup>32</sup> though Persian monarchy was an obvious model for an ambitious Macedonian king to follow.<sup>33</sup>

But even if one agrees that Macedonian kings knowingly began to do certain things because Persians did them, neither Alexander nor Philip nor any of the Successors wholesale traded off their own customs for those of the other culture; they apparently picked and chose some features and not others.<sup>34</sup> We cannot always tell if they understood the meaning in Persian culture of what they were borrowing. As has now been widely recognized, Macedonia borrowed from many cultures around the Aegean and the result was an eclectic civilization.<sup>35</sup>

Alexander, of course, destroyed the Persian Empire. He and the Successors dealt with many people who had been important in running the Achaemenid enterprise, but as the centuries passed, less and less was known of what it had been like. By the time most of our surviving sources on the reigns of Philip and Alexander wrote, the empire had been gone for five centuries. Consequently, Roman era authors may have misunderstood customs and actions that would have been far more comprehensible to fourth- and third-century Macedonians, and our sources may also have been more inclined to understand events in terms of the

hackneyed Greek-versus-barbarian stereotypes than were fourth century Macedonians and more inclined to interpret them in the context of Roman issues, experiences, and conflicts.<sup>36</sup>

Until recently people did not think much about the Roman (mostly imperial, Diodorus apart) date of our major narrative sources for Philip's and Alexander's era. Everyone who wrote about the period knew these narratives had been composed during the Empire, but despite work on Roman views of Alexander, scholars largely ignored uncomfortable questions about how Roman experience and culture might have shaped the image of Alexander, Philip, and the Macedonians which generally is preserved in extant accounts. There was even less recognition of the possible effect of Greek high (and low) culture during the period, generally referred to as the Second Sophistic. Many of my older articles, for instance, simply sort "Greek" versus "Roman" sources, yet Plutarch was not Greek in the same way Demosthenes or Aristotle was Greek. It's not just that Plutarch was Roman too, but that the Second Sophistic generated a sense of Hellenic culture and values that was quite different from, and sometimes at odds with, those of the late Classical and early Hellenistic period, especially as Macedonians experienced it.<sup>37</sup> Tarn loved Plutarch and Arrian and no wonder; there is much about their mindset that resembles late Victorian values, particularly in matters sexual. Once one recognizes how much of written material about Alexander is in some sense a Roman construct, what is one to do?

D. Spencer, author of *The Roman Alexander: Reading a Cultural Myth*,<sup>38</sup> is, after all a Roman historian, so her constructed Alexander is a Roman one, on the very good grounds that the sources are as I've described them. But what if, as I am, one is interested in Macedonian and Greek culture? I'm not just worrying about the old-fashioned notion that we can recover what "really" happened in ways other than fairly literal and basic, but also about the understanding of "Alexander" as a Roman construct that tends to privilege Roman over Greek or Macedonian or even Asian constructs. I'll give an example. Mary Beard, in her review, suggests that Alexander's extreme grief over Hephaestion, the hugely expensive funeral pyre he had built for him, and his heroization of him might have been a creation of Arrian (7.14.1–10), using Hadrian's grief over Antinous and his deification of him as a model, rather than the reverse. But Diodorus (117.110.8), Plutarch (*Alex.* 72.1–4), and Justin (12.12.11–12) all give accounts of Alexander's profound grief and expensive funerary commemoration for Hephaestion, and Diodorus' version (though short, it mentions the intensity of his grief and the magnificence of the funeral) can hardly be modeled on Hadrian. This construction, whose ever it is, predates Hadrian.

Moreover, if Kottaridi is right about the astonishingly elaborate funeral pyre houses created for Tomb II at Vergina and the “Eurydice” tomb, then some material confirmation exists that elite Macedonians might have done something like this.<sup>39</sup>

What we have in these various texts may or may not bear a resemblance to the funeral preparations Alexander actually made, but it appears to be a Hellenistic construct, possibly then further altered by various later Roman authors. Alexander’s behavior, varying with accounts, clearly recalls, as long been recognized, that of Achilles at the death of Patroclus (*Il.* 23.35–286). Indeed, his behavior on a number of occasions, as reported in multiple sources, appeared to imitate the behavior of his supposed ancestor. The many ways in which elite and royal Macedonian funerary customs mimic, one might almost say slavishly, those described by Homer (see also *Il.* 24.782–804) suggests that the funerary behavior of Alexander may have had an “author” earlier than the Roman period, namely Alexander himself,<sup>40</sup> a view that does not deny subsequent modulation in narrative by authors of the Roman era.<sup>41</sup>

Insisting on interpreting our textual Alexander as a Roman creation not only privileges Roman culture over Graeco-Macedonian, it also privileges text over actor and seems to deny that Philip II or Alexander (or other figures of importance such as Olympias or Antipater) any agency at all and certainly fails to recognize their own self construction,<sup>42</sup> something for which there is contemporary evidence (e.g. the Philippeum),<sup>43</sup> confirmed and duplicated by assorted Hellenistic kings. Philip and Alexander themselves were the first texts.

Indeed, particularly since the turn of the twenty first century, an understanding has developed of Argead and Hellenistic monarchy as staged by kings and other members of their families who in effect played (or constructed) “themselves” via images and structures,<sup>44</sup> rituals, costumes, procession and significant public behavior and gestures. Philip II, as Spawforth realized, was an “impresario of monarchy.”<sup>45</sup> Excavators now believe that the theater and palace at Aegae/Vergina were built as a complex<sup>46</sup> by Philip II who died in a procession entering that theater (Diodorus 16.92.5–93.3). Scholars from many disciplines have commented on the general theatricality of Macedonian culture,<sup>47</sup> as demonstrated by its physical remains, including its tombs and palaces often displaying illusionistic facades, stage sets for ceremony and ritual.<sup>48</sup> If the current excavators are right, the palace at Aegae (which they now understand as space intended largely for public actions and entertainment, for royal display and not a building used for domestic space)<sup>49</sup> was itself a stage set (and its façade much resembled the palace backdrop of theaters),

constructed by Philip II (or Cassander if you prefer the traditional later date) on which he played the role of king.

Our extant texts provide us with descriptions of behavior that sound melodramatic and theatrical but rather than being simply constructs of our sources (which they surely are in part), they may also and perhaps primarily have been scenes consciously created by the main actors, under the influence of Homer or tragedy. How would, for instance, Olympias, knowingly facing her death, have acted? I consider it possible that she played the tragic queen just as she was becoming one, as did Adea Eurydice, and Arsinoë II.<sup>50</sup>

None of this, of course, vitiates the truth that our surviving literary texts about actors Macedonian are the end result of an unknowable series of accretions (often from sources we don't know about) and deletions; the story of Philip II and Alexander and their entourages was from the beginning a kind of interactive Romance (one of the many reasons why I've never wanted to compose a "biography" of Alexander). Traditional *Quellenforschung* is too linear to analyze the kinds of phenomenon I have been discussing. While I swear a solemn oath never again to say "as Arrian reports" or "as Plutarch reveals" but, instead, to listen for the Roman resonances in our Roman-era sources, I believe that we should also pay attention to the assorted other agendas that shaped these same sources.

Plutarch and Arrian were contemporaries with some shared values, but considerably different ones as well and certainly they wrote to different purposes. Moreover, with Plutarch anyway, one can tell that at times that the genre in which he writes or the purpose of a particular piece changes the image of Alexander and others that he constructs. Thus Olympias is bad, bad and always interfering in Plutarch's life of Alexander, but in the *Moralia*, she is far more likeable and easy going.<sup>51</sup> Even more striking is a story Plutarch tells a number of times in which Alexander is to be admired for instructing his father in correct kingly behavior (and Philip clearly to be condemned) but in one case Plutarch reverses the roles of father and son and Philip is in the right and instructing his son.<sup>52</sup> Which one is the Roman Alexander, or for that matter, Plutarch's Alexander or Philip? How much did versions of the Romance affect our conventional literary sources?

Perhaps the most vexing aspect of our need to listen to the Roman character of our sources is the question of political influence, particularly influence of a fairly literal sort, like the example Beard imagined regarding Hadrian and Antinous. Most often, the issue is whether the character, actions, and policy of the emperor at the time the author wrote has shaped the portrait of Alexander or Macedonian monarchy or army behavior.<sup>53</sup> Such readings can move easily from the subtle and convincing to the

reductive, transforming the narratives of Curtius or Arrian as a kind of “roman à clef” in which Alexander is Tiberius or Domitian or whoever.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, that Arrian or Curtius sometimes overtly understand the behavior of the Macedonian army on the basis of what they have seen or read about the Roman army or interpret what is correct or not for a king to do or say on the basis of what Roman emperors do or say, seems to me interesting – unless one assumes there could be a narrative without a point of view – and sometimes useful, but only if I can be confident that I have a rough sense of what that point of view is.

When writing about Macedonian mutiny, I was intrigued by an article by R. W. Messer published after World War I, in 1920, about Roman mutinies in which the author revealed that he had begun to rethink Roman mutiny in 1914 as World War I commenced (apparently leading him to read texts again in the light of his contemporary experience). He deduced that mutiny in the Roman army was widespread, contrary to “modern” belief in the perfection of Roman discipline, paralleling this “myth” about an ancient army to the destruction of the myth about the perfection of discipline in armies of his own day, presumably because of the many mutinies on the Western Front.<sup>55</sup> So often with ancient authors, we lack exactly this sort of specific chronological information and so can’t tell which emperor and which political scenario our authors might be channeling or, for that matter, trying hard to avoid.

Traditionally, the Alexander Romance in its many western and eastern versions, was not taken seriously as a source for the reign of Alexander or that of Philip (with exceptions being made for particular incidents), though its origins go back to a period soon after Alexander’s death and some versions clearly incorporate knowledge relevant to the monarchies of Egypt and Asia. Our conventional sources inevitably had encountered the Romance in various forms but scholars have rarely faced up to how much the Romance may have influenced our “respectable” literary sources. Once one has read a number of anecdotes about Alexander, Philip, or Macedonians generally in Plutarch’s essays or in Athenaeus, one’s confidence in the existence of a great distinction between the Romance and the other narratives begins to erode. To some degree, we have privileged writing considered in recent generations a production of “high culture” over that we saw as “low”, and have consequently overlooked the interactions of various literary traditions.<sup>56</sup> The collection of essays edited by Stoneman, Erickson, and Netton on the Romance in the East is a sign that the role of the Romance has begun to change, but much more work will doubtless be done.<sup>57</sup>

If the recognition that our literary sources about Macedonia should

always be read with the era of their production in mind has both illuminated but complicated thinking about power and its institutions in Macedonia, the growing interest among Hellenistic historians in court studies, a sub-discipline that has its beginnings, though hardly all its development, in the work of Norbert Elias on court life and style in early modern Europe, has proved a less complicated blessing, though it too has its problems or limitations.<sup>58</sup> Unlike most theoretical approaches, this one's origins in the study of a particular place and time can produce over-universalist statements; monarchies are not all alike and not always similar, though they often are. Taking the court studies approach has the great advantage of understanding monarchy as collective enterprise, if one usually dominated by the king, with "negotiation of power" functioning as a useful and to me reasonable catch phrase.<sup>59</sup> In many ways, this interpretation meshes easily with the way political historians had begun to understand Macedonian monarchy as absolute in the abstract, but in practice limited by the actions of others at court and in the dynasty.<sup>60</sup> Court studies is also an approach that helps to explain the role of royal women at various Macedonian courts and how integral were activities such as drinking and hunting to the workings of a court and why conspiracies tended to develop. While Argead and Hellenistic courts were hardly identical enterprises, and certainly not at all periods, papers I hear or read using a court studies approach, but looking at other monarchies, often are helpfully suggestive. Conferences hosted or co-hosted by the two current centers or institutes for the study of the Hellenistic World – University of Edinburgh's "Hellenistic Court" in February of 2011 and University of Waterloo (along with McGill University) "Seleucid Royal Women" in February of 2013 – have proved stimulating, as much because of approaches I hear and reject in terms of Macedonian history as for ones that seem more applicable. There are limits – I cannot but think you'll find an inner and outer court if you assume they are there to be found – but, at the same time, it is a helpful way to think about familiar material, articulated in our sources in a particularist way.

Despite the publication of a series of attacks against it, it seems to me that the field with which this collection deals has changed considerably. James Davidson's famous, often hilarious, and outrageously partisan 2001 review (nominally) of A.B. Bosworth's and E. J. Baynham's collection of articles, *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, portrayed what he termed "Alexanderland scholarship" as completely traditional, mired in *Quellenforschung*, and generally sunk in pedestrian, non post-modern worries about what really happened. Davidson wanted the objects of his condemnation to pay more attention to the intersection of sexuality and

politics at court.<sup>61</sup> In 2011 Beard<sup>62</sup> reviewed six “Alexander” books (though only two were literally about Alexander) she considered part of the “Alexander industry,” argued that more attention needed to be paid to the Roman date of most of the sources on Alexander, and concluded that Davidson’s views remained valid. In 2014 Hugh Bowden, reviewing a wide range of books, embraced Davidson’s “Alexanderland” terminology, this time faulting the supposed field for not paying enough attention to the Near Eastern aspect of Alexander’s reign and to Near Eastern sources and to the eastern and western versions of the Alexander Romance.

What is that field these reviewers excoriated? Is it an academic field at all? As Bowden conceded,<sup>63</sup> publishers seem ever willing to produce books on Alexander, but is the study of one man’s career a valid construct for an entire academic area, however popular books of virtually any sort on Alexander remain? As I have already observed, I no longer think of myself as an Alexander historian; today I describe myself as a historian of ancient Macedonia and that, increasingly, is how many people think who write about the impact of Macedonia, its kings and elite, its material culture. (Though Brill published a handbook on Alexander in 2003,<sup>64</sup> Blackwell in 2010<sup>65</sup> and Brill in 2011 came<sup>66</sup> out with handbooks on ancient Macedonia.) It’s not an accident that surprisingly few “biographies” of Alexander have been written by people who regularly publish work about Macedonian history.

One could argue that the reviewers revived a dead horse in order to beat it. Intriguingly, the very topics or areas whose absence each reviewer noted had already begun to be examined more seriously by the time the reviews appeared. Daniel Ogden’s book on royal polygamy (1999) and his (2011) *Alexander the Great: Myth, Genesis and Sexuality*<sup>67</sup> deal with sexuality and its manipulation and construction, in the context of ancient Macedonia. The first of these books was published (in Britain), before Davidson’s review, as was (in the U.S.) my own *Women in Monarchy*.<sup>68</sup> Spencer published her monograph on the Roman qualities of Alexander sources in 2002,<sup>69</sup> whereas Beard’s review did not appear until 2011. Sabine Müller’s *Alexander, Makedonien und Persien* appeared in 2014,<sup>70</sup> the same year as Bowden’s review. In monographs, collections, and articles, the Alexander Romance has already begun to receive a great deal of attention,<sup>71</sup> though Beard ignored the Romance and Davidson looked down his nose at it. The reviewers shared a similar desire to “bash” a field they had, to some degree, themselves constructed or at least defined, but as work began to appear dealing with topics previously not treated or not often treated, the next reviewer moved on to a new sin of supposed omission.

There’s still plenty of traditional political scholarship out there; Davidson, Beard and Bowden are right about that. They do, however, seem

to assume that work they consider traditional somehow happens at the expense of subfields they prefer. It is more useful to think about layers of analysis and a multitude of approaches. Certainly, we should not be apologetic about analyzing the power structure and dynamic of a place that changed the course of history (cultural, political, material, intellectual) of the Mediterranean and western Asia. One of my undergraduates once wrote a paper with the wonderful title, “The *Sarissa*, How Big Was it?”. As I remember, he, not unlike Davidson and Beard, made fun of the scholarship he had read, but in the end, he also engaged with the question, silly and trivial though it sounds and to some degree is, because he understood (as Beard refused to) that the size of that particular thing and the ability to manipulate it, made a tremendous amount of difference. People died in vast numbers, democracies and empires fell, partly because of the Macedonians’ ability to employ the *sarissa* (as well as a number of other military techniques and technologies). Later more people died when wielding the *sarissa* was not enough to defeat the Romans in 168 BC. Recently, inside a looted tomb of earlier date, excavators at Vergina found “fifteen horses, several dogs, a dozen of adults, several infants and toddlers,”<sup>72</sup> all likely slaughtered and tossed in the abandoned tomb in the aftermath of Roman victory. For them the rise and fall of the *sarissa* – and of the military and political machine that employed it – made all the difference.

A glance at articles, monographs, and collections published over the last twenty years paints a far more complex picture of work on Macedonia than our reviewers noticed, much of it in areas they ignored because these publications were not centered on Alexander and certainly not on Alexander alone. In 1998, E. Voutiras had produced a fascinating discussion of a curse tablet found at Pella and what it might tell us about the role of magic there; in 2007 Ogden discussed the possible role of witches and magic at the court of Philip II.<sup>73</sup> M. B. Hatzopoulos, employing his vast knowledge of Macedonian epigraphy, has produced a number of important works focused on the *longue durée*, rather than on Alexander or a narrative of Macedonian history at a given period.<sup>74</sup> The volumes of *Archaia Makedonia / Ancient Macedonia*, the work of a series of international conferences, always contained a mix of art history, archaeology, political and cultural history and other fields as well and did not focus on Alexander. Ada Cohen has employed material and traditional art history in her study of the Alexander Mosaic and of art in the era of Alexander, as well as a host of “post-modern” theories to read the culture of ancient Macedonia from its material as well as its literary remains.<sup>75</sup> Franks has done much the same with the frieze on tomb II at Vergina.<sup>76</sup> None of the reviewers seems



interested in the Balkan context of Macedonian culture, but that is an important aspect of the analysis of a number of scholars, including Franks herself, Archibald, and Greenwalt, and many others.<sup>77</sup>

As my remarks have indicated, in the time I have been working on Macedonian topics, the way we read our sources, written and material, documentary and literary, has changed immensely, and so have the questions and responses (if not exactly answers) we discover in them. We already knew we should not put our faith in speeches in historical narratives and now we know that not much more faith, at least of a fundamentalist sort, should be placed in the narratives themselves or in excavated objects and buildings without informative inscriptions, themselves after all constructed to serve someone's purposes. I doubt that anyone will any longer think of classical scholarship as an act of retrieval, of uncovering and removing all that dust, in order to reveal something unvarnished and yet absolute. Among other things, another generation of scholars is likely to conclude that we should save the dust, that the dust is the issue.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Macurdy 1932.

<sup>2</sup> Badian 2012 is a posthumous collection of his most important publications on Alexander.

<sup>3</sup> Tarn 1948a and 1948b encapsulate his views.

<sup>4</sup> Badian 1958 and another article originally published in 1958, republished as Badian 1964 (both articles now appear in Badian 2012) constituted the beginning of the demolition.

<sup>5</sup> Heckel 1992 and 2006 are his most important general works, but Heckel 1977 exemplifies this approach.

<sup>6</sup> Bosworth 1988a and 1996b.

<sup>7</sup> Hammond 1981, 1988, 1997.

<sup>8</sup> Lane Fox 1973, 1977 are the important works.

<sup>9</sup> Hammond 1972; Hammond and Griffith 1979; Hammond and Walbank 1988.

<sup>10</sup> Andronikos 1977, 1984 are important; for lengthier bibliography, see Hatzopoulos 2008 and Borza and Palagia 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Yalouris *et al.* 1983. Other exhibits followed: Pandermalis 2004; Kottaridi 2011d; Descamps-Lequime and Charatzopoulou 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Adams and Borza 1982 and Barr Sharrar and Borza 1982 are both collections on Macedonian political history and culture as well as on the royal tombs, both projects arising from conferences held at two of the places the exhibit toured.

<sup>13</sup> Cawkwell 1978, Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos 1980, Wirth 1985; Hammond 1994b, Corvisier 2002; Worthington 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Hammond 1970, 64–67, though the article was delivered orally in Thessaloniki in 1968.

<sup>15</sup> Borza 1990, see also Borza 1999.

- <sup>16</sup> Archibald 2010–11, 86.
- <sup>17</sup> To give just a few examples: Miller Collet 1973, 1993, 1996; Palagia 1998, 2000, 2008, 2010; Barr-Sharrar 2008; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 2001, 2007, 2011; Cohen 1997, 2010; Schultz 2007, 2009; Franks 2012.
- <sup>18</sup> Archibald 2005, 212; Nicgorski 2005; Castor 2008.
- <sup>19</sup> Archibald 2010–11, 86.
- <sup>20</sup> Το Αρχαιολογικό Έργο στη Μακεδονία και τη Θράκη (*AEMTH*).
- <sup>21</sup> Hall 2001.
- <sup>22</sup> See Engels 2010, Asirvatham 2010, Hatzopoulos 2011a and 2011b.
- <sup>23</sup> Hammond 1972, 101 n. 3.
- <sup>24</sup> Borza 1990, 113 notes that most people given the epithet were non-Greeks, but suggestions about why he was given the epithet do not necessarily exclude the perception of him as a Hellene (see Hammond 1972, 101; Sprawski 2010, 143).
- <sup>25</sup> E.g. Badian 1965a.
- <sup>26</sup> Lane Fox 1973.
- <sup>27</sup> Briant 1973 and 1974.
- <sup>28</sup> Among many works, 1979, 1994, 1999.
- <sup>29</sup> E.g. Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993.
- <sup>30</sup> See recent discussion and bibliography in Briant 2009a and 2009b and Olbrycht 2010.
- <sup>31</sup> Kienast 1973.
- <sup>32</sup> Cohen 2010, 109–110 doubts that external influence is always the answer to similarity.
- <sup>33</sup> Spawforth 2007, 92.
- <sup>34</sup> Coppola 2010, 148.
- <sup>35</sup> Rolley 2006, 314; Cohen 2010, 290; Franks 2012, 3.
- <sup>36</sup> Spawforth 2007, 88; Weber 2009; Howe and Müller 2012, 26–27; Spawforth 2012, 199, 206. See Bowden 2013 for a Roman reading of the *proskynesis* debate preserved (or constructed) in our sources.
- <sup>37</sup> See Asirvatham 2001, 2005, 2008, 2010a and 2010b.
- <sup>38</sup> Spencer 2002.
- <sup>39</sup> Kottaridi 1999, 2002, 78–81; Guimier-Sorbet and Morizot 2005, 197.
- <sup>40</sup> See Carney 2000c, 273–85; Müller 2006, for recent discussions and references.
- <sup>41</sup> See, for instance, Mossman 1988, especially 83–84, on Plutarch’s use of tragic and Homeric coloring to build his portrait of Alexander.
- <sup>42</sup> Cohen 2010, 41 deduces that Alexander had a “deep understanding of life as theater”.
- <sup>43</sup> See Carney article in this volume and Schultz 2007.
- <sup>44</sup> Ajootian 2003 and Schultz 2007, 222–25 (see nn. 45 and 47 below for further references) understand the Philippeum as a theater of sorts. Schultz (p. 224) describes the royal images as “heroic or divine actors”.
- <sup>45</sup> Von Hesberg 1999; Spawforth 2007a, 91. See Spawforth 2007a, Chaniotis 1997, Kuttner 1999; Carney 2011, 95–96.
- <sup>46</sup> Kottaridi 2011, 303.
- <sup>47</sup> See discussion in Cohen 2010, 41; Carney 2010, 43–44.
- <sup>48</sup> Guimier-Sorbets and Morizot 2007, 119–24, speaking specifically of tombs.
- <sup>49</sup> Kottaridi 2011, 328–29.

<sup>50</sup> Carney 2011, 50; 2013, 62.

<sup>51</sup> Carney 2006, 132-135. See discussion in Koulakotis 2008, 79 n. 18, of similar difference in depiction based on genre in Arrian.

<sup>52</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 67f, 179b, 334d, 634c-d but *Per.* 1.5. As with Plutarch's treatment of Olympias, it may be significant that the first four versions come from an essay, the last from a life.

<sup>53</sup> Howe and Müller 2012, 33-37 discuss examples of similarities between narratives of Roman mutinies and the Hyphasis event.

<sup>54</sup> See Carney 2001, 66-70, on Curtius' narrative of events after the death of Alexander and to what degree it is a Roman construct.

<sup>55</sup> Messer 1920, 159.

<sup>56</sup> See further the essays in Whitmarsh 2013.

<sup>57</sup> Bowden 2014, 44-45 makes this point forcefully. See Stoneman, Erickson and Netton 2012.

<sup>58</sup> Herman 1997; Weber 1997; Spawforth 2007; Strootman 2007; Weber 2009; Ma 2011; Mitchell and Melville 2013; see also Paspalas 2005.

<sup>59</sup> Heckel 2003b, 197; Spawforth 2007, 86; Mitchell and Melville 2013, 16-17.

<sup>60</sup> Some early examples: Heckel 1977; Wirth 1985; Borza 1990.

<sup>61</sup> Davidson 2001, 7-10.

<sup>62</sup> Beard 2011, 1-6.

<sup>63</sup> Bowden 2014, 146.

<sup>64</sup> Roisman 2003b.

<sup>65</sup> Roisman and Worthington 2010.

<sup>66</sup> Lane Fox 2011b.

<sup>67</sup> Ogden 1999, 2011.

<sup>68</sup> Carney 2000a.

<sup>69</sup> Spencer 2002.

<sup>70</sup> Müller 2014.

<sup>71</sup> See for instance Stoneman, Erickson and Netton 2012.

<sup>72</sup> Kottaridi 2013.

<sup>73</sup> Voutiras 1998; Ogden 2007.

<sup>74</sup> Hatzopoulos 1994 and 1996 are important examples.

<sup>75</sup> Cohen 1997, 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Franks 2012.

<sup>77</sup> See, for instance, Greenwalt 1993 and 1997, Archibald 2005 and 2012.

## PERMISSIONS

The author and publisher of this volume thank the editors and authorities of the following publications for permission to reprint the original articles which, updated, now form the main chapters of the present book.

- Chapter 1 “Women and *Basileia*: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia”, *Classical Journal* 90 (1995), 367–91.
- Chapter 2 “Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander”, *Classical Philology* 91 (1996), 19–44.
- Chapter 3 “The Philippeum, Women, and the Formation of a Dynastic Image”, in Heckel, W., Tritle, L. and Wheatley, P. (eds) *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay*, Regina Books, Claremont, CA, 27–70 (2007).
- Chapter 4 “Tomb I at Vergina and the Meaning of the Great Tumulus as an Historical Monument”, *Archaeological News* 17 (1992), 1–10.
- Chapter 5 “Were the Tombs under the Great Tumulus at Vergina Royal?”, *Archaeological News* 26 (2001), 33–44.
- Chapter 6 “Alexander the Lyncestian: The Disloyal Opposition”, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 20 (1980), 23–33.
- Chapter 7 “The Death of Clitus”, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 22 (1981), 149–60.
- Chapter 8 “Regicide in Macedonia”, *Parola del Passato* 211 (1983), 260–72.
- Chapter 9 “The Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander, and the Murder of Philip”, *Historia* 41 (1992), 169–89.
- Chapter 10 “Elite Education and High Culture in Macedonia”, in Heckel, W. and Tritle, L. (eds), *Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander*, Regina Books, Claremont, CA, 47–63 (2003).
- Chapter 11 “The Role of the *Basilikoi Paidai* at the Argead Court”, in Howe, T. and Reames, J. (eds) *Macedonian Legacies: Studies on Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in honor of Eugene N. Borza*, Regina Books, Claremont CA, 145–64 (2009).
- Chapter 12 “Symposia and the Macedonian Elite: The Unmixed Life”, *Syllecta Classica* 18 (2007), 129–80.
- Chapter 13 2002 “Hunting and the Macedonian Elite”, in Ogden, D. (ed.) *The Hellenistic World*, Classical Press of Wales, Swansea and London, 59–80 (2002).

## PART I

### ARGEAD MONARCHY: IMAGE AND PRACTICE

#### 1

#### WOMEN AND *BASILEIA*: LEGITIMACY AND FEMALE POLITICAL ACTION IN MACEDONIA

This is a chapter which attempts to define the role of royal women in Macedonian βασιλεία/*basileia* (monarchy or dominion), primarily in the Argead period, and does so, in part, by examining the nature of Macedonian monarchy itself. I argue that ancient Greek and modern western cultural prejudices which link legitimate political action to the holding of office rather than to membership in a royal clan have distorted our understanding of Macedonian monarchy. We have failed to recognize its essence, the persistent domination of a royal clan, made possible by the persistent acceptance of that domination by many elements in the unruly yet dynamic society that was ancient Macedonia.

This initial failure has precipitated a second misapprehension. Although the prominence of royal women in Macedonia has often been noted, nonetheless a presumption has remained that this prominence was essentially accidental, that the wives, sisters, and daughters of the Argead kings of Macedonia were not really part of Macedonian monarchy, that public or even political action on their part was not simply peripheral to the monarchy but actually apart from it,<sup>1</sup> that royal women (other than those possible few who may have held some office)<sup>2</sup> were automatically excluded from legitimate political action, and that such action constituted interference in matters not legitimately women's concern. The truth is more complex. In fact, in Macedonia, the acceptability of political acts by royal women varied considerably, depending in part on circumstance but even more on the point of view of the person or group judging.

In support of these views, I shall first examine the nature of monarchy in Macedonia, arguing that it was understood primarily as the domination of a clan rather than as an office held by an individual, at least until the end of the Argead period. Next, I shall consider the role of women in *basileia*, arguing that they were considered part of it because they were part of the clan. If so, we cannot automatically judge political action by royal women as illegitimate or as mere interference simply on the basis of whether or not they held office. In an attempt to develop a more contextual standard for judging the legitimacy of political actions of royal women, I examine the sources in order to see what sorts of political or at least public actions are considered acceptable or even praised, and what sorts of action criticized and why.

### **The nature of *basileia* in Macedonia: the rule of the clan**

Virtually all would agree not only that monarchy was the central institution of Macedonia but also that *something* placed limitations on the powers of the monarch. Tremendous disagreement exists, however, about the origin of these limitations. Some scholars – the “constitutionalists” – find the origin of these limits on royal power in the nature of Macedonian monarchy itself, which they see as circumscribed both by traditions so well-defined as to have the force of law and by the assembly, which they believe to have shared power with the king. Others, myself among them, conceive of the Macedonian monarchy as an autocracy, but one whose real power was often limited by circumstance, most typically by the pressure of various groups within the Macedonian elite.<sup>3</sup>

If we are to justify excluding royal women from legitimate political power and action because they did not ordinarily hold office, then we must demonstrate that office-holding constituted the way in which power was understood and allotted in Macedonian society. (For the purposes of this discussion, I shall define an office as a position with a fixed title and a clearly delineated or at least implied job description.) Granted the disagreement about the essential nature of the Macedonian monarchy, such a demonstration of the identification of office with clearly defined powers, duties, and limitations cannot be sustained for most of the Argead period; it is even less defensible for the troubled period of Argead decline and ultimate demise. A number of factors indicate the difficulties inherent in understanding Argead monarchy as an office.<sup>4</sup>

The history of Macedonia prior to the reign of Philip II was frequently chaotic and intermittently violent; rival branches of the royal family fought over generations for the throne, often involving foreign powers in support of their claims. Invasions and even royal exile were commonplaces of

Macedonian political life. Regicide was frequently attempted and was sometimes successful. Virtually every succession to the throne was contested; one Argead seemed to be able to supplant another with comparative ease. No clear pattern for succession to the throne developed; one Argead was apparently as good as another, so long as he was able to defeat the others. Even in the more stable reigns of Philip and his son, many of these patterns persisted.<sup>5</sup> In the light of such long-standing political practices, it is difficult to assert that the emphasis in Macedonian monarchy was primarily on the individual ruler; his identity was too subject to change.

On the other hand, despite all the violent intrigue and confusion, one aspect of Macedonian monarchy remained stable for many centuries: the perpetuation of the Argead dynasty on the throne. As far as we know, only Argeads ruled Macedonia from the historical beginnings of kingdom (7<sup>th</sup> century BC) until the death of the last male in the direct line, Alexander IV (c. 309). The death of an individual Argead was commonplace and does not seem to have precipitated long-lasting trouble, but the death of the Argead clan certainly did.<sup>6</sup> The Antipatrids were unable to retain control of the throne Cassander had, in effect seized,<sup>7</sup> and a generation of anarchy followed before the Antigonids managed to reestablish order, partly by manipulating nostalgia for the Argeads.<sup>8</sup> Thus the weight of centuries of Macedonian history argues against an understanding of kingship as an office held by an individual and in favor of an understanding of Macedonian monarchy as the possession of a clan.

Other signs also point in this direction. Only in the reign of Alexander the Great, the last Argead to rule in his own right and even then not consistently, did the king begin to use a title. Typically the kings designated themselves by a personal name and a patronymic.<sup>9</sup> The existence of a title and the conceptualization of kingship as an office are not identical issues, but the absence of a regularly used title suggests that the king's power was determined not by title or office but rather by his position as the dominant Argead.<sup>10</sup> It is probably significant that when the Successors of Alexander began to call themselves and each other βασιλεύς/*basileus* (king), it was still so undefined, so personal a term that it was tied neither to the rule of a specific people nor to a specific area, as the career of Poliorcetes demonstrates. The Successors would transform being *basileus* into an office, but that is not where it began.

Another sign that the kingship was not seen as an office with well-defined powers is the kind of situation, distressingly messy and undefined by modern standards, which tended to develop in Macedonia whenever the king himself was not personally present for a considerable period. It has proved virtually impossible to clarify the distribution of power on these

occasions. Such a circumstance would appear to suggest not only that kingship was not yet conceived in terms of defined powers but that the task of those who stood in for the king is even less likely to have been seen in such terms. For instance, when Philip II was out of Macedonia on campaign when Alexander was only about sixteen, contemporary evidence suggests that both Alexander and Antipater had some power and authority during the king's absence.<sup>11</sup> If this were the sole example, one might attribute the seemingly anomalous situation to Philip's desire to indicate his son's position while nonetheless providing a more mature back-up for his yet inexperienced heir.

But the same explanation cannot apply to another example of this same phenomenon: the situation that developed during Alexander the Great's long absence. Diodorus (17.118.1) reports that Alexander left Antipater as στρατηγός/*stratēgos* (commander) of Europe. Diodorus' diction may preserve Macedonian usage, or it may simply constitute Diodorus' understanding of Antipater's main tasks, which, like *stratēgoi* generally in the Hellenic world, were predominantly but not exclusively military; certainly he elsewhere (17.17.5) refers to Antipater's ἡγεμονία/*hēgemonia* in speaking of what appear to be the same duties. Arrian's language is rather different (1.11.3): he reports that when Alexander marched to the Hellespont, he entrusted to Antipater matters Macedonian and Greek. This passage, which refers to no office but rather to a sphere of interest or duty, probably gives us a clearer sense of Antipater's rather undefined role.

Despite this vague evidence, traditional scholarship assumed that Antipater had sole authority within Macedonia, although even a cursory examination of the evidence (e.g., Plut. *Alex.* 68.3) should make it clear that this, especially as Alexander's absence lengthened, was not the case at all.<sup>12</sup> In fact, Alexander had left the powers and responsibilities of his mother and sister as undefined as those of Antipater. Not surprisingly, Arrian (7.12. 6–7) reports that both Antipater and Olympias felt that the other failed to recognize his or her limits. When the quarrel between the women of Alexander's family and Antipater became heated, Alexander, rather than settling the matter himself, refused to intervene, preferring to allow the confusion and strife to continue, as it did.<sup>13</sup>

The situation after Alexander's death would seem particularly appropriate for the development of a clear definition of the office of substitute kingship – there were two incompetent heirs, one never likely to be competent and the other, an infant, eighteen years away, at best, from competency – but such a development did not occur. While it is true that no Macedonian sources for this period survive and that many of the extant



sources dealing with the period were written by non-Macedonians at a much later time and are likely to have been affected by later and non-Macedonian political views and presuppositions, nonetheless, the absence in our sources of any consistent terminology to refer to the position of those who at one time or another stand in for the king is striking and significant. Attempts have been made to rationalize the confusing use of abstract nouns like *προστασία/prostasia* (leadership, protection), *ἐπιμέλεια/epimeleia* (commission, charge), *ἐπιτροπεία/epitropeia* (guardianship) or related terms referring to individuals (e.g., *προστάτης/prostatēs*, leader, ruler, protector; *ἐπιμελητής/epimeletēs*, manager, or *ἐπιτροπος/epitropos*, steward, guardian) applied to those who stood in place of the king,<sup>14</sup> but they founder on the profound inconsistency of the sources themselves. The need of the sources to flesh these terms out with adjectives or explanatory objects is in itself suggestive.<sup>15</sup> Too often scholars have taken a very general term and attempted to give it a more specific meaning than its usage can justify.<sup>16</sup>

Arguments based on the assumption that passages which employ the verbs related to the abstract nouns mentioned above refer to an office, or even to the noun, are especially unpersuasive, just as, in English, it would be wrong to assume that those who “preside” are always “presidents”. Significantly, while we shall find (see below) that royal women are frequently associated with *βασίλεια/basileia* (dominion, monarchy, kingdom, rule), the only passage in which the verb form *βασιλεύω* refers to an Argead woman involves the alleged statement by Alexander that Macedonians will not tolerate such action (Plut. *Alex.* 68.3).<sup>17</sup> Arguments based on analogies to Epirote practice are also inappropriate.<sup>18</sup>

“Constitutionalist” scholars, recognizing that an individual seems to exercise real power or influence, tend to assume that such power is tied to a specific and well-defined office and then try to find an appropriate office to allot to that person. Hammond, for instance, recognizing, as others had not, the real power and prestige which Olympias and her daughter possessed during the reign of Alexander, something for which there is considerable evidence, all but invented an office (something for which there is no evidence) in order to explain what needs no explanation. This insistence on making power synonymous with office does violence to the confusing and complex picture of power relationships preserved in our sources and imposes on a people not inclined to tidy and consistent political practices an implausibly rigid order completely alien to a society fundamentally pragmatic and situational in its approach to problem solving.

Moreover, the inconsistency of our sources, the use of several “generic” terms rather than the consistent use of one, is unsurprising in the light of previous Macedonian political experience. Prior to the death of Alexander

the Great, instances involving a person who held power in the place of the king for any length of time are very rare. Typically, what we might term a “regency” simply constitutes a brief transition period allowing the person acting as king to become king in fact.<sup>19</sup>

More important, what really mattered in the period of the Successors was not descent or legitimacy at all, whether defined by office or not, but brute force in the shape of military success (*Suda* s.v. *basileia*), as is amply confirmed by the careers of many of the Successors. In practice, authority simply accompanied victory and could in turn generate legitimacy.<sup>20</sup>

Early in the period, it is true, authority which derived from membership in the Argead clan did sometimes temporarily prevail. For instance, the troops’ anger at the murder of Philip’s daughter Cynnane forced Perdiccas to allow the marriage of her daughter to the king Philip Arrhidaeus (*FGrH* 156 F 9.22–23). Her authority was certainly not defined by office: Perdiccas had been recognized as a regent of sorts, but Cynnane had no status other than that derived from her birth. When Macedonian troops saw Olympias, mother of Alexander and wife of Philip II, they abandoned Philip Arrhidaeus and his wife for her. Although many believe that Olympias actually held an “office” at this period, or perhaps even two (*prostasia* and/or *epimeleia*), Diodorus says nothing of office-holding in explaining the army’s behavior, but rather he attributes it to Olympias’ ἄξιωμα/*axiōma* (reputation) and the memory of her son’s deeds (19.11.2). Nicanor, commander of Munychia, promised to restore Munychia and Piraeus to Athens on Olympias’ request, again, not because of any office she was about to hold but because he believed she was about to reacquire the ἀποδοχή/*apodochē* (acceptance, approbation) and τιμή/*timē* (esteem, dignity) she had in her son’s reign (Diod. 18.65.1). She was, in short, to reacquire the status she derived from being mother of a king. It is worth noting that Olympias herself is reported to have doubted the legitimacy of the *epitropoi*, seeing the “office” as simply a cloak for personal ambition (Diod. 18.58.3). The violent deaths of all the surviving members of Alexander’s clan speak, however, to the ultimate victory of force, even over the authority of royal blood.

Some movement toward seeing kingship as an office may have begun during the anarchy after Demetrius Poliorcetes’ departure from Macedonia and may have solidified in some degree as the Antigonids took over for good. The cultural shock engendered by the final collapse of the Argead dynasty and the anarchy it precipitated may well have created a growing perception of monarchy as an office to be held, exactly because dominion and dynasty, after a period in which they had been disassociated,<sup>21</sup> had to be consciously reunited and their relationship, in the process, somewhat

rationalized. The monarchy had been so closely associated with the only royal family Macedonia had ever known that dynasty superseded office in thinking about monarchy.<sup>22</sup> When that was no longer possible, Macedonians were more able to see kingship in a more abstract way, in terms of an office that anyone or any one family, if appropriately recognized, might hold. It is no accident that the festival called *Basileia* seems to date to this period.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, rather than viewing Macedonian monarchy, at least in the Argead period, as an office held by an individual, one should see that *basileia* belonged to the Argead clan, that Macedonian monarchy was for long simply the rule of this clan through the person of its most powerful member, as was situationally determined. Although early Macedonian history was often troubled and confusing, no one ever seems to have ruled who was not an Argead and the dismay and disorientation that the end of the dynasty caused are certainly signs of the importance of the idea of *δυναστεία*/*dunasteia* (lordship, power) of the clan.

### Women and *basileia*

Having concluded that Macedonian monarchy was long perceived not as a succession of office-holders but as the rule of a clan and that the conceptualization of any position that an individual held as something so defined as an office was only beginning to develop in Argead times, we can return to the role of women in Macedonian political life. I suggest that all members of the clan were seen as part of the *basileia*, including women who were Argeads by blood or marriage.<sup>24</sup>

The evidence is considerable. Several passages in our sources state this idea directly by explicitly associating women with *basileia* and several more imply it. Passages which seem to deny women a role in *basileia* are not only partisan, but actually tend to support the inclusion of women in *basileia*. A once-striking public monument confirms it, as does the participation of royal women in dynastic crises. Only the power of our own cultural prejudices as well as those of our Greek sources has prevented us from recognizing the role of women in *basileia*.

According to Plutarch, Alexander, when told that his sister Cleopatra is having an affair, rather than criticizing his sister, observes that she ought to have some enjoyment out of her *basileia* (*Mor.* 818b–c). Whatever the literal truth of this tale (see below), its conceptualization of Cleopatra's role is surely significant. (It is possible that the *basileia* referred to is in Epirus rather than Macedonia, but the anecdote seems to imply a Macedonian context.) In his life of Alexander (9.3), Plutarch complains that the disorders in Philip's household generated many quarrels and disagreements

because his marriages and affairs in effect spread the “disease” of the women’s quarters to the *basileia*. That Macedonian political life was permeable by female influence was a circumstance obviously distressing to a Greek used to the extreme separation of the worlds of women and men, to the association of women with private life and of men with public matters.<sup>25</sup> Diodorus (19.11.5), considering the different deaths that Olympias allotted to Philip Arrhidaeus and to his wife Adea Eurydice (herself an Argead), explains that Olympias considered Adea Eurydice worthy of greater punishment because the young woman kept saying that *basileia* belonged more to her than to Olympias. The false letter Eumenes created in order to improve his own insecure standing included the assertion that Olympias, with her grandson, had taken over *basileia* in Macedonia (Diod. 19.23.2), an assertion obviously intended to please and reassure his troops.<sup>26</sup>

If women were indeed part of *basileia*, how then are we to account for statements in ancient sources which seem to deny this, sources which characterize political action by royal women as interference? For instance, Plutarch (*Alex.* 39.7) reports that while Alexander sent his mother many gifts, he would not allow her to meddle or interfere or to countermand his military orders, and that when she objected, he simply put up with her difficult character. Alexander, however, proved (see below) considerably more tolerant of Olympias’ “interference” in Antipater’s activities. In fact, Plutarch concludes this section with a story which says that Alexander paid more attention to his mother’s dissatisfaction with Antipater than to the complaints of Antipater about her. This passage seems to say that, on the one hand, Alexander certainly did not consider his mother his equal and squelched any efforts of hers to act in matters under his control but that, on the other hand, her opinion mattered more to him than did that of Antipater. He does not seem to have minded if she “interfered” in Antipater’s affairs.

Diodorus describes Adea Eurydice as interfering in many matters shortly before the settlement at Triparadisus (18.39.2). One must always consider the context of such statements. In this case, Hieronymus, Diodorus’ presumed source, is clearly supportive of the *epitropoi* and their ultimate patrons, Antipater and Antigonus. Actions similar to those which Diodorus/Hieronymus treats positively in reference to Phila (see below) are treated negatively when Adea Eurydice is involved.

A passage in Arrian (7.12.6–7) referring to Olympias has a similar context: Antipater complains to Alexander about his mother’s stubbornness, sharpness and interference. Olympias, in turn, complains that Antipater had an inflated sense of himself because of his reputation

and flattery and because he forgot that Alexander had appointed him to his position (is this an implied reference to the fact that she was not appointed to hers?), believing that he himself was worthy to be first among other Macedonians and Greeks. One might conclude that Olympias thought Antipater was interfering in *basileia*. Arrian, although clearly more sympathetic to Antipater than to Olympias and inclined to put as positive an interpretation on circumstances as he can, nonetheless reports that Olympias' words were gaining weight with Alexander (a lacuna follows). Thus, we know that Antipater believed that Olympias was interfering, but it rather looks as though Alexander did not share his view.

Incidents in Antipater's career other than his notorious quarrels with Olympias<sup>27</sup> seem to suggest that he in particular was generally opposed to political action by women. When he came to Asia and met Alexander's sister Cleopatra, the former would-be bride of Perdiccas and friend to Eumenes, despite her comparative political discretion – she sent Eumenes away to avoid a confrontation between them and a possible battle – Antipater scolded her publicly for her support of these two (*FGrH* 156 F11.40). Yet since Perdiccas was at least as legitimate an *epitropos* at the time Cleopatra was friendly to him as Antipater ever was (arguably more so), and since Cleopatra had vied with his own daughter Nicaea for a marriage alliance with Perdiccas, it is difficult to see this as anything other than a partisan encounter rather than as evidence that Antipater opposed female political action.

The same judgment should apply to a similar confrontation between Antipater and Adea Eurydice. Shortly after the events Diodorus describes as “interference” on the latter's part, Antipater turned up and with the help of Antigonus, despite considerable support for Adea Eurydice among Macedonian troops, was somehow able to silence her (*FGrH* 156 F 9.33; Diod. 18.39.2–4). Here again, Antipater's treatment of Eurydice has everything to do with his own interests. Similarly, his supposed death-bed caution against the rule of Macedonia by a woman (Diod. 19.11.9) – almost certainly a fiction – if it is to be taken seriously, should also be seen as a partisan statement, particularly focused on his long-time Argead enemy, Olympias.

That these passages derive from partisanship rather than from general opinion about the appropriateness of political action by women becomes obvious when one compares them to Hieronymus' praise (in Diodorus 19.59.4–6) of Antipater's daughter Phila for political skills such as her ability to soothe camp trouble-makers, apparently by promises of reward, for freeing from danger those falsely accused, and for having special intelligence. When, in this same passage (19.59.5), we learn that Antipater

is said to have consulted Phila about affairs of state, even before her first marriage, it becomes obvious that Antipater was not opposed to political action by women, but to political action by women who were his enemies.

Thus, those passages which appear to consider political action by royal women illegitimate interference prove, upon analysis, rather to demonstrate that such actions might be attacked as illegitimate by political enemies, but that similar actions by women in the same camp would not be considered illegitimate. Moreover, the diction of those passages which in translation seems to imply that royal women interfered in political matters, that is to say that they involved themselves in matters in which they should have had no part, actually suggests that they went too far or did too much in matters in which they did have a concern; similar terminology is applied to Alexander himself. The diction of these passages, while hostile in a partisan way, actually supports an understanding of women as part of monarchy.<sup>28</sup>

A structure which stood at Olympia, the Philippeum, was once visible confirmation that royal women were seen as part of *basileia* by the kings themselves. Pausanias' description of the monument (5.20.9–10) has left much about the date and purpose of the building subject to disagreement, despite subsequent excavation.<sup>29</sup> Nonetheless, it seems certain that the circular structure housed five statues: those of Philip and Alexander and Philip's father Amyntas, but also those of Philip's mother Eurydice and his wife Olympias. Interpretations of its purpose vary,<sup>30</sup> but Philip seems to have conceived of the building in the period immediately after his great victory at Chaeronea, although his son may have supervised its completion.<sup>31</sup> The inclusion of the two statues of royal women – public statues of women were as yet rare – must have been startling to southern Greeks,<sup>32</sup> the more so in that the images, like the statues of the male Argeads, were chryselephantine.

Since only cult statues were made of this sumptuous material, these statues were somewhat similar to Octavian's assumption of the title "Augustus," and constitute part of the sometimes subtle flirtation with divine monarchy which characterized the reigns of both Philip and Alexander.<sup>33</sup> I want to stress that the material of the female statues implies that this flirtation extended to the women of the Argead clan as well and might be taken to confirm Curtius' (9.6.26; 10.5.30) assertions that Alexander intended to deify his mother after her death. The period after Alexander's death would, in fact, see the first cults to royal women. Women received cult for the same reason Philip and Alexander included them in the monument: they were part of *basileia*.

We know of a number of occasions of dynastic crisis, some already referred to, in which royal women involved themselves in affairs of state

and met with, if not universal approval, acceptance and support from various elements within Macedonian society. One tradition has Philip's widowed mother Eurydice attempting to gain non-Macedonian support for the succession of her sons (Aesch. 2.27–29). Cynnane acted at the cost of her life to bring about her daughter's marriage to Philip Arrhidaeus and the army forced the Macedonian generals to make the marriage happen (Arrian *FGrH* 156 F 9.22–23). Polyperchon asked Olympias to return to supervise matters during her grandson's minority (Diod. 18.49.5, 57.2, 18.65.1). In practice, royal women functioned as the reserve troops of the dynasty, ready to be called into active service when no male adult Argeads were available.

If, then, royal women were somehow part of *basileia*, what did this mean? Being part of the *basileia* certainly did not mean that women ruled Macedonia (e.g. Plut. *Alex.* 68.3) in the ordinary course of matters, but rather that they were part of the dynasty which ruled, as their presence in the Philippeum indicates. In stable times, being part of *basileia* might entail little observable public action for a royal woman (yet a probable readiness and preparedness to act),<sup>34</sup> but in uncertain times, particularly when the succession was in jeopardy, their role in the dynasty could and did bring them into prominence and political action. The prolonged absence of the head of the dynasty might have the same effect. This situation recurs so often in the course of the fourth century that it constitutes the norm in certain dynastic circumstances. This noted, one would need compelling evidence indeed to term such action “interference.” Royal women occasionally played critical roles in Macedonian history not by chance, but because, as members of the dynasty, in the absence of capable males, they could act for the dynasty. Argead women were, in effect, royal understudies who had to be ready, at a moment's notice, to undertake, however temporarily, starring roles, center stage.

Why, then, if women were seen as part, if usually a subsidiary part, of monarchy in Macedonia, have we come to see them as outsiders who interfere in royal affairs? The answer lies in two different cultures' understanding of monarchy and power. None of the surviving ancient sources is Macedonian; all are either Greek or derived from Greek sources and thus centered in the *polis* culture of southern Greece, where power, after the archaic period, was indeed defined by office rather than clan, and the power of clan or dynasty was feared, seen as subversive and reactionary.<sup>35</sup> Not infrequently it is the greater role allotted women in societies where clan and dynasty matter that is specifically criticized (e.g. Plat. *Laws* 3.694a–(696a), as we have seen in Plutarch's passage about Philip's court.

At the same time that Greek sources understood that women played a greater role in monarchy and dynastic circumstances, they might nonetheless underestimate that role or describe it in terms suggesting illegitimacy because of both their hostility and their ignorance. This situation would be particularly likely when other elements alien to them (royal polygamy, for instance) were also present. Macedonians themselves, particularly male Argeads, may have fed this compound of ignorance and hostility by their tendency to insist on the hellenization of the royal family, if not all Macedonians. Thus the tale in Herodotus about Alexander I and the women of his family and the nefarious Persian ambassadors (5.17–21), already recognized as a fiction constructed to demonstrate Argead political correctness in matters Hellenic,<sup>36</sup> should also be recognized as an attempt to demonstrate cultural correctness in matters Hellenic as well, to convince Athenians and others that the women of the royal family were just as secluded as the most respectable Athenian housewife, unlikely though this was to have been true.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, anecdotes about Alexander's dealings with Olympias often seem intended to demonstrate that he did not allow his mother any non-Hellenic role in his life.<sup>38</sup>

These ancient misunderstandings and hostilities have been compounded by our own cultural preconceptions. In the modern west, office defines power (even in the few surviving monarchies) and it is difficult for us to conceive of power in other terms. Yet modern legislation against nepotism speaks to a fear of the power of dynasty and springs from an ideology not dissimilar to that of the Greek *polis*.

### **The sources and the legitimacy of female political action**

Since it is inappropriate to characterize political action of royal Macedonian women as interference or illegitimate on the basis of offices they or others held, we must, instead, consider what the sources indicate about the legitimacy of female political action. In support of such consideration, it would be helpful to establish some sort of Macedonian norm against which to judge these royal women. What, in other words, was the role of women in Macedonian society in general? Unfortunately, it is largely impossible to answer this question, other than to note that the content of women's graves suggests that Macedonian women did not usually bear arms but did function as status indicators.<sup>39</sup>

While it is virtually impossible to provide further discussion on the role of ordinary women in Macedonia, a little more can be said about non-royal women in the Macedonian elite. What meager information we have about elite women suggests that they, like the royal women, were often indirectly involved in politics and might occasionally take more direct action.



Cleopatra, ward of Attalus and the last wife of Philip II, a Macedonian woman not born to royalty, is said to have been involved with Attalus in arranging the sexual humiliation of Pausanias (Plut. *Alex.* 10.4). This particular rape, like other sexual offenses in Macedonia, had a political aspect and was part of partisan retaliation by the clan of Attalus. Perhaps Cleopatra became involved with court politics only after her marriage, but it is more likely that women of her class were expected to be aware of relevant events, and occasionally to be participants.

We do not know that Cratesipolis, the wife of Polyperchon's son Alexander, was a Macedonian aristocrat, but it is likely that she was. Her career certainly suggests that female members of the elite were typically knowledgeable about the public affairs of the men of their family. Like many royal women, Cratesipolis was able to step into a role normally male in a moment of crisis.<sup>40</sup>

Our best information about female members of the elite involves the career of Phila, daughter of Antipater and ultimately wife of Demetrius Poliorcetes, in the period before her husband took the title and she was transformed into a royal wife.<sup>41</sup> As we noted, her father, the great Macedonian politician and general, prized her opinion and advice even when she was a young girl (Diod. 19.59.5). Diodorus' famous praise of Phila (19.59.3–6), usually assumed to derive from Hieronymus, does not appear to focus on the period when she was married to a king, let alone the king of Macedonia. Rather than underplaying her public and political role, he emphasizes it. Thus, based on admittedly scant evidence, the political role of women in the elite seems similar to that of women within the royal family.

Let us now examine the sources' treatment of political action by royal women. I shall argue that grand and more public versions of the ordinary domestic role of women tend to be admired as the Macedonian version of "family values": participation in cult, patronage both private and political, and the performance of household duties on a more luxurious scale. Similarly, actions motivated by pursuit of dynastic goals (support for sons, daughters, descendants and husbands; courage, particularly in the face of death; and even the involvement of royal women in military actions) are surprisingly well received. But actions not clearly attributable to the pursuit of dynastic concerns and capable of interpretation as acts intended solely for the benefit of royal women might excite comment and criticism. Brutality was condemned as both unwomanly and too womanly.

The most obvious example of domestic virtue involves public piety. From the time of Philip's mother (and probably earlier) we hear of royal women dedicating statues and other offerings at sanctuaries, being active

in cult, particularly the cults popular in Macedonia, those of Dionysus and the Great Gods at Samothrace.<sup>42</sup> It is likely that they played a role in cult for the royal family.<sup>43</sup> The sole exception to the generally favorable treatment of public religious activity by royal women is Plutarch's treatment of Olympias' fondness for the Dionysiac mysteries (*Alex.* 2.5–6). But even this passage focuses less on Olympias' individual excesses – she is portrayed as going beyond the excesses of northern Greek women in this area – than on male fear of women's role in general in the mysteries and Greek unease about the more Dionysiac aspects of Macedonian culture in particular.<sup>44</sup>

Another activity which recurs and which receives no criticism and some implied praise is patronage by royal women. The evidence for patronage by Hellenistic royal women is much more substantial<sup>45</sup> than that for Argead women, even for those in the period immediately following Alexander's death. Some of this female Argead patronage seems fairly private or public only in the sense that in Macedonia, as elsewhere in the ancient world, elite women participated in the display of family wealth (e.g. Cleopatra's funding of a tomb for one of her court musicians, Paus. 1.44.6). Even this sort of patronage, however, demonstrates these women's ability to control and distribute wealth. Much of this female patronage is overtly political like Olympias' ability to shelter Macedonian "draft dodgers" (Curt. 7.1.37) or Cleopatra's to protect Dionysius of Heraclea from her brother's anger (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F4.37). Some female patronage was fraught with political implications. For instance, Olympias made splendid offerings at Delphi from her son's booty and Cleopatra gave a gift of grain to needy Corinth.<sup>46</sup>

Even less controversial are those acts of royal women which, while public, were also domestic and often suggested the role of ordinary women within the family, but on a grander scale, much as religious acts by royal women did. Since the days of Homer, the most characteristic task of women was the making of fabric; it is not surprising that we hear of the skills of royal Macedonian women. But even this most domestic of tasks could have political implications, just as Penelope's work at the loom did: the domestic skill of Alexander's sisters is contrasted to lack of it in the luxury-loving Persian royal women, continuing the Herodotean theme of Greek plain living versus Persian excess (Curt. 5.2.20). I have already suggested that the seclusion of royal Macedonian women, to the degree it existed at all,<sup>47</sup> was apparently used to demonstrate the Hellenic nature of the Argeads, much like Alexander I's Olympic victory. What little indication survives of household management on the part of these women is not surprisingly accepted without comment and reinforces the image of Argead austerity.<sup>48</sup>

Actions, even very political actions, of royal women in their role as mothers are generally well-received, although their enemies may deny that motherhood was their real motivation. In the two traditions (one hostile and one friendly) about Philip's mother Eurydice, she is on the one hand blamed for being a very bad mother (betraying both her daughter and her son) and on the other hand praised for defending her fatherless sons' chances at succession.<sup>49</sup> Whatever Thessalonice's role in the confused events after Cassander's death, it is interesting to note that Justin (16.1.4) at least does not blame her for supporting both her sons.<sup>50</sup> Support for royal daughters is less obviously praised in the sources, but one looks in vain for statements in the ancient sources condemning Olympias or Cynnane for their support of their daughters' political options through marriage. While Olympias is often criticized by the surviving sources, it is never for defending her son's or grandson's interests. As we shall see, the role of protective mother involves much more than simple acts of protection or motherly piety – like Olympias' possible smuggling of luxuries to Alexander when he was a boy (Plut. *Alex.* 22.5) or her public offerings on his recovery from illness – but extends into a political role during a disputed succession.

Much less is made of the public role of royal women as wives of kings, perhaps because this role, like that of royal sister or daughter, so often involved a tension between loyalties to the dynasty into which a woman was born and the one into which she married. Nonetheless, reference to connubial correspondence is favorably, even sentimentally treated (Plut. *Demetr.* 22.1; *Mor.* 799e), as are connubial gifts. We should probably pay more attention to the number of occasions on which *ἀξίωμα*/*axiōma* (honor, reputation) is said to belong to a royal woman because of whose daughter, wife, or sister she was or had been.<sup>51</sup> The fictionalized account in Diodorus of Adea Eurydice's wifely devotion to her husband's corpse in the last minutes of her own life should not be forgotten (Diod. 19.11.7). Sexual fidelity is almost assumed for royal women in the fourth century; the only serious accusation of infidelity against an Argead woman relates to Eurydice, Philip's mother, and even that is problematic.<sup>52</sup>

Royal daughters play a less important role, but the sources do indicate that being the daughter of the king made political action acceptable. Cynnane's bold actions, the very ones which led to her murder, seem to have been approved because she was Philip's daughter (Arrian *FGrH* 156 F 9.23–24). It is difficult to assess how much of Adea Eurydice's appeal and short term military support derived from being Philip's granddaughter and how much from being wife of a king. In the case of Cleopatra, it is similarly hard to tell how much to attribute to her status as daughter of Philip and

how much to being Alexander's full sister. Arrian (*FGrH* 156 F 10.40) seems to admire her defiance of Antipater, and her aggressive entry into the politics of the Asian marriage market does not seem to have cost her the interest of suitors (Diod. 20.37.4 attributes the number of her suitors to the distinction of her birth), although it ultimately cost her life. Daughters, too, could be political, if in support of dynastic goals.

Another kind of public, political action which is universally treated favorably by the sources is the noble and courageous death. Narratives of the deaths of Adea Eurydice and Olympias tend to couch their descriptions of the heroic ways in which these women faced their violent deaths in terms of their worthiness to be the daughters or wives (or both) of famous kings.<sup>53</sup> Courage, perhaps because it involved the risk of death, can also be admired: Arrian (*FGrH* 156 F 11.40) seems to admire the way, contrary to that of women in general (he says), that Cleopatra withstood Antipater's accusations against her and launched her own against him. Their courage is dynastic.

Perhaps most surprising is the fact that, despite clear evidence that women in Macedonian society did not usually bear arms and fight in battle, there is general acceptance of military activity by female members of the elite and royal family. We hear of armies, partly or wholly Macedonian, supporting women against male leaders (Arr. *FGrH* 156 F 9.23, 31–33; Diod. 19.11.2–3). Just as the mass of Macedonians much more enthusiastically supported monarchy in general and the Argeads in particular than did the elite, so they were more positive about royal women's actions, whether political or military. Indeed, the two views are really one. Military action by women in support of dynastic goals was acceptable.

To what degree women participated in military action is not entirely clear. Phila, Cynnane, Cratesipolis, and Olympias all seem to have involved themselves in military administration. Cynnane and her daughter Adea Eurydice distinguished themselves as military orators (Polyaen. 8.60; Arr. *FGrH* 156 F 9.23, 33; Diod. 18.39.2–4). Olympias, Cynnane and Adea Eurydice appeared in front of armies. Olympias, who had no military training that we know of, is unlikely to have engaged in combat, although she seems to have had considerable command responsibilities.<sup>54</sup> Polyaeus (8.60) reports that Cynnane, the daughter of Philip's Illyrian wife Audata (Illyrian women are known to have taken part in battle), did engage in combat and trained her daughter Adea Eurydice to do the same. It is quite possible that Adea Eurydice also engaged in combat: Duris (*ap.* Ath. 13.560 f.) says that she confronted the forces of Olympias, Polyperchon, and Aeacides armed like a Macedonian, although it is unclear whether she was in charge of the Macedonian forces (she was captured separately from her

husband, with her counselors, but Diodorus 19.11.2–3 seems to imply she was in charge of the army). No condemnation of her actions survives, probably because she was perceived to act in her husband's interests.

Ancient sources tend to be more ambivalent in their attitudes toward public and political action by royal women when the actions in question involve something more than women's domestic roles writ large and do not obviously serve dynastic ends. Protection of supporters or underlings, when it involves not only financial patronage but political or military as well, gets a varied reception, probably on partisan grounds, as we have already seen. It would be fair to say, for instance, that Eumenes receives more favorable treatment for his support of Olympias and Cleopatra than they do for their support of him. But, in the context of the army, Diodorus, presumably following Hieronymus, clearly admires Phila's role as a military patron and the narrative of the last days of Olympias' power seems to imply a certain admiration for her concern for her military followers.

Another area of ambiguity in terms of political action by royal women derives from the frequency of marriage alliances in the Argead and Hellenistic periods. The marriage of a royal daughter to the member of another dynasty always entailed the possibility that a royal woman could function as a kind of long-term diplomatic link between two families. We know that Phila, at least, functioned in this role (Plut. *Demetr.* 33.3) and seems to have been admired for doing so. Yet the possibility certainly existed that a royal woman could be destroyed by this double role: that seems to be the reason for the imprisonment of Eurydice; her father Lysimachus seems to have felt that she favored her husband's interests over those of her father (Just. 16.2.4; Euseb. *Chron.* 232).<sup>55</sup>

The sources do condemn the sometimes murderous violence of Olympias much more than they bother to condemn similar acts committed by royal men. The clearest sign of this is Diodorus' and Justin's treatments of Olympias' role in the deaths of Adea Eurydice, Philip Arrhidaeus, and the supporters of Cassander (Diod. 19.11.1–3; Just. 14.5.8–10). The evidence for Olympias' supposed murder of Cleopatra wife of Philip is less clear. While I have argued elsewhere that it is easy to overestimate the negative consequences of Olympias' murders, it is certainly true that the sources seem to expect that royal women should not do these things, although they do not harbor similar views about royal men.<sup>56</sup> Hostile tradition about Philip's mother would appear to suggest the same thing. Behind these sentiments lie two seemingly contradictory views: such murderous violence is on the one hand characteristic of women, especially royal women (e.g. Just. 14.6.1), and on the other hand not to be tolerated in royal women as it often was in royal men.

## Conclusion

Ancient sources uniformly condemn, or treat as illegitimate action, very few political acts by royal women. When they do, their motivation is often partisan or founded in Greek unease with the different cultural role of royal Macedonian women. In general, the further a woman's actions are removed from her clan loyalties and the more likely it is that her actions can be attributed to personal ambition rather than clan loyalty to son, husband, or father, the more likely it is that her actions will be criticized. Surviving evidence does not support a view of Macedonian monarchy which somehow institutionally excludes the women of the dynasty from political action, but rather one that allots them a political role which in ordinary circumstances was modest, but which could become important, even decisive, when dynastic succession was at issue. They could not interfere in *basileia*, because they were part of it.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The omission of more than passing mention of royal women from most standard histories of Macedonia as well as the absence of significant discussion of their role from institutional analysis of Macedonian monarchy presumes their peripheral role. For instance Green 1990, 19, terms Olympias' return to Macedonia on behalf of her grandson "intervention", a judgment that seems particularly inappropriate because her action came at Polyperchon's request. As I have previously pointed out (Carney 1993, 30–31, esp. n. 4), historians tend to supply unsupported personal motivation for Olympias when similar actions by males do not produce similar suggestions for motivation; one implication of this tendency seems to be the assumption that Olympias, outside the structure of the monarchy, could have only personal motivation. However, Hammond 1989, 31–36, paid more attention to the role of royal women in monarchy, but (see below) tied many actions of Olympias and her daughter to an office (*prostasia*) he believed that they held (Hammond 1989, 240 f., 250), rather than to membership in the dynasty.

<sup>2</sup> Three royal women have sometimes been supposed to have held office: Olympias, the *prostasia*, during the period of Alexander's long absence in Asia (no ancient evidence, but suggested by Hammond 1980c, 455–76; 1985, 158–59; see Carney 1987a, 50–53 and Anson 1992, 39, n. 6 for refutation); Olympias, the *prostasia*, after Alexander's death and in response to an offer of Polyperchon (Diod. 18.49.4; rejected by Hammond, accepted by Carney, but its significance doubted); Cleopatra in the last year of Alexander's reign (no ancient evidence, but suggested by Hammond; see refutation by Carney 1987a, 50–53); and Adea Eurydice, perhaps the *epimeleia* (no ancient evidence; deduction based on her request that Cassander replace Polyperchon; Diodorus 19.11.1 simply says that she had the power to do this; Justin 14.5.2–3 says that she usurped it; see Carney 1987b, 496–502). See below for consideration of whether such offices actually existed.

<sup>3</sup> See Borza 1990, 231–48, for discussion of both interpretations, references, and an argument in favor of the "anti-constitutionalist" view.

<sup>4</sup> Naturally, one can give a rough description of the kinds of power Macedonian monarchs typically exercised in religious, military, and judicial areas, but, as some of the confrontations of Alexander's reign suggest (the murder of Parmenio; the death of Cleitus), one often found out what a king's power was by seeing whether or not he got away with whatever he had done.

<sup>5</sup> See Carney 1983, 260–72. See also Borza 1990, 240 and Greenwalt 1989, 19–43.

<sup>6</sup> Borza 1990, 240, contrasts the stability of the rule of the Argead clan to the instability of the rule of individual Argeads.

<sup>7</sup> Many factors contributed to the demise of the Antipatrid clan: the early death of Cassander's oldest son; the internecine struggles of his remaining sons and the events they precipitated: one of them fled the country, a matricide, and the other was murdered by a supposed ally. Pausanias (9.7.2–3) and Justin (16.1.14–18) connect the end of Cassander's dynasty to his crimes against the Argeads. Cassander's actions against the Argeads had occurred some years before, but it is distinctly possible that the irresponsibility of his sons revived anger about these actions, the last Argeads proving more likeable long-dead. On the last years of the Antipatrids, see Errington 1990, 147–50 and Walbank 1988, 199–218.

<sup>8</sup> See Edson 1934, 213–35.

<sup>9</sup> Hammond 1988, 382–84, 390, has argued that inscriptional evidence demonstrates that Alexander used the title *basileus* early in his reign, prior to his departure for Asia (his argument depends on a restoration in the inscription in question).

<sup>10</sup> Thus, for instance, in *IG* i 3.89, Perdikkas appears as the first signatory of a treaty, followed by other Argeads, apparently in order of their status. A similar reluctance to conceptualize power in terms of office holding may have characterized Macedonian society in general. Errington 1990, 222, points out that kings addressed their administrators not by title but by personal name, implying that they were, “at least nominally, personal servants of the king (ἐπιστάται/*epistatai*).” It is not clear that such men are office holders: apparently they lack a title and one doubts that their duties were defined by anything other than the king's will. In the cities, office holding followed, roughly, the common Hellenic pattern. See further Errington 1990, 229–38.

<sup>11</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 9.1 reports that in 340 BC Philip II left Alexander behind in Macedonia as κύριος/*kurios* (master, guardian) of affairs and of his seal while he conducted his expedition against Byzantium and that Alexander subdued a revolt of the Maedi during this period and made an eponymous foundation in the area. Nonetheless, a letter of Isocrates to Antipater (*Eph.* 4) strongly implies that Antipater had the controlling position in Macedonia in 340 and there is no mention of Alexander. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 217) reports that in the period of Philip's absence, Antipater took the city of Angissus in the course of putting down a rebellion of a Thracian tribe, the Tetrachoritae, and then says that both Parmenio and Antipater were in the area of the Tetrachoritae. See further Griffith 1979, 558. Schachermeyr 1973, 93, n. 74, doubts the authenticity of the Isocrates letter, whereas Berve 1923, 2. 46, n. 4, seems to accept it, as does Hamilton 1969, 22. Thus the evidence suggests that Alexander, Antipater and Parmenio probably all campaigned in Thracian regions during the period and thus rule of Macedonia must have been in more than one person's charge.

<sup>12</sup> Hammond 1980c, *passim*, first challenged this view, but he did so by arguing that Olympias, and later Cleopatra, had office as well. His challenge was salutary but his argument is conceived in unacceptable constitutional terms. See nn. 1, 2, and 14.

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 68.3) reports that in the later years of Alexander's reign Olympias and her daughter Cleopatra formed a faction against Antipater and shared Alexander's ἀρχή/*archē* (rule), with Cleopatra taking Macedonia and Olympias Epirus. Plutarch asserts that the apparently indifferent Alexander approved his mother's choice on the grounds that the Macedonians could not bear to be ruled by a woman. Diodorus 17.108.7 notes that Olympias, as well as Antipater and Philoxenus, demanded Harpalus' extradition from Athens. Hammond (see references in Hammond 1989, 33–34), rejected the standard view and suggested that Olympias had a formal position, which he believes was the *prostasia*. (See below for discussion of *prostasia*.) As I have argued elsewhere (Carney 1987a, 50–53), the evidence, rather than suggesting that Olympias had a clearly defined constitutional position, implies that both Olympias and Antipater had power in Macedonia and quarrels arose because their powers were not clearly defined.

<sup>14</sup> Hammond (see works cited above, n. 2) is the primary advocate of this view. Anson 1992, 38–43, has recently joined him, at least in some areas.

<sup>15</sup> For instance, when Polyperchon offers Olympias some sort of return to power and prestige in Macedonia via custody of her grandson, Diodorus (19.49.4) mentions βασιλική/*basilikē* (royal) *prostasia*. One might conclude that other sorts of *prostasia* existed. Diodorus refers to Perdikkas as having *prostasia* of the kings (18.22.2), a somewhat different conception. Dexippus (*FGrH* 100 F 8.4) and Photius (*FGrH* 156 F 1.3) both say that Craterus was to be *prostatēs* of Arrhidaeus' *basileia*. The sources preserve not the name of an office but a job description, and a vague one at that.

<sup>16</sup> Anson 1992, 40–41, argues that whereas *prostatēs* is the official Macedonian title for regent, words like *epimeletēs* and *epitropos* are “generic terms,” descriptive, but not official titles. He claims that *prostatēs* never required a qualifier as the other terms did, but then concedes that *epimeletēs* became a “quasi-official title.” His arguments do not convince: as we have seen above, *prostatēs* or *prostasia* often has a qualifier or object; Polyperchon's initial offer to Olympias mentions both *epimeleia* of young Alexander and royal *prostasia* and does not treat them as synonymous (Diod. 18.49.4); the methodology which enables the author to draw a distinction between the use of one word as a descriptive “generic term” and another as an “official” or even “quasi-official” title is never clarified. Hammond 1985 158–60, makes the curious argument that Olympias was *prostatēs* when no ancient evidence says she was and that she was not when Diodorus 18.49.4 specifically connects her to *prostasia*, office or no. Hammond claims that she now held the title or perhaps the honor of it, but that the office itself no longer existed. Again, the basis on which such fine distinctions can be drawn is not explained.

<sup>17</sup> For an example of such an argument: in Antipater's famous and probably apocryphal death bed warning to Macedonians, when Diodorus (19.11.9) says that Antipater cautioned the Macedonians μηδέποτε συγχωρήσαι γυναικί τῆς βασιλείας προστατῆσαι (never to agree to a woman's rule of the kingdom), both Hammond, 1985, 160 and Anson 1992, 40, assume that the verb refers specifically to the office of *prostasia* rather than to rule or domination in general.

<sup>18</sup> See Anson 1985, 313, esp. n. 57 and 1992, 40, for persuasive arguments against the Epirote analogy made by Hammond 1985, 157.

<sup>19</sup> When Archelaus died, leaving a minor son Orestes, Orestes' guardian Aeropus soon took over direct rule as king, whether by violent means or not (Diod. 14.37.6;



see Errington 1990, 28). Ptolemy Alorites was, or became, regent for Perdiccas, son of Amyntas (Plut. *Pelop.* 27.2–3; Aeschines 2.29), but in dubious circumstances; his subsequent murder may well have been intended to prevent similar usurpation (see recent discussion in Mortensen 1992, 156–71). While Justin (7.5.9) claims that Philip II was regent for his infant nephew Amyntas before he became king in his own right, Diodorus does not mention it and many doubt that Philip was ever regent (see Griffith 1979, 2. 209). If Justin’s claim is correct, then Philip’s situation may have been analogous to that of Aeropus. The reign of Antigonos Doson appears to involve a similar scenario, but reference to Antigonid practice is not perhaps appropriate.

<sup>20</sup> Beginning with Antigonos (Plut. *Demetr.* 17.2–18.1), the Successors took royal titles after signal military victories; see Gruen 1985, 253–71. The Successors sometimes used charges of illegitimacy against their enemies, but easily abandoned them when they changed sides, as so often happened. Such charges rarely mattered to ordinary Macedonian soldiers. See Carney 1994, 361, n.7, for the example of Eumenes.

<sup>21</sup> Sosthenes, for instance, chose to govern for a time during the interregnum, but explicitly refused kingship (Just. 24.5.1). See Walbank 1988 3. 254, n. 4, for discussion of Sosthenes’ position and references to other views. Like Walbank, I see no reason to believe that Sosthenes had the *prostasia*.

<sup>22</sup> While opinions vary as to exactly when Cassander first used a royal title (see Gruen 1985, 259, n. 43), no one thinks that he did so immediately and most would agree that he was unlikely to have done so until after his murder of Alexander IV, at the earliest. In practice, of course, he exercised royal power from the time of his defeat of Olympias. Cassander thus blurred the transition from one dynasty to another. Had his immediate successor had a long reign, this approach might have succeeded. As it was, adjustment to a new dynasty became a traumatic process, lasting a generation.

<sup>23</sup> Tarn 1913, 174, followed by Hammond 1989, 315.

<sup>24</sup> Pomeroy 1984, 8, remarks, in reference to later Argead women, that, “It is in the nature of monarchy to supersede gender differences for dynastic interests.”

<sup>25</sup> See further Carney 1993, 33.

<sup>26</sup> Nicolaus of Damascus (*ap.* Ath. 593a) associates *basileia* and a woman connected to a Macedonian king, but he refers to the post-Argead period and to a *betaira*, not a wife.

<sup>27</sup> See also Diod. 17.118.1; Just. 12.14.3; Plut. *Mor.* 180d and discussion in Carney 1987a, 55, especially n. 55.

<sup>28</sup> So περιεργαζομένης (Diod. 18.39.2) and πολυπραγμονεῖν (Plut. *Alex.* 39.7) and πολυπραγμοσύνη (Arr. 7.12.6). Arrian 7.1.6 also speaks of Alexander πολυπράγμων and (*Ind.* 43.10) of his πολυπραγμοσύνη. The roots of these words suggest excess in legitimate tasks rather than involvement in matters not of their concern. If both kings and royal women can do this, it may be irritating or excessive but it is neither illegitimate nor interference.

<sup>29</sup> For discussion and references, see Miller 1973, 189–218; Fredricksmeier 1979, 52–56; Badian 1981, 71.

<sup>30</sup> Fredricksmeier 1979, 53, says that it was a temple, signifying Philip’s intent to establish a dynastic cult of himself, Alexander, Olympias, Amyntas and Eurydice; Miller 1973, 191, suggests that it was a “display gallery” for statues of the royal family, not a cult; Badian 1981, 71, also denies that it had cultic significance.

<sup>31</sup> Pausanias (5.20.10) says that the Philippeum Φιλίππῳ δε ἐποιήθη; Miller 1973, 190, translates this “it was built by Philip” and Fredricksmeier 1979, 53–56, seems to do the same, whereas Badian 1981, 71 argues that it is unlikely to have meant that Philip built it, although it could. The views of Miller and Fredricksmeier seem more likely. Pausanias refers to the period after Chaeronea for its construction, although it is certainly possible that Alexander completed the project early in his reign (so Miller 1973, 191). The presence of Olympias in the group, as Fredricksmeier 1979, 55 rightly argues (*contra* Badian 1981, 71), says nothing about the date. The presence of her statue in this group is a function of the ideology of dynasty and is unlikely to have been affected by spousal affection or lack of it.

<sup>32</sup> Paus. 5.17.4 mentions that at some later date the statues of the two royal women were removed and placed in the Heraeum. It would be interesting to know when and by whom. Although statues of royal women, often erected by grateful Greek cities, became commonplace soon after Alexander’s death, in the 330s, when the statues in the Philippeum first appeared, they may well have shocked Greek sensibilities.

<sup>33</sup> Fredricksmeier 1979 *passim* argues that Philip went past flirtation and received cult in his lifetime. Badian 1981 *passim* rejects this view and generally takes a more conservative view of the development of divine monarchy or royal cult in Macedonia. Both would agree to “flirtation.”

<sup>34</sup> Granted the speed with which several royal women, after periods of obscurity in which no public action of theirs is known, were able to act in an apparently well-informed manner (e.g. Cynnane’s sudden interjection of herself and her daughter into events in Asia after Alexander’s death or Olympias’ apparently equally well-informed knowledge of the politics of the Successors despite her prolonged absence in Epirus), one must assume that many took care to be well-informed on political matters and may, although we have no proof, have exercised influence privately even when not publicly active.

<sup>35</sup> Maitland 1992, 26–40.

<sup>36</sup> Errington 1991, 139–43. Hammond 1979, 98, suggests Alexander I invented it himself.

<sup>37</sup> I do not mean to suggest that royal Macedonian women would actually have been present at a drinking party; certainly we know they were not in the days of Alexander the Great and his father. The story, however, gives the impression, certainly illusory, that royal women in Macedonia were not active in public, but resembled southern Greek women in their behavior in every other way (see Carney 1993b, 313–23).

<sup>38</sup> They tend to picture Alexander as an exasperated but dutiful son: thus the joke about the high price for Alexander’s stay in his mother’s womb, a *logos* preserved by Arrian (Arr. 7.12.6), or the series of references to tension between Olympias and Hephaestion in which Alexander, up to a point, seems to favor Hephaestion over Olympias (Plut. *Alex.* 39.5; *Mor.* 180d; 333a; 340a). On the other hand, Plutarch tells us that Alexander’s correspondence with his mother was secret and that Hephaestion was favored by being the only one other than Alexander privy to it. If true, the tale has obvious implications about the content of her correspondence.

<sup>39</sup> Macedonian historiography has until recently been an almost exclusively political enterprise, so the question of women’s role has not often been raised. Hammond 1989, 5, suggests that women played a more important role in Macedonian society

than southern Greece. He has no evidence for this suggestion, but bases it on his theory that pastoral transhumance is central to Macedonian society as agriculture was to southern Greece and his belief that women tend to play more prominent roles in pastoral transhumant societies. Tataki 1988, 433, on the other hand, asserts (based largely on inscriptional evidence) that “The position of women in Macedonian society was no different, generally speaking, from that in the rest of the Greek world”. Pomeroy 1984, 3, concludes, “...the basic distinction between the sexes in grave goods was the same in Macedonia as it was in Athens.” There is probably more evidence to support the point of view of Pomeroy and Tataki than that of Hammond, but their view does not take into account the literary evidence about women in the elite discussed below. Nothing, of course, prevents their generalizations from being correct about the mass of Macedonian women, although both the grave goods and inscriptional evidence also tend to deal largely with the elite.

<sup>40</sup> See Macurdy 1929, 273–78.

<sup>41</sup> On Phila’s career, see Wehrli 1964, 140–46.

<sup>42</sup> For Philip’s mother Eurydice, there is a dedication to the Muses (Plut. *Mor.* 14 b–c) and several dedications to the goddess Eucleia (see Mortensen 1992, 163–65, for references). For Olympias, we have Plutarch’s statement (*Alex.* 2.2) that she met Philip at the Samothracian mysteries; she made an offering to the Athenian goddess Hygeia (Hyp. *Eux.* 19); she also made grand dedications at Delphi (*SIG* 1252 N5 ff.); for later Macedonian royal women’s religious involvement, see Le Bohec, 1993, 241.

<sup>43</sup> For a discussion of this possibility, see Fredricksmeyer 1966, 179–82, particularly for discussion of a letter (*ap. Ath.* 14.659 f.) implying her involvement in or knowledge of such rites.

<sup>44</sup> See Henrichs 1978, 143.

<sup>45</sup> See Pomeroy 1984, 13–16, for references, as well as Le Bohec 1993, 239–45.

<sup>46</sup> Lycurg. *Leoc.* 26. Kingsley 1986, 167, suggests that Cleopatra’s grain shipments imply that she was involved in her brother’s policy. Even the grain both Olympias and Cleopatra received from Cyrene (*SEG* IX 2) would mean that they could operate as patrons for their own people.

<sup>47</sup> See Carney 1993b, 314–15, for a discussion of the probable limits on Argead seclusion of royal women.

<sup>48</sup> Hammond 1979, 2.154 and 1989, 31 (followed by Pomeroy 1984, 4, n. 5) believes that royal Macedonian women regularly wove the clothing and made the meals of their men folk, and asserts that there was no staff of slaves. His only proof for these statements, in addition to the passage of Curtius just discussed (suspect because of its resemblance to Roman tradition about the women of the family of Augustus (Suet. *DA* 64), is a dubious reference in Aristides (45.55) to the use of a grain mill by a royal woman in the late fifth century. On the other hand, Athenaeus 14.359 f preserves reference to a letter from Olympias to her son about a slave she owns whom she suggests her son buy because of his special skills in cooking for ritual purposes. The size of Macedonian palaces and the well-known and fairly constant political activities of Olympias and her contemporaries make it difficult to believe that she or the other women did much regular domestic work themselves. It seems more likely that they did fine work with fabric and were managers of a rather large domestic enterprise. It is perhaps not chance that we know Phila was involved in the transport of domestic goods to her husband, but we cannot tell whether she herself made the goods (Diod.

20.93.4). In general, in terms of both domestic work done by royal women and the related question of slaves at court, it is dangerous to assume no change over time. Fourth-century Macedonian burials indicate considerable change in the material standards of the elite and the conquests of Philip and Alexander are almost certain to have had an effect on the presence of slaves.

<sup>49</sup> See Mortensen 1992, *passim*.

<sup>50</sup> See Carney 1988, 391–92, for a discussion of Thessalonice's actions.

<sup>51</sup> Plutarch (*Demetr.* 14.2) explains that Phila had greater *axiōma* than any of Demetrius' other wives not simply because she was Antipater's daughter, but because she had been the wife of Craterus. Diod.19.51.6, concluding his description of Olympias' death, states that she had the highest *axiōma* because she was the daughter, the sister, and the mother of kings, but also because she was the wife of Philip. On the other hand, when describing the *axiōma* of Olympias which led the Macedonians to change sides and abandon the cause of Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus, Diodorus (19.11.2) mentions only her son, not her husband.

<sup>52</sup> See Mortensen 1992, *passim*, especially 168. The affair of Alexander's sister Cleopatra mentioned by Plutarch (*Mor.* 818b–c) may be apocryphal, and if true, it clearly refers to the period of her widowhood (her husband died very early in Alexander's reign). Plutarch, of course, roundly condemns Alexander's attitude toward his sister's supposed action.

<sup>53</sup> See Diod. 19.11. 6–7 for Adea Eurydice. Diodorus (19.51.5–6) admiringly notes that Olympias' death was neither ignoble nor womanish, while Justin (14.6.11–12) observes that she did not cry out like a woman but faced death in the manner of strong men and in a way that showed her to be Alexander's mother. He also admires her care in assuring the modesty of her body in death.

<sup>54</sup> Diodorus 19.11.2 seems to say that Polyperchon and Aeacides led the army that restored Olympias to Macedonia, but that her presence with the army was what led the Macedonians to go over to the other side. Justin (14.5.9–10) makes no mention of Polyperchon and implies that Aeacides' position was subordinate to hers (*prosequente Aeacida*). Duris (ap. Ath. 12.560f) says she went into battle as a maenad to the beat of a Dionysiac drum. After this victory, Olympias' participation in military leadership is even less clear: she is said to have sent out troops to prevent the passage of Cassander's forces through various passes (Diod. 19.35.3); she appointed Aristonous *stratēgos* before she withdrew to Pydna (Diod. 19.35.4) and she seems to have been in charge of the troops involved in the siege (Diod. 19.50.1). On the oddities of this situation and uncertainty about the chain of command, see further, Carney 1994, 271–72.

<sup>55</sup> See further Seibert 1967, 97 n. 20; Macurdy 1932, 56.

<sup>56</sup> See Carney 1993a, 41–42, 48–50.

## AFTERWORD

Since the publication of this 1995 article, I have often written on topics related to women and monarchy in Macedonia (see Carney 2000a; 2006, 2010a and 2010b) and on royal women more generally, especially in the early Hellenistic period (Carney 2011, 2013). See also Le Bohec (-Bouhet) (1993), Mirón Pérez (1998, 2000), Ogden 1999, Müller (2007, 2011), Mitchell (2012) and on Hellenistic royal women Savalli-Lestrade (1997, 2003) and Bielman Sánchez (2003). See also Kottaridi (2011c). Kottaridi (2004b) believes that royal women during this period, and probably later, functioned as royal priestesses. She bases her belief on a series of rich female burials at Vergina from the archaic period and later, especially that of the “Lady of Aegae.” She interprets these burials as those of royal women and concludes, on the basis of the burial goods, that these women were also priestesses.

As this considerable recent bibliography implies, the study of the role of royal women in Macedonian monarchy (and its derivatives) has increased dramatically. Most of those now working in this and related areas share the view advocated in this article, that royal women were part of, not apart from, monarchy. Doubtless the development of court studies as a sub-discipline (see Introduction) has contributed to the spread of this understanding. As with many of my earlier articles, however, this one now seems to underestimate possible Roman influence in our Alexander sources, particularly in terms of Roman views on the appropriate roles of women, royal and otherwise.

In this article, I also asserted that Argead monarchy (but not necessarily Hellenistic monarchy) achieved its longevity because the focus was less on the individual Argead ruler and more on the royal clan and generally argued for an *ad hoc* approach to succession and the absence of both an understanding of kingship as an office and of the development of some sort of official or institutionalized substitute kingship. King (2010) provides a useful overview of controversies about the nature of the Macedonian constitution generally. Mitchell (2012) connects some of royal women’s ability to act politically to a related point, the tendency to connect the “right to rule” to heroic ancestry and its hereditary virtues. Anson (2009), in the context of a persuasive discussion of Philip II’s position immediately after the death of his brother Perdiccas III, revises some of his earlier views discussed in this article, generally concluding that our extant sources used generic terms and did not really understand the nature of Argead rule, often superimposing Antigonid practice upon it. He suggests that kings often became guardians for youthful sons of dead kings and that later sources conflated this situation with regency. Meeus (2009), however, in an article centered on constitutional issues concerning the succession and the meaning of *prostasia* after the death of Alexander the Great, rejects the views presented in this chapter, concluding that it is possible to sort out Macedonian terminology from anachronistic ones in our available sources.

More work has been done on a number of topics touched upon in this article. In terms of the role of non-royal women in Macedonia, see Archibald (2005), Le Bohec (2006), and Carney (2010b). Le Bohec cautiously notes slender evidence for a somewhat less circumscribed legal situation for Macedonian women as opposed to those of southern Greece and Archibald (2005, 24) argues persuasively that the elaboration of female elite burials suggests that elite women “enjoyed a social prominence of which their more southerly sisters were deprived.” New discussions on female patronage have appeared. Le Bohec 2006 has some important things to say about women and grain patronage and Mirón Pérez and Martínez López (2011) provide a useful overview of patronage by women in the Hellenistic period, with considerable focus on royal women. Ramsey (2012) pays particular attention to connections between royal female interventions in cities and patronage. On the contrast between Persian and Macedonian royal women as a fictional *topos*, see Briant 1994, 226, n.9; Carney 2000, 729, n.117, and Mirón Pérez 1999. On the ways in which Alexander and other Macedonians used Persian royal and elite women in projecting their own versions of monarchy, see Carney 1996, O’Neil 2002, Müller 2012, 2013. On women in the Greek world and military affairs, see Carney 2004; Loman 2004; Pillonel 2008. On the Philippeum, see Chapter 3 in this volume and the afterword.

## MACEDONIANS AND MUTINY: DISCIPLINE AND INDISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY OF PHILIP AND ALEXANDER

Sometimes how we label something profoundly affects our understanding of it. Historians commonly refer to two events in the reign of Alexander the Great as mutinies.<sup>1</sup> In the summer or early fall of 326, camped on the banks of the Beas or Hyphasis River after an arduous but victorious campaign in India, Alexander wanted to proceed further east. His troops, exhausted from years of fighting, troubled by unfamiliar terrain and climate, and anxious about the future, did not want to continue. In the end, the troops got at least some of what they wanted: the army turned south and the king's original intention was thwarted.<sup>2</sup> At Opis, about two years later, Alexander's dismissal of many Macedonian troops triggered a second confrontation. The outcome of this second confrontation was in many respects the reverse of the earlier trouble: this time the army entirely failed in its goals and the king succeeded.<sup>3</sup>

Is it appropriate to refer to these events as mutinies? Scholarship about the incidents on the Hyphasis and at Opis has been shaped by modern expectations and ideals (not necessarily reality) about the behavior of armies and their generals, and especially by the concept of mutiny in modern military history. It is suggestive that scholars have been uncertain about what term to apply to the Beas incident; some have admitted their uneasiness with calling the incident a mutiny and others have rejected this terminology outright.<sup>4</sup> While those who doubt that events on the Beas constituted a mutiny are perceptive, their discussions seem somewhat misdirected. Similar problems surround scholarship on the troubles at Opis. The application of anachronistic military ideology has obscured the nature and significance of the incidents on the Beas and at Opis. In order to provide an interpretation of the significance of the events on the Beas and at Opis based on the appropriate historical context, I will begin by discussing discipline in Hellenic armies in general and then, more specifically, discipline in the Macedonian army of Philip and Alexander. Once I have described the overall nature of discipline in the Macedonian army, I will turn to the problem of whether the concept of mutiny is

applicable to the Macedonian army. Finally, I will apply my conclusions to the two incidents in Alexander's reign frequently considered mutinies. I shall argue that while the incidents cannot be labeled mutinies, they did, indeed, constitute serious problems for Alexander's control of the Macedonian army.

### **I. Discipline in Hellenic armies**

The subject of discipline in the Roman army has often been discussed, but comparatively little has been said about Greek military discipline,<sup>5</sup> and even less about Macedonian.<sup>6</sup> This discrepancy reflects the judgment of military historians: the Romans were simply more disciplined than the Greeks.<sup>7</sup> In fact, Greek armies did not so much lack discipline as operate on the basis of a discipline very different from that of modern armies, whereas Roman military discipline bore a much greater resemblance to that of modern armies. We should not assume that maintenance of discipline was always focused primarily on obedience to orders, as it is in modern military systems. This is an important point because the concept of mutiny assumes that military discipline is centered on obedience to commands; that is why disobedience to a specific command is seen as so grave an action. Mutiny has an absolute quality: there is the sense that, at a certain point – usually specific refusal of direct orders – soldiers pass a legal point of no return. The concept of mutiny appears to be an early modern phenomenon.<sup>8</sup> It has been little studied, but probably relates to the decay of the feudal bond and the warrior ethos, the growth of the nation state, development of the ideal of separation of political and military worlds, improved communications, and the growth of specific military codes.<sup>9</sup>

In suggesting that Greek military discipline did not depend on obedience to specific orders as much as modern military discipline does, I do not mean to imply that Greek military discipline did not involve the expectation that troops would do what they were commanded to do (of course it did), but rather that granted the nature of Greek warfare in the classical period, this may not have been so central an element in the discipline of a Greek army as in that of a modern army. Therefore, for the purpose of this discussion, I shall define discipline as control gained by enforcing order of some sort. This control may be primarily attained by the issuing of specific orders, but it may also be created largely by the maintenance of a common standard of conduct.<sup>10</sup>

Since Macedonian society and institutions have usually been perceived as more Homeric than those of southern Greece, let us begin our examination of Greek discipline with Homer.<sup>11</sup> At the center of the *Iliad* is Achilles' refusal to continue to obey Agamemnon.<sup>12</sup> While the focus of



the *Iliad* is certainly not on strict obedience to orders (indeed, discipline is twice associated with disobedience to orders),<sup>13</sup> discipline of a different sort is nevertheless maintained through cultural notions like concern for ἀνδρεία (manliness, bravery) and ἀρετή (competitive excellence: e.g., *Od.* 11.408–10). The fundamentally agonistic nature of Homeric culture continued to affect the behavior of historic armies.<sup>14</sup>

The values of Homer did not disappear but simply formed part of a more complex whole. With the growth of the πόλις and hoplite warfare in the sixth and fifth centuries, warfare became a brief and terrible clash between two forces that simply slammed into each other. A commander could make few choices once battle commenced since little communication between the commander and his troops was thereafter possible.<sup>15</sup>

Scholars usually connect the supposedly undisciplined nature of Greek armies to the political culture that produced them, the πόλις. A Greek soldier was protected by his citizen status and the discipline expected of him was not perceived to be different from the kind of discipline expected of citizens in general. Generals were usually officials elected by the men they commanded, men who could prosecute them at the end of a campaign. Granted that popular assemblies typically played an important role in the structure of the πόλις and in democracies the central one, events we might term mutiny, like any normal decision reached by the whole civic body, never entirely lacked legitimacy.<sup>16</sup>

Greek hoplites were motivated more by concern for the good opinion of their fellow hoplites and their hoplite general than by fear of punishment.<sup>17</sup> The comparatively few reported examples of punishment or the threat of it for military infractions deal primarily with cowardice or treason.<sup>18</sup> Events which have been interpreted in modern times as punishable because someone disobeyed orders often prove not to revolve around disobedience but around the presumption that those who disobeyed commands did so because of cowardice, the more important offense.<sup>19</sup> Limited communication during battle helps to explain this presumption: once battle commenced, the fundamental yet probably not reiterated command was, simply, to fight and not retreat; bravery was obedience.<sup>20</sup>

The greater complexity of warfare in the fourth century inevitably affected discipline. Xenophon is notably more concerned with εὐταξία (good order, discipline) than his predecessors and more likely to connect it to obedience.<sup>21</sup> Nonetheless, Greek soldiers continued to be free-spoken and not terribly focused on respectful obedience to commands.<sup>22</sup>

Whatever the ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians, they operated within an increasingly Hellenic military and political context<sup>23</sup> and any discussion of their military discipline should, therefore, be seen as part of the

continuum of discipline within the Hellenic world. The Macedonian political system was, of course, dramatically different from that of the πόλις and therefore offered a different perception of the relationship between individual and state.

Macedonians had a monarchy, hereditary in the Argead clan, which was in essence absolute, although in practice often limited by the personality and abilities of an individual king, the threat of intervention or invasion by various foreign powers, and by the machinations of the Macedonian elite and rivalries within the royal dynasty. In matters both civil and military, Macedonians had the habit of speaking freely, even bluntly, to their kings, rulers who were also their commanders.<sup>24</sup> Rapid and fundamental change in Macedonia's basic institutions occurred in the reigns of Philip and his son. The Macedonian army was in good part the product of this quickly evolving society.<sup>25</sup>

Paucity of evidence makes comparative judgments difficult, but the Macedonian army was probably more focused on obedience to orders than were Greek armies, possibly substantially more so. A scattering of general statements in extant sources seems to suggest this conclusion, as does Macedonian emphasis on drill whose effectiveness is often associated with obedience to commands.<sup>26</sup> The existence of a permanent and hereditary commander (the king) as opposed to a changing elective or appointive general as well as the less urban and more hierarchical nature of Macedonian society are likely to have made this so. Curtius (3.3.27) says that the Macedonian army was "ready to stand and follow...intent not only on the signal of the leader, but even his nod." By the time of Philip and Alexander, battle plans were more complex, communications more elaborate, and delegation of command more common than in the hoplite armies of the sixth and fifth centuries.<sup>27</sup>

Given the poor quality of our evidence, especially about ordinary soldiers, it is difficult to determine how considerable this distinction between Greek and Macedonian emphasis on obedience really was. Specific incidents in which a soldier or officer is punished for disobedience are scarce and susceptible to varying interpretations.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, an argument from silence in this context may or may not be significant. The threat of punishment by the king or at his order – fear in short – may have made Macedonians much more focused on obedience, especially in the reign of Alexander. Then again, there is no evidence for any codification of military discipline in this period or for the mentality that produced it, as there is for the later Antigonid period and for the Romans.<sup>29</sup> The custom of Macedonian outspokenness, as we shall see, did not always lead to immediate compliance with orders. Moreover, one must recognize

that this comparative judgment, that Macedonians focused more attention on obedience to commands than many Greeks, is necessarily contaminated to an unknown and unknowable degree by the fact that extant sources all date from Roman times and were inevitably affected by Roman military experience and understanding of the nature of discipline.<sup>30</sup> By modern standards, obedience to direct commands seems to have played a comparatively modest role in Macedonian notions of military discipline, but by the standards of the Hellenic world, this role may have seemed large.

## **II. Discipline in the army of Philip II and Alexander**

Let us now turn more specifically to a consideration of discipline in the Macedonian army of Philip II and his son. While Macedonian soldiers may well have sworn an oath to their king, any such oath focused on the general allegiance of troops to their commander rather than on obedience to specific orders.<sup>31</sup> If oaths do not seem to have been an important aspect of the Macedonian army's discipline, drill and training certainly were. Philip demanded a degree of training unprecedented in the Greek world (Diod. 16.3.1–3),<sup>32</sup> a feature of Macedonian military affairs perpetuated by Alexander. Philip required his men to carry a thirty-day ration of flour on their backs, to train by forced marches carrying full rations and equipment. He also forbade wheeled transport and drastically limited the number of support people allotted to both infantry and cavalry.<sup>33</sup>

This strict drill and training stood in stark contrast to contemporary Greek habits, as well as to those of peoples north of Macedonia (Arr. 1.6.2–3). It is not chance that one of the first things Alexander did after the murder of Philip was to drill and exercise (i.e., re-establish discipline in the army, Diod. 17.2.3). The constant reassertion of this standard had more than a practical side; it tended to have the psychological effect of creating continuity in the ever-changing world of the expedition, a kind of psychic home away from home, a practice tending to maintain the original standard.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to drill and some concern for obedience to commands, Philip and Alexander employed a system of rewards and punishment; generally there was much more of the former than of the latter. Their troops retained booty, sometimes at the king's order and sometimes without.<sup>35</sup> The king also gave gifts of land and cash, often graduated by rank or other distinction, after victories and sometimes when troops were being sent home.<sup>36</sup> Alexander offered cash bonuses for particularly difficult tasks, in order to mute criticism of his Persianizing, and as an incentive for dismissed troops to stay on as mercenaries or to keep following him.<sup>37</sup> Benefactions other than outright gifts were also frequently used.

Not surprisingly, promotions followed bravery in battle (Curt. 5.2.3–5). We also hear of honors such as gold crowns (Arr. 7.8.3) or the right to sit in the front at the theater (Plut. *Alex.* 71.5). At one point or another Alexander also handed out a variety of “perks”: marital leave for the newly married (Arr. 1.24.1–2), a monthly ration for wives and children traveling with the army (Diod. 17.94.4), and payment of debts (Arr. 7.5.1). There were also death benefits, however irregularly proffered: magnificent military funerals, remission of taxes and other obligations for survivors of the dead, a pension for orphans, and even commemorative statues.<sup>38</sup> The newly acquired wealth of Philip and Alexander certainly made it more possible to provide such material benefits. Less tangible, but important for morale and discipline, was the honor of having the king single a man out for praise, be it before, during, or after a battle.<sup>39</sup>

Another important facet of discipline under Philip and Alexander was its relaxation, typically after a difficult piece of campaigning. Just as Alexander’s demands on his men might be extreme, so could be the relaxation he offered. Aside from simply resting his troops after a battle or stressful period, there might be a sacrifice to the gods (thus a feast for the human beings), perhaps to some especially appropriate deity, followed by contests: athletic, literary, dramatic, musical, equestrian, and dancing; well-known artists might be imported from Greece for very splendid performances.<sup>40</sup> Allowing for some exaggeration in our sources, there were clearly Dionysiac κῶμοι, involving sometimes only the Companions, sometimes the army in general. For the elite, there were also συμπόσια; the popularity of Dionysus and of heavy drinking in Macedonia is well known.<sup>41</sup>

Anecdotal material suggests that relaxation might take the additional form of forgiveness for infractions of ordinary standards of behavior. A dishonest but brave soldier might be pardoned, so might a man in love; starving soldiers might be forgiven theft of food meant for all.<sup>42</sup> Curtius (6.9.20) claims that Alexander relented on the more or less customary punishment of relatives of traitors. Making exceptions in a sense reinforces the standards of behavior; whether one regards such exceptions as signs of inconsistency or flexibility, they tend to emphasize the power of the king over his troops and thus confirm the need to please him.

According to stories preserved in some of the sources, Alexander also sponsored (or at least accepted) rougher forms of relaxation: a mock battle between someone jokingly named “Alexander” and another called “Darius” (Plut. *Alex.* 31.1); Alexander’s public embrace of the eunuch Bagoas at the encouragement of his soldiers (Plut. *Alex.* 67.4); a fight between a Greek and a Macedonian athlete that, although probably intended to reduce ethnic tensions, in fact increased them (Diod. 17.101.1–6).

Sometimes we hear of a more sinister relaxation of the rules: tacit or overt permission for slaughter, most often because of desire for vengeance.<sup>43</sup> It is unclear what kind of limits Alexander usually placed on atrocity and violence after victory; he himself was not often personally inclined to indulge in such behavior, but evidence suggests that he put few limits on his troops.<sup>44</sup> Some acts of brutality by his troops were a consequence of his policy (Diod. 17.104.6–8).<sup>45</sup> The story of Timoclea of Thebes, whom Alexander pardoned for killing her rapist (Plut. *Alex.* 12), is the exception, not the rule: the brutal treatment of the women of the Persian elite by Alexander's soldiers (Diod. 17.35.4–36.1) was probably more typical.

Philip and Alexander did punish their men, although capital punishment is rarely mentioned by our sources other than in the case of the notorious political and military confrontations of Alexander's reign: Philotas and Parmenio, Callisthenes, Alexander of Lyncestis.<sup>46</sup> On all these occasions the king's life, at least allegedly, was in danger. Alexander's punishment of satraps for dereliction of duty also falls into a quasi-political category. Of course, all these people were officers, usually quite important ones. Plutarch (*Alex.* 57.2) says that Alexander was feared by his troops because he was such an inexorable punisher of wrongdoers. Aside from dubious anecdotal material,<sup>47</sup> the ordinary soldiers we hear of Alexander executing are those he considered ring-leaders at Opis.<sup>48</sup> But the fear of execution, primarily for revolt or actions perceived to threaten the life of the king, did constitute a weapon in the king's armory. It might lead to the revelation of a plot or to desertion of troops.<sup>49</sup> A king might compel his men to fight by removing any hope of safe return except through victory (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.2.15).

Lesser measures were more common. Whether or not Philip really did demote an officer for bathing in hot water (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.2.1), demotion was certainly sometimes used as a disciplinary tool, along with relegation to positions away from the main expedition, and perhaps even exile (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.2.3). The king's disapproval, whether of ordinary soldiers (Arr. 4.29.7) or of famous ones like Craterus and Hephaestion (Plut. *Alex.* 47.6–7), could be a potent weapon, both because of the importance of retaining the king's good opinion and the threat that disapproval conveyed.

In connection with the removal of the faction of Parmenio and Philotas, we hear of Alexander's censorship of letters sent home and the formation of a contingent of those believed to support the fallen clan,<sup>50</sup> what Diodorus (17.80.4) termed an ἀτάκτων τάγμα (an undisciplined unit). While these last measures appear to be unique, the growing climate of political

fear in the course of Alexander's reign naturally disciplined the aristocrats and in some degree the ordinary soldiers too; one thinks, for instance, of the silence that greets Alexander's request at the Beas to hear his troops' complaints.<sup>51</sup> Arrian (4.13.2–4) and Curtius (8.6.7–8) report that Alexander had Hermolaus flogged and that this flogging was the trigger for Hermolaus' conspiracy against the king; Curtius (8.8.3–4) even has Alexander assert that flogging was a traditional royal punishment for Royal Youths, only to be administered by the king (Curt, 8.6.5). If Curtius' assertion is true, Hermolaus' punishment had rather extreme consequences; it seems likely that, however traditional, in practice flogging was rarely imposed.<sup>52</sup>

While drill and the application of both carrots and sticks had an important role in Macedonian discipline, the role of the leader, his relationship to the troops, would seem to be more central. Diodorus (16.35.1–3), describing Philip's adept handling of the very uncertain situation he encountered at the beginning of his reign, offers a kind of model for the combination of measures that made up discipline in the Macedonian army: undeterred by the various internal and external threats, Philip inspired confidence in his troops by a series of speeches and thus increased their ἀνδρεία, improved organization and weapons, drilled his men and involved them in competitive drill, was friendly and courteous and tried to win loyalty by gifts and promises.

Macedonian kings often showed almost paternal concern for their troops, whether motivated by practical reasons or the emotional factors the sources so often ascribe to kings, or both. Alexander regularly visited the wounded after battle, even when wounded himself.<sup>53</sup> Greenwalt argues that because of Alexander's willingness to use the more magical elements of ancient medicine for his own ends, he created a kind of sacred kingship which also reinforced his leadership.<sup>54</sup> Although Alexander often made tremendous demands on his troops (forced marches, night marches, near suicidal assaults, risky river-crossings as in Arr. 4.4.8–9), he could be sensitive, at least at times, to which troops were able to bear such exertions and which were not.<sup>55</sup> The army's physical comfort or safety at times determined the course of his march, or its timing.<sup>56</sup> The Gedrosian disaster was the exception, not the rule. Generally periods of rest, relaxation and looser discipline followed periods in which Alexander made superhuman demands.

The leadership of Philip and Alexander was extremely personal.<sup>57</sup> Alexander in particular is often shown to inspire or soothe his troops by acts of personal heroism, even foolhardiness.<sup>58</sup> Both Philip and Alexander used oratory to control their troops. Philip, first in the panic and confusion after his brother's death in battle (Diod. 16.2.5, 3.1) and later after an

unexpected defeat (Diod. 16.35.2), used his oratorical skills to calm and discipline his men. Alexander also used oratory to reestablish discipline, whether before battle or in moments of hysteria and upset (Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.3.9). We need not believe a word of any of the speeches included in our surviving sources (probably we should not) to recognize that oratorical suasion by Macedonian monarchs could be a powerful factor in holding the army together and getting it to act as the king desired.

Given the comparatively limited distance between king and commoner in Macedonian society, the ability of the king to share in the common lot of the army could also be an effective disciplinary tool. Many of the stories about Alexander's willingness to share suffering with his men are highly sentimental and individually suspect.<sup>59</sup> The pattern they sketch, however, much like the stories of the king's personal heroism, is believable enough. The army found it difficult, at least for a long time, not to do what Alexander was himself willing to do. Alexander's increasing distance from his Macedonian army because of his Persianizing did, however, tend to undercut this personal relationship, making him seem alien or fonder of alien ways.<sup>60</sup>

Michael Crawford has argued that the "only way in which Rome could symbolize her leadership...was by placing the troops of the confederacy under the consuls. And then...what else but war and conquest?"<sup>61</sup> In a sense, Philip's constant campaigns, followed by Alexander's, had a similar effect on the Macedonians. Griffith observed of Philip that "no doubt it was through the army most of all, that he came to know the people, and the people to know him."<sup>62</sup> The union of king and people could lead to greater discipline and success in battle, even in the later periods of Alexander's reign when Macedonians constituted a comparatively small, but still critical part of his army.

The high value placed on warfare in Greek culture and ethics, particularly intense for the old-fashioned and Homeric Macedonians, obviously contributed to the discipline of the army; concern for ἀνδρεία tended to generate good discipline. Applause could greet a display of skill in battle (Diod. 17.25.1) and there was real love of battle and enthusiasm for it.<sup>63</sup> Concern for κλέος, (fame) or δόξα (reputation) could be collective (Arr. 2.26.6), but was often individual and could take the form of Homeric-style boasting. While such concern for individual repute could generate situations that seem by modern standards divisive and dangerous to the maintenance of discipline, there is little indication that a similar perception existed in Macedonia.<sup>64</sup>

Macedonian military discipline achieved great success. One thinks not only of Alexander's unending conquests, but also of the willingness of his

army to follow him into truly appalling situations. Problems with Macedonian discipline were often the mirror image of successes. Both Philip and Alexander had difficulties with strife between groups and individuals in the army. Greeks and Macedonians often quarreled and dangerous tensions sometimes arose.<sup>65</sup> At least one of the events usually termed a mutiny can be tied to hostility to Persians (whom Alexander had been adding to the army) by Macedonians and Greeks. Other uneasy moments were related to these tensions.<sup>66</sup>

Most of the developing difficulties with discipline in Alexander's Macedonian army, however, related to the central role in discipline of the king and his personality. As the army became increasingly less Macedonian (perhaps only a sixth of the entire force)<sup>67</sup> and more mercenary, loyalty to the person of the commander became the only unifying factor.<sup>68</sup> Problems did develop, as we shall see, in Alexander's relationship with the army. In a way Alexander required his troops to take on his personal characteristics; as the campaign dragged on, his troops could no longer maintain his level of energy, his discipline and resolve in the face of endless hardships and demands in an alien land.

Granted that there was no real division between personal and political in Macedonian society, as Alexander's political troubles increased, they began to spill over into the military. For instance, the elimination of the Parmenio faction had military consequences, as did Alexander's interest in Ammon, his killing of Cleitus, and his interest in προσκύνησις.<sup>69</sup>

F. L. Holt has illuminated the troubles of Alexander's administration of Bactria and particularly the unhappiness of the garrisons Alexander left behind him there.<sup>70</sup> In addition to the factors he enumerates, I would suggest that in an army where discipline was increasingly defined by the person of the commander, permanent separation from the commander tended to generate breakdown in discipline, partly because of feelings of rejection. In just this way Alexander's dismissal of the veterans at Opis produced indiscipline.

One thinks, too, of all those incidents in which his troops panicked when they feared for one reason or another that they would lose Alexander: after the murder of Cleitus,<sup>71</sup> Alexander's near fatal wound among the Malli (Arr. 6.12.3),<sup>72</sup> his rumored death and the revolt of his garrison troops (Diod. 17.99.5), and his anger at his troops at Opis. When Alexander really did die, the generals who survived him had reason to appreciate the dangers of so personal a form of discipline (Curt. 10.5.7). A remark variously attributed to Demades or Leosthenes compares the Macedonian army after Alexander's demise to the Cyclops after his eye had been put out.<sup>73</sup> Thus, we have learned that Macedonian discipline, although maintained by drill



and the application of both punishment and reward, focused on the relationship of the king to his troops.

### **III. Mutiny and the Macedonian army**

Applying the concept of “mutiny” with its modern associations to the Greek and Macedonian world creates any number of difficulties. The idea of mutiny assumes two things lacking in Macedonian military matters: very considerable and consistent emphasis on unquestioning obedience to orders, even in non-combat situations, and a clear distinction between the rights and behavior of the Macedonian subject and the Macedonian soldier.<sup>74</sup>

Our sources do not employ a term we can reasonably translate “mutiny.” Both Curtius and Justin use the term *seditio*.<sup>75</sup> They depict Alexander trying to wheedle, chastise, inspire, or flatter his troops out of this state; it does not appear to constitute a point of no return, as mutiny tends to.<sup>76</sup> Curtius (6.2.4) also uses the term *secessio militum* (perhaps parallel to the Roman notion of *secessio plebis*) to describe what is clearly not mutiny in the modern sense but rather chronic problems with indiscipline; *secessio* seems to denote indiscipline rather than the more specific concept of rebellion.

Nor does there seem to be a single word Greek sources use which we can reasonably translate as mutiny. None of them even utilize ἀταξία, a term signifying military disorder, though not necessarily revolt.<sup>77</sup> No Graeco-Macedonian concept of an absolute state of rebellion, a kind of crossing of a judicial Rubicon involving disobedience of a direct order, seems to exist, but rather there is a tendency to see incidents as points on a continuum of indiscipline.<sup>78</sup> While no term has the precise significance of “mutiny” in English, a number indicate general disturbance and upset. This disparity accounts for scholarly uneasiness about the application of the concept of mutiny to Macedonian events.

Greek usage of πείθω (persuade) and its derivatives speaks to an understanding of discipline and obedience very different from our own; one does what a person has ordered because one has been persuaded, not necessarily because one has been ordered. A person we might describe as obedient is literally one who has been persuaded. Thus the play on words Arrian puts into the mouth of Alexander at the Hyphasis (5.25.3) employing πείθω: he will persuade them to go forward or he will be persuaded to go back.<sup>79</sup>

Greek authors apply the language of personal relationships to these two incidents, referring to the dialogue and disagreement between the men and the king (e.g., Diod. 17.108.3) and to their emotion. The troops suffer from ἀθυμία (despondency) and δυσθυμία (lack of heart). The men are pained by the king’s actions and feel that Alexander is less ἐπιεικής (kindly) to them

than he once was.<sup>80</sup> This diction is appropriate to the personal nature of discipline in the Macedonian army.

The diction of the extant sources does not necessarily echo the terminology of the lost first-hand accounts, but it does reflect later authors' understanding (however colored by their own expectations) of earlier accounts they had read. Since all five extant authors wrote in Roman times and may have been affected by Roman disciplinary expectations, they may have introduced a greater element of rigidity into descriptions of the soldiers' behavior than was present in the lost primary sources.

Examination of the diction of the surviving authors demonstrates more than the simple semantic point that no one term can reasonably be equated with "mutiny", or even the more important conclusion that the use of such terminology is anachronistic because it assumes structures and values not present. The language of the sources also implies that they saw such confrontations not as mutinies but as arguments, quarrels between the commander and his men, moments when the blunt discourse between Macedonian king and people became heated and dangerous, much as in Alexander's quarrel with Cleitus. Alexander employed many of the same techniques in resolving the two military crises which he had used to good effect after the death of Cleitus.

There has been a tendency to conclude that if these events were not mutinies, then they signified no serious difficulties with discipline.<sup>81</sup> Yet such a conclusion says very little about their significance to the discipline of the army and leaves unanswered important questions about the non-mutinies. How then are we to explain the events on the Beas or at Opis, if we are to avoid imposing a modern construct on them? We must ask whether the discipline of the Macedonian army, shaped by Philip and sustained by Alexander, was injured. Was Alexander's position as king and commander threatened, or at least weakened, by either or both events? It is these questions which I shall now try to address in connection with events on the Hyphasis and at Opis.

#### **IV. Unpleasantness on the Hyphasis**

There are five major accounts of Alexander's troubles with his men on the Hyphasis in 326.<sup>82</sup> In Justin (12.8.10–17) the troops, about to confront a large Indian cavalry army, beg Alexander to turn toward home because of their exhaustion and Alexander immediately yields.

According to Diodorus (17.93.2–95.2), Alexander, undiscouraged by intelligence about a very large army waiting further east but aware that his troops' morale was low, offered them a series of benefits and delivered a speech that failed to persuade the men to continue to the east. Accordingly,

the king gave up his plan. However, a subsequent reference to this same incident (17.108.3) makes it sound more confrontational and puts it in the broader context of the continuing unruliness of the army, its resentment of Alexander's claims about Ammon, and the king's consequent determination to form the Ἐπίγονοι.<sup>83</sup>

Plutarch's account (*Alex.* 62) clearly describes a confrontation: dulled by the difficult campaign with Porus just completed, the men violently oppose Alexander's attempt to force them to march east. Out of despair and anger (ὑπὸ δυσθυμίας καὶ ὀργῆς) the king sulks, considering what the men want worse than a retreat, until, ἐπικλασθεὶς,<sup>84</sup> he yields to his friends' advice and the soldiers' complaints. Plutarch's reference to the king's friends is the first suggestion that the officers, and perhaps the king's inner circle, supported the men.

Scholars have generally preferred one or both of the longer and somewhat similar accounts of Curtius and Arrian.<sup>85</sup> Both authors, however, include speeches attributed to Alexander and to Coenus; like most speeches preserved in ancient historical writers, these deserve little credence.<sup>86</sup>

According to Curtius (9.2.1–3.19), Alexander, aware that the morale of his troops is poor, delivers a speech intended to persuade them to his point of view.<sup>87</sup> Alexander's increasingly emotional pleas are met with sullen silence. Curtius says that the men were waiting for their officers to speak on their behalf, but that the officers feared to do so until Coenus dared to. At this point the other officers, especially the older ones, come to Coenus' support and Alexander, at a loss, withdraws but no one comes to visit. After two days of anger, he yields and a few days later Coenus dies. Coenus' role in Curtius' narrative conveys the general impression that the incident involves a serious loss of face for Alexander.<sup>88</sup>

In Arrian (5.23.1–29.1), Alexander is ignorant of morale problems until some of the men threaten not to obey his order to march. Finally aware of their feelings, he gives a speech to the officers.<sup>89</sup> Again there is silence until Coenus comes forward. Coenus' speech meets with approval and even tears from the other officers, but Alexander, irritated by Coenus' aggressiveness and by the lack of it in the other officers, dismisses them and reconvenes the next day just long enough to announce that he will go on but will not force others. Alexander sulks, excluding even the Companions. After three days of the troops' silence and resentment, he finds the sacrifices unfavorable and, having first called together the oldest of the Hetairoi and particularly those friendliest to him, he announces to the whole army that he will turn back. Only then do the men show affection to Alexander and give him thanks since, says Arrian, he had yielded to defeat only in confrontation with them (πρὸς σφῶν μόνων

νικηθῆναι ἡνέσχετο, 5.29.1). Arrian notes (6.2.1) that Coenus soon after died of disease.

The narrative of Arrian distinguishes itself from that of Curtius in a significant respect. While the officers are not the center of opposition to Alexander's plans but rather the appropriate spokesmen for the army as a whole in Curtius, in Arrian the Companions appear to be the focus of resistance. Alexander speaks first to them; he excludes them, and he feels compelled to include them when he announces his defeat. Arrian, typically the king's apologist, here offers the least flattering and most troubling version of the affair. Yet, since Ptolemy has often been considered his source, his has usually been judged the most trustworthy account.<sup>90</sup>

The differences in the accounts of the Hyphasis incident in the major narratives are less substantial than is often realized. Many differences may be apparent rather than real, the consequence of variation in narrative length. Diodorus' supplement to his initial narrative may be typical of the kind of detail and interpretation left out in the shorter versions of the incident, yet known and not necessarily considered untrue by the terser writers. All sources agree that there was a difference of opinion between Alexander and his army about whether they should proceed further east and that the army, motivated not by political concerns but by the rigors of a long campaign, succeeded in getting much of what it wanted and Alexander did not.<sup>91</sup>

This minimal description of the scene on the Hyphasis is enough, in itself, to make untenable the view that Alexander intentionally staged this event to avoid going further east. Voluntarily risking his prestige (yielding, that thing no Greek hero wants to do) would have been unimaginable because it made it appear that the army rather than the king was in charge. That, rather than the specific issue of disobedience, was the problem: indeed, it is not clear, because of the differences and vagueness of source material, whether any direct refusal of a command by Alexander ever occurred. None may have. The sources generally treat the troops sympathetically and do not imply that they acted out of cowardice.<sup>92</sup>

Nor does it seem reasonable to interpret the scene at the Hyphasis as a mass example of the Macedonian right to petition the king.<sup>93</sup> Only the account of Justin suggests that the Macedonians sought the king out and told him about their feelings; in all the others, he seeks them out and only with great hesitation do they speak of what bothers them. If we focus on the generally more respected accounts of Curtius and Arrian, we see that while the dissatisfaction of the troops that precipitated the scene on the Hyphasis was not political and did not arise from the army's resentment of Alexander's changes in the nature of Macedonian kingship, Alexander's

treatment of their dissatisfaction transformed the situation into one in which these issues were indeed involved, into a situation whose long-term impact would affect not only political tensions but the discipline of the army.

Although these events had not arisen out of any Macedonian sense of entitlement to political power or decision-making but out of the desperation of the troops, that they happened and that the troops got what they wanted because of their spontaneous action must have contributed to the events at Opis (as well as to the generally more troubled nature of the army in the subsequent period) and may have generated a sense of entitlement previously lacking. In this sense, the troubles at the Hyphasis may have acted to create a new, yet ultimately illusory self-definition for the army, particularly the Macedonian part of it. The army's success in thwarting the will of Alexander may have radicalized it and thus contributed to the more rancorous and political confrontation at Opis.<sup>94</sup> It is more difficult to say whether we should also associate the troubles experienced by Alexander's Successors after his death in maintaining control over their armies with these events, since the disappearance of royal (i.e., Argead) authority could easily be explanation enough.<sup>95</sup>

The Hyphasis affair had a negative effect on military discipline as well. Both Curtius and Arrian make it clear that Alexander's officers, including those closest to him personally, actively or passively supported the army rather than the king. (Plutarch's narrative hints at the same point.) Coenus' role, as described in these authors, is not necessarily sinister but it is significant. Coenus was no simple and plain-spoken soldier but rather an able and ruthless opportunist who had risen to his high rank through Alexander's patronage; when such an individual embraced an opinion he knew was anathema to the king, Alexander was in trouble. He clearly had no support among the officer corps for continued campaigning to the east.<sup>96</sup>

Alexander's Achilles-like sulk and its emotional finale speak to the very personal nature of the event; there was now a troubled personal relationship between the king and his men and yet that relationship was critical to military discipline, as we have seen. Curtius (9.4.16–23) reports that, at the beginning of his campaign against the Malli, his troops began to speak out angrily against his plans and Alexander had once more to persuade them to go on. All accounts of the tremendous risks he took in the attack on the citadel of the Malli suggest that his troubles with discipline had worsened and that Alexander took the risks he did in an attempt to regain his domination over the soldiery.<sup>97</sup> He was "lucky" to suffer a nearly fatal wound and thus reassert some of his control over the army, but subsequent events demonstrate that he was only partially successful. Diodorus says that disciplinary troubles continued (17.108.3).

To return to the two questions I have suggested should be posed about the two incidents often termed mutinies, it is clear that military discipline was compromised by the events on the Hyphasis and that Alexander's position as king and as commander was weakened. There may not have been a mutiny on the Hyphasis, but there was trouble for Alexander. Arrian said it: Alexander let himself be defeated by his own army. Alexander had lost the control he had once exercised in his relationship with his soldiers.<sup>98</sup> The army, apparently with the agreement and probably with the lead of the officers, arrogated to itself the power to relax the incredible demands Alexander had so long imposed. Neither the king nor his men would be able to forget this.

What happened on the Hyphasis was an argument and Alexander lost it. Even after the argument was over the bad feelings it had generated, as so often happens, endured. That Alexander then made the best of a bad bargain or that he did not totally yield to the troops' demands does not mitigate the severity of his discomfiture at the Hyphasis. Badian was right: this truly was Alexander's first major defeat.<sup>99</sup>

## V. Confrontation at Opis

Analysis of the Opis "mutiny" proves to be a more demanding task than consideration of the events on the Hyphasis. The sources were unanimous in explaining the reason for the troops' dissatisfaction at the Hyphasis; not so for Opis. None of the sources offers a really coherent description of the motivation of the troops at Opis. The sources agree on little more than the fact that the dismissal of the veterans was the precipitant. Some aspects of the Opis quarrel defy rational analysis, but posing the same two questions already applied to the earlier event should provide some answers of significance for our understanding of Macedonian military discipline.

Let us begin with Arrian's account (7.8.1–12.4). Arrian says that the incident began when Alexander calls the Macedonians together at Opis<sup>100</sup> to announce the discharge of those too old or too disabled for further service. Although Alexander does this to please the Macedonians, hurt (because they believed the king considered them useless) and angry (because of Alexander's continuing drive to Asianize both his monarchy and his army), they demand that all of them be released from further service and refer unflatteringly to his claims about Ammon. The king, now used to Asian subordination, sharper-tempered and less sympathetic to the Macedonians, jumps down from the platform along with some of his officers and commands the ὑπασπισταί to arrest the ringleaders, pointing out thirteen men who are summarily executed. Alexander delivers a speech to his men, who have been stunned into silence, in which he says that they

can go home if they wish. The king retreats and refuses to see ἑταῖροι other than those close to him and his bodyguard (the implication is that the others are somehow part of this opposition to him, as subsequent events do suggest). On the third day Alexander assigns commands to chosen Persians and introduces Asians into various ranks, giving some Macedonian army names. When the Macedonians hear about this they shout and beg Alexander to let them in and promise to give him the leaders of the disturbance.

An emotional but puzzling reconciliation (the Macedonians say they acted because they were hurt and jealous about this most recent Persianizing but of course, they had already disagreed with the king when that happened), sacrifices, and a feast follow. Ten thousand disabled or elderly veterans depart with pay and a bounty of a talent each, but without their half-Asian children.

Arrian's account lacks any plausible motivation for the Macedonians' reactions. Many of the grievances mentioned were longstanding. It is not clear whether the men want to go or to stay. If rejection bothers them, why do they not ask to stay rather than to go? Anger at the idea of departure is surprising since they had wanted to go home for some years. Arrian's list of their grievances seems to duplicate those he had already mentioned when the ἑπίγονοι arrived at Susa (7.6.2ff.)<sup>101</sup> The speeches deserve little credence.<sup>102</sup>

Whereas in Arrian, the affair seems to come out of nowhere, Diodorus (17.108.3–109.3) states that the ἑπίγονοι were created by Alexander as a solution to disciplinary problems that had first surfaced in India (shouting in assembly and mockery of Alexander's supposed connection to Ammon) but continued thereafter. The king's selection of the older and disabled ten thousand to return home causes an outburst.

In Diodorus it is those who were to remain with Alexander who are angry: they begin to be disobedient (ἀπειθούντων) and shout in assembly. Alexander accuses them, jumps down, and seizes the most blameworthy, turning them over to attendants for unspecified punishment. Only when Alexander gives select Persians high rank do the Macedonians change their minds; the king is reconciled to them with difficulty. Diodorus knows that the dismissal of the veterans triggered a confrontation, but is unclear about why it did, although he does imply that the primary desire of all Macedonians was to go home.

Plutarch's version of events (*Alex.* 71.1–5) makes the arrival of the ἑπίγονοι central: the Macedonians feel rejected and this leads them to interpret his dismissal of the physically unfit as an insult, abandonment, and hubris to those who had served him well. They all demand to be sent

home and Alexander in anger drives them away and makes Persians his bodyguards and attendants; the sight of Persians in their places makes the Macedonians humble. They conclude that they have acted out of anger and jealousy and tearfully beseech the king. Only on the third day does he relent and honor the departing men. Plutarch's account reads more like a misunderstanding that is ultimately resolved than any sort of confrontation; there are no arrests and no clear indication that he has replaced Macedonian with Persian military leadership.

In Justin (12.11.5–12.10) the catalyst is again the dismissal of veterans, but the reason for the troops' anger is different: they want Alexander to base dismissal not on the age but the years of service of soldiers. They grow more abusive, particularly about Ammon (which they put in the context of his rejection of them) and Alexander arrests thirteen and sends them off for punishment. Justin then mentions an assembly of Persian troops in which Alexander makes it clear they are to be included with Macedonians in many positions of responsibility and to be integrated into Macedonian brigades. In Justin, reconciliation between the king and the Macedonians happens because of his plans for the Persians and the veterans depart. Justin's version differs substantially from the others: the troops are angry not because they are being dismissed but because they are not all being dismissed; their reasons for agreeing to reconciliation are quite unclear, granted that their initial reaction to the inclusion of Persians was hostile.

Curtius' account (10.2.8–4.2) is broken off and has lacunae as well. The news that Alexander is sending only some of the Macedonians home (the older ones) makes the Macedonians frantic because they interpret the news as signifying that Asia would be his permanent base. Military discipline breaks down, there is rebellious talk and all the men demand their departure, undismayed by the efforts of their officers or respect for the king. They interrupt the king and say they will only obey an order to go home. Alexander's response is a speech<sup>103</sup> reproaching them and listing his accomplishments and those of his father. He tells the men to leave and see how they do without him, but then he leaps down and arrests thirteen of the most antagonistic and turns them over to his bodyguards (they seem to be executed, but there is a lacuna). The news of the deaths of the prominent dissidents makes the Macedonians regretful and when only Asian soldiers can gain access to the king, the Macedonians beg him to relent. As in Justin, Alexander has an assembly of foreign troops, instead of heeding the requests of the Macedonians and appreciating their remorse. A subsequent lacuna ends with the supposed speech of a dissident about to be led away to execution in which he condemns Alexander's Asianizing.



The army, however, is completely cowed by the king's unyielding disregard of their feelings.

Curtius' truncated account is, even more clearly than Justin's, influenced by Roman military experience, and resembles the modern concept of a mutiny: the army threatens direct disobedience of orders and capital punishment for the worst offenders follows. His version emphasizes the changing nature of Alexander's monarchy; it is not the Ἐπίγονοι or the departure of some veterans that bothers the Macedonians, but rather the implication of their departure: Alexander is becoming an Asian ruler. It is therefore the most political interpretation of the event.

On the Hyphasis, both ordinary soldiers and officers and even those closest to Alexander opposed his policy; here the situation is more obscure. In Arrian, some officers help Alexander arrest the ringleaders; Arrian's terminology (7.8. 3) seems to suggest squadron leaders rather than more important leaders. Two other passages in Arrian (7.11.1.3) offer information. In the first, Arrian reports that Alexander refused to see any of his ἑταῖροι for two days and in the second he notes that after his speech he was followed only by ἑταῖροι close to him and by his elite bodyguards. Here Arrian seems to make a distinction between the general group of ἑταῖροι and a small group of stalwarts.<sup>104</sup>

Another piece of information suggests that some elements in the elite and leadership of the army were involved in confrontation. In most of the accounts, the Macedonians are upset because Alexander is allotting various commands, positions in the ἑταῖροι cavalry and the ἄγημα, to Asians. Only members of the elite, if minor ones, had held these positions previously. It seems reasonable to conclude that, contrary to the situation on the Hyphasis, at Opis Alexander maintained a firm control over his inner circle and important commanders, but that there was considerable resistance to his leadership within the lower ranks of the officer corps.

It is difficult to weigh the gravity of the disciplinary problem here because our sources are so confused about the motivation of the troops. Plutarch and Arrian seem to say jealousy and feelings of rejection led to their actions (emotional problems relatively easy to deal with) and Arrian says that they all wanted to go home; Diodorus does not know; Justin believes that all the men wanted to go home, essentially for personal reasons, whereas Curtius also believes they all wanted to go, for political reasons. The explanations of Arrian and Plutarch would make sense if the soldiers had wanted to stay, but not if they all wanted to go home. The combined verdict of Justin and Curtius, that they all wanted to go and take their king with them, makes more sense.<sup>105</sup> If one adds that the Macedonian reaction to Alexander's Asianizing increased the more he did it and that

the recent shock of the appearance of the Ἐπίγονοι made this general reaction more vivid, then we may be as close to a logical explanation of the actions of the Macedonian troops as it is possible to be.<sup>106</sup>

Let us return to our two original questions: did the events at Opis pose a problem for Alexander's continuing maintenance of discipline over his remaining Macedonian troops? Yes. The troops tried the tactics that had succeeded on the Hyphasis a second time, but this time they rather than the king had to relent. Moreover, this time, the king punished, apparently severely, his most prominent opponents. Clearly he was the victor, but his problems with discipline can hardly have disappeared, although the brief period remaining in his reign makes it impossible to judge. If, however, one remembers that those Macedonians who stayed were the angriest with the king and that many of his Asian troops were untried, one must conclude that, particularly if he had to confront Macedonian enemies, he cannot have counted on the discipline of his troops. Despite the tremendous differences in the various accounts, virtually all describe a relationship between commander and army which had deteriorated dramatically since the first confrontation.<sup>107</sup> On the other hand, the king's ability to get his way so quickly and entirely certainly meant that for the moment he had more control over the army than he had two years before.<sup>108</sup>

However mixed the verdict for the disciplinary significance of this second confrontation, its political consequence for Alexander as king was obviously more negative. On the Hyphasis, the unhappiness of the army arose from situational factors, whereas the events at Opis seem to have arisen primarily for political reasons, in reaction to Alexander's increasing changes in the nature of his kingship and his relationship to the Macedonians in the army. As I have suggested, the comparative success of his troops at the Hyphasis in achieving their goals may have emboldened them to try again at Opis. Indeed, the earlier incident may have given them the feeling that they were entitled to oppose the king, even though their circumstances were not desperate, as they had been before, but simply frustrating and infuriating. The primary precipitant of this second large-scale problem in military discipline was, however, the changed political policy of Alexander, not any alteration in the army's perception of its power.

The troops and Alexander seemed much angrier at each other the second time. Whereas none of those who opposed the king's policy on the Hyphasis were punished, most of the accounts of the affair at Opis claim that Alexander severely punished his most visible opponents there. Does this punishment indicate that the king considered events at Opis graver offenses than those on the Hyphasis? Probably. The second case involved the threat of direct disobedience and more apparent disorder than the first.

Alexander may have been incensed not only by the defiance of the troops but also by their sense that they were entitled to demonstrate it. He may have concluded that the scene on the Hyphasis had set what proved to be an ominous precedent and that he had to react in a way which would counteract the apparent precedent.<sup>109</sup> But, I would suggest, the difference in the king's reaction derives not only from perceived distinctions in the gravity of the offense of his opposition, but also, and probably more importantly, from the difference in the context of each event.<sup>110</sup>

In fact, the comparative defiance of the troops at Hyphasis, particularly given the great unity of this opposition, caused Alexander much more trouble than the scene at Opis because at the Hyphasis he had no alternatives; he had to give up what he planned to do and do instead part of what they wanted. At Opis he had alternatives, used them, and was not thwarted. His treatment of those who opposed him was more severe mainly because it could be. Otherwise, Alexander reacted in much the same way to opposition: seclusion and emotional blackmail.<sup>111</sup>

## **VI. Conclusion**

Having stripped away some of our anachronistic presuppositions about the dynamics of power in the Macedonian army, it is now possible to see the incidents on the Hyphasis and at Opis more clearly. These two events caused Alexander problems as both king and commander not because they were mutinies or because orders had been disobeyed, but because they were quarrels that poisoned the relationship between the king and his troops, a relationship at the heart of Macedonian military discipline, and thus threatened to compromise future control of the army.

## **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> The term "mutiny" has not usually been applied to Philip's occasional disciplinary problems, perhaps because the descriptions of them are so brief and vague, so they are not discussed at length here. At the beginning of his reign at the time of the great Illyrian defeat which caused his brother's death, there was panic that Philip had to quell (Diod. 16.2.5, 3.1) and panic again after Philip's defeat by Onomarchus (Diod. 16.35.2). Polyaeus (*Strat.* 4.2.6) recounts an incident in which Philip's troops began to shout for back pay and Philip essentially joked them out of their upset.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. 17.93.2–95.2; Just. 12.8.10–17; Plut. *Alex.* 62; Curt. 9.2.1–3.19; Arr. 5.25.1–29.1; Strab. 15.1.27, 32.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. 7.8.1–12.4; Diod. 17.108.3, 109.1–3; Plut. *Alex.* 71.1–5; Just. 12.11.5–12.10; Curt. 10.2.8–4.2.

<sup>4</sup> Faure 1982, 155 argues that the Macedonians at the Beas did not revolt, but rather went on strike. Holt 1982, 33 concludes that events on the Beas or Hyphasis were "mutinous never mutiny." Bosworth 1988a, 160 says of the Opis affair, "This protest

can hardly be dignified with the term mutiny that is universally applied to it.” Errington 1978, 110, 112 rejects as overdramatic Tam’s characterization of events at the Hyphasis as mutiny (Tarn 1948a, 1:98–99) and also distances himself from those who apply the term to the troubles at Opis. Adams 1986, 49–50 rejects “mutiny” for Hyphasis, but accepts it for Opis.

<sup>5</sup> So Pritchett 1974, 2: 232, at the beginning of his nearly unique discussion of Greek military discipline, 232–45.

<sup>6</sup> Specific discussions of Macedonian military discipline in Argead times: Berve 1926a, 198–220 and Faure 1982, 81–88. Berve’s analysis, helpful on the psychology of discipline, is dated in some respects and lacks any context in the continuum of Hellenic military discipline. A number of discussions of associated issues are, however, relevant. See, for instance, Ellis 1976, 54–56. On discipline for the Hellenistic period, see Bar-Kochva 1976, 94–102.

<sup>7</sup> See, for instance, Kromayer and Veith 1928, 1. The amount of evidence available for each is also a factor.

<sup>8</sup> McNeill 1982, 107 observes, “Mutinies achieved conventional definition in the Italian Wars of the 1520s....” ‘Mutiny’ did not appear in the English language until the late sixteenth century; Parliament began to pass mutiny acts about a century later (*The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary*). Modern usage tends to refer explicitly to military rebellion. For instance, *The Oxford American Dictionary* defines mutiny as “open rebellion against authority, especially by members of the armed forces against their officers.”

<sup>9</sup> There is popular work such as Fuller 1953, especially ix–xiii, who believes the concept to have been virtually timeless and not just military. My suggestions are derived from reading discussions of individual mutinies rather than from any general examination of the subject. See Morrill 1972, 34–48, Parker 1973, 38–52, Horn 1969, and especially Messer 1920, 158–75.

<sup>10</sup> A somewhat simplified version of *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language* Unabridged, 15th ed., s.v. “discipline,” suggests, along with several definitions focusing on obedience, “systematic, willing and purposeful attention to the performance of assigned tasks: orderly conduct” or “an orderly or regular pattern of behavior.” Garland 1975, 177 implies an understanding of military discipline similar to my own. Rodger 1986, 206–7, discussing the non-existence of “discipline” on a modern standard in the early-eighteenth-century British navy, takes much the same view. See *contra* Bar-Kochva 1976, 96 who defines discipline as, “basically, compliance with instructions” and Faure 1982, 81–88, who does much the same.

<sup>11</sup> On the generally Homeric nature of many Macedonian values and institutions, see Edson 1970, 17–44. See Fredricksmeyer 1990, 304–15 and Carney 1992, p. 177, n. 24 for perpetuation of the agonistic values of Homer at court. Alexander, supposedly descended from Achilles (Eur. *Andr.* 1239–49; Paus. 1.11.2; Pind. *Nem.* 4.51, 7.35–40), was devoted to the *Iliad* (Plut. *Alex.* 8.2, 15.4–5; Strab. 13.1.17; Ath. 12.537d).

<sup>12</sup> *II.* 1.289, 296. Achilles specifically refuses to obey Agamemnon because of his treatment of Achilles and because of his bad character. Elsewhere (9.370) he encourages others to disobey Agamemnon, for similar reasons.

<sup>13</sup> 2.73–339; 14.65–134. Odysseus maintains discipline by generating what would, in other military cultures, be insubordination, and he does so by holding his fellow Greeks to generally established standards of behavior.

<sup>14</sup> Pritchett 1974, 245. An incident at the siege of Halicarnassus (Arr. 1.21.–3; Diod. 17.25.5) demonstrates the retention of Homeric values among the Macedonians.

<sup>15</sup> This is the conventional interpretation of the nature of hoplite warfare; see Hanson 1989, 24, 28–29, 107, 172–77 and Anderson 1970, 70–80. Cawkwell 1978, 150–53 and 1989, 375–89 and Krentz 1985 have challenged this interpretation. Their views would allow more possibility for transmitting orders in the course of an engagement.

<sup>16</sup> So Garlan 1975, 178. Spartans, whose commanders were often kings or members of the royal family, did act somewhat differently, reflecting the more passive nature of Spartan citizenship (Herod. 7.22; Thuc. 5.9.9; see Pritchett 1974, 235). But Spartans did not always impose punishment, even for cowardice, or equate obedience with bravery (Plut. *Ages.* 30.2–4; Hdt. 9.53–57; Thuc. 4.38.3; 5.34–35).

<sup>17</sup> Hanson 1989, 26, 107, 118. A stern disciplinarian's regime could backfire: Xen. *An.* 26.7–12; *Hell.* 6.2.18–19.

<sup>18</sup> See Pritchett 1974, 238–43. Pritchett 1974, 234, on the basis of Lys. 14, deduces that an Athenian law stated that there were three sorts of military crimes: refusal of service, desertion, and cowardice; obviously, the first two tend to be associated with cowardice too. Of Pritchett's twenty-one testimonia on punishment, ten clearly refer to cowardice and three to treason. Many of the passages do not specify the reason for punishment, but two mention sleeping on guard duty and three seem to imply concern for obedience to orders.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. Thuc. 5.72.1, where two men who have refused a direct command are exiled not because they disobeyed a direct command but because they acted like cowards (μαλακισθῆναι). Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.34 seems similar: Iphicrates threatens punishment to those leaders who do not follow him into battle. See also Dem. 51.8.

<sup>20</sup> E.g., when Socrates (*Ap.* 28c–e) explains that, as a hoplite, he remained where he had been commanded to be and risked death; he equates his action to that of Achilles in deciding to kill Hector. Granted that no one other than himself had ordered Achilles to do so, the parallel here is clearly not to obedience but willingness to risk death.

<sup>21</sup> Not all of this can be attributed to his fondness for Sparta. See Pritchett 1974, 236 on his use of εὐταξία.

<sup>22</sup> E.g., Plut. *Phoc.* 25; Diod. 18.17.1. See Pritchett 1974, 243–45; Anderson 1970, 71: generals still remained with the forces and had little ability to communicate once battle started.

<sup>23</sup> On the disputed ethnicity of the Macedonians, see Borza, 1990, 90–97 for discussion and references. Philip's familiarity with Theban tactics and his military reforms speak to the increasingly Hellenic context of Macedonian military culture. The influence of Homer is clearly something shared by Macedonians and Greeks.

<sup>24</sup> See Adams 1986, 43–52 for evidence about the Macedonian habit of blunt speech and the expectation of the accessibility of their kings.

<sup>25</sup> See Borza 1990, 231–52 for a general discussion of Macedonian political institutions, including the nature of “constitution” and the possible existence of an army assembly. I support the views of Errington, Lock, Anson, and Borza, who reject the existence or constitutional relevance of such an assembly.

<sup>26</sup> Diod. 17.65.4, speaking of reforms Alexander made in his army after the beginning of the Asian expedition, mentions improvements in their obedience to

commands (τὰ παραγγελλόμενα πειθαρχοῦσαν). Arrian 3.9.8 refers to a speech of Alexander to his troops before the battle of Gaugamela in which he supposedly urges them to pay attention to their battle position, keep silent, to shout or even howl at appropriate moments, to heed commands sharply (ὁξέως κατακούειν τῶν [τε] παραγγελλομένων) and to pass them along. (The speech is relevant not because it is likely Alexander said anything like it, but because it speaks to Arrian's understanding of Macedonian discipline.) Curtius 3.2.13–16 contains a supposed speech of Charidemus to Darius in which Charidemus refers not only to the good order of the Macedonian troops, but compliance to orders (...*quod imperatur omnes exaudiunt*). (The speech is, of course, fiction.) Thus both Arrian and Curtius place Macedonian obedience to orders in the context of general speed and experience in drill.

<sup>27</sup> See Griffith 1979, 405–49 and Milns 1975, 87–136 for general descriptions of the army under Philip and Alexander.

<sup>28</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 57.2) gives two examples of his generalization that Alexander was a severe chastiser: Menander, a ἑταῖρος and the commander of a garrison, was put to death when he failed to remain at his station (as usual, it is difficult to tell if this is a punishment for disobedience or for cowardice) and Orsodates, a Persian, was killed because he revolted. Orsodates was clearly punished for political rather than military reasons; Menander's case (he is otherwise unknown) may also be political. See above for the point that Alexander was generally more severe about political rather than military crimes.

<sup>29</sup> There are surviving fragments of Macedonian military codes from the Hellenistic period, e.g., one from Amphipolis from the reign of Philip V (Austin 1981, 136–38). It would be unwise to assume that these documents reflect conditions more than a century earlier; in that century Macedonia experienced traumatic change, including a change in dynasty (see Walbank 1940, 289–94 for a discussion of the Macedonian army under Philip V and its differences from the Argead army). Antigonid monarchy was inevitably different from Argead. The codes focus on fines for an elaborately detailed list of fairly minor errors and on the maintenance of stores by officers. Welles 1938, 246 and de Sanctis 1924, 515–21 suggest that these were new measures instituted by Philip V after Cynoscephalae, under Roman influence. Bar-Kochva 1976, 97 does not disagree, but concludes that, despite Roman influence, the king could not have gone far from traditional standards. Perhaps, but although the individual punishments do not seem terribly different from those of Alexander and Philip, the mentality involved in collecting and recording them does. Pritchett 1974, 244–45 contrasts the regularization and codification of Roman military discipline to the absence of such a mentality in a classical Greek context.

<sup>30</sup> Justin and Curtius, our two Latin sources, for instance, contain a number of references to *disciplina militaris* (Just. 12.11.9; Curt. 5.1.36, 2.6, 6.6.11–17, 10.2.12). One wonders if such an abstract notion is appropriate in reference to Greek or Macedonian institutions. Curtius, in particular, seems inclined to impose Roman military practice on Macedonian in matters both superficial (i.e., 3.8.23 refers to Roman rather than Greek divisions of the night) and fundamental (9.4.22–23 generalizes about the changeable behavior of troops, apparently on the basis of personal experience, suggesting that Curtius' understanding of Macedonian discipline is colored by his own Roman experience).

<sup>31</sup> Although there is no clear evidence for any oath prior to the death of Alexander (Plut. *Eum.* 12.2), Hammond 1989, 65–67 believes that oaths were customary earlier.

<sup>32</sup> Pritchett 1974, 229. Polyaeus (*Strat.* 4.2.7) says that at Chaeronea Philip used the greater skill and training of the Macedonians (compared to the Athenians) to his advantage.

<sup>33</sup> Frontinus (*Str.* 4.1.6. 2.4.), Polyaeus (*Str.* 4.2.7, 10, 4.3.10), and Curtius (3.3.26–28) refer to similar practices by Alexander.

<sup>34</sup> On the psychological effects of drill and its efficacy in discipline, see McNeill 1982, 130–33.

<sup>35</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 24.1; Diod. 17.35.1, 70.1–6, 94.3, 104.1; Curt. 5.6.4.

<sup>36</sup> Diod. 16.3.3, 34.5, 53.3, 17.64.6; Plut. *Alex.* 34.1. 39.1–6; Arr. 1.12.1, 7.5.4; Curt. 7.5.27.

<sup>37</sup> Curt. 7.11.11, 9.1.2–3; Arr. 2.18.4, 3.19.5, 4.18.6–7; Diod. 17.74.3, 78.1; Plut. *Alex.* 42.

<sup>38</sup> Diod. 17.21.6, 46.6; Arr. 1.12.1, 16.4–5; Plut. *Alex.* 71.5; Curt. 5.2.5.

<sup>39</sup> Arr. 2.10.2, 4.29.7, 7.12.1; Curt. 3.10.4; Plut. *Alex.* 58.2.

<sup>40</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 29, 37.1; Diod. 17.16.3, 46.6, 86.3–6; Arr. 2.5.8, 2.24.6. Whereas many Greeks saw athletic competition as good training for war and Philip II was certainly personally enthusiastic about Olympic competition, Alexander was not, and is said to have preferred more aesthetic ἀγῶνες (Plut. *Alex.* 4.5–6). Thus, at least in the army of Alexander, athletic competition, like other public contests Alexander offered, seems to have functioned simply as entertainment rather than training. See further Brown 1977, 76–88.

<sup>41</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 70.1; Arr. 5.1.6; Curt. 8.10.11–18, 9.10.24–29; Diod. 17.106. Bosworth 1988a, 147, accepting the historicity of the Dionysiac revels after the terrible desert march, observes that they were “fundamentally a matter of therapy.” This is not to deny the more serious aspects of religion for both Alexander and his troops, or the importance of the religious role of the king (p. 28 below).

<sup>42</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 181a, 339c –d, *Alex.* 70.3–4; Arr. 6.23.4–5, 25.1.

<sup>43</sup> Arr. 4.23.4, 6.11.1.

<sup>44</sup> Curt. 4.11.21, 5.6.4–8; Diod. 17.94.3. Exceptions about Alexander are known: e.g., his terrible treatment of the commandant of Gaza (Curt. 4.6.25–29; *FGrH* 142 F 5).

<sup>45</sup> The sacking of Persepolis, for instance: Diod. 17.70.1–6; Curt. 5.6.1–8; Plut. *Alex.* 37.3–5. Scholars have generally interpreted it as an act of policy, although they differ about which policy: Badian 1967, 186–92; Borza 1972, 233–45; Balcer 1977, 119–33; Bosworth 1988a, 92 and Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993, 184–85; Badian 1994, 258–92. Bosworth 1988a, 108–109 makes a similar argument for the destruction of the Branchidae.

<sup>46</sup> On these incidents, see discussion and references in Bosworth 1988a, 101–103, 118–19, 50–51.

<sup>47</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 22.2–3; Arr. 7.22.4.

<sup>48</sup> Arr. 7.8.3; Curt. 10.2.30; Just. 2.11.8; Diod. 17.109.3.

<sup>49</sup> Curt. 8.6.21; Curt. 7.1.13; Arr. 3.27.2.

<sup>50</sup> Curt. 7.2.35–38; Just. 5.4–8.

<sup>51</sup> Curt. 9.2.31, 3.1–2; Arr. 5.27.1.

<sup>52</sup> So Carney 1981a, 230. See also Hammond 1990, 262.

<sup>53</sup> Arr. 1.16.5; 2.12.1.

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<sup>54</sup> Greenwalt 1986, 213–22.

<sup>55</sup> Arr. 3.9.1, 21.2–10; Plut. *Alex.* 25.1.

<sup>56</sup> Arr. 3.7.3; Diod. 17.68.3.

<sup>57</sup> Greek generals personally participated in battle, often at considerable physical risk, because it was perceived to be an important part of generalship (see Hanson 1989, 107–18); if anything, expectations were even greater for Macedonian kings: Philip's elder brother, Perdiccas, died in battle and Philip and Alexander received many battle wounds.

<sup>58</sup> Bosworth 1988a, 43 argued that Alexander's perpetual self-endangerment and frequent wounds, rather than reinforcing his control over the army, jeopardized it. Alexander's obsessive risk-taking did tend to exaggerate the already marked traditional emphasis on the personality of the king as central to maintenance of discipline.

<sup>59</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 24.6–8, 40.1–4, 41.1, 42, 58.1–2; Arr. 6.26.1–3; Curt. 5.12–17, 7.3.17, 8.4.5–11.

<sup>60</sup> e.g. Diod. 17.77.7–78.1, 107.3.

<sup>61</sup> Crawford 1978, 53.

<sup>62</sup> Griffith 1979, 392.

<sup>63</sup> Arr. 2.10.2–6, 6.3.3.

<sup>64</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 50.4) recounts that verses sung at a banquet making fun of generals recently defeated triggered the brawl that led to the death of Cleitus. For another example, see n. 14 above for the incident at Halicarnassus.

<sup>65</sup> Curt 8.1.23–25, 9.7.16–26; Diod. 17.100.1–101.6.

<sup>66</sup> E.g., the departure of the Greek allies: Curt. 6.2.15–16; Diod. 18.74.3; Just. 12.3.2–3; Plut. *Alex.* 47.1–3.

<sup>67</sup> So Hammond 1980a, 214.

<sup>68</sup> Bosworth 1988a, 277 suggests that Alexander consciously intensified this circumstance. See Keegan 1988.13–91.

<sup>69</sup> See Bosworth 1988n, 101–104, 71–74, 282–83, 114–15, 117–19, 284–87 for references and discussion of these incidents.

<sup>70</sup> Holt 1988, 70–85.

<sup>71</sup> See Carney 1981b, 149–60 for discussion and references.

<sup>72</sup> See further Lammert 1953, 1–7.

<sup>73</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 181F, *Mor.* 336, Plut. *Galb.* 1. Granted that traditional discipline had focused on the person of the current Argead king, it is not surprising that after Alexander's death when there were no competent Argead commanders available, his generals experienced serious problems with discipline, most notably in the first days after the king's death (Curt. 10.5.1–10.20) and also before the accord at Triparadisus (Arr. *FGrH.* 156 F 1.32–2; Diod. 18.39.3–4; Polyaeus *Strat.* 4.6.4). While these later disciplinary problems may well have had connections to those in the reign of Alexander (some of the same troops were certainly involved), the circumstance is fundamentally different because of the absence of a king. None of the “regents” could assert the authority of a king over the army. For this reason, my study stops with the death of Alexander.

<sup>74</sup> Even Roman military revolts often went unpunished and in any event tended to be treated as practical problems to be solved rather than as well-defined crimes with absolutely certain punishment to follow. See Messer 1920, 159–61; Garlan 1975, 178.

<sup>75</sup> Like mutiny, it can apply to both civil and military revolt: *OLD* s.v., 1726. Adams 1986, 50 assumes that *seditio* is synonymous with mutiny.



<sup>76</sup> For instance, Justin, referring to Alexander's second confrontation with the army, has Alexander reproach his troops with gentle words and threaten that their glory will be tarnished by *seditio* (12.11.8). The implication, although they had already refused an order, is that they had not yet been guilty of *seditio* but would be if they persisted. See also Curtius 9.4.22, 4.10.4.

<sup>77</sup> Pritchett, in his discussion of *εὐταξία* and *ἀταξία* (1974, 236–45), seems to favor translating *εὐταξία* not as “good order, discipline” (so *LSJ*) but something more like “obedience” and *ἀταξία* as equivalent to insubordination rather than disorder. His evidence, other than for the specific case of Xenophon, does not convince.

<sup>78</sup> E.g., Arrian's usage of *ταραχή* (trouble, disorder, and confusion) to describe the situation of the Hyphasis: he tells us Alexander fears it will get worse (5.25.2). Arrian uses the verb *ταράσσω* to describe the ring-leaders at Opis (7.8.3), although he clearly considers it a graver situation. One does not worry about whether or not something is a *ταραχή*, but one does about whether it is a mutiny, because of the greater precision of the latter term.

<sup>79</sup> In describing Philip's ultimate success in calming his army, Diodorus (16.35.2), calls the army *εὐπειθεῖς*, just as he later describes the army at Opis as *ἀπειθούντων* (Diod. 17.109.2). These terms are usually translated “obedient” and “disobedient.”

<sup>80</sup> Diod. 16.35.2; Arr. 5.25.2, 7.8.2–3; Plut. *Alex.* 71.1.

<sup>81</sup> E.g., Hammond 1980a, 25.

<sup>82</sup> See discussions in Bosworth 1988a, 132–33, Green 1991, 404–406, Robinson 1993, 84–99 on how much further Alexander planned to go.

<sup>83</sup> In 327, upon his departure from Bactria, Alexander ordered thirty thousand Asian youths to be recruited and trained in Macedonian arms and methods. They were termed *ἑπίγονοι* (Successors), the implication being that they would succeed to the position of the Macedonian phalanx. See further discussion and references in Bosworth 1980, 272–73. See pp. 43–46 below for the impact of their reappearance in 324 at Susa.

<sup>84</sup> Liddell and Scott note that the word can signify either being broken in spirit or turned to pity.

<sup>85</sup> For instance, Holt 1982, 48 and Adams 1986, 49.

<sup>86</sup> While not everyone shares my minimalist approach to speeches preserved in ancient historical writers, see Brunt 1983, 528, Bosworth 1988b, 96–134, and Adams 1986, 50 for similar views.

<sup>87</sup> Berve 1926b, 218, concludes that Curtius made the speeches up and Andreotti 1957, 136 concurs. Schachermeyr 1973, 436, n. 530, however, seems to accept the speeches as genuine, as does Komemann 1935, 148. Both do so because they believe that the speeches preserved in Curtius derive from Ptolemy. Tarn 1948b, 2:94, insists that Curtius composed the speech, but later (289–90) attributes part of it to Ptolemy, although he believes that the Ptolemaic section is a doublet of the speech Alexander gave at Opis.

<sup>88</sup> Tarn's attempt (1948b, 2: 287) to deny the role attributed to Coenus by Curtius (and Arrian, as we shall see) has deservedly met with little acceptance.

<sup>89</sup> It is often thought that the speeches in both Curtius and Arrian derived from Ptolemy and that Ptolemy is the primary source for Arrian's general narrative of events on the Hyphasis; see Jacoby 1962, 2: 506; Holt 1982, 41–47 (who considers Ptolemy the source for the speech of Alexander, but is less confident that Ptolemy is the source

for Coenus' speech); and Schachermeyr 1973, 436). Brunt 1983, 532–33 argues that Aristobulus is more likely the source of the speeches. Bosworth 1988b, 123–34 suggests that they include some material from Ptolemy and much embroidery.

<sup>90</sup> See varying views of bias in Ptolemy in Bosworth 1975, 32–33 and Errington 1969, 233–42. In the affair on the Hyphasis, where Ptolemy apparently did not support Alexander, he had the difficult task of justifying his own actions without making the king look terrible. If Ptolemy lies behind Arrian and Curtius, his self-interest could explain the comparatively even-handed account found in those sources.

<sup>91</sup> Most of the sources also preserve descriptions of the construction of a false giant-sized camp with larger-than-life belongings left behind to impress posterity and of altars dedicated to the twelve Olympians: Plut. *Alex.* 62.4; Arr. 5.29.1–2; Curt. 9.3.19; Diod. 17.95.1–2; Just. 12.8.16; Strab. 3.5.5 (171); Pliny *N.H.* 6.62; Philostr. *VA* 2.43. Hamilton 1969, 174 observes that no scholar takes the camp story seriously.

<sup>92</sup> Plutarch *Alex.* 62.3 could imply cowardice on the part of the troops and he does refer to the behavior of the troops “at the Indus” as cowardice at 13.3.

<sup>93</sup> So Adams 1986, 49–50. While Adams makes a good case for the power of the tradition of free speech and the accessibility of Macedonian kings, it is another matter to consider either free speech or petitioning “rights,” and yet another to believe, if such “rights” existed, that either was exercised here.

<sup>94</sup> Ober's discussion and analysis (1993, especially 224–28) of a spontaneous mass action by the Athenians that played a critical role in the revolution of 508/7 suggests some limited parallels to the Hyphasis event. While his application of J. L. Austin's speech theory to the Athenian event (a confrontation between rival “speech acts” presenting two different understandings of authority and sovereignty) offers little of relevance to the Macedonian situation (Alexander's difficulties with his army on the Hyphasis do not relate to sovereignty or even authority in a direct way), Ober's use of the work of Thompson, Davis, and Desan (see Ober 1993, 227 for discussion and references) on the tendency of spontaneous riots to function as acts of “collective self-definition” is suggestive and seems quite applicable to the situation on the Hyphasis.

<sup>95</sup> So troubled was the army by the absence of Argead authority that a significant portion of it forced the leadership to accept the Argead Arrhidaeus as king despite his lack of competence (Curt. 10.6.20–8.23), forced Perdikkas and his associates to allow Arrhidaeus to marry Adeia, an Argead herself, because he and his brother had murdered Adeia's Argead mother (Arr. *FGrH* 156 F 9.22–23), and nearly killed Antipater because of their fondness for young Adeia, now called Eurydice (Diod. 18.39.1–4; Arr. *FGrH* 156 F 9.30–33). Any Argead, even the mentally incompetent or female, threatened the authority of non-Argead commanders.

<sup>96</sup> On the career of Coenus, see Berve 1926b, 215–18. Heckel 1992, 58–64. Coenus, although married to a daughter of Parmenio, played a critical role in the elimination of Parmenio and his son Philotas. Badian's speculations on the political motivation of Coenus' speech, the suspiciousness of his death, and his role in possible factions opposed to Alexander (1961, 21–23), although plausible, are unprovable (Holt 1982, 48 finds Badian's arguments implausible). Badian's characterization of Coenus as an opportunist, however, rests on a firm evidentiary basis. It seems reasonable to conclude that Coenus judged it more opportune than not to speak for the army and the rest of those close to Alexander did not find it opportune to speak up for the

king's view. Griffith 1979.2:392 observes that, since Alexander's main communication with the army would have been through the officer corps, the opposition of Coenus at a meeting between the king and officers (as in Arrian) is critical.

<sup>97</sup> So Badian 1961, 20–21. Arrian 6.7.6 reports an earlier incident in which Alexander had to shame the other Macedonians into following him up and over a wall of another Malli citadel. As Hamilton 1969, 176–77 implies, this earlier incident helps to explain why Alexander wrongly believed that the Macedonians were malingering when he once more felt the need to lead the way up a wall (Arr. 6.9.3).

<sup>98</sup> Errington 1978, 110 concludes that Alexander had staked his influence with the army on winning his way and then lost. Berve 1926a, 213–17 suggests that Alexander's growing spiritual estrangement from the Macedonians, as demonstrated at Hyphasis and later Opis, broke down the identification of king and people, which he believed was essential to Macedonian military discipline. Schachermeyr 1973, 437–42 saw Alexander as torn between his goals for world rule and the practical demands of that world.

<sup>99</sup> Badian 1961, 20 *contra* Hammond 1980c, 213–15, who asserts that Alexander “emerged unscathed” and Holt 1982 47–49 who characterizes the incident as essentially a compromise. Hammond believed that Alexander would have been prevented by the Macedonian constitution from proceeding further without the permission of the “army assembly.”

<sup>100</sup> Arrian's location of the confrontation at Opis, rather than Susa as the other sources imply or state, has won general acceptance: Hamilton 1969, 197; Lane Fox 1974, 544; Badian 1965, 160; Wüst 1953/54a, 420.

<sup>101</sup> Badian 1965, 160.

<sup>102</sup> See Brunt 1983, 532–33 and Bosworth 1988b, 112, 134.

<sup>103</sup> The speech attributed to Alexander by Curtius is similar to that in Arrian in detail and theme – see Tarn 1948a, 1:296, Wüst 1953/54a, 424.

<sup>104</sup> These two passages are neither contradictory nor doublets (*contra* Wüst 1953/54a, 422) but refer to two different moments, the one during the initial confrontation, the other days after.

<sup>105</sup> Wüst 1953/54a, 419 accepts this as the whole explanation.

<sup>106</sup> Bosworth 1988a, 159 calls their protest “understandable if illogical.”

<sup>107</sup> Berve 1926a, 217 sees the end of the old Macedonian military discipline in the settlement at Opis and the beginning of an entirely new military organization with a new ethos.

<sup>108</sup> Badian's suggestion (1965, 160) that Alexander deliberately provoked the incident inflaming Macedonian spirits is implausible.

<sup>109</sup> Adams 1986, 51 again raises the idea of the “right of petition” in the context of these events and refers to the sense of entitlement the soldiers demonstrate in Arrian's narrative in airing their grievances and their surprise that the king arrests the ring-leaders. He points out that Arrian attributes the king's severe reaction to his growing fondness for Asian subservience (7.8.3). While Adams' argument seems more convincing here than for the events at Hyphasis, Alexander does not seem very persuaded of his troops' right to petition and the greater anger of the men at the king may better explain the harshness of their language than their sense of entitlement. Schachermeyr 1973, 493–94 sees the incident as a challenge to the existence of the army assembly, something he saw as a basic peasant right. Austin's speech act theory (see Ober 1993, 224–28) seems more relevant to Opis than the

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Hyphasis affair. At Opis there is a confrontation between the speech acts of the king and of the troops.

<sup>110</sup> Errington 1978, 112 observes that Alexander “chose to interpret” what was essentially a spontaneous political action as a “mutiny.” He is right to suggest that Alexander made a conscious decision to regard an event not very different from that on the Hyphasis as something much more serious.

<sup>111</sup> This was the third occasion (the death of Cleitus and the Hyphasis affair are the others) in which Alexander resorted to an Achilles-like sulk which ultimately led his troops to supplicate him outside his door, like lovelorn poets beseeching their beloved. These tactics, bizarre by modern standards, worked, probably because they were part of the personal relationship between king and troops which was so central to Macedonian discipline. In a curious way, his sulking seclusion was part of the discipline he enforced. The implicit reference to Achilles, made by his supposed descendant, may have helped.

## AFTERWORD

This 1996 article attempted to understand the nature of discipline in the Macedonian army and to place analysis of the two incidents during the reign of Alexander the Great, commonly referred to as mutinies, in an ancient context rather than that of modern military discipline, as previous discussions had done. I concluded that these incidents should not be termed mutinies because Macedonian military discipline did not embrace the military values connected to the concept of mutiny but that the incidents were nonetheless of critical significance in terms of Alexander's ability to control his army. More specifically, I argued that the first incident, arising out of the exhaustion of the troops, was less important than the second, but that both confrontations mattered because of their negative impact on the relationship between the king and his army, a relationship central to Macedonian discipline, and thus to continued control of the army.

Subsequent discussions have frequently looked at only one or the other of the two incidents, often focusing on causation. Nagle (1996) worried primarily about the origins of the speech attributed to Alexander at Opis. Olbrycht's examination (2008) of the motivation of events at Opis produced an explanation (Alexander's interest in creating a combined ruling class for his empire, described as his "pro-Persian" policy) that failed to account for significant differences in the ancient accounts of the Opis incident.

Those considering the confrontation on the Hyphasis have sometimes argued that Alexander actually wanted to have the army refuse to go further, but needed to have the army, rather than the commander, yield and so manipulated the troops to bring about their refusal to go further. Heckel (most fully at 2003a) argued that Alexander had intended to gain control only of territories part of the Persian Empire and the civilized world, but then discovered at the Hyphasis (Beas) that these two entities were not synonymous. When forced to confront this truth, Heckel concluded that Alexander then pressed his army to indicate its lack of desire to go further. Spann (1999) suggested that Alexander was shocked to discover on the Hyphasis that Ocean was not close and that the conquest of India would involve formidable further efforts and then arranged events so that the army would not go further, yet the king would not lose face. Both views require us to believe that Alexander purposefully generated upset in his imperial troops, in order to put the responsibility for turning back on them, not him. Anson (2011) pointed out that the sources mention no such plan of Alexander's and that he could, as on the Danube and on the borders of Scythia, have announced that the Hyphasis was the border of empire. It is simply not believable (see also Anson 2011, 93–95) that Alexander would have voluntarily caused controversy and weakened his authority in an army already discontented with his innovations. In fact, the first confrontation demonstrably contributed to the second and more problematic event. Alexander would not have risked sparking this particular flame, not knowing what might come of the conflagration he supposedly inspired.

Howe and Müller (2012), also looking only at Hyphasis, concluded that our Roman era sources essentially invented the entire confrontation, partly because of their ignorance of the history of the Persian Empire and partly because they

needed to understand Alexander as so heroic that only the refusal of his troops could explain why he did not go further. Like Heckel, they suggested that Alexander, rather than wanting to march to Ocean, planned to conquer the territory that the Achaemenids, at the time of their greatest power, had controlled. The Persian part of their argument (particularly the discussion of Near Eastern precedents for the marking of the borders of empire) is more compelling than the notion that our Roman era sources were so colored by their own culture that they invented events (not just speeches or melodramatic detail) to shape an image of Alexander with which they were comfortable.

In terms of the broader topic raised by this chapter, the nature of discipline in the Macedonian army, Heckel's examination (2009) of the relationship between the king and his troops is very helpful. Roisman (2012, 31–60) produced some interesting results by analyzing Macedonian military discontent from the point of view of the ordinary soldiers rather than from that of the king or officers. Lendon (2005, 20–38, 115–39) discusses the importance of Homer in Greek warfare generally and in terms of the Macedonians. Brice (2011, 2013) has employed the methodology of military sociology to examine Macedonian military behavior. His focus on discipline is interesting, though categorizing events like the Philotas affair as a “military conspiracy” seems to prize military over political analysis.

Analysis of military disciplinary issues of a more general sort, whether these issues are defined as mutiny or not, as well as examination of other military cultures continues to provide insight into Macedonian military behavior. Roman mutinies and military discipline have always attracted more attention than Greek. Moreover, Roman military and political experience inevitably influenced Roman-era Alexander narratives such as that of Curtius, though to what degree and in what way remains debatable (see above and Rutz 1983; Spencer 2002, 201–3). Two dissertations on *sedition* (Chrissanthos 1999; Manolaraki 2003) are relevant. Both Manolaraki (2003) and Fulkerson (2006) focused on Tacitus' treatment of mutinies and were comparatively uninterested in what actually happened. Fulkerson's discussion of the performative aspects of mutinies, however, though she connects this quality to the author, could as easily be connected to the actors in these events; one could, for instance, understand Alexander as playing to his military audience and the soldiers as doing the same. Recent work on the theatricality of monarchy and the tendency of rulers like Philip to stage their power (see Introduction) fit in well with this view.

In 1996, my analysis omitted a critical article of Rose (1982). His discussion was largely founded in events of the twentieth century and he assumed universality in the conception of mutiny, an assumption that I do not share, but his work is nonetheless fascinating and useful. For instance, he found three types of discontent tended to trigger disorder: “working conditions” (here he indirectly cites the events on the Hyphasis), grievances connected to “demobilization,” and soldiers' belief that continued military activity was objectionable for “moral, ethical, or political reasons” (Rose 1982, 565–6). Thinking about the event at Opis as a problem with demobilization proves clarifying, particularly if we put it, as he did, in the context of the coherence of a military unit. His analysis of the strong and “emotive” reaction of modern military leadership and civilians as well to the

word “mutiny” (Rose 1982, 561–4; see also Watson 1997) supports my view that it is a term that should be used only when its applicability is certain.

Apart from Rose, discussions of events commonly termed mutinies have remained relatively rare among historians, but Smith 1994’s analysis of the behavior of one French regiment during World War I is helpful because it put mutiny in the context of general obedience and discipline, and traces a negotiation of power between soldiers and their officers. Hathaway (2001a, xv), in the introduction to a comparative collection dealing with mutinies in different periods and cultures, helpfully points out that while simple things like poor food or bad living conditions can trigger disorder, these events nonetheless related to longer-term, more deep-seated and broader problems. In an essay in Hathaway’s collection, Brummet (2001) discusses the relationship between river-crossings and mutiny in terms of Ottoman history, arguing that both metaphorical and practical considerations make such moments critical, as at the Hyphasis.





## THE PHILIPPEUM, WOMEN, AND THE FORMATION OF A DYNASTIC IMAGE

A wide array of elements can contribute to formation of a dynastic image. Public actions, gestures, and ceremonies can play a role, whether by involving multiple living members of a dynasty in a way that focuses on the unity of the dynasty or by replicating the deeds of earlier members of the family. The dwelling place of a ruling dynasty can embody its power. Splendid tombs can commemorate the greatness of departed rulers while highlighting the wealth and taste of their successors. Objects such as coins, produced by individual rulers but in accordance with dynastic patterns, can assert both a ruler's individuality and his continuity with predecessors and, thus, his legitimacy. Statue groups, based on various selection principles, can also assert claims to legitimacy. Some may include female members of the dynasty while others ignore them. Dynastic images are not generic. Some constructions stress the passage of time while others emphasize a particular moment. In some cases, the point of the group is who is included, in others, who is excluded is the issue. Some dynastic images allow for, or even emphasize, the varying accomplishments of members of the dynasty while others are unconcerned with individual achievements.

The primary purpose of this chapter (which was published in 2007) is to evaluate the meaning of one dynastic monument, the Philippeum. Such an evaluation necessarily entails considering the nature of the Argead dynastic image prior to the Philippeum, its possible architectural and art-historical precedents, and reflection on the long-term impact of this particular dynastic image. Although I shall discuss architectural issues, my main concern is the statue program contained within the structure known as the Philippeum.

Prior to the reign of Philip II, extant evidence about the Argead dynastic image is not primarily visual. Some of it is literary. Herodotus paints a picture of the Argeads that stresses their Hellenic ethnicity and their Hellenic way of life: they seclude and protect their women in a way that southern Greeks would applaud (Hdt. 5.17–21) and they compete successfully in the great Panhellenic games at Olympia (5.22–23).<sup>1</sup> Herodotus (5.22) and other authors (some under Argead patronage) generated various

versions of the Argead lineage that made them Argives, Heracles their ancestor, and again emphasized their Hellenic roots.<sup>2</sup> For generations, Macedonian coins depicted images of an enigmatic mounted rider somehow associated with monarchy, and images of Zeus and of a lion-helmeted Heracles.<sup>3</sup> Macedonian coins, therefore, alluded to the divine and heroic origins of the Argeads. Archelaus and, to some degree, other early Argead kings, attempted to be patrons of major Greek artists, thereby advertising both their Hellenic culture and their wealth.<sup>4</sup> Royal dwelling places tend to play an important role in dynastic images: in Greek, as in English, the same word (οἶκος/*oikos*) can refer to both a dynasty and its dwelling place. “Buckingham Palace” and “White House” refer not only to residences but also to the power and policies of the occupants. Archelaus created a particularly splendid palace that attracted foreign visitors (Ael. *VH* 14.17), part of his general policy to increase his own prestige and that of his kingdom within and without Macedonia.<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, even allowing for the loss of many possible buildings, statues, and monuments, the political uncertainty and comparative poverty of Macedonia, particularly in the first half of the fourth century BC, necessarily limited the formation of a dynastic image.

This circumscribed situation changed with Philip II, the king who rapidly centralized his country and turned it into the dominant power of the Greek world, acquiring great wealth as he did so. Many of Philip’s acts relate to the formation or rather renovation of the Argead image. He worked to elevate and distinguish the royal dynasty from the rest of the Macedonian elite, in keeping with a policy that gave him unprecedented central control of previously semi-independent regions.<sup>6</sup> While dating issues remain, it may well be that Philip II sponsored the construction of buildings I and II in the palace complex at Pella and the palace at Aegae (Vergina), making him responsible for the creation of the prototype for the Hellenistic *basileia* (royal residence).<sup>7</sup> He used the wealth demonstrated by the palaces to turn the Argead court into an international center for writers and artists.<sup>8</sup> Philip’s first great victory, a decisive defeat of the invading Illyrians under Bardylis (Diod. 16.4.4–7), had, quite apart from the practical need to drive the enemy out, a significant dynastic aspect. His victory could be read as revenge for the death of his brother Perdikkas III in battle against the Illyrians and for other humiliations inflicted by the Illyrians during earlier reigns, particularly his father’s.

Several factors suggest that Philip tended to involve royal women in his reformation or articulation of the dynastic image of the Argeads. While I consider it likely that many earlier Argead rulers were polygamous, Philip practiced polygamy on an unprecedented scale. He took seven wives.

Scholars have often discussed the practical political benefits of Philip's marriages and have generally associated them with his growing centralization of power within Macedonia and his extension of power to his borders and even (in terms of influence and alliance) outside them.<sup>9</sup> His many wives and the complexities their presence at his court drew the attention of Greeks in the monogamous south, but mainly in a negative way (e.g. Plut. *Alex.* 9. 3, 6). While he must have been aware of the comments his polygamy generated, Philip apparently found the benefits greater than the disadvantages. He may have seen his marriages as symbolic of his ability to centralize and control and may even have enjoyed any discomfort other Greeks took in their existence.

Shortly before his intended departure for his Asian campaign, Philip planned to combine the wedding of his daughter by Olympias to her uncle, Olympias' brother the king of Molossia, with a great festival to which people all over the Greek world were invited (Diod. 16.91.4–93.2). Of course, this event proved to be the occasion for Philip's assassination, but it nonetheless became a prototype for royal wedding festivals, a model followed by many Hellenistic rulers. Philip transformed a previously private matter, the wedding of a royal daughter, an event already important as a confirmation that dynastic fences had been mended between the Molossian and Macedonian royal families after recent troubles, into a public event intended to dramatize the unity and wealth of the Argead dynasty.<sup>10</sup>

I would suggest that Philip chose to have his mother Eurydice play a major role in the dynastic image he was shaping. On the face of it, this was not an obvious choice: she lived a tempestuous life. After the death of her husband, Amyntas III, each of Eurydice's three sons ruled Macedonia. The years of her first two sons' reigns were hardly stable ones for Macedonia: her eldest son was assassinated by a rival claimant to the throne, a man whom she may have married; other Argeads attempted to take the throne by force; the Thebans intervened in Macedonian affairs; Eurydice herself arranged the intervention of the Athenian general Iphicrates in support of her sons' continued rule; and her son Perdiccas took over direct rule by assassinating his brother's assassin, only to be killed in battle within a few years. The first few years of Philip's reign were not much calmer. Apart from Illyrian invasions and foreign-backed pretenders, Philip had to deal with claims to the throne by at least one of his half-brothers, sons of Amyntas III by Gygaea rather than Eurydice.<sup>11</sup>

Almost certainly because of these enduring intra-dynastic struggles, Eurydice's public image was compromised: there were claims that she attempted the murders of her husband and sons, that she was adulterous and lustful, that she could not be trusted, and that she was a barbarian

(she was likely part Illyrian).<sup>12</sup> Though Kate Mortensen has shown that these stories about the “bad Eurydice” are unlikely to be true and are probably the consequence of propaganda generated by competing branches of the royal house,<sup>13</sup> they remain significant. These lurid tales meant that Eurydice and her descendants brought with them “baggage.” She (and they) had what we might call a problem of κλέος/*kleos* (renown, fame, good repute).

I would propose that her most famous son, rather than hoping to outlive these slanders or to cover them up, himself originated or encouraged his mother to originate a series of public monuments and actions crafted to deal with the image problem head on. While the date of none of these is certain, all are most likely to have occurred during the reign of Philip II. An essay attributed to Plutarch<sup>14</sup> tells us that Eurydice, grateful for the education she acquired after her sons were grown, made a dedication on behalf of female citizens to the Muses (Plut. *Mor.* 14c).<sup>15</sup> The nature and location of the dedication is unknown.<sup>16</sup> The reference to the age of her sons implies that the dedication happened after the death of Amyntas III; granted the troubled nature of his brothers’ reigns, this dedication is most likely to have happened early in the reign of Philip II, certainly not during his father’s reign.<sup>17</sup> Excavation at Vergina has revealed the existence of a sanctuary to Eucleia that included a large altar, a tripartite stoa, a two-room temple, and a building with a peristyle, all dating to, roughly, the second half of the fourth century. In front of the main sanctuary were found two statue bases reading “ΕΥΡΥΔΙΚΑ ΣΙΡΡΑ ΕΥΚΛΕΙΑΙ/*Eurydika Sirra Eukleiai*” (Eurydice, daughter of Sirrhas, to Eucleia). Saatsoglou-Paliadeli has suggested that at least one of these bases supported a statue (most of which has been found, in several fragments) of Eurydice herself. The entire sanctuary is likely a dedication of Eurydice.<sup>18</sup> We know little of the character of the cult to Eucleia at Aegae, but whatever its exact nature,<sup>19</sup> patronizing a cult somehow honoring good *kleos* would make sense for a woman (and family) with *kleos* problems. A damaged inscription from Dium may indicate that Eurydice made some sort of dedication there as well.<sup>20</sup> Saatsoglou-Paliadeli has argued that a third statue base, found a few miles from Vergina and inscribed on one long side with Eurydice’s name and patronymic but no dedication, indicates that a statue of Eurydice was part of a group of statues erected somewhere around Aegae. She concluded that it post-dated the Philippeum and constituted a marble replication of the portrait statues from the Philippeum.<sup>21</sup> The inscription, however, is too heavily damaged to aid in dating the monument;<sup>22</sup> in fact, it could predate the Philippeum. Moreover, though the location of the inscription on the base indicates that Eurydice’s image was placed at the right end of

the monument, we know nothing about the size of the monument and the number of figures it supported, let alone their identity. Instead of the five persons portrayed in the Philippeum, this monument could, for instance, have contained images of Eurydice, her husband Amyntas, and their three sons. All told, the remarkable amount of evidence about Eurydice individually and as part of some group indicates that an effort was made to make her a prominent part of the dynasty's image. This was done partly to combat slanders against her and therefore her descendants, partly to highlight her and her sons rather than those descendants by Amyntas III's other wife and sons, and partly to stress her (and therefore the dynasty's) Hellenic culture, whatever her literal ethnicity.

But it is the Philippeum that most clearly and elaborately illustrates Philip's desire to shape a dynastic image. We know about the Philippeum from two sources: a pair of passages in the work of Pausanias (5.17.4, 20.9–10) and the excavated remains of the structure.<sup>23</sup> Although I have discussed the meaning and significance of the Philippeum before, my earlier discussions focused on its implications for the development of cults for royal women.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, they were published before Lapatin's recent work on the statues in the Philippeum (see n. 23). As I write in 2005, efforts are underway to restore the Philippeum.<sup>25</sup>

Let me begin with what is certain, or fairly certain, about the monument. It was constructed at Olympia, within the sacred precinct, after Philip's great victory at Chaeronea. In Pausanias' day it was known as the Philippeum and contained three statues fabricated of gold and ivory, those of Philip himself, his father Amyntas, and his son Alexander. Pausanias was aware, however, that it had once housed<sup>26</sup> two more statues of similar fabrication, those of Philip's wife and Alexander's mother, Olympias, and Eurydice (despite some problems with the corruption of Pausanias' text and the absence of a patronymic, the presence of no other royal woman of that name other than his mother makes sense in this context).<sup>27</sup> Pausanias attributed the statues to Leochares, a famous Athenian artist. Though Pausanias does not quite say that Philip himself planned the elaborate building, he mentions no donor and seems to imply that it was Philip's construct.<sup>28</sup>

Though the statues themselves are long gone and the orientation of the building uncertain,<sup>29</sup> it appears that the door (with a window on each side) was centered on the middle of the five figures represented. Perhaps only the central image would have been visible, via the doorway, from a distance.<sup>30</sup> The images were installed on a semicircular statue base. Each image was framed by engaged columns in the wall of the structure. The cuttings in surviving sections of the base, as well as other evidence,

strongly suggest that the female figures were placed at the two ends of the semicircle.<sup>31</sup>

Previous statues constructed of the expensive, fragile and life-like materials of gold and ivory represented divinities.<sup>32</sup> Because of their great expense, chryselephantine images were typically dedications by city-states, not by individuals.<sup>33</sup> While some scholars believe that Philip himself received cult worship in his lifetime, most do not.<sup>34</sup> The images in the Philippeum certainly would have had the gleaming quality of this fabrication that accorded with Greek understanding of divinity as bright or gleaming,<sup>35</sup> but they probably lacked another conventional attribute of a divine image: size larger than life.<sup>36</sup> The height of the statue base implies that a person entering the room would have had to look up sharply to view them.<sup>37</sup> Thus these chryselephantine images hinted at the divinity of Philip's family, but did not proclaim it in an uncompromising way. In this, they represent a point of view similar to that demonstrated by Philip's decision to include an image (possibly also chryselephantine)<sup>38</sup> of himself with those of the twelve Olympians in the public procession at the time of his daughter's wedding (Diod.17.92.5). The Philippeum suggested that Philip's entire family was godlike whereas the procession image focused on the godlike qualities of the ruler alone. Like other images, those in the Philippeum were intended to "make the absent present."<sup>39</sup> While Pausanias, as did other writers, sometimes calls the images *eikones*, he also speaks of the statue as of a person (for instance, "here were Philip and Alexander and with them the father of Philip, Amyntas," 5.20.10). These striking images, artfully positioned, indicated the newly elevated status of Argead monarchy under Philip.<sup>40</sup>

Much has been made of the location of the Philippeum at Olympia, within the Altis, close to the Pelopeum and not far from the temple of Zeus with Phidias' famous chryselephantine image of the king of the gods. Heracles, the supposed ancestor of the Macedonian royal house, was also the supposed founder of the games at Olympia (Paus. 5.7.9). Heracles, according to tradition, founded the Pelopeum in honor of his grandfather Pelops. Zeus, of course, was the father of Heracles and thus the ultimate divine ancestor of the Argeads.<sup>41</sup> In addition to the supposed Olympic victory of his ancestor Alexander I (see above), Philip himself was an Olympic victor and had made much of his victories (Plut. *Alex.* 4.5).<sup>42</sup> Thus the placement of the Philippeum discreetly alluded to Philip's divine and heroic ancestry as well his own success (and perhaps that of his ancestors) at the games.

The significance of the Philippeum's structure is ambiguous and may always have been so, intentionally. In several respects, the Philippeum

resembled the treasuries many Greek cities built at Olympia (and other panhellenic sites): it was small in size, elaborately decorated, and sheltered precious yet fragile statues.<sup>43</sup> Like them, it was both an offering to Olympian Zeus and a piece of propaganda.<sup>44</sup> The other treasuries were, however, rectilinear and had been constructed in a row, on an avenue outside the Altis. The Philippeum was built within the Altis, not on the avenue outside, among the treasuries. Significantly the Altis was probably extended to include the Philippeum.<sup>45</sup> Treasuries were not intended to be open to the public and were essentially closed structures,<sup>46</sup> whereas the Philippeum had windows constructed to make its statues visible, at least from the interior and possibly from the exterior.<sup>47</sup> There is no indication – for instance, no altar – of cult or sacrifice, heroic or divine, in association with the building. It was not a conventional temple.<sup>48</sup> The *tholos* construction of the Philippeum, though often associated with heroic cults, has uncertain significance since the function of many *tholoi* is disputed and the building type seems to have been used for several different purposes.<sup>49</sup> At the time of the Philippeum's construction, some of the people whose images it housed were still alive, though others were already dead. It was not, therefore, a *hērōon*. Nor is there any evidence that it housed diplomatic functions for Philip as ἡγεμών/*hēgemōn* (leader) of the Corinthian League.<sup>50</sup> Certainly, it was conspicuous and intended to be so: a small yet elegant circular Ionic structure placed in the sacred area near large rectilinear Doric temples,<sup>51</sup> blatantly luxurious in form and content.<sup>52</sup> Its unusual mix of architectural styles typifies the eclecticism of elite Macedonian material culture<sup>53</sup> and was, in itself, eye-catching. Indeed, as I have already stated, the Philippeum was an ambiguous structure and contained ambiguous images; it and they alluded to a number of things, most obviously the divinity or approximation to divinity of Philip and his “family” as constituted for this structure, but stated or claimed nothing directly, other than the wealth (and ostentation) of those represented.<sup>54</sup>

Before I turn to analysis of the political significance of the Philippeum, a discussion that will center on its statue program, it is necessary to consider its probable models and prototypes in order to understand its context and inspiration. The Mausoleum is an obvious and reasonable possibility<sup>55</sup> since the Hecatomnids (the dynasty to which Mausolus belonged) functioned as models and forerunners for fourth-century and Hellenistic rulers in a number of areas, particularly those relating to the public presentation of individual and dynastic power and development of public portraiture for women.<sup>56</sup> This structure, though it contained the tomb of the Hellenizing Carian satrap Mausolus, almost certainly functioned as a *hērōon* as well.<sup>57</sup> Its elaborate, several-layered superstructure supported a large number of these

statues (perhaps over two hundred). Many scholars consider a number of these statues portraits of Mausolus' ancestors, both male and female, and interpret the entire structure as a dynastic monument.<sup>58</sup> Though the conception of the Mausoleum was probably that of Mausolus himself, his sister-wife Artemisia certainly took responsibility for its completion, and so in all probability did his siblings and successors, Idrieus and Ada.

Philip and the artists he employed would have been familiar with the Mausoleum. About the time he decided to build the Philippeum, Philip was negotiating a marriage alliance between his son Arrhidaeus and the daughter of Pixodarus, Mausolus' remaining brother and the current satrap of Caria (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1–3). The Mausoleum was a famous structure, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. Moreover, the name of Leochares, the supposed author of the statues in the Philippeum, appears on the list of major Greek artists whom sources associated with the construction of the Mausoleum.

While the Mausoleum may have influenced the conception of the Philippeum, it was not its sole source of inspiration and may not even have been the most important influence. Both monuments flaunt the wealth of the dynasts who constructed them, demonstrate an understanding of their respective *oikoi* (houses or dynasties) that includes and publicizes women as well as men, hint at the heroic or divine status of those represented, and were intended to elevate and thus legitimize their rule.<sup>59</sup>

The differences between the two, however, seem striking. The Mausoleum, a huge structure built like a wedding cake with right angles, displayed many marble statues on its facade. The Philippeum was a building of comparatively modest size, one level, circular shape, and displayed no human images on its exterior. The statues it housed were fabricated of gold and ivory. The Mausoleum was a royal tomb in the midst of a capital city, the Philippeum a structure of uncertain nature in the sacred precinct of one of the great panhellenic shrines. Thus the shape, construction and function of the two buildings differed greatly.

From the point of view of this paper, however, the most important difference between the two monuments lies in their statue programs. That of the Mausoleum is, apparently, a lineage, a long and large one. That of the Philippeum depicts only the immediate line of the current Argeads; there is no founding divine father, no long line of Argead ancestors, and many close kin of Philip are excluded. For instance, Philip's full brothers, his daughter by Olympias, Cleopatra, were absent. Thus the Mausoleum represents the rule and power of a clan, probably an entire clan, over generations, apparently in keeping with Anatolian precedents, whereas the



Philippeum includes only a small segment of the Argead γένος/genos (race or lineage), taken from a comparatively brief period of time. It hints at the divinity of those depicted but includes no divine ancestor. The number of male and female statues in the Mausoleum was about the same, in keeping with the world view of a dynasty where women co-ruled with males.<sup>60</sup> The female figures in the Philippeum were literally peripheral. While both monuments recognized the role of women in descent, probably, in both cases, in order to stress a specific line of descent, the degree of recognition is not the same.<sup>61</sup> The Philippeum contained a very selective version of the Argead dynasty and demonstrated a narrow, quite specific construction of dynastic power in contrast to the broad claims of the Mausoleum.

Other, more overtly Hellenic, precedents existed for aspects of the Philippeum, particularly in relation to the manner in which the statue program was displayed. In the late fifth and fourth century a civic competition of sorts in the erection of chryselephantine statues had developed. As the power of the city-states waned, this competition came to include individual rulers such as Dionysius I of Syracuse.<sup>62</sup> On Delos, the Athenians erected the Temple of the Seven Statues.<sup>63</sup> This structure housed seven chryselephantine statues, probably of Apollo, his relatives and retainers, and the statues were placed on an elongated semicircular base comparable to the Philippeum. Though the building itself was roughly square, its interior, like the Philippeum, was illuminated by a door and two flanking windows.<sup>64</sup>

The Argives donated a structure to Apollo at Delphi that contained a statue group more similar to the Philippeum in respect to the identity of those portrayed than the group in the Temple of the Seven Statues.<sup>65</sup> Sometime after 369, the Argives, in conjunction with the Thebans, created a second semicircular base, just opposite their earlier semicircular offering, which supported statues of the sons of the Seven who went against Thebes. This second semicircular recess housed ten bronze statues of male and female members of the legendary Argive royal house, including Heracles himself and his mother Alcmena. Here at Delphi was a semicircular construct involving images of male and female members of a royal Heraclid house. Granted, however, that the dynasty was extinct, this monument must have been intended to give distinction to the donor city Argos rather than to the dynasty represented.<sup>66</sup> The images may have been arranged in chronological order, from right to left<sup>67</sup> and less symmetrically placed than those in the Philippeum.<sup>68</sup>

Another dynastic monument was constructed at Delphi, about the same time the Philippeum was being built at Olympia. Daochus of Thessaly erected a statue base on which stood nine statues, his lineage.<sup>69</sup> Daochus

had served as an envoy (Plut. *Dem.* 18.2) for Philip who was *ταγός*/*tagos* (commander) of Thessaly. Nonetheless, although Daochus was in Philip's political orbit, the statue program of Daochus' monument differs from that of the Philippeum in many respects. The cutting for the first figure on the right was much larger than those for the other images, suggesting that the first image was that of a god (most likely Apollo the patron of Delphi); this means the monument "read" from right to left.<sup>70</sup> Each figure had its own inscription. The monument's linear organization seemed to stress the passage of time, of generations. It included no women. Visually, it was far less unified and symmetrical than the Philippeum: statues varied in size and pose and conception (some ancestors were commemorated as warriors, others as rulers, others as athletes).<sup>71</sup>

Semicircular statue groups keep the viewer equidistant from all the images and thus emphasize the unity of the group whereas linearly-arranged statue groups require the viewer to look first at one image, then another, tend to imply the passage of linear time, and do not stress the unity of the group to the same degree.<sup>72</sup> Thus, even if the identities of the statues in the linear monument near Aegae that Saatsoglou-Paliadeli has posited (see above) were the same as those in the Philippeum (we do not, to repeat, know that they were), the feeling and ideology of the construction of the statue program could have been quite different.

Discussion of the significance of the statue program of the Philippeum necessarily relates to its date and to the political situation in Macedonia and Greece at the time of its erection. Pausanias tells us only that it was constructed after Philip's victory at Chaeronea in summer 338. Philip was assassinated about two years later, in 336. In all probability the project was not complete at the time of Philip's death and Alexander, his son and successor, oversaw its completion prior to his departure for Asia in spring of 334.<sup>73</sup> The likelihood that the project was incomplete at the time of Philip's death opens up the possibility that Alexander made changes to his father's original plans. Nonetheless, I shall argue that Alexander did not change his father's project in any significant way and suggest that an understanding of the monument based on a close reading of Pausanias and the physical remains has much greater validity than those that depend on unsupported hypotheses about Philip's or Alexander's plans (see below).

This four-year period was a turbulent one, full of events whose absolute dates are often uncertain. In some cases the chronological order of events is equally unknown.<sup>74</sup> Although Philip gave Alexander a prominent role in the battle of Chaeronea and its diplomatic aftermath, events at Philip's wedding to Cleopatra, a Macedonian girl, compromised Alexander's role as his father's apparent successor. At the wedding symposium, Cleopatra's

guardian Attalus made a toast that expressed the wish for legitimate heirs to the throne. Alexander tossed a wine cup at him and a drunken brawl ensued in which Philip either failed to support his son or openly attacked him. Alexander and his mother then left Macedonia; he deposited her with her brother the king of Molossia and himself went on to the Illyrians. Not surprisingly, granted the imminence of his Asian campaign and his lack of another viable son, Philip quickly arranged a formal reconciliation. Alexander returned to Macedonia, as did, in all likelihood, his mother. A subsequent event (the Pixodarus affair), however, suggested that this reconciliation was not heartfelt and that tensions remained between father and son; certainly a number of Alexander's close associates were sent into exile in this period. During this same two-year period, young Cleopatra bore Philip at least one child, a daughter. Some scholars believe she bore him a second child, a son. Philip's assassin had strong personal reasons for his act, but may not have acted alone. Contemporaries suspected the involvement of Alexander or his mother.

In the nearly two-year period between his father's death and his departure for Asia, Alexander became king, dealt with a series of foreign and domestic threats, was recognized as *hēgemōn* of the League of Corinth and commander of the Graeco-Macedonian expedition, and eliminated a number of his domestic enemies, among them Attalus. Cleopatra and her baby were murdered, most likely by Olympias, although, *pace* Plutarch, doubtless with Alexander's knowledge and approval.

Those who have considered the significance of the Philippeum have often assumed that, after the departure of Alexander and Olympias for exile, Philip would never have allowed an image of Olympias to stand in the Philippeum and they have therefore concluded that it was Alexander, after his father's death, who included his mother in the Philippeum's statue program. The presence of Olympias' statue in the building, however, cannot be used to date the Philippeum.<sup>75</sup> Such interpretation fails to convince because it depends on a mistaken understanding of the quarrel between Philip and Alexander, the Macedonian political situation, royal Macedonian marriage, and the nature of the monument. The quarrel occurred between father and son at a male drinking party. Olympias was not present. Her son took her with him when he left Macedonia because Attalus' insult, whether it referred to ethnicity, whether it implied that Philip was not Alexander's father, or whether it simply denigrated the status of Olympias' family in comparison to that of Attalus, implicitly involved Olympias. Even if, as Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.3) argues, Olympias' difficult and jealous nature led her to exacerbate tensions between Philip and Alexander, her involvement in the quarrel was indirect. Philip had not divorced

Olympias. He was polygamous and as the famous Satyrus passage preserved in Athenaeus (Ath. 13.557b–e) explains, he brought Cleopatra in beside Olympias. The affront was not the marriage itself, as Alexander's presence at the wedding symposium indicates, but rather Attalus' interpretation of its significance and Philip's either tacit approval or actual support for this interpretation, an interpretation that threatened Alexander's viability as heir to the throne. Since the quarrel involved Philip and Alexander, so did the public reconciliation. Though I believe that Olympias also returned to Macedonia, as Plutarch (*Mor.* 179c) explicitly states, her involvement in the reconciliation was secondary and indirect, just as her involvement in the quarrel had been. Thus, if one believes that Philip would have altered the dynastic image created by the statues in the Philippeum because of the quarrel, one must conclude that he would have removed both Alexander's image and that of Olympias.<sup>76</sup> Since the public reconciliation followed the quarrel fairly quickly, had Philip contemplated the purging of statues, the reconciliation would have required the restoration of his original plans. Since the trigger for the now settled quarrel had been an insult that implied an affront to Olympias, her image had to be restored as well. After all, the figure of Olympias was part of the statue group not because she was Philip's wife (if that were the case, six other female images would have been present) but because she was the mother of Alexander.

The purpose of marriage in the Greek world was the production of legitimate children. This was even more true of royal marriages where the creation of heirs was of prime importance.<sup>77</sup> Marriages were arranged between males, typically the guardians of the women, and the grooms. In Macedonia, however, royal fathers sometimes arranged marriages for their sons, not the sons themselves. Romantic or erotic passion was not the impetus for marriage. Despite the claims of Plutarch and others that Philip's marriages to Olympias and Cleopatra were both prompted by *erōs*, each had an obvious political context. The rivalry between the clans of Olympias and Cleopatra was not about Philip's sexual preference for one over the other, but about which would be the mother of Philip's heir.

Nor is it likely that Philip's current sexual preferences had anything to do with the Philippeum. This elaborate and expensive monument within the sacred precinct at Olympia was a carefully crafted public work, not the ancient equivalent of a paparazzi photo indicating who was in and who was out in Philip's sex life.<sup>78</sup> Granted Philip's many marriages and amours with both men and women, the statue population of the structure would have had to change with great frequency, had that been the case.

Another argument, based primarily on a mistaken understanding of the contemporary political events, has arisen in terms of the placement of the portrait images in the Philippeum. While physical evidence, as we have seen, strongly suggests that the two women's images were placed at either end of the semicircle, it does not indicate the order or placement of the male images. Some have suggested that, after the death of Philip, Alexander changed the intended order of the statues and had his own image rather than Philip's<sup>79</sup> placed in the central position.<sup>80</sup> This notion is implausible for a number of reasons. For one thing, as Pausanias twice remarks, nearly five centuries later, the building was known as the "Philippeum," nomenclature unlikely to have endured had the structure focused on the image of Alexander not Philip. Had it nonetheless done so, such a discrepancy between name and content would likely have inspired comment by Pausanias. Since Pausanias mentions the statue of Philip first, one might conclude that this too indicates that Philip's image remained the central one.

In any event, reflection on the political situation in Alexander's first two years as king, the period during which the Philippeum was surely completed, makes it virtually impossible to imagine that Alexander would have dared to implement such a change. As we have seen, thanks to the recent troubles in Philip's household, rumors of Alexander's involvement in his father's death persisted. His hold on the throne was initially not strong and he had to work hard to gain recognition as his father's successor as head of the Asian expedition. We know that he claimed to have pursued and punished his father's murderers. Much of what he did was geared to indicate that he was Philip's legitimate successor. Years later Alexander could flirt with the idea that he was the son of a god and distance himself in various ways from Philip's image and reputation, but not at the beginning of his reign. Before his successes in Asia, with Philip's murder and the suspicions it engendered fresh in everyone's mind, the last thing Alexander would have done, whether or not Philip's plans for the order of the statues was generally known, was to put himself rather than his father in the central position in the dedication his father had planned. Indeed, I will suggest that the entire statue program of the Philippeum, while in no way antagonistic to Alexander's interests between 336 and 334, better fits Philip's needs and goals than those of Alexander.

Having spent a great deal of time on what the Philippeum is *not* about, let us now turn to analysis of what it was about and why. I will start by discussing the implications of the absence of various portraits from the Philippeum group. No image of Zeus or Heracles, the divine ancestors of the Argeads, was present. The Philippeum is not about the divine ancestry

of the Argeads and does not directly refer to it (although, as we have seen, its location may allude to it). Despite the fact that Olympia was the supposed site of Alexander I's victory, the Philippeum does not include an image of the most famous of the ancestors of the contemporary Argeads, nor any of Alexander's less famous successors. Moreover, it is not even a short complete lineage: Amyntas III is there but his two sons, Philip's full brothers, who ruled after Amyntas, were not depicted. Nor are his nephew or his three half-brothers or Philip's other son, Arrhidaeus. The inclusion of royal women in the monument is interesting, but like the male statues, the images of royal women represent a selection: Amyntas' other wife, Gygaea, is not there, nor his daughter Eurynoe. None of Philip's daughters appear.

The selection principle for the statues is not broad or inclusive: it centers on Philip and shows us his father (thus his claim to be king) and his heir (thus his ability to perpetuate rule). The two women are there primarily because they are part of these two claims, although, as I will suggest, there may have been other reasons as well why these two royal women appeared. When one thinks about why this particular edition of the Argead family tree was generated, the most obvious answer is that the edition is a response to past and continuing dynastic controversy. Philip and probably Amyntas were polygamous, but each is shown as though he were monogamous and as though each had only one male heir. Such a picture of the Macedonian royal family doubtless went down more easily in the monogamous south, but that is not the only reason it was constructed. The Philippeum tidies up Macedonian mess, not only in terms of contested and complex successions, but also in terms of bad publicity. Eurydice, as we have seen, had her share. In the 330s memories of past scandals and controversies would have begun to fade, but not for men of Philip's generation and not for Philip. As we have seen, a number of earlier Macedonian monuments commemorated her publicly, probably for the same reason. Olympias' statue had to be there not simply because she was the mother of Alexander but also because its presence in the statue group confirmed the reconciliation and indicated that Attalus' slurs had no validity. As we have already noted, the physical structure of the Philippeum, particularly the placement of the statues on the high semicircular base, generates an image of unity and comparative homogeneity.

While nothing in the version of the Argead dynasty constructed by this statue group would have been contrary to Alexander's interests early in his reign, it is a construct more likely produced by Philip than by his son.<sup>81</sup> One doubts that Alexander would have bothered with his grandfather, dead long before he was born and anything but distinguished in his

accomplishments. In the early years of his reign, Alexander's claim to legitimate power within and without Macedonia depended much less on his more distant lines of descent (shared, for instance, by his cousin Amyntas) and largely on the fact that he was the son of the most powerful monarch Macedonia had ever seen, the man who had managed to dominate the entire Greek peninsula. Particularly for the audience at Olympia, it mattered much more that he was the son of Philip II than that he was an Argead. While Eurydice, as I have suggested, may have lived into the early years of Philip's reign and thus have been personally known to her grandson, he, unlike his father, had no particular need to highlight her position in the family tree.

The inclusion of Amyntas and Eurydice in the group is much more likely Philip's idea, one then faithfully followed by his son. Quite apart from any personal affection his parents may have inspired, Philip's experiences made him more likely to want to commemorate them. During his childhood and youth, Macedonia had been an unstable backwater. His father and brothers had to make inglorious concessions to various foreign powers and had no great victories. His own ability to reach the throne depended in part on the advocacy of the Athenian Iphicrates and on his mother's ability to persuade Iphicrates to act. He spent a humiliating period as a Theban hostage. Though the Argeads' claims to Hellenic ethnicity were, however genuine, at least fairly old by Philip's day, Eurydice's ethnicity was apparently challenged, as we have already noted. Despite the fact that Philip was a hereditary ruler, he was in a sense a self-made man and not one inclined to conceal his roots or forget his past. The Philippeum flaunts it and, by doing so, refers to Philip's own success. He had little interest in demonstrating that he was part of the long Argead line, much more in highlighting his immediate place in it.

Indeed, as we have noted, Pausanias associates the Philippeum with Philip's greatest success, the battle of Chaeronea and the control of the Greek peninsula it guaranteed. This leads me to the question of why Philip chose to put this severely edited version of his family in the sacred precinct of the great panhellenic shrine, in such an ambiguous building, with statues of such suggestive fabrication. I have explained why, I think, the statue group was constituted as it was but not what it was doing at Olympia. Some scholars have argued that the Philippeum was not a monument to Philip's military victory over the leading Greek states but instead intended as a dedication to panhellenic unity, something meant to de-emphasize Greek defeat and instead focus on the panhellenic crusade Philip was about to lead. Some have even seen it as his diplomatic center for his role as *hēgemōn* of the Corinthian League.<sup>82</sup> While both Philip and Alexander were

sometimes conciliatory to some Greek powers, most notably the Athenians whose aid they needed, they were not so to all and not all the time. Olympia was full of plunder dedicated to the gods, some of it from the defeat of fellow Greeks, and the Hellenic world was hardly one which was self-effacing about military success.

The Philippeum does not appear to have been one of Philip's conciliatory gestures. It is hard to see what would have been panhellenic about the monument and its contents, other than its location. What Philip did was create a structure that embodied hereditary royal power and imply that this power might be divine (certainly godlike). He put this structure in the very heart of the great Greek shrine. The presence of female portraits, particularly in such a political context, would have been comparatively unusual in the 330s and would inevitably have reminded the Greeks about one of the things they did not like about monarchy, the role of royal women and the distressing blurring of public/private lines. The Philippeum was a statement about Macedonian *δυναστεία* *dunasteia* (power, rule), past, present and future, about what Philip's victory meant to Greeks: Argead domination. It was the dynastic version of Philip's decision to have his own "godlike" statue paraded with those of the twelve Olympians (Diod. 16.92.5), another gesture directed at an international Greek audience, the one he had invited to Aegae. Thus the Philippeum and its statue program were at once subtle and nuanced and at the same time blatant and defiant about Philip's power and that of his family.

Apart from his probable role in the completion of the Philippeum, Alexander is not known for his interest in the creation of a dynastic image. Alexander's dynastic image-shaping, though less architectural in nature, seems to have followed his father's prototype in some respects and diverged from it in others. Certainly it is true that we know of no dynastic monument constructed during Alexander's reign, though many individual portraits of him were created and he appeared in other kinds of non-family groups. Nor did he practice marriage politics on his father's scale, a practice that contributed so much to Philip's dynastic image, though not in the specific case of the Philippeum. Alexander's postponement of marriage and thus procreation of legitimate heirs is notorious. Many have seen this as proof of his lack of interest in dynasty, let alone the creation of a dynastic image. As I have argued elsewhere,<sup>83</sup> this view is something of an exaggeration; in some respects Alexander emulated his father's marriage policy, but on a smaller scale and only when his position was more stable. The wives he took, when he finally did so, were all Asian and their controversial ethnicity certainly explains their comparative lack of prominence, but the placement of his marriage to the daughter of Darius



in the splendid context of the mass marriages at Susa, as well as his familial treatment of the women of Darius' family in general, speaks to a desire to create a new and partly Asian dynastic image.

In any event, in a selective manner reminiscent of the Philippeum, Alexander's public acts did create a dynastic image involving some of his female kin. Though he ignored his two half-sisters, he sent plunder to his mother and his full sister Cleopatra. Olympias made a showy dedication at Delphi from this plunder. Olympias and her daughter, now the widow of Alexander of Molossia, played a prominent role in attempts to guarantee the grain supply of their countries, a role quite possibly inspired, and perhaps funded, by Alexander. Both mother and sister were known to have influence with Alexander. Both exercised some degree of political power, power that Alexander may well have encouraged them to exert for various reasons of their own. Alexander's identification, by himself and by others, as an Aeacid, that is as a member of his mother's clan, an odd and unusual thing in a world so patrilineal and patriarchal, may have been an element in his tendency to highlight and elevate these two women, since his mother was the daughter of an Aeacid king and his sister the wife of another.<sup>84</sup>

As we have seen, the career of Philip's mother demonstrates the growing importance of women in the Argead public image, a growth at least partly tied to the elevation and distancing of the monarch and monarchy from the rest of the Macedonian elite. As monarchs became more special, so did the women of their families, particularly their mothers. In this Alexander clearly continued his father's policy. In the Philippeum, Philip had hinted at the divine qualities of his mother and wife, and Alexander, if we believe Curtius (9.6.26, 10.5.30), may have planned to deify his mother after her death. If this assertion is true, it could have been part of yet another dynastic image, one that gave Alexander two divine parents, Zeus-Ammon and Olympias.

Unlike Philip, Alexander excluded other royal males from the dynastic image: he murdered his cousin Amyntas and tried to consign his cousin's widow, Alexander's own half-sister, to barbarian obscurity. He allowed his half-brother Arrhidaeus to live and, at least in the last year of Alexander's reign, allotted him ritual tasks associated with ancestral cult, but hardly emphasized his role. Had Arrhidaeus not been mentally limited, even this modest involvement in Argead image-making might not have occurred. Of course, had Alexander lived long enough to see the birth of his son by Roxane, he might well have evolved a dynastic image even more like that which Philip constructed in the Philippeum, just as his marriage policy began to develop a resemblance to his father's.

Once Alexander was dead, in the absence of viable adult Argead males, Alexander's female kin in effect became the dynastic image. Circumstances gave unusual if temporary prominence and some power to these women, but their ability to stand for the dynasty, for the memory of Philip and Alexander, is what enabled them to act and what ultimately led to the murder of each.<sup>85</sup> Arguably the collapse of the Antipatrid dynasty after the death of Cassander had much to do with a negative dynastic image: he and one of his sons as the murderers of Argeads, the murderers of the Argead dynasty. Of course, in the period of the Successors, as the Argead dynasty was dying out, many Macedonian elite families sought to transform themselves into royal dynasties. Family statue groups became common.<sup>86</sup> By the end of the period of the Successors, three new dynasties had emerged, though others would follow. Each, though influenced by Argead dynastic construction, would develop its own distinctive dynastic image, one that sometimes changed over time.

Having discussed the Argead prototypes for the construction of dynastic images including women, the paper will look briefly at two Hellenistic examples of dynastic image-construction and consider why some include and even highlight the role of the women of the dynasty and others do not. I will mention a few general aspects of the construction of dynastic image in the period of the Successors and the early Hellenistic period and then briefly consider two specific examples. As the Successors made the transition from being merely generals of Alexander to being kings themselves, they, like Philip and Alexander before them, used military victory and royal women as tools in the process of legitimization of their power as royal.<sup>87</sup> They founded cities and named them after themselves, as Philip and Alexander had, but also after their kin, including their female kin. All but the Antigonids (at least in Macedonia itself) moved past Philip and Alexander in the direction of cults, sometimes private, sometimes public, of individual males and their wives. Lifetime cults to royal women, like those for men, appear to predate the use of a royal title by either. In another generation, dynastic cults began to develop, also involving royal women. What the Philippeum had merely hinted at now became common practice. Whereas Eurydice and Olympias had no titles and appear in inscriptions simply with their personal names, sometimes with patronymics, in the era of the Successors, virtually as soon as they took royal titles, royal women began to employ and be referred to by a title, *basilissa*. In some if not all dynasties, king's daughters as well as king's wives used the title. Whereas some of the Successors imitated the polygamy of Philip and Alexander and employed marriage politics to build legitimacy and support, the popularity of royal polygamy had declined by the early third century, though it

probably did not disappear. Philip and Alexander, hereditary kings, had not needed to legitimize their rule within Macedonia whereas legitimization was a central concern of the upstart Successors and thus of their dynastic images.<sup>88</sup>

In general, the very broad dynastic image of the early Argead period, with its comparative lack of emphasis on individual Argeads, that had begun to narrow during the reigns of Philip and Alexander, continued to narrow yet more, though the manner in which it did so varied from dynasty to dynasty. Two monuments, one Antigonid, one Ptolemaic, illustrate versions of this process.

Around the middle of the third century BC, Antigonus Gonatas dedicated a huge stoa at Delos' sanctuary to Apollo.<sup>89</sup> This probably happened during the period in which the Antigonids reestablished their naval power.<sup>90</sup> The Antigonids, the last of the Hellenistic dynasties to establish a secure dynastic base, not surprisingly claimed, like the Argeads, to be Heraclids and probably also claimed descent from the Argeads themselves.<sup>91</sup> Despite the fact that his father had tried and failed to establish lasting rule in Macedonia, Antigonus Gonatas finally managed the task and was thus the real founder of the Antigonid dynastic image. In front of Antigonus' stoa stood a long pedestal supporting bronze statues, probably twenty-one in all.<sup>92</sup> A central inscription gave Antigonus' dedication and described the statue group as *progonoi* (ancestors); below each statue was an inscription naming the individual.<sup>93</sup> Unlike the Philippeum, this monument really did attempt to constitute a fairly full lineage. Granted that the cuttings in the statue base at the left end of the monument are much larger than those for the other statues, Gonatas' monument almost certainly began with a statue of a founding divinity,<sup>94</sup> most likely Heracles,<sup>95</sup> and moved in chronological order from left to right.<sup>96</sup> The cuttings in the surviving statue bases indicate that the images that once stood on these bases were all male. This granted, the seven statues with no physical remains were probably also male.<sup>97</sup> If so, this would be in keeping with the generally narrow presentation of monarchy in Antigonid Macedonia. Unlike the Philippeum, Antigonus' monument was only about a long line of kings and about the legitimacy of their rule. It was not so much a dynastic monument as a king-list in statuary form.

Compared to other Hellenistic dynasties, after the career of Demetrius Poliorcetes, women played a fairly limited role in Antigonid monarchy.<sup>98</sup> Whereas dynastic murder of royal women and by royal women was rife in the other dynasties, no one bothered to murder any Antigonid royal women; they simply were not important enough to murder. Even when two royal sons competed for the succession, their mothers (or their

mothers' families) did not function as their succession advocates. Antigonus' monument stresses the antiquity, distinction, divine origin and length of his dynasty in a way that the Philippeum, a construct of a king whose family had ruled for centuries, did not need to do, and it eliminated royal women from the dynastic construct because, in a monarchic world where multiple wives were scarcer and, when they did exist, did not generally create competing heirs, there was no need to signal which competing line was the one chosen. Antigonid women sometimes received cult outside Macedonia but, like their husbands and fathers, not within Macedonia. Whether one concludes that royal cult did not develop in Macedonia and thus elevate women because it was unnecessary and they were unimportant, or whether one concludes that they were unimportant partly because royal cult did not establish itself, the Antigonid dynastic image largely excludes women. They patronized shrines and did charitable work like elite women everywhere. Apart from these modest roles, they played no part in the construction of dynastic identity.

The Ptolemies, of course, were another matter. Long before brother-sister marriage became standard dynastic practice and yet longer before any Ptolemaic women co-ruled with a Ptolemaic male, there were signs of a very different construction of dynastic identity from that of the Antigonids, one that involved royal women to a much greater degree. Though Ptolemy I probably claimed to be a son of Philip II, the Ptolemies, as is well known, based most of their claims to legitimacy on association with Alexander and control of his corpse and tomb. The conqueror's tomb became the foundation of the royal cult that they would found.

Ptolemy II is considered the primary creator of the dynastic cult. He began with the establishment of cult to his parents, Ptolemy I and Berenice I, as the Savior gods. Ptolemy II also became the first Ptolemy to marry his full sister, Arsinoë II. Theocritus (17.121–8) refers to chryselephantine statue pairs of Ptolemy and Berenice commissioned by Ptolemy II, erected in temples, statues to which Ptolemy II and Arsinoë II sacrificed.<sup>99</sup> Many factors led to the establishment of a royal Ptolemaic cult, the growth in the practice of brother-sister marriage, and ultimately co-rule of male and female Ptolemies. One factor, however, is critical to this early formation of Ptolemaic dynastic power in terms of royal spousal pairs: polygamy. Ptolemy I had two major wives, Eurydice and Berenice, but ultimately chose as his heir his son by Berenice and rejected Eurydice's son. Rivalry between the two Ptolemaic lines continued through the activities of the daughters of Ptolemy's two wives, but Berenice's daughter triumphed and she ultimately returned to Egypt and married her full brother, thus reinforcing the definition of the Ptolemaic dynasty as that descended from

the children of Berenice. The statue pair, though it was not apparently part of a larger group that showed the founding parents with their married children, nonetheless signaled, as did the Philippeum, by selection, what the official version of the dynasty would now be. Their children joined themselves to the image by the offerings they made to the chryselephantine pair. This statue pairing demonstrated a construction of dynastic identity and image that not only preferred one line of descent to another but gave an early indication of the importance of royal pairs in the construction of the Ptolemaic dynastic image.

Dynastic images are not generic but variable.<sup>100</sup> In effect all dynastic images are selective, but the principle of selection varies with the needs and circumstances of those constructing the image. Constructions of dynastic power that were inclusive of both genders as well as those that involved only males could entail and support configurations of dynastic power which were either extended over many generations or concentrated on a comparatively brief period of time and a relatively narrow selection of individuals from the dynasty in question.

Those who included royal women focused on the familial aspects of royal power whereas those who excluded them were less interested in familial power and more in an understanding of kingship as an office or position held by a series of individuals. Such constructs portrayed not rule but rulers. The inclusion of women as a prominent aspect of a given dynasty's image was not necessarily a function of the power of individual royal women, though it could be, and certainly it could generate more power and prominence for the women depicted. The presence of women in a dynastic image certainly indicated recognition of their role in the line of descent and rejection of the understanding of human conception advocated by Apollo in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* (657–73). Given the concern of virtually all these dynasties to acquire wives of distinguished family and the problems of rulers whose mother's lineage could be slighted, such recognition is unsurprising. Generally, rulers involved women in their formation of a dynastic image when they perceived that their involvement somehow aided their assertions of legitimacy and contributed to the stability of their rule. Philip and Alexander provided important models for the construction of the dynastic images of the Hellenistic period, though not the only ones. The degree to which Hellenistic dynasts imitated the dynastic constructions of Philip and Alexander depended on their individual circumstances.<sup>101</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> On the dubious historicity of these two Herodotean passages, see discussion and references in Roos 1985; Greenwalt 1986; Borza 1992, 102, 110–13; and Adams 2003. The point is not the literal historicity of these two tales but the construction of dynastic identity that they support.

<sup>2</sup> See discussions in Borza 1982; Greenwalt 1985 and 1986b.

<sup>3</sup> On Macedonian coins and their imagery, see Price 1974. See recent discussion of the mounted rider on Macedonian coins and the significance of the persistence of the image in Carney 2002, 60–61; see also Greenwalt 1993. A sense for the continuity of the imagery of Argead coins can easily be gained by viewing Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos 1980, 28–29, 50, Pls. 13–16, 28.

<sup>4</sup> For Archelaus, see Greenwalt 2003. On Argead sponsorship of Hellenic artists pre-Philip II, see Carney 2003, 50–52.

<sup>5</sup> Greenwalt 2003, 142–4 stresses the impact within Macedonia, noting subsequent Macedonian love of ostentation. Robertson 1982, 241 suggests that figured mosaic floors may have originated with this palace, through the work of Zeuxis, the artist Aelian mentions. Certainly, later in the century, Pella was critical to the development of pebble mosaic.

<sup>6</sup> On the reign of Philip, see Griffith 1979; Borza 1992, 198–276.

<sup>7</sup> The once standard dating of the palace at Vergina to the time of Cassander has recently been questioned and many now date it to the reign of Philip; see references in Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2001, 210 n. 33. Similarly, although some disagree, many now accept Nielsen's dating of buildings I and II at Pella to the reign of Philip II also; see discussion and references in Hatzopoulos 2001, 192.

<sup>8</sup> See discussion and references in Carney 2003, 52–53.

<sup>9</sup> Carney 2000a, 52–76.

<sup>10</sup> See Carney 2000a, 203–207, particularly for the idea (based on W. R. Connor's analysis of festivals) that such events built unity by creating a communal experience. In this case, the community in question, the audience for the dynastic image, was both Macedonian and international.

<sup>11</sup> On the career of Eurydice, see Mortensen 1992; Carney 2000a, 40–46.

<sup>12</sup> Eurydice's actual ethnicity is disputed. I believe that she was part-Illyrian but it is certain that several ancient sources claim that she was Illyrian (see Carney 2000a, 41).

<sup>13</sup> Mortensen 1992, 156–71; Ogden 1999, 11–16.

<sup>14</sup> Many scholars believe that the essay is not Plutarch's work; see references in Mortensen 1992, n. 16.

<sup>15</sup> Scholarly discussions (e.g. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 401–03) of this passage have often ignored the emendations to the inscription recorded in "Plutarch" by Wilhem and Robert and Robert (see references in Carney 2000a, 271 n.34). Whereas previously one had to deduce that the Eurydice referred to was Philip's mother, the Roberts' emendation (made after the discovery of the first Vergina inscription) recognized her patronymic in the text and thus makes her identification certain.

<sup>16</sup> Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 401–03 suggests that it was a statue of Pothos, but her suggestion is not persuasive if one accepts the emendations of the text (see above).

<sup>17</sup> See discussion and references in Carney 2000a, 45 n. 32.

<sup>18</sup> See Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 287–97 and Drougou and Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 28–31. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 394, on the basis of the lettering of the Eucleia

inscriptions, dates Eurydice's dedications to 350–325, but will not rule out 375–350. No ancient source refers to activities of Eurydice's later than 368 and she was almost certainly dead by 346 (see Carney 2000a, 41–43). Her husband's reign was troubled and he died in 369. Her son Alexander II ruled only briefly (370/69–367) before he was assassinated and her second son Perdiccas, who also had to deal with dynastic violence, ruled briefly (365–359) and died in battle. Philip II followed his brother in rule. The combined evidence of the lettering, our knowledge of events, and the relative probability of temple construction in troubled times suggests that a date early in Philip II's reign is most likely, although one in that of his brother Perdiccas is possible.

<sup>19</sup> See recent discussion and references, though not necessarily conclusions in Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 395. It is not clear how relevant Eucleia cults elsewhere in Greece, like those to Artemis-Eucleia, are to the cult at Aegae. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli understands the cult as “political” but my own inclination is to connect the dedication less to specific events and more to the general notion of *kleos*.

<sup>20</sup> A fragmentary inscription found at Dion contains the name of Eurydice's father, Sirras. It may represent the remains of another dedication of hers; see reference in Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 393 n. 41, 103.

<sup>21</sup> See discussion and references in Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 397–400.

<sup>22</sup> Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 399.

<sup>23</sup> On the early excavation of the Philippeum, see references in Lapatin 2001, 115 n.176. For major discussions, see Gardiner 1925, 128–36; Zschietzschmann 1944, 24–52; Wiesner 1939, 105–07; Drees 1968, 121–23; Mallwitz 1972, 128–33; Miller 1973; Borbein 1973, 66–67; Fredricksmeyer 1979, 52–56; Griffith 1979, 691–5; Badian 1981, 71; Seiler 1986, 89–103; Borza 1992, 250; Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 131–34; and Lapatin 2001, 115–19. See also Huwendiek 1996.

<sup>24</sup> Carney 1995, 380–81; Carney 2000a, 211–16 and 2000b, 24–30. See also Mirón Pérez 1998b.

<sup>25</sup> *Archaeology* 2004, 24.

<sup>26</sup> For discussions of the possible date and motivation of their removal: see Gardiner 1925, 213; Drees 1968, 113; Mirón Pérez 1998b, 223; Carney 2000b, 24 n. 17. Whereas once I thought a late fourth- or early third-century date likely, I am now more inclined to conclude that their removal was recent in Pausanias' day. The inclusion of both women in the removal makes it less likely to be tied to early Hellenistic politics and more likely to be a response related to discomfort with gender roles seen as unconventional.

<sup>27</sup> The end of the text of Pausanias 5.17.4 is corrupt and 5.20.10 simply calls her “Eurydice,” but the Eurydice referred to can only be Philip's mother: see Lapatin 2000, 116–17, especially n. 198. Whether or not Philip's last bride was ever called “Eurydice” (Arrian 3.6.5 does that but may do so in error), neither Philip nor Alexander would have put both women in the same monument (Griffith 1979, 693 n. 4); the same applies to other royal women sometimes known by that name: Audata and Philip's granddaughter Adea Eurydice.

<sup>28</sup> Badian 1981, 71 doubted this assumption. One would expect Pausanias to name a donor if Philip were not that person.

<sup>29</sup> Lapatin 2001, 117 n. 202: none of the architectural elements that would indicate orientation were found *in situ*. Suggestions about its orientation tend to be based on the writer's assumptions about the nature of the building: Zschietzschmann 1944, 22

thinks it faced east and cannot have faced west because of the proximity of the wall of the Altis; Drees 1968, 123 thinks it faced south; Thompson 1982, 174 thinks it faced east, stressing its association with the nearby Pelopeum; Seiler 1986, 90 suggests an eastern entrance, replicating that of the Pelopeum.

<sup>30</sup> Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 133 and Seiler 1986, 98 seem to picture observation only from the doorway, a distance of about six meters from the statue base. Borbein 1973, 67 believes that some of the figures (not just one) would have been visible from the entrance. Seiler 1986, 97 believes that the windows were so high that they served only as a light source, not as a means of display. The central figure would surely have been visible from some distance from the entrance, if the door were open.

<sup>31</sup> Lapatin 2001, 116, who also suggests that traces of paint on parts of the end blocks of the base imply a different place of deposition, something that would, presumably, have happened to the two previously-removed female statues. As Borbein 1973, 66 notes, the fact that the female statues were moved suggests that they were on the two ends of the base. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 398 n. 78, since she believes that the statue base found at Palatitsia was part of a statue group that duplicated that of the Philippeum, suggests that Eurydice's right-hand position in the Palatitsia monument (as she reconstitutes it) signifies that Eurydice stood on the extreme right at the Philippeum as well. See also Hitzl 1995, 11–12.

<sup>32</sup> Lapatin 2000, 118, though agreeing that the gold and ivory fabrication implies connections to divinity, warns against overemphasis on this point because "There is no evidence that chryselephantine materials alone signified divinity..." On the other hand, Seiler 1986, 101–2 goes further than the evidence in suggesting that these materials had already been used for human beings.

<sup>33</sup> Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 134. See below for an exception, the tyrant of Syracuse.

<sup>34</sup> See discussion and references in Fredricksmeyer (2003, 254–55, especially n. 5).

<sup>35</sup> Gordon 1979, 12. See also references in Carney 2000b, 27, n. 30.

<sup>36</sup> Cult statues were not always larger than life but often were. Gordon 1979, 14 links size to an indication of "otherness." See Carney 2000b, 29 n. 43 for references and discussion of the size of the Philippeum images and now Lapatin 2001, 116 n. 185. See also Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 131–32. Both conclude, *contra* Borbein 1973, 70, that the statues were approximately life-size but probably not larger.

<sup>37</sup> Gardiner (1925, 133) lists the height of the base as 1.92 meters; Schleif 1944, 21, especially p. 17), appears to suggest a height of only about .914 meters; and Seiler 1986, 98 calculates a height of 1.73 meters. Even Schleif's lower estimate would require that an observer in this small building would look sharply upward. See references in Seiler (1986, 98 n. 409) on the effect of high bases on the viewer.

<sup>38</sup> Lapatin (2000, 118). Diod. (16.92.5) says they were expensive and elaborate and that Philip's was suitable for a god but does not directly describe the materials of which they were made.

<sup>39</sup> Gordon 1979. See further discussion and references in Lapatin 2001, 5 and Elsner 1996.

<sup>40</sup> Borza 1990, 250. Borbein 1973, 67 interprets the monument as purposely distancing and separating the viewer from the images; she sees this as part of a general phenomenon of the period (often involving higher statue bases) but possessing greater significance in the case of the Philippeum.

<sup>41</sup> See Thompson 1982, 174; Lapatin 2001, 117 for discussion and references to



these mythic associations. Lapatin himself, noting the proximity to the Pelopeum, suggests that Pelops may have served as a model for Philip as leader of Greece. Huwendiek 1996, 155–56 argues for a more elaborate scheme involving the locations of temples at several shrines.

<sup>42</sup> See Adams 2003 on Philip's Olympic activities and the possibility that Archelaus, another early Macedonian king, had also won Olympic victories.

<sup>43</sup> Stewart 1990, 46.

<sup>44</sup> Roux 1984, 154 sees this as characteristic of treasuries.

<sup>45</sup> Drees 1968, 122. Thompson 1982, 173 oddly considers this a “modest” choice as a location, atypical of Philip, yet later he refers to the location as having “high visibility.” The latter is a more reasonable description than the former.

<sup>46</sup> Roux 1984, 15. Some treasuries were actually difficult to enter.

<sup>47</sup> Roux 1984, 170.

<sup>48</sup> Fredricksmeyer's suggestion (1979, 52) that the Philippeum demonstrates Philip's intent to found a dynastic cult, has no evidentiary basis. Roux 1984, 158–62 discusses it as a type of structure he considers a temple-treasury, one where cult did not take place (other than prayers), built to house precious statues and display them. He believed that the *tholos* at Delphi is an example of this category. Clearly the Philippeum could fit this category. Roux himself (1984, 169–70) is unclear in his categorization of the Philippeum, terming it a treasury at one point but, a few sentences later, apparently seeing it as an example of the temple-treasury, evolving into yet another form, the temple-museum.

<sup>49</sup> See Roux 1984, 166–70; Lapatin 2001, 114, 117 n. 202 for discussion and references.

<sup>50</sup> *Contra* Momigliano 1934, 174–ff.

<sup>51</sup> Lapatin 2001, 118.

<sup>52</sup> Roux 1984, 167 sees *tholoi* as comparatively rare because of construction difficulties and thus expensive. In terms of the Philippeum, he suggests (1984, 170) that the *tholos* form may have been chosen partly because of the space constraints of its location and partly because it attracted attention.

<sup>53</sup> Miller 1973 suggested that the Philippeum's mix of styles may have been characteristic of Macedonian art. She presciently (1973, 217) commented that future excavations might confirm her thesis and, in fact, they have. Borza 1992, 268, writing after the discovery of the royal tombs at Vergina and the consequent explosive growth of Macedonian archaeology, describes the “eclecticism” of Macedonian taste and style.

<sup>54</sup> Lapatin 2001, 117 warns against easy categorizations of the Philippeum and observes that it and its images “cross many boundaries.”

<sup>55</sup> Waywell 1978, 77–78, 105; 1989, 29 points to the proliferation of monuments or statue groups of families in the late fourth century and argues that the Mausoleum was the model for the Philippeum and other structures.

<sup>56</sup> See further discussion in Carney 2000b, 26–27 and 2005. See also Nourse 2002, 74, 99.

<sup>57</sup> The Mausoleum's roots lay in Anatolian funerary monument tradition, particularly in terms of its memorialization of a whole dynasty, not just Mausolus. The Nereid monument is often mentioned in this context. See discussion and references in Nourse 2002, 97.

<sup>58</sup> Stewart 1990, 181 considers 36 of these images portraits. Waywell 1978, 77

78,105; 1989, 29) suggests that the monument was a συγγενικόν/ *suggenikon* (hereditary monument), one that included both male and female members of the dynasty, citing the portrait-like quality of some female statues, their colossal size, and the past tradition of statues of female members of the dynasty. Hornblower 1982, 268–71 accepts this idea and seems to assume that female ancestors (real or fictional) would be included. So also Gunter 1989, 92; Nourse, 2002, 92. Granted the formal involvement of Hecatomnid women in some aspects of rule (however modest their actual role), it seems likely that they would have been included in a dynastic monument.

<sup>59</sup> Nourse 2002, 94 argues that the Mausoleum was intended to raise the Hecatomnid dynasty above and apart from other dynasties, legitimizing it by making it seem royal. The Philippeum makes similar claims, though here the competition is not other dynasties but city-states.

<sup>60</sup> Nourse 2002, 99–100; Carney 2005.

<sup>61</sup> Nourse 2002, 100 suggests this about the Mausoleum but it applies to the Philippeum as well.

<sup>62</sup> Lapatin 2001, 109–114.

<sup>63</sup> See Borbein 1973, 63; Lapatin 2001, 105–9 for discussion and references.

<sup>64</sup> The date of the “Seven” has been disputed but Lapatin 2001, 106 argues convincingly for c. 425–17. He observes, on the basis of the size and height of the statue bases, that they could have been larger than life-size.

<sup>65</sup> Borbein 1973, 63–64; Onians 1979, 157–59.

<sup>66</sup> Onians 1979, 158.

<sup>67</sup> Onians 1979, 157–58, who sees it as the first example of a row of statues given a chronological order and meaning. Borbein 1973, 64 thinks the monument should be read from center going toward the left. See below on the order of the Philippeum statuary.

<sup>68</sup> Borbein 1973, 63 notes that they were all placed on the left side of the base and that the right was empty.

<sup>69</sup> Onians 1979, 158 sees it as influenced by the Argive monument. Ridgway 2001, 46–49 believes that it post-dates the Philippeum by a few years. See also Borbein 1973, 79–84 as well as Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 134–47 who implausibly sees the conception of the group as similar to the Philippeum.

<sup>70</sup> Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 134.

<sup>71</sup> Borbein 1973, 80–81.

<sup>72</sup> Borbein 1973, 61–62; Onians 1979, 158, who notes that a statue group in a semicircle, as opposed to a group in a line, makes the viewer more clearly aware that one is “looking at a group not at a series of individual statues” and that the viewer can be equally close to each statue. He adds that semicircular groups are less appropriate when the point of the monument is the passage of generations, of time.

<sup>73</sup> Fredricksmeyer 1979, 55 n. 45 believes that it could have been finished during Philip’s lifetime since he considers it likely that Leochares worked with assistants. Most scholars reject the idea that the work could have been completed in Philip’s lifetime. See discussion in Lapatin 2001, 116. Much more improbable is the idea (Momigliano 1934, 174–5) that the Philippeum had no statues originally and that Alexander had them added in 324, intending the creation of a dynastic cult, not just the one to Olympias which Curtius (9.6.26; 10.5.30) says he planned. As Fredricksmeyer observes (1979, 54) the idea is not only too hypothetical but also it is

highly unlikely that Alexander would have planned a dynastic cult in 324 that centered on Philip.

<sup>74</sup> See Carney 1992 for a lengthier exposition of my own views on this period and for references to other discussions. What follows represents a brief summary of this longer discussion.

<sup>75</sup> Fredricksmeyer 1979, 53; Seiler 1986, 101; Carney 1992; 2000b, 25 n.20, *contra* Momigliano 1934, 174–75; Griffith 1979, 693; Badian 1981, 71; Schumacher 1990, 439 n. 66; Huwendiek 1996, 156; Lapatin 2001, 116–17.

<sup>76</sup> Schumacher 1990, 439 actually suggests that Philip planned to have only a statue of himself in the Philippeum, partly because he believes that Philip was trying to assimilate himself to Zeus and partly because he thinks that both Alexander and Olympias had been rejected. The suggestion is too speculative to be useful and depends on false assumptions about the situation at Philip's court.

<sup>77</sup> Carney 2000a, 18–22.

<sup>78</sup> Seiler 1986, 101 n. 424 rightly doubts that a transitory episode in Philip's private life would have affected the display in this public monument.

<sup>79</sup> Those who believe Philip's image was the central one: Fredricksmeyer 1979, 53 (who asserts that the other images "were set back"); Mirón Pérez 1998b, 218–19.

<sup>80</sup> Zschietzschmann 1944, 52; Borbein 1973, 66 n.105; Thompson 1982, 174 n.8; Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 132; Schumacher 1990, 439; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000, 398 (who suggests that Pausanias' description moves from left to right, but Pausanias' wording links Philip and Alexander, and then adds Amyntas); Lapatin 2001, 116–117. None of their arguments compel. Zschietzschmann 1944, 52 thought the cuttings for the central figure suggested that it held a lance or scepter and felt this demonstrated that it was meant for Alexander, but Lapatin 2001, 116 makes no distinction in the cuttings for the three "male" positions and considers it possible all held a staff, scepter or some other object. Even if this situation applied only to the central figure, either Philip or Alexander could have been so portrayed.

<sup>81</sup> So Fredricksmeyer 1979, 54 *contra* Wikander 1996, 186; Lapatin 2000, 118 who asserts that the dynastic image it generated "served Alexander's interests more than his father's."

<sup>82</sup> See, for instance, Drees 1968, 123; Seiler 1986.

<sup>83</sup> Carney 2000a, 97–100.

<sup>84</sup> See Carney 2000a, 82–93.

<sup>85</sup> Carney 2000a, 153–78.

<sup>86</sup> Hintzen-Bohlen 1990 attempts to trace the evolution of family group statues.

<sup>87</sup> Carney 2000a, 203–33.

<sup>88</sup> Ridgway 2001, 49–50 speculates that "ancestral galleries" like the Daochus monument may have been more common than generally recognized. She seems to refer to the late fourth and early third centuries and to non-royal groupings. Royal models may certainly have influenced elite monuments.

<sup>89</sup> *IG* XI.4.1096; Durrbach no. 36; Courby 1912, 74–83; Edson 1934, 217–219; Thompson 1982, 176–77; Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 138–140; Ridgway 2001, 172. The inscription naming the king is fragmentary but usually understood to refer to Gonatas. Though much larger in size and in the number of statues, Antigonus' monument resembles the Daochus one: both are dedications at an Apollo shrine, both linear, both contain only males, and both seem to have shown a divine figure first.

### Chapter 3

<sup>90</sup> Tarn 1913, 388–91; Thompson 1982, 76.

<sup>91</sup> Edson 1934, 214–217, 220–226. Bohm 1989, 27–51; Huttner 1997, 159–74.

<sup>92</sup> Traces of fifteen statues remain, but calculation suggests that once there were twenty-one. Courby 1912, 78.

<sup>93</sup> Courby 1912, 74–83; *IG* X1.4, 1095; Durrbach 1921, no. 35; Thompson 1982, 177.

<sup>94</sup> Courby 1912, 81.

<sup>95</sup> Edson 1934, 219. Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 138 less plausibly suggests Apollo.

<sup>96</sup> Onians 1979, 158, who believes that the Philippeum also read from left to right, in chronological order.

<sup>97</sup> Edson 1934, 218, who notes that *progonoi* usually refers only to male ancestors, followed by Carney 2000b, 26 n. 27 *contra* Le Bohec 1993, 239.

<sup>98</sup> Macurdy 1932, 75–76; Carney 2000a, 180–202 *contra* Hatzopoulos 1990, 144–47; Le Bohec 1993, 229–45.

<sup>99</sup> Lapatin 2001, 120–21.

<sup>100</sup> Borbein 1973, 88–90; Hintzen-Bohlen 1990, 140–54 attempts to trace the evolution of family group statues from the earliest into the later Hellenistic period. She sees their numbers and importance declining, particularly because legitimization of dynasties was no longer such an issue.

<sup>101</sup> See the important forthcoming work by Schultz, based on his thorough re-examination of the extant physical remains of the Philippeum. Among other things, he argues that the statues in the Philippeum were not chryselephantine, though they probably looked as though they were, that the structure could have been and probably was completed during Philip's lifetime, and that probably no changes were made to the statue program in the course of construction.

## AFTERWORD

As indicated in the last note of this 2007 article, I saw the manuscripts of Peter Schultz' two important articles on the Philippeum (2007, 2009) too late to incorporate their views into my discussion. He argued that the statues in the Philippeum were not chryselephantine, though they probably looked as though they were, that the structure could have been and probably was completed during Philip's lifetime, and that no changes were made to the statue program in the course of construction. His arguments, heavily based on new study of the statue base, are persuasive, particularly his conclusion that the statues in the Philippeum were not chryselephantine but marble, at least at the base, but that they must have looked chryselephantine, probably because they were gilded and painted. Though he grants that such treatment could have happened much later, for instance in Neronian times, he suggests that Leochares himself was responsible and that the images consciously imitated chryselephantine ones with their divine associations (Schultz 2007, 221). In general Schultz understands the statue group as heroizing or divinizing in style and association.

If one grants that the Philippeum's images were not ivory and gold and thus not in need of a protective roof, then the distinctive architecture of the Philippeum becomes more important, particularly since most statues at Olympia and elsewhere were open to the skies: the tholos structure must be linked to the semi-circular statue group and how the architect (as Schultz points out, Leochares was possibly the architect as well as the sculptor) wanted the images to be experienced (Schultz 2007, 221). Developing themes others had considered, Schultz stresses the theatricality of the conception of the Philippeum and points to the ways in which its distinctive structure (and that of the statue base) made the spectator an audience for figures both contemporary and yet heroic. As I and he have noted, those inside the Philippeum had to look sharply upwards to view the images, an effect heightened by the small size of the structure.

Though Schultz' work stresses the theatrical conception of Philip's monument, he does not contextualize this finding in recent work that focuses on the staging of monarchy, the relationship between monarchy and theater; Philip II has been understood as critical in this development (see Carney 2010a, 43–44 for discussion and references). In recent years, the re-excavation of the Vergina Palace and continuing work in the Vergina agora have indicated that the palace and theater were built at the same time, as part of the same complex, by Philip, and even more recently the excavators have concluded that the palace itself was not a residence at all, but a place for display of royal power and wealth (Kottaridi 2011b). In effect, in the Philippeum Philip stage-managed a permanent drama in stone of his version of the royal house.

Palagia (2010) has argued that the image of Eurydice in the Philippeum was not that of Philip's mother but rather that of his last wife, a woman generally known as Cleopatra but whom once Arrian (3.6.5) names "Eurydice". (See Carney 2000a, 74 for discussion and references; Lane Fox 1973(74), 504 made a similar argument on different grounds.) Palagia conceives of this group including two wives of Philip II as a kind of reconciliation monument aimed at both a

Macedonian and wider Greek audience. While there are undeniable problems with the text of Pausanias 5.17.4, Palagia's argument does not convince for several reasons. First, she believes, as most do, that Philip commissioned the building right after Chaeronea, before his last marriage and she seems to accept Schultz' conclusions that the program was not changed. At that point there was no need for reconciliation and Cleopatra was not yet a wife, let alone a mother. Second, until Cleopatra had produced another male heir, there would be no reason for her presence. Olympias was there because she was Alexander's mother, not because she was Philip's wife. Third, if we accept Schultz' conclusions about the placement of the statues – Philip in the middle with Amyntas on his left and Alexander on his right – then "Eurydice's placement at either end (the two female statues were at the extremes of the statue base) makes no sense if the woman in question is Philip's intended bride.

Schultz 2009 provides an excellent and extensive bibliography on the Philippeum, but several minor points remain to be made. Schultz (2007, 216–18) understands the female statue found at the Eucleia sanctuary at Vergina as a portrait of Philip's mother Eurydice and as a model for a kind of retrospective, archaizing and heroizing conception of the Argead images in the Philippeum. Not everyone has agreed that the statue, usually associated with dedicatory inscriptions by Eurydice to Eucleia found in the same ditch with the statue, was indeed a portrait at all rather than an image of the goddess, but Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, the original excavator, has only recently discovered (2011, 280–82) that the peplos-clad statue in question, contrary to her previous assumptions, did not fit the statue base with the inscription. She continues, however, to believe that it is indeed a portrait of Eurydice, probably for the base found nearby, at Palatitsia, also bearing Eurydice's name, though not in dedicatory form. This view enables her to continue to embrace an understanding of the statue as a possible model for the Philippeum similar to that of Schultz. Finally, though a remarkable tomb found at Vergina has often been attributed to Eurydice, like Palagia 2002, I am not certain that it is indeed her tomb and so did not include it on the list of monuments commemorating her.

## TOMB I AT VERGINA AND THE MEANING OF THE GREAT TUMULUS AS AN HISTORICAL MONUMENT

From the beginning of scholarly consideration of the three tombs, commonly considered royal, once hidden under the Great Tumulus at Vergina, Tomb II has received nearly all the attention. Many of us have become somewhat obsessive on the question of the identity of the male buried in the main chamber of Tomb II: was he Philip II or his obscure and less-than-competent son Philip Arrhidaeus?<sup>1</sup> I intend to reverse the usual emphasis and begin my examination of the problem of the meaning of the Great Tumulus and the structures it once covered by concentrating on Tomb I, and by using the question of the identity of its occupants as a springboard for an attempt to understand the entire monumental complex.

Tomb I,<sup>2</sup> the first of the three royal tombs to be discovered, is an unusually large cist tomb (3.05 by 2.09 m. and 3 m. high). It was looted in antiquity via a small opening in the roof, but that opening and another attempted entry point were covered over at some point prior to the construction of the Great Tumulus. The magnificent paintings which cover three walls of the tomb (the Rape of Persephone, the Three Fates, and a seated female figure probably to be identified as a grieving Demeter) remained, but the tomb otherwise appeared empty, its once rich offerings (assuming they matched the quality of the frescoes) long gone. A number of human bone fragments lay on the floor beneath the earth which had filtered in during the period in which the two openings had remained uncovered. Since the bones were scattered and clearly did not occupy their original position, the excavator Andronikos deduced that the looting occurred after only skeletons remained. On the floor were also a few fragments of stamped black-glazed pots and fragments of a marble shell and an ivory comb, both probably part of a woman's toiletries.<sup>3</sup> Burial, like the later robbery, happened through the roof. The excavator believed that in the place of the permanent limestone slabs now covering the tomb were once wooden planks and he concluded that once these stone slabs were in place, no later burials were possible.<sup>4</sup>

In the years since these initial discoveries were made, an anthropologist

has concluded that they are the bones of three separate individuals: a young woman around twenty-five; a new-born infant; and a small boned male “in the prime of his life,” perhaps as young as twenty-five to thirty-five. All three, unlike the occupants of Tombs II and III, were inhumed.<sup>5</sup>

Granted the scanty remains left by the tomb robbers, dating this tomb in both an absolute sense and relative to the two other royal tombs has proved difficult.<sup>6</sup> The excavator always dated Tomb I to the mid-fourth century BC, or slightly after (based primarily on the pottery, but also on his evaluation of the style of the frescoes) and usually suggested that it is the earliest of the three. He preferred a date of 350–25 for the whole tomb complex, but reluctantly conceded that the lower limit might be pushed as far as 310.<sup>7</sup> Generally, his relative dating of the tombs has won more acceptance than his absolute dating of Tomb I (see below, especially n. 40), and with good reason: the only Macedonian monarch who died within the time-frame upon which Andronikos insisted for Tomb I was Philip II and yet only a few weeks after the tombs were discovered, Andronikos also insisted that Philip II lay in Tomb II.<sup>8</sup>

Andronikos always refused to name the occupants of Tomb I,<sup>9</sup> a refusal which was disingenuous granted that he was adamant that they, like those entombed in II and III, were members of the same royal family. As Peter Green noted some years ago, we know who all the Argeads – or, at the very least all the adult male Argeads – in the period were.<sup>10</sup> It follows that either Andronikos’ dating or his assumption that those buried in Tombs I, II and III are royal or his belief that Philip II lay in Tomb II is flawed. The location at Vergina, the unprecedented size of the Great Tumulus, the quality of the frescoes, and more subjective judgments about the quality and workmanship of objects from the tombs all confirm that these are royal burials.<sup>11</sup> I shall proceed, therefore, in the belief that at least one of Andronikos’ other assumptions is flawed.

The suggestion has been made that the male bones in Tomb I might belong to a grave robber rather than to an Argead purposely entombed there.<sup>12</sup> We should reject this phantom grave robber out of hand because believing in him requires accepting a series of remote possibilities, any one of which is implausible: we would have to believe that a robber either happened to die of natural causes in the tomb or had a fatal quarrel with his companions, that his fellows left him there unburied but stripped of everything not biodegradable (especially unlikely if the mystery man were a mercenary soldier), that animals entering through two small openings so gnawed, fragmented, and removed his bones that they finally exactly resembled the state of those of the legitimate occupants of the



tomb, and that enough time passed for all this to occur before the tomb was resealed.

Much more plausible but by no means certain is the possibility that the tomb was originally intended for the burial of a woman. Certainly the theme of the frescoes and the fragments of toilet objects, as well as the absence of iron weapons (usually left behind by robbers) originally led Andronikos to expect a female burial. However, while it remains possible that the tomb was originally intended only for the burial of a young woman, neither the absence of weapons nor the theme of the frescoes requires that one assume the original occupant was a woman. If the weapons were as rich as those in Tombs II and III, they probably would have been looted. Hammond has argued convincingly that the Persephone theme may refer to the afterlife in general – a frequent concern in Macedonian burials – and not to the death of a young person, of either sex.<sup>13</sup>

In our search for the identity of the occupants of the tomb we are, therefore, looking for relatively young but mature Argeads, probably a married pair. Since we cannot be sure that historical narratives would bother to mention even a royal child who died at birth or within days of birth, the baby cannot constitute an important factor in our identification, particularly because we cannot be certain that the woman died in childbirth, likely presumption though that is. At the moment, no method exists for determining whether remains were added to a tomb a few or even a hundred years later:<sup>14</sup> the baby could have died before either adult; the woman could have predeceased the man or the reverse.

As we have seen, Andronikos believed that the structure of the tomb's roof (limestone slabs in situ, but a ledge suggesting that the tomb once had a temporary roofing of wooden planks) meant that, once the slabs were in place, no further burials were intended because none was possible;<sup>15</sup> one might also deduce that the original tomb builders had intended at least one more burial and for that reason had roofed the tomb with removable planks.<sup>16</sup> Some have suggested a somewhat similar circumstance for the building of Tomb II, again on the basis of tomb-structure: the builders had determined that a second burial would be added before they completed the structure intended for the first burial.<sup>17</sup> There is, however, an important difference: we know that the male in Tomb II was buried before the woman; we do not know which of the people buried in Tomb I was the first to be buried.

If we reject Andronikos' most narrow dating of 350–40 for Tomb I, and allow somewhat more leeway, our options for identifying the male (it seems reasonable to focus on royal males because of the better quality of information) should be limited to four Argeads: Amyntas III, father of

Philip II; Philip's two full brothers Alexander II and Perdikkas III; Philip II himself. There were, of course, other adult male Argeads alive during this period, but they were all either pretender or potential pretender. It is unlikely that they would have been buried at Aegae at all and certainly not near legitimate, splendidly buried Argeads. Even less likely is the possibility that Cassander, Antigonos, or any other Hellenistic ruler would have involved such controversial figures in the structure of the Great Tumulus.<sup>18</sup> In the past, identification of the occupant of Tomb I has tended to depend on whom one preferred for the occupants of Tomb II: if one believed that Philip II lay in Tomb II, then one tended to favor the choice of Amyntas III for Tomb I, and if convinced that Philip Arrhidaios was the man in Tomb II, one tended to argue that Philip II must have lain in Tomb I, along with Cleopatra and her baby.<sup>19</sup> For the moment I shall ignore Tomb II and simply consider the merits of the candidates for Tomb I.

Almost certainly we should eliminate Amyntas III from further consideration, for several reasons. The woman in Tomb I cannot be one of his two known wives, Eurydice, the mother of Philip II: she would have been too old at the time of her death to fit the age of the bones in Tomb I.<sup>20</sup> The fate of his other known wife, Gygaea, is less clear; not only was she also likely to have been too old at the time of death to match the young woman's bones in Tomb I but the political circumstances at the time of her husband's death and after make it unlikely that she would have been buried with her husband.<sup>21</sup> Amyntas may, of course, have had another wife, who died young, but there is no evidence for such a woman's existence.<sup>22</sup> Much more important, though, is the information Isocrates gives us (6.46) and Justin implies (7.4.8): Amyntas died of old age. Moreover, the date of Amyntas' death, ca. 370, is so far outside Andronikos' range as to cause considerable unease.<sup>23</sup>

Of Amyntas III's two elder sons by Eurydice, Alexander II makes only a slightly better candidate than his father. He was probably about twenty-two at the time of his death and we know of no wife or child; in the light of his age and what little we know of the age at marriage of male Argeads, he may not yet have married.<sup>24</sup> Alexander II was assassinated by Ptolemy Alorites and the years immediately subsequent to his assassination were very troubled and chaotic; essentially his murderer was in charge. Ptolemy was unlikely to commission magnificent frescoes for his victim. In addition, the date of Alexander II's death, ca. 368, is only slightly closer to Andronikos' dating of Tomb I than that of his father. While it is less easy to eliminate Alexander II from consideration, both his age and the circumstances surrounding his death imply that Alexander II is not the man in Tomb I.<sup>25</sup>

His brother, Perdiccas III, makes a more likely candidate for identification as the occupant of Tomb I. Perdiccas was killed, in battle against the Illyrians, in 359. At the time of his death he was probably at least twenty-four and may have been older. We know he had a wife because he was survived by a son, Amyntas. One could easily hypothesize that Amyntas' mother died shortly before Perdiccas, having a second child. Perdiccas' age and marital circumstances suit those of the man in Tomb I better than those of his father or elder brother, but difficulties exist: he fell in battle against the Illyrians and the battle turned into a rout (Diod.16.2.4–5). Doubtless his loyal followers tried to save his body and perhaps they did. Nonetheless, he seems a more likely candidate for cremation on a distant battlefield than inhumation at Aegae. It would be surprising if his brother Philip II, in the unstable period at the beginning of his reign (Diod. 16.2.6–3.1), could have afforded to commission a major artist to work on the frescoes. The date of Perdiccas III's death, however, is closer to that suggested by Andronikos, suggesting that we should retain Perdiccas III as a candidate.<sup>26</sup>

Philip II's career better fits our information about the man buried in Tomb I than either of his brothers or his father, but the fit is hardly a perfect one. Philip's age, about forty-six, will suit Musgrave's broader age estimate, but not his narrower one. Philip married seven times, and of these seven women we can safely eliminate from consideration only Olympias (who died too old) and perhaps Nicesipolis.<sup>27</sup> Tradition says that Olympias killed or forced to commit suicide Cleopatra, Philip's last-married wife and that Cleopatra's baby was killed at the same time (Paus. 8.7.7; Just. 9.7.12). We know little about Cleopatra's age at the time of her murder (she was probably somewhat younger than her mid twenties)<sup>28</sup> but it could suit and the rest of the scenario certainly seems to. However, while the sources imply that Cleopatra was murdered soon after Philip's death (Plut. *Alex.* 10.4; Just. 9.7.2; Paus. 8.8.7), Ellis has long argued that her death must have occurred much later.<sup>29</sup> If his argument is correct, the baby could not have been a newborn at the time of its death.

There are other, well-known difficulties surrounding the question of Cleopatra's offspring.<sup>30</sup> While I do not find Ellis' argument convincing,<sup>31</sup> matching the newborn infant in the tomb to Cleopatra's child (if the bones in the tomb are indeed those of a neonate)<sup>32</sup> is not easy. One might also wonder whether Tomb I is the kind of structure appropriate to the burial of so great a king, but granted the disappearance of virtually all the goods and the uncertain history of development of Macedonian tombs, one can only wonder.<sup>33</sup>

Musgrave has also objected to the identification of the man in Tomb I

as Philip II because he believes that Philip's status would have required cremation, not inhumation.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, as he is well aware, Graeco-Macedonian practice about burial methods was anything but consistent; surviving evidence suggests that even within the same family practices varied.<sup>35</sup> Obviously change in burial practices over a passage of time might be a factor as well. We have as yet no clear information about whether royal practice varied in similar fashion or whether it might, for instance, have tended to be more conservative than aristocratic practice. As Borza has observed,<sup>36</sup> since we have in Tomb I a fourth-century inhumation burial that has been universally considered royal, it becomes difficult to argue that royal burial required cremation. While it is true that cremation was more expensive, it does not necessarily follow that it was more prestigious.

A final difficulty, the most important, remains inherent in an identification of the man in Tomb I as Philip II: if Philip is in Tomb I, then it is a virtual necessity to conclude that his son Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice must have lain in Tomb II. This is not the occasion to review the evidence about that problem;<sup>37</sup> suffice to say that this solution would hardly meet with universal, let alone unqualified, approval. While many of the early objections to this solution to Tomb II now seem less than persuasive, Musgrave's view that both sets of bones from Tomb II were cremated soon after death cannot be ignored: if he is right, it is difficult though not impossible to fit the known circumstances of the deaths of Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice to the evidence of the bones themselves.<sup>38</sup>

To conclude this brief survey of possible occupants of Tomb I, based largely on the nature of the tomb and its contents, Amyntas III is not a likely choice and his eldest son not much more so. The man in the tomb is more likely to have been Perdiccas III and most likely to have been Philip II, but only if a number of other difficulties are resolved.

Let us turn to the larger complex. Whereas uncertainty has surrounded the identity of those in Tomb I and controversy those in Tomb II, virtually everyone except the excavator himself has agreed that the youth buried in Tomb III is Alexander IV, son of Alexander the Great, even though the reported circumstances of his death – a secret murder and burial – require some explaining if he is to be placed in Tomb III.<sup>39</sup> Here too, Andronikos' dates do not work: he wants everything in the complex to be no later than 325, yet Alexander IV was murdered no earlier than 309 and was buried even later.<sup>40</sup> After some initial uncertainty,<sup>41</sup> Andronikos and opinion generally have favored the assumption that the numbering of the tombs reflects the chronological order of their construction.<sup>42</sup> A number of scholars, including the excavator, have concluded that Tombs II and III,

which have a number of similar features, were constructed very close to each other in time.<sup>43</sup> Andronikos alone, and less plausibly, has believed that Tombs I and II were also constructed within a brief time span.<sup>44</sup>

A mysterious marble building, an above-ground structure, once stood next to Tomb I; apparently it had been destroyed by the time the Great Tumulus was created; Andronikos believed that it was a *hērōon* and recalled that the only Argeads buried in Macedonia known to have had cults were Philip II and his father Amyntas III.<sup>45</sup> While his suggestion about this structure is reasonable, if true, we would still not know whether the cult related to the entire complex or to only one of the tombs and, if only one, which one. While it seems fairly certain that the so-called *hērōon* must have been built some time after Tomb I, it could have been built yet later, after either of the two other royal tombs.<sup>46</sup> The skeletons found in the fill of the mound and the more modest mud-brick tombs covered by the Great Tumulus have been taken to be accidental, the remains of less famous Macedonians who wished to be associated with the royal burials.<sup>47</sup>

What about earthen constructions covering the tombs and the “*hērōon*”? Andronikos suggested that the Great Tumulus (110 m. by ca. 12 m.) was created by Antigonos Gonatas some time not long after Pyrrhus’ Gallic mercenaries looted the royal cemetery ca. 375;<sup>48</sup> Hammond, less believably, preferred a slightly earlier date, possibly Lysimachus’ period of domination.<sup>49</sup> It is clear that the southwest edge of the Great Tumulus covered a much smaller (20 m. by 4 m.), pre-existent burial mound, the red-earth mound or tumulus. All three royal tombs lay under this red-earth mound. However, Andronikos believed that Tomb III was added to the red-earth mound after its initial construction, whereas Tombs I and II were already in place when the red-earth mound was built. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I will assume that his belief is correct.<sup>50</sup>

Peeling this many-layered burial onion any further now becomes confusing because Andronikos nowhere clearly stated whether he had found evidence that any other mounds lay under the red-earth tumulus. Hammond (on the basis of what evidence is not clear) believed that separate mounds covered Tombs I and II and that these were subsequently concealed first by the red-earth mound and then by the Great Tumulus.<sup>51</sup> Assuming that Tomb I was indeed the oldest of the three tombs, in all likelihood, it once had a mound of its own: such mounds were customary and a considerable length of time may have passed before Tomb II was built. There is, however, no published evidence that such a mound existed.

It is much more difficult to determine whether it is likely that Tomb II also had a mound of its own before it was covered by the red-earth mound. Unfortunately it is also more significant. While the builder of Tomb II

could certainly have constructed a mound over Tomb II which covered only that tomb, another possibility exists: the person who built Tomb II may have built the red-earth mound, not as a subsequent commemorative, but as the actual mound for Tomb II, purposely enclosing and covering Tomb I in the mound he had constructed for Tomb II.

In short, we simply do not know how many stages went into the creation of the structures under the Great Tumulus. Thus, we cannot be certain that the person who built Tomb II and the person who constructed the red-earth tumulus are identical, although they could be. Indeed, even if there were only one builder involved in both projects, he may not have constructed them at the same date: instead, the same ruler could first have built Tomb II and its hypothetical individual mound and then, at some later date, added the red-earth tumulus.

Nor can we exclude the possibility that Tomb I was only accidentally included by the builder of the red-earth mound, much as has been assumed about the simpler mud brick tombs included in the Great Tumulus. Certainly, since Tomb II lay at the center of the red-earth mound, it is likely that the central concern of its builder was Tomb II. Borza<sup>52</sup> has long noted the need for a stratigraphical study of this site and my readers should now see that there is even more necessity than previously recognized for adequate stratigraphical information; our ignorance of the number and sequence of mounds under the Great Tumulus is a fundamental limitation on our understanding of the entire complex.<sup>53</sup>

Inevitably this uncertainty about the number of mounds under the Great Tumulus significantly complicates the task of reaching an understanding of the entire complex as an historical monument. This tomb complex is a memorial to the last of the Argeads including, certainly, the very last, Alexander IV. The Great Tumulus was constructed as a memorial to the Argeads by a Hellenistic ruler, probably by Antigonos Gonatas early in his reign when he needed to assert legitimacy, claim connection to the Argeads, and restore order.<sup>54</sup> Gonatas would not have been the first to use the glorious past which the tombs represented to shore up a less certain present. It had already become a memorial to the last rulers of the dynasty when Cassander<sup>55</sup> placed Alexander IV's tomb in the complex.

Common sense suggests that the builder of the Great Tumulus believed that the greatest of Macedonian rulers, Philip II, lay under the red-earth mound: a structure apparently unprecedented in size, created long after the lives of those buried there, over tombs dating to the mid-fourth century, built by a ruler not part of the same dynasty can signify little else. While Hammond's list of occupants (Amyntas III, Philip II, and Alexander IV) recognized the apparent intent of the builder of the

red-earth mound to associate the occupants of I and II and makes dynastic sense,<sup>56</sup> it failed to account for the age of the remains found in Tomb I and to explain the apparent closeness in time of the burials in Tombs II and III.

Those who believe that Philip II lies in Tomb II must then conclude that Perdiccas III was buried in Tomb I. This possibility makes less sense dynastically, but may have everything to do with where Philip's father and other brother lay.<sup>57</sup> This solution, however, would mean that Alexander the Great built only his father's tomb but not the red-earth mound; it is highly unlikely that in 336 Alexander would have wanted to connect his father's memory to that of Perdiccas III. Thus, if further stratigraphical information reveals that the red-earth mound was constructed as the initial burial mound for Tomb II, it will then become difficult to identify Philip II as its occupant and Alexander the Great as its builder.<sup>58</sup>

This solution seems less plausible than the alternative which makes more dynastic sense and solves other difficulties: Philip II in Tomb I, Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice in Tomb II, and Alexander IV in Tomb III. Not only did Cassander have good reason to bury Philip Arrhidaeus and his Argead wife near Philip II, but rejecting this solution requires us to believe that Cassander for some reason chose to bury Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice, as well as Cynanne, apart from the king's father, but later chose to add Alexander IV's burial to that of Philip II.<sup>59</sup>

If, instead, we accept my alternative, then this would be the approximate history of the burial complex: Alexander the Great buried Philip II, Cleopatra, and the baby in Tomb I, over which he probably but not certainly built a mound; Cassander buried Philip Arrhidaeus and Eurydice in Tomb II and then built the red-earth mound in which, roughly ten years later, he placed Tomb III. The "*hērōon*," if that is what it is, could have been built after either Tomb I, commemorating Philip, or after Tomb II, but more likely after Tomb III, commemorating the dynasty; in 275 looters entered Tomb I and destroy the "*hērōon*" but failed to find the other tombs;<sup>60</sup> some time in the 270's Antigonos Gonatas constructed the Great Tumulus, hoping to capitalize on the enduring popularity of the Argead dynasty with the mass of the populace. Genuine continuity with the Argead past was not desired by any of the rulers who came after, but the appearance of it, as in a commemorative monument to Argeads long and safely dead, could be useful indeed. The politics of the past aided in reestablishing security in the present.<sup>61</sup>

It would be foolish to ignore the many problems surrounding any set of identifications for the occupants of these tombs and any scenario created to explain the gradual construction of the burial monument. Further study

of the bones in both Tomb I and Tomb II is essential: only Musgrave has given his opinion on the question of the rapid cremation of the bones from Tomb II and his examination of the bones from Tomb I has been brief.<sup>62</sup> The publication of more stratigraphical information, and perhaps histological study of the bones in all three tombs, could dramatically alter analysis of the tombs. As long as our historical information is at war with our physical evidence, the ways in which a series of Macedonian rulers used and manipulated the tomb complex will remain unclear. Nonetheless, I think that I have demonstrated two things, based on current information: Amyntas III is not in Tomb I and an approach to the identification of the occupants of the tombs which takes into account all three tombs tends to make the case for Philip II's burial in Tomb I stronger than more piecemeal approaches.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Carney 1991, 17, n. 1 for a general bibliography on the royal tombs at Vergina.

<sup>2</sup> See Andronikos 1984, 86–95, for a detailed description of this tomb and its contents.

<sup>3</sup> Andronikos 1984, 86. The comb is mentioned in Andronikos 1978b, 70.

<sup>4</sup> Andronikos 1984, 86.

<sup>5</sup> Musgrave 1991, 7 n. 21, gives the broader estimate for the male bones, whereas Musgrave 1985, 8, gives the narrower and lower estimate. See below, nn. 32 and 62 for further uncertainties.

<sup>6</sup> Andronikos 1984, 224; 1978b, 35.

<sup>7</sup> Andronikos 1977, 69–70, says that he believes I and II are close in time, but that Tomb I is the earlier. He notes, however, that the position of Tomb I at the edge of the mound could indicate that it was built later than II. See similar statements in Andronikos 1978a, 52. There is no discussion of stratigraphy there despite its obvious relevance.

<sup>8</sup> Tomb II was entered on November 8, 1977; at a news conference on November 24, 1977, Andronikos identified it “without reservation” as that of Philip II (Gage 1977).

<sup>9</sup> Andronikos 1984, 231, where he consigns such speculations to historians.

<sup>10</sup> Green 1982, 137, who then called for a “single interdependent inquiry” into the whole tomb complex.

<sup>11</sup> See Andronikos 1984, 224–6, for a concise exposition of this argument, one which has been universally accepted. While there seems little reason to doubt that these were indeed royal tombs, a longer and more thorough discussion of the question, one which took into account subsequent discoveries at Vergina and elsewhere in Macedonia, would be useful and clarifying.

<sup>12</sup> Lane Fox 1980, 80 attributed this suggestion to Andronikos; the suggestion, if accurately reported, was one Andronikos never pursued in print.

<sup>13</sup> Andronikos 1984, 87 says that the absence of weapons led the excavators to expect a female burial. Green 1982, 147 suggested that the frescoes might refer to the



death of a young girl, but Hammond 1978, 338 interpreted the frescoes' theme as Orphic and noted the popularity of references to the afterlife in Macedonian tombs.

<sup>14</sup> Musgrave 1990a, 285.

<sup>15</sup> Andronikos 1984, 86.

<sup>16</sup> However, while some other Macedonian cist tombs are roofed with similar stone blocks (e.g. that at Katerini, dated by a coin of Amyntas III – see discussion and references in *AR* 1982–3, 37), there is at least one surviving cist tomb which had only a plank roof (Derveni Grave delta, dated by a coin of Philip II – see discussion and references in *AR* 1961–2, 15). Perhaps the wooden-roofed Derveni tomb is an accident and a roof intended to be temporary chanced to become permanent, but its existence means that we cannot be sure that a wooden roof was never intended to be permanent or that it always signified an intention to add other burials.

<sup>17</sup> So Borza 1987, 121. While the burial in the main chamber was completed and the chamber sealed before the roof of the antechamber was constructed or the second burial in position, the walls of the antechamber were built at the same time as those of the main chamber and thus the unusual size of the antechamber was part of the builder's original plan.

<sup>18</sup> Therefore I do not consider the three sons of Amyntas III by Gygaea or the two pretenders who gave Philip difficulty early in his reign candidates for Tomb I. Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas III and Philip II's nephew, whether or not he was ever king, might have been buried at Aegae had he not attempted to seize the throne, but once he had, Alexander would hardly have allowed his burial near that of his father or other close relatives. On Amyntas, see Berve 1926b, 30–31.

<sup>19</sup> N. G. L. Hammond, although considering other possibilities, consistently favored the identification of Amyntas III for the man in Tomb I and always insisted on the presence of Philip II in Tomb II (1978, 338; 1982, 125–6; 1989, 28). E. N. Borza (1982b, 8–9; 1987, 119; 1992, 266), and W. L. Adams (1991, 32) favored putting Philip II in Tomb I and Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice in Tomb II.

<sup>20</sup> On Eurydice, see Macurdy 1932, 17–22. Eurydice's eldest son took the throne in 370, apparently in his early twenties, and we know that she lived, at least, into the reign of her second son Perdiccas III; even if she lived no longer, Eurydice would already have been too old for the bones in Tomb I. In fact, Andronikos' continuing excavations at Vergina, including the discovery of statue bases dedicated by her (1984, 49–51) and a tomb he believed belonged to her (see discussion and references s.v. "Vergina" *AR* 1987–8, 52), led him to conclude that she long outlived her husband and may have survived into the 330s.

<sup>21</sup> See Greenwalt 1988a, 37 and 1989, 25–8 for Gygaea. She was probably the older wife, but granted that her sons failed to succeed their father and that they tried to seize the throne in Philip II's reign (see Ellis 1973, 350–4), even if she died young, it is unlikely that any of Eurydice's three sons would have added her to their father's burial or added him to hers.

<sup>22</sup> There are other difficulties with positing such an anonymous wife, presumably dead in childbirth. If she survived Amyntas, if only slightly, or if she died near the end of his life, then it is surprising that no mention of her survives along with all the other preserved scandal about the period immediately after Amyntas' death. If she predeceased him, that is to say she died before 370, then Andronikos' dating becomes an even more severe problem.

<sup>23</sup> Borza 1992, 297–8, made additional arguments against the identification of Amyntas in Tomb I, most notably that the approximate date Andronikos suggested for the frescoes as well as his suggestion that they were the work of Nichomachus (or his school) requires a date much later than that of Amyntas' death.

<sup>24</sup> Greenwalt 1988b, 94 concluded Argead males tended to marry in their early twenties.

<sup>25</sup> On Alexander II's brief career, see Hammond 1979, 180–2 and Errington 1990, 35.

<sup>26</sup> On Perdiccas, see Hammond 1979, 181–8 and Errington 1990, 37.

<sup>27</sup> Olympias was in her late fifties or early sixties when Cassander murdered her (see Strasburger 1939, 177–82). Nicesipolis' death, subsequent to childbirth, sometime in the 340s (see Carney 1988, 386–7 n. 4) might mean that she was in her mid-twenties at her death, but if we are to place her in Tomb I, it would require that Philip had built a grand tomb for a rather obscure wife and that he had left a temporary roof to allow for subsequent burials. Some of Philip's other wives may well have been dead by 336 or so, but we have no certain knowledge of it.

<sup>28</sup> Our sole information on her age: Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.4) calls her a *παρθένος*/*parthenos* (maiden or virgin) and a *κόρη*/*kore* (maiden or bride) and implies that she was much younger than Philip at the time of her marriage. We know nothing about the ages of Macedonian girls at marriage. Athenians might consider fourteen an ideal age for marriage for a girl (Lys. 1.6), but this does not mean that Macedonians did. Macedonian royal women do not easily fit the early age for marriage common in the Mediterranean (Greenwalt 1988b, 93–7), but Cleopatra was not known to be an Argead. While the date of her marriage remains uncertain, she lived at least a year longer.

<sup>29</sup> Ellis 1981, 122–3, believes that it can only have occurred much later, after the death of Attalus, which he puts in mid-335.

<sup>30</sup> See Heckel 1979, 385–93, for a discussion of the problems about the number, sex, and timing of Cleopatra's children. See also Borza 1981a, 76, n. 24 and Musgrave 1990b, 7, n. 23.

<sup>31</sup> Aside from doubts about Ellis' dating of the death of Attalus (see Musgrave 1990b, citing doubts by Hammond on the subject), one might also reject his assumption that Attalus would not have tried to convince Alexander that he was still loyal if Cleopatra were already dead. If Attalus' importance late in Philip's reign arose not from the king's marriage to Cleopatra, but rather the marriage arose from his importance (Attalus' previous history and thus status are unknown: see Berve 1926b, 94) her life or death may not have been critical to him. Moreover, one should never underestimate the willingness of Macedonian aristocrats to betray relatives or ignore crimes committed against them if self-interest lay in another direction.

<sup>32</sup> As we have seen, Musgrave 1991, 7 n. 21 believed that the baby was only days old, but he also conceded that he has not yet completed a thorough examination of the bones from Tomb I and remarks of the infant's remains, "By modern standards it was a late fetus of 38–30 intrauterine weeks. It could also have been a viable neonate."

<sup>33</sup> See Borza 1992, 272, for a discussion of the dangers of assuming that chamber tombs drove out cist tombs entirely and for a reminder that our knowledge of the chronological development of Macedonian tombs is not extensive.

<sup>34</sup> Musgrave 1990a, 280 and 1991, 7, described the practice of cremation as customary and noted that many non-royal Macedonians already practiced it in Philip's day.

<sup>35</sup> See Musgrave's own remarks in 1990a, 273 about the variability of Graeco-Macedonian funerary practice and the presence of both methods of burial in the same tomb. Much as in the development of tomb structure, it is dangerous to assume that one practice drove out the other. In the burials at Derveni, for instance, apparently all part of the same family and within the same rough time-frame of Philip's reign, there is grave Beta, dated approximately by a gold quarter stater of Philip II, containing the cremated remains of two individuals (see discussion and references in *AR* 1961–2, 15 and Musgrave 1990b, 310–21) and grave Delta, containing a eighth stater from the same reign, but containing inhumation burials (see *AR* 1961–2, 15 for references).

<sup>36</sup> Borza 1991, 38.

<sup>37</sup> See Carney 1991 *passim*, especially 20, for a recent review of the evidence.

<sup>38</sup> Musgrave 1985, 7; 1990a, 276–7; 1991, 5. See Carney 1991, 19–20 for a discussion of the evidence for their death and burial or re-burial and how this evidence relates to Musgrave's belief that cremation followed soon after death. Even if one believes that Olympias did choose to have them cremated rather than leaving them unburied or simply having them inhumed (there are good arguments for each alternative), the presence of golden acorns in the fragments from the pyre would still need to be explained: even if Olympias wanted for some reason to give them a splendid burial (a circumstance not unknown to Macedonian murderers – e.g. the murder and royal burial of Alexander's sister Cleopatra, both the work of Antigonos – Diod. 20. 37. 3–6) it is hard to see how, on the Macedonian frontier, she could have managed such a display. On the other hand, one cannot say that such a gesture was impossible or even implausible.

<sup>39</sup> Andronikos 1984, 231, noted the tendency of others to identify the youth in Tomb III as Alexander IV (see Adams 1991, 26, n. 5, for a list of those who believe that the youth in Tomb III is Alexander IV), but stated that he had "some reservations" about this identification, without specifying what they may have been. On the difficulties of fitting the supposed secret murder and burial of Alexander IV to the public burials of Tomb III, see discussion and references in Adams 1991, 28–31.

<sup>40</sup> See Adams 1991, 29–30 for a discussion of the evidence concerning the date of Alexander IV's murder, the controversies surrounding it, as well as the period at which it became known: he concluded that the burial must have happened between 311/10 and 306/5.

<sup>41</sup> As we have seen (*supra* n. 7) Andronikos initially entertained some doubts that Tomb I was earlier than Tomb II; similarly, he was once inclined to think that Tomb III was earlier than Tomb II (Andronikos 1978a, 55).

<sup>42</sup> As Borza 1991, 39 points out, one need not assume that cist tombs are automatically to be dated earlier than chamber tombs to reach this conclusion.

<sup>43</sup> Hammond 1982, 116; Borza 1991, 39; Adams 1991, 30, 32 and Andronikos 1984, 224.

<sup>44</sup> Andronikos 1977, 70. This belief presents difficulties for the rest of his argument: if Perdikkas III, who died in 359, lay in Tomb I and, following Andronikos' views, Philip II, who was murdered in 336, lay in Tomb II, we do not have tombs constructed within a short period of time.

<sup>45</sup> Andronikos 1984, 64–5. See Hammond 1978, 333 n.11, for references to these

cults. Aside from the uncertainty of this evidence, doubting that cult could have been accorded Arrhidaeus, on the basis of his obscure and inglorious career, is dangerous: cult often arose in response to rather specific events and gestures of patronage, neither of which are impossible to imagine occurring during Arrhidaeus' "reign," and the cult of Amyntas himself, hardly a distinguished ruler, is evidence that the existence of cult worship does not necessarily match the judgments of historians about a monarch's worth or importance.

<sup>46</sup> Andronikos 1977, 45, argued persuasively that features of the construction of the *hērōon* and Tomb I require that it must have been built after the tomb. There is, however, no reference to stratigraphy in his discussion, despite its obvious relevance. (See *supra* n. 7, for a similar failure to discuss stratigraphy.) Since the *hērōon* is closest to Tomb I, but also right on the edge of the red-earth tumulus, it seems reasonable to conclude that if indeed the structure related to royal cult, it could have related to any one of the burials, or to all three. Another factor to consider: Andronikos discovered traces of sacrifice above Tombs II and III, but not I.

<sup>47</sup> Andronikos 1984, 82.

<sup>48</sup> Andronikos 1984, 82.

<sup>49</sup> Hammond 1978, 334, suggested that the Great Tumulus must have been built by the late fourth century, perhaps by 311, because he thought that only this could explain why looters missed Tomb II (he presumed that they found Tomb I, nearer the edge of the huge structure, by means of a horizontal tunnel which missed the other tombs). In 1989, 30 Hammond hypothesized that the great mound was probably a cenotaph to Alexander the Great, created by his former associate Lysimachus around 285–1, again arguing that robbers missed Tomb II because it was already covered by the Great Tumulus. Neither of Hammond's hypotheses accounts for the many broken stelai found in the fill of the Great Tumulus, the very evidence which led Andronikos to conclude that the Great Tumulus must have been created after Pyrrhus' mercenary looters.

<sup>50</sup> So Andronikos 1984, 224. Hammond 1982, 127 proposed a similar scenario, but n.b. his diagram (1982, 112, fig. 1), which appears to contradict his own statements by showing a separate tumulus for Tomb III, under the red-earth mound (this apparent contradiction was pointed out to me by W. L. Adams). Adams 1991, 28, rejected the idea of the addition of Tomb III to the red-earth mound and assumed that (like Hammond's contradictory fig. 1), Tomb III had its own individual tumulus and that the red-earth mound was constructed later. For the measurements of the red-earth mound, see Andronikos 1977, 47.

<sup>51</sup> Hammond 1982, 126.

<sup>52</sup> Borza 1981a, 76. See above, especially nn. 7 and 46.

<sup>53</sup> It would also be helpful to have a plan similar to Borza's plan (*supra* fig. 2), which would show the locations of the skeletons and mud brick tombs covered by the Great Tumulus as well as the relative location of the newly discovered tombs just outside it (mentioned by Andronikos 1984, 83). While the quality of the frescoes in Tomb I suggests that it was a royal tomb and thus unlikely to have been included in either mound accidentally, as we have seen, no sacrifices were associated with this tomb, unlike the other two, thus allowing for the possible conclusion that those buried in Tomb I were not royal or did not share the same status as the occupants of Tombs II and III.

<sup>54</sup> On Gonatas as the continuer of Argead tradition and the Great Tumulus in that context, see Errington 1990, 165–6. On Antigonid claims to blood relationship (as well as their possible veracity) and the date for the initiation of such claims, see Edson 1934, 213–35 and Billows, 1990, 15–18. Since the tombs had been violated, Antigonus Gonatas could also, like Alexander dealing with the robbery of the tomb of Cyrus (Plut. *Alex.* 69. 2–3; Arr. 6.29.9–11; Strab. 15.3. 7), have posed as the restorer of traditional order and as the respecter of the status of fellow kings. By the 370s Macedonians had endured a long period of instability, dynastic and otherwise, and such a posture in a new king would be attractive.

<sup>55</sup> Adams 1991, 30–3 argued convincingly that this was the act of Cassander and in keeping with his policy.

<sup>56</sup> Hammond 1982, 126.

<sup>57</sup> Many generations of Argeads lay buried at Aegae; there may well have been no space left next to either Amyntas III or Alexander II. Some unknown necessity may have required that they be buried elsewhere.

<sup>58</sup> Even if Alexander had not yet eliminated Perdiccas' son Amyntas (Plut. *Mor.* 327 c; Curt. 6. 9. 17; Just. 12. 6. 14) by the time of Philip's burial, he would hardly have wished to stress his cousin's claim to the throne via his father at the very moment that he, Alexander, was trying to secure his own hold on the throne. Difficulties in dating and chronology make it possible that Amyntas was not only still alive but un-disgraced at the time of Philip's burial. However, Alexander may have found Amyntas' marriage to his half-sister Cynnane, an event usually assumed to have been of recent occurrence, threatening. Moreover, the Plutarch passage cited above implies that support for Amyntas as a claimant to the throne appeared long before he acted upon it. To think otherwise about the likelihood that Alexander would bury his father next to Perdiccas III, one would have to assume that Alexander wanted to stress the unity of the dynasty, perhaps as a response to rumors of lack of unity such as those described by Plutarch.

It is more likely that Cassander, allied to Perdiccas III's Granddaughter Adea Eurydice and the avenger of her murder at the hands of Alexander's mother, could well have wanted to stress Adea Eurydice's claim on the throne via Perdiccas. Certainly it was Cassander who buried her, her husband Arrhidaeus, and her mother Cynnane at Aegae with royal honors (see discussion and references in Carney 1987b, 496–502).

<sup>59</sup> Many have objected to the identification of Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus with the occupants of Tomb II because Diodorus 19.52.5 reports that Cassander buried Cynnane when he buried the other two, but her separate burial may now be explained by Andronikos' discovery of a series of rich, quite probably royal yet separate, female burials elsewhere at Vergina (see a brief report in *AR* 1990–1, 56). Moreover, rejection of this alternative would involve reversing the policy Diodorus 19.52.4–5 describes Cassander as having followed: highlighting Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus and their burial and de-emphasizing Alexander IV.

<sup>60</sup> Adams 1991, 32, suggested that the looters stopped because they had found the famous tomb they were looking for, Tomb I, which he believed to be that of Philip.

<sup>61</sup> Scholarship has taken different views of the reputation of Alexander in particular and the Argeads in general after Alexander's death. Errington 1975, 145–52 denied that relationship to Philip or Alexander had any real significance in the period of the Successors. Bosworth 1986, 1–12 suggested that Alexander's memory was hated, but

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not that of Philip. Carney 1988, 394 argued that attitudes to Philip, Alexander and the Argeads varied from person to person and group to group, but that the populace (as late, at least, as the murder of Heracles, Alexander's son by Barsine) retained a fondness for the dynasty which was not shared by the aristocrats. Two generations before the discovery of the royal tombs at Vergina, Edson 1934, 213–35 argued that the Antigonids claimed blood relationship with the Argeads early in the third century.

<sup>62</sup> Musgrave 1991, 7 n. 21 explains that he examined the bones from Tomb I only briefly in 1984 and therefore characterizes his findings as “tentative.”

## AFTERWORD

Almost as soon as the discovery of the first two tombs under the Great Tumulus and Andronikos' early declaration that the male in the main chamber of Tomb II was Philip II (see Chapter Four and its Afterword for further reference and discussion), the identity of the dead has been mired in controversy (Gage 1977b). Many scholars continue to believe that Philip Arrhidaeus (III) once lay under the Great Tumulus, not his famous father (see Borza and Palagia 2007 for references). General agreement has developed that Alexander IV lay in Tomb III. Tomb I, a large but looted cist tomb that contained the inhumed remains of a woman, an adult male and a neonate, has received far less attention. This 1992 article focused on this tomb, but also on the meaning of the construct created by the builder of the Great Tumulus.

Those who believe that Philip II was the occupant of Tomb II have often, though not always, argued that Tomb I was intended for the burial of the woman and her baby and that the male remains were intrusive, perhaps those of a tomb robber (Kottaridi 2011e, 25; Lane Fox 2011a, 3). Those who conclude that Philip III and Adeia Eurydice lay in Tomb II tend to believe that the male burial was not intrusive, that the burial was that of a royal couple and baby, and that the royal pair was Philip II and Cleopatra. Lane Fox (2011a, 3–5) insisted that the archaeological evidence demonstrated that the male remains are irrelevant, whereas Bartsiakos and Carney (2007–2008) concluded that the male remains are indeed integral to the burial and that they were disturbed early on, at the time of robbery. Final publication of the tombs has, of course, not happened, thus contributing to continuing uncertainty. Continuing uncertainty surrounds the issue of whether the “*hērōon*” was constructed to relate to Tomb I or Tomb II (see, for instance, varying views of Lane Fox 2011a, 7 *contra* Kottaridi 2011e, 24).

While consensus has developed that the Great Tumulus was created by a king, most likely Antigonos Gonatas, after the end to Argead dynasty to commemorate the last of the Argeads (as this article argued), Kottaridi (2011e) clarified some issues, at least based on her conclusions, related to chronology and stratigraphy, raised by this article. She insisted that Tomb III was part of an extension of the red-earth mound that initially covered I and II (Kottaridi 2011e, 15). If she is correct, that would mean that the creator of the red-earth mound chose to include the occupant of Tomb III in the initial monument, a person most likely to be identified as Cassander. Even if one assumes that Tomb I was originally the tomb of a royal woman, which royal woman is highly debatable; if, for instance one argues that it was Philip II's obscure wife Phila (Lane Fox 2011a, 7), then one wonders why any subsequent ruler would care about her tomb. Though Antigonos Gonatas clearly intended the Great Tumulus to commemorate the last of the Argead dynasty, unfortunately it remains possible that, if whatever marker named those buried underneath had been destroyed, he may not have known which tomb belonged to which ruler or the identities of all under the large mound. The builder of the red-earth tumulus, however, is more likely to have known and more thought needs to be given, even if one understand Tomb I as only the burial of a woman and her child, to why this particular woman was so honored. Philip II had seven wives and clearly not all of them are there.





## WERE THE TOMBS UNDER THE GREAT TUMULUS AT VERGINA ROYAL?

Since the discovery in 1977 and 1978 of the three tombs once covered by the Great Tumulus at Vergina, no one, including their excavator Andronikos, has ever expended more than a few paragraphs arguing in support of the idea that these tombs were royal, the burials of members of the Argead dynasty.<sup>1</sup> Their royal identification has been a truth virtually universally acknowledged, yet not discussed at length, even by those few expressing doubts.<sup>2</sup> Instead, scholars have devoted themselves to the still unresolved problem of which Argeads, particularly which male Argeads, once lay in the three tombs.

A serious examination of the presumed identification of these tombs was already overdue when Faklaris published his 1994 *AJA* article which argued that Vergina was *not* ancient Aegae and therefore, since the rulers of Macedonia were buried at Aegae (*Anth. Pal.* 7.328; Diod. 19.52.5, 22.12; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.6), that the tombs under the Great Tumulus, as well as others at Vergina, could not be royal. He further claimed, reviving theories of Heuzey and Papazoglou, that Vergina is really ancient Valla and that Aegae actually lay in the area of the village of Kopanos.<sup>3</sup> Our consideration of the nature of the burials once covered by the Great Tumulus must, therefore, begin with the more fundamental issue of the identity of the city whose remains lie around modern Vergina.<sup>4</sup>

When Hammond first argued for locating Aegae at Vergina in 1968,<sup>5</sup> virtually no one took his theory seriously, not even Andronikos, until 1976 when Andronikos' own discovery of numerous fragments of broken grave stelai in the fill of the Great Tumulus led him to speculate that these fragments had been created by the looting of the cemetery at Aegae by Pyrrhus' Gallic mercenaries ca. 275 BC. Andronikos hypothesized that these despoilers had looted not only the royal tombs, as attested by ancient evidence (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.6–7; Diod. 22.12), but more modest burials as well. He suggested that when the Great Tumulus was constructed, probably by Antigonos Gonatas, fragments from the desecrated tombs were used in the fill.<sup>6</sup> Andronikos' spectacular discoveries in the two

following years led most of the scholarly world to conclude that Vergina was indeed ancient Aegae, the traditional burial place of the kings.

Faklaris has reminded us, albeit unintentionally,<sup>7</sup> of what the wonders of the Vergina tombs have made us forget: the literary evidence for the identification of Vergina as Macedonia's first capital is poor. It is critical to recognize, however, that Faklaris fails, nonetheless, to demonstrate that this evidence makes the Vergina identification impossible. In truth, ancient literary evidence about the location of Aegae is too unclear and contradictory to offer firm support for either Hammond or Faklaris. Moreover, much of the relevant extant literary evidence is contaminated by centuries of political myth-making about the origins of the Argead dynasty and the Macedonian kingdom.<sup>8</sup> The origins and early development of Macedonian monarchy remain obscure. Arguments for the location of the first capital which depend upon assumptions about that development are, if anything, more dubious than those based on the literary evidence.<sup>9</sup>

No ancient author clearly places Aegae near the gardens of Midas or Mount Bermium, as Faklaris and others choose to, although Herodotus (8.138) has often been so understood.<sup>10</sup> The myth recounted by Herodotus merely claims that the sons of Temenus settled and conquered that area first and from there proceeded to take the rest of Macedonia.<sup>11</sup> Justin (7.1.1–11) asserts that Caranus conquered the city of Edessa and renamed it Aegae;<sup>12</sup> whatever the truth of this assertion, it now seems clear that ancient Aegae was entirely different from the town known as Edessa in later antiquity and today.<sup>13</sup> Justin does mention Caranus' conquest of territory previously held by Midas, but seems to dissociate it from Aegae (7.1.11).<sup>14</sup> Thucydides' version of the foundation of the Macedonian kingdom (2.99) differs from both Herodotus and Justin. Thucydides makes no mention at all of the gardens or Bermium, but seems to make the double conquest of Pieria and Bottiaea the beginning of the kingdom.

Although Faklaris insists that the sources incontrovertibly demonstrate that Aegae was in Bottiaea, and not in Pieria, and that Vergina/Palatitsia can only have been considered part of Pieria, in fact, ancient references do no such thing. Among other difficulties, regional nomenclature certainly changed over time. Pliny (*N.H.* 10.33), Justin (7.1.1), and Strabo (7.11.1) all report that Macedonia was once called Emathia (an epitaph included in the Palatine Anthology [7.238] implies the same thing), but Justin (7.1.3) also seems to say that it was known as "Bottia" even earlier.<sup>15</sup>

The areas understood to be part of a region are not always clear<sup>16</sup> and may have changed over time. Diodorus (7.16) and Ptolemy (3.13.39) specifically locate Aegae in Bottiaea, but the Diodorus passage (which quotes an oracle), may use Bottiaea, as implied by the Justin passage, to

refer to all of Macedonia, not just one section of it, and Ptolemy is unreliable. Pliny (*N.H.* 4.10.33) seems to imply that both Aegae and Veroea were not in Pieria and thus suggests that they were in Bottiaea. Herodotus (7.127) rather confusingly notes that the Loudias and Haliacmon rivers form the border between Macedonia and Bottiaea, implying that Bottiaea was not the Macedonian heartland and thus an unlikely location for the ancient capital.<sup>17</sup> A fragment of Hesiod (fr.7) which remarks that the Macedonians lived around Pieria and Olympus<sup>18</sup> seems to confirm the location of the Macedonian homeland in Pieria. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that ancient Aegae was located in the region of Bottiaea, it is not certain, as Heuzey first noted,<sup>19</sup> that the area of Vergina would always have been considered part of Pieria rather than Bottiaea. The Haliacmon may have constituted the southern border of Bottiaea, thus excluding Vergina.<sup>20</sup> But if the Pierian mountains were the border, Vergina would have been included.<sup>21</sup> The imprecision of ancient geographers in employing terms denoting the region further confuses the issue.<sup>22</sup> The rise and decline of other nearby towns such as Veroea might also affect the understanding of regional divisions.

Several sources do seem to suggest that Vergina better suits the location of ancient Aegae than does the Kopanos/Lefkadia area. As Hammond pointed out, Theophrastus (*De ventis* 27) speaks of the tendency of northern winds around Aegae to divert clouds back toward the north because the mountains of Olympus and Ossa force the winds back. Whatever the scientific accuracy of Theophrastus' report, Vergina is obviously closer to the mountains named than is Lefkadia.<sup>23</sup> Hammond also argued that Diodorus' account of a coup attempted against Philip in 359 BC (*Diod.* 16.3.5–6) supports the location of Aegae at Vergina.<sup>24</sup> While the passage offers no certainty, as Faklaris rightly pointed out,<sup>25</sup> it clearly assumes that Methone was the closest port to Aegae and implies that the distance between the two was not great. Both Pliny (*N.H.* 4.10.33) and Ptolemy (3.13.39) seem to associate Aegae and Veroea, possibly implying that the two towns were close together. Nonetheless, unless an inscription from Vergina appears which clearly names the city which once stood there, written evidence can neither prove nor disprove the identification of Vergina as Aegae.

The archaeological part of Faklaris' argument is much less developed and much less convincing, a critical weakness since, as we have seen, it was the archaeological evidence which led to general acceptance of the identification of Vergina as Aegae. Faklaris' identification of Vergina as Valla<sup>26</sup> is particularly implausible. We know virtually nothing about Valla, other than its general location (Pliny *N.H.* 4.10.34; Ptol. 3.13.40).<sup>27</sup>

Hatzopoulos has argued against Faklaris' belief that Valla had a cult of Apollo Pythius.<sup>28</sup> Even if one concedes that Valla had such a cult, it is not certain that Vergina did. Faklaris suggested that a structure recently discovered near the Eucleia temple<sup>29</sup> was dedicated to Apollo. His suggestion is interesting, but is currently supported only by the existence of a stone snake found on the site (an item easily connected to various cults)<sup>30</sup> and two stelai, possibly votives, referring to Apollo, but with no direct tie to the possible temple site. Moreover, even if we were to concede that the structure in question was dedicated to Apollo,<sup>31</sup> we have no reason to conclude that there could have been no temple to Apollo at Aegae.<sup>32</sup> While it is true that a number of scholars, beginning with Heuzey, once identified Vergina/ Palatitsia with the site of Valla,<sup>33</sup> all these identifications were made prior to 1977. The extensive, even spectacular, remains uncovered at Vergina since then cannot possibly be those of Valla, a town whose obscurity is generally recognized.<sup>34</sup>

At the moment, comparatively little is known or published about most of the ancient remains of Naoussa/Kopanos/Lefkadia,<sup>35</sup> the area Faklaris believes to be that of Aegae.<sup>36</sup> Ironically, Faklaris somehow finds the same sort of evidence, in much scantier and more preliminary form, sufficient to convince him that the Kopanos area was the site of Aegae as, in the case of Vergina, convinced him that Vergina was *not* the site of the old capital.<sup>37</sup> At both sites we have remains of a city and its walls, a large structure which might have been a palace,<sup>38</sup> a theater nearby, and numerous tombs.<sup>39</sup> Neither site has, as yet, produced an inscription which refers to the name of the city.

The current excavators of Kopanos do not suggest that this was the site of Aegae.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, although the structure found at Belovina near Kopanos in the Demetriou field was slightly longer than the "palace" at Vergina, its excavators have said nothing to suggest that it was a dwelling place and are not even certain whether it was one building or several public buildings "integrated within the same urban fabric."<sup>41</sup> Indeed, they believe that they have found the public section of the *polis*, not royal living quarters.<sup>42</sup> They date the theater on the site to the late Hellenistic period.<sup>43</sup> The tombs in this area are the best known of the ancient remains so far discovered there (e.g., the Great Tomb at Lefkadia, the Kinch tomb, the tomb of Lyson and Calicles) but the tombs are fewer than those at Vergina.<sup>44</sup> Evidence for the occupation of the site for the period of the Iron Age is scant. Occupation appears to have continued to the early Christian era, with the height of prosperity occurring prior to Roman times.<sup>45</sup>

We know much more about the ancient remains at Vergina than those around Kopanos. The structure at Vergina commonly termed "the palace"

was demonstrably a dwelling place, “a house on a grand scale,”<sup>46</sup> with areas clearly designed for dining, as well as a long stoa possibly not unlike that found at Kopanos in the Demetriou field. Andronikos dated the main palace structure to the late fourth century, but it was in use at least until the reign of Perseus.<sup>47</sup> Unlike the large Kopanos structure, the “palace” at Vergina lies somewhat apart from other buildings, on a hill overlooking the agora, but separated from it and the theater by a number of tombs.

The theater at Vergina, believed by Andronikos to be a fourth-century structure,<sup>48</sup> has a very small cavea and an unusually large orchestra.<sup>49</sup> The atypical proportions of the Vergina theater may speak to the needs of a royal dynasty.<sup>50</sup> A number of the Vergina tombs, quite apart from those once covered by the Great Tumulus, are extraordinary, most notably the so-called Eurydice tomb with its giant, painted marble throne and stool.<sup>51</sup> Like those at Kopanos, remains at Vergina date from the Iron Age to Roman and early Christian times, but at Vergina they are most extensive in the fourth century and early Hellenistic period.<sup>52</sup>

Specific evidence links the remains at Vergina to Macedonian monarchy and the reigning dynasties, while nothing similar has been found, as yet, at Kopanos. Excavators at Vergina have uncovered three inscriptions referring to Eurydice, the mother of Philip II, two of which are dedications to the goddess Eucleia, found in a temple to this goddess, itself quite possibly the dedication of Eurydice.<sup>53</sup> In the remains of the palace on the hill above was found another inscription, reading ΗΡΑΚΛΗΙ ΠΑΤΡΩΙΩΙ (to Heracles the ancestral).<sup>54</sup> Both the Argeads and Antigonids claimed descent from Heracles.<sup>55</sup>

The general body of evidence from Vergina is a better fit than Kopanos for what we might reasonably expect for Aegae, but, most important, there is the Great Tumulus, a burial mound of nearly unprecedented size.<sup>56</sup> It was constructed many years after the initial burials it covered, with fill containing the highly unusual element of many broken grave stelai. The nature of the Great Tumulus continues to argue very strongly for Andronikos’ original conclusion that this was a memorial for kings, constructed by a king. According to this view, the Great Tumulus was an Antigonid memorial to the Argead past,<sup>57</sup> an assertion of continuity with that past.

Thus, on the basis of currently available information, it remains very unlikely that Vergina was Valla and much more likely that Vergina, not Kopanos, was the site of ancient Aegae. The contents of the tombs once covered by the Great Tumulus only strengthen this conclusion. I shall proceed with the assumption that Vergina can more reasonably be considered ancient Aegae than any other site currently known.

But, even if Vergina is Aegae, how are we to determine which of the many burials there is royal? Some are so modest that none would suggest that they belonged to a member of the royal family, and others, the Rhomaios tomb or the tomb Andronikos liked to call the “Eurydice tomb,” are, even in their looted state, grand enough to make them plausible candidates for royal burials, even though they do not lie under the Great Tumulus. If Vergina is Aegae, then some of these tombs were doubtless royal burials, but determining which remains, for the moment, an entirely subjective task.

I shall therefore limit my consideration to the two un-looted tombs once hidden by the Great Tumulus, for reasons already discussed.<sup>58</sup> Andronikos, over the years, advanced numerous arguments for considering these burials royal.<sup>59</sup> Some, like his original explanation of the ivory heads found in the main chamber of Tomb II, have proved ephemeral.<sup>60</sup> Others fail because Andronikos had a tendency to make absolute statements when the evidence merited only qualified assertions: the so-called Argead star found on the two *larnakes* from Tomb II appears in many Macedonian burials and is demonstrably not limited to the exclusive use of the Argead dynasty;<sup>61</sup> sacrifices like those found above Tombs II and III have been found near other tombs at Vergina and elsewhere in Macedonia;<sup>62</sup> similarly, the *hērōon*, if that is what it is, is not a unique feature;<sup>63</sup> indeed there is evidence for the heroization of other, non-royal Macedonian dead.<sup>64</sup>

Two items found in the main chamber of Tomb II suggest but do not prove a specific tie to the Argead dynasty: a fifth-century bronze tripod with an inscription indicating that it was a prize at the Argive games<sup>65</sup> and a wine strainer of silver, with gilt decoration, on the underside of which is inscribed the genitive of the name “Machatas.”<sup>66</sup> Argos was the region from which the Argeads claimed to originate, and Machatas, unlike, say, Amyntas, is not a terribly common male Macedonian name. We know of a person of that name whose sister Phila was a wife of Philip II, and whose sons, among them the notorious treasurer Harpalus, were prominent during the reign of Alexander.<sup>67</sup>

While a number of the items from the burials, particularly those in Tomb II, are unparalleled because of the material of which they were constructed (e.g., the corselet, the iron helmet, the ivory and gold shield), two objects found in Tomb II, unique in nature rather than merely in their fabrication, may allude to the royalty of its occupants. Andronikos found an adjustable gilded silver tubular circlet he termed a “diadem.”<sup>68</sup> Difficult questions about diadems abound: were they exclusive to Macedonian kings; what should and should not be termed a diadem; if unique to Macedonian kings, when did kings first wear them and how?<sup>69</sup> Despite

these complexities, the circlet remains the single most compelling item from the tombs for determining their royalty. Early reports of the contents of the main chamber of Tomb II include references to a scepter, a wooden rod about two meters long wrapped in gold,<sup>70</sup> but, as Borza recently noted, Andronikos' later work fails to mention this item.<sup>71</sup> I am aware of no published picture of it. The Porus medallion shows a figure, probably Alexander, holding a scepter and Macedonian coins show Zeus with a similar scepter.<sup>72</sup> Like the circlet, the scepter cannot offer certainty but adds to the list of reasons for thinking the burial is royal.

Andronikos' judgments about the quality of the grave goods from Tombs II and III have often been doubted or rejected because of the supposed lack of comparanda.<sup>73</sup> While only two other tombs of the "Macedonian" type (vaulted chamber tombs) have been found un-looted and neither contained comparable offerings,<sup>74</sup> there are, in fact, rich, un-looted tombs in Macedonia from the second half of the fourth century, containing a large number of objects; but these are cist tombs.<sup>75</sup> I am thinking of the six Derveni tombs, four of them un-looted, several of which contain coins dating them to the reigns of Philip II or Alexander III.<sup>76</sup> Since these tombs lie north of Thessaloniki, no one has ever suggested that they could be royal. While scholars have often compared individual items from these tombs to similar ones from Vergina,<sup>77</sup> I would like to compare the entire collection of grave goods from Tomb II to those from Derveni Beta (both are the burials of a man and a woman) and Tomb III to Derveni Alpha (both burials of a single male). This comparison, rough and necessarily incomplete, is, nonetheless, suggestive.<sup>78</sup> Naturally, the greater space available in tombs of the Macedonian type allowed for a greater number of grave goods, especially bulkier items.<sup>79</sup>

Such a comparison can only be suggestive, in view of the greater space available for grave goods in tombs of the Macedonian type, and in view of the inadequate publication of the contents of the Derveni tombs. Even so, the comparison leads to significant observations. On the one hand, both the Vergina and Derveni burials reflect what Borza termed "a common burial culture."<sup>80</sup> Many objects from both burials are similar not only to each other (the male burials, for instance, contain sets of roughly twenty metal banqueting vessels, often in pairs; see below), but also to objects found in many burials of the Macedonian elite. On the other hand, the Vergina items tend to be made of more precious metals, silver at Vergina and bronze at Derveni, or gold at Vergina and silver at Derveni. Gold is much more prevalent in the Vergina burials. Moreover, as we have noted, the nature, not merely the fabrication, of some objects found at Vergina, is unique.<sup>81</sup> Although both the Vergina and Derveni burials of males

include armor and weapons, typical features of male burials of the Macedonian elite, the quantity and quality of the weapons in the Vergina burials is noticeably greater. This combination of the typical and the unique conforms to what we know about the position of the Macedonian kings within their elite.

In Derveni Alpha the cremated human remains were placed in a bronze krater, in which were also found fragments of a golden oak wreath with acorns and of another wreath with gilded bronze leaves and gilded clay berries. The tomb contained bronze vessels associated with banqueting, many of them in pairs.<sup>82</sup> Prominent among the offerings from the tomb and pyre were greaves, a bronze lantern, strigils (some gilded), a sword, spears, small disks (some of silver), miniature gilded shields, and a silver plaque. An Orphic papyrus was found with debris from the pyre, above the tomb. Tomb III contained 28 silver vessels, two wreaths (one of them gold and the other gilded), gilded strigils, gilded greaves, spear heads including one entirely gilded, a gorget or pectoral, remains of a cuirass with gold decoration, two large bronze bathing vessels, and a silver-plated iron lampstand. The cremated remains, wrapped in purple cloth, were placed in a silver hydria, along with an Orphic papyrus.<sup>83</sup>

Both the combined male and female burials contain more and richer items than their single male parallels, but otherwise remain quite similar. In both cases, items likely attributable to the female burial seem scant by comparison to other female burials of the same period in Macedonia.<sup>84</sup> Derveni Beta had about 20 silver banqueting vessels and about the same number of bronze as well, miniature gilded silver shields, spears, bronze greaves, a sword, a leather pectoral with some gilded copper decoration, a bronze *pyxis* and bronze toilet case (each with traces of make-up), a gold diadem, and a glass drinking cup. The cremated dead, wrapped in purple cloth, were placed in the famous bronze krater, along with a gold quarter stater, two gold fibulae, a gold ring, and fragments of a wreath with gilded bronze leaves and gilded clay berries. A golden myrtle wreath had been placed on the krater.

In addition to the already-mentioned gold decorated cuirass, iron helmet, ivory and gold shield, tripod, and gilded silver circlet, Tomb II at Vergina had approximately 20 silver banqueting vessels, nine or perhaps ten bronze bathing vessels,<sup>85</sup> two gold wreaths, two more shields, four swords (including one with golden decoration), 13 spears, a gilded silver gorytus (with bow and arrows), a gilded silver pectoral,<sup>86</sup> a bronze lantern and a bronze torch, an iron tripod, numerous small decorations of gold and ivory, many small golden disks, a golden diadem,<sup>87</sup> and a gold fibula. The cremated remains of the man and woman were separately wrapped in



purple cloth and each placed in a solid gold *larnax* which was, in turn, enclosed in its own marble sarcophagus. In front of both sarcophagi were couches elaborately decorated in gold and ivory.

Judgments of style and quality are difficult, but Andronikos' insistence on the greater quality of grave goods from Vergina seems less subjective as one makes more one-on-one comparisons. Indeed, the entire collection of objects at Vergina seems to meet a higher standard in terms of craftsmanship and expense of material.<sup>88</sup> The only apparent exception to this generalization is the famously elaborate krater from Derveni Beta. However, while the two golden *larnakes* from Tomb II are unique, the krater apparently was not.<sup>89</sup>

The Argeads were not pharaohs. Macedonian monarchy, at least in the period prior to Alexander, was not replete with an assortment of icons of royal power. Scholars have long described the Macedonian king as *primus inter pares* and that is exactly what we see when we compare the Vergina grave goods to others. This was not a monarchy in which the kings stood far above the rest of the elite,<sup>90</sup> but just as one could distinguish Alexander from the rest in battle by his richer and more distinctive armor (Plut. *Alex.* 16.4, 32.5–6), so can we distinguish the royal dead.

The balance of the evidence justifies continued belief that the remains at Vergina are those of Aegae and that the tombs under the Great Tumulus belonged to some of the last Argeads.<sup>91</sup> Discoveries at Vergina, Kopanos, or elsewhere could quickly change this conclusion. While we do not know that ancient Macedonian kings had many palaces (other than the one at Vergina, only two other structures have been identified as royal palaces, and only one, at Pella, is in Macedonia proper),<sup>92</sup> we cannot be certain that they did not. Eurydice could have made dedications at towns other than Aegae or Pella. The discovery of yet more splendid un-looted tombs elsewhere in Macedonia could dramatically alter the current apparent context for the Vergina tombs. Nonetheless, while the evidence that the tombs once covered by the Great Tumulus were royal is hardly indisputable, its cumulative weight continues to compel belief.\*

## Notes

\* This manuscript was last revised in 1997. Since that date, the lengthy publication of the Derveni burials referred to in n. 75 has appeared: P. Themelis and J. Touratsoglou, *Oi Tapboi Tou Dervenion* (Athens 1997). In addition, S. Drougou, C. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, P. Faklaris, A. Kottaridou, and E-B. Tsigarida, *Vergina: The Great Tumulus: Archaeological Guide* (Thessaloniki 1996) offers some new and some revised material on the Vergina burials.

<sup>1</sup> Andronikos 1984, 224–26 is his lengthiest discussion of the question.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, Borza 1987, 105 n.2 revealed that A. B. Bosworth continued to have doubts that the Vergina tombs were royal and suspected that the burials were Antipatrid, not Argead. Bosworth never published a discussion of these doubts. Although Petsas, 1986, 448 clearly retained some uncertainty about the identification, he has not pursued the issue.

<sup>3</sup> Faklaris 1994, 609–16. Heuzey and Daumet 1876, 183. Papazoglou once believed that the Lefkadia-Kopanos area might be the site of Aegae (Papazoglou 1957, 121 n. 79), but abandoned this belief after the discovery of the tombs at Vergina (Papazoglou 1988, 133).

<sup>4</sup> Hatzopoulos 1996, 264–69, an entire article devoted to disproving Faklaris' arguments, appeared in print after the initial submission of this article to *Archaeological News*. W. S. Greenwalt was kind enough to provide me with a pre-publication copy of an article of his (Greenwalt 1999, 158–183) which included an appendix dealing with Faklaris' arguments. Both authors rejected Faklaris' views. See below.

<sup>5</sup> This paper was later published as Hammond 1970, 53–67; see also Hammond 1972, 156–58.

<sup>6</sup> Andronikos 1984, 58–62.

<sup>7</sup> Faklaris 1994, 609–16 suggested no lack of confidence in the literary sources. It is analysis of his argument, and therefore of his evidence, which leads to this realization. Unlike Hatzopoulos 1996, 269, I do not question the scholarly utility of the publication of a stimulating if ultimately unconvincing argument.

<sup>8</sup> See Borza 1982a, 7–13 and Greenwalt 1986b, 117–18 on these problems and the variant traditions.

<sup>9</sup> Thus, while Hammond 1970, 156 rightly pointed to the strategic advantages of the site at Vergina (command of both mountain and coastal passages to the south and of the approach to the crossing of the Haliacmon), Papazoglou 1988, 134 n. 63 with equal plausibility noted that a location of Aegae at Vergina poses certain problems in terms of the apparent evolution of the Macedonian state.

<sup>10</sup> Faklaris 1994, 613 n. 34 admitted that Herodotus does not actually locate Aegae there.

<sup>11</sup> Greenwalt 1999 argued that Herodotus not only does not place Aegae within the Gardens of Midas, but that he “positively excludes that possibility” and instead links Aegae's location to the mysterious kingdom of Lebaea.

<sup>12</sup> Huxley 1983, 254–55 offered evidence dating back at least to Euphorion which seems to confirm the name-change.

<sup>13</sup> Tafel 1841, 49–50; Papazoglou 1957, 110–11, 343 and Papazoglou 1988, 131–35, followed by Faklaris 1994, 610. Hammond 1970, 64 and 1972, 156–57 reached the same conclusion (unaware of Papazoglou's work), and was followed by Huxley 1983, 253–54.

<sup>14</sup> Greenwalt 1999 reached a similar conclusion, further suggesting that the Justin passage implies that Caranus founded Aegae first and only later conquered the region previously in control of Midas.

<sup>15</sup> Hammond 1972, 153 discussed the changing meaning of “Bottiaea” and concluded that by the time of the Roman Empire it had been replaced by “Emathia.”

<sup>16</sup> Daux 1977, 626 noted numerous variations from one ancient author to another on regions and their borders. Faklaris 1994, 613 concedes that “...the ancient sources

are somewhat vague with regard to the boundaries between Emathia and Bottiaea, for some cite the territories of Bottiaea as belonging to Emathia.” See Hatzopoulos 1996, 265 for a review of the argument that Vergina/Palatitsia belonged to Emathia, not Pieria.

<sup>17</sup> Faklaris 1994, 613 n. 32 agreed that Herodotus here seems to mean “Pieria” when he speaks of “Macedonia,” but denies the obvious implication of this passage.

<sup>18</sup> Hammond 1994, 133–34 referred to this passage as well as Herodotus 7.127, and concluded (1994, 133 n. 7) that “the original homeland of the Macedonians was Pieria.”

<sup>19</sup> Heuzey and Daumet 1876, 183.

<sup>20</sup> Hammond 1970, 64 and Edson 1980, 10 saw the Haliacmon as the border and located Aegae in Pieria (at Vergina), whereas Faklaris 1994, 613, although recognizing the same border, believed that Aegae was in Bottiaea.

<sup>21</sup> Heuzey pointed out that in his day the villages in the Palatitsia area were dependent on Veria and that the mountains made a more effective border than the river (Heuzey and Daumet 1876, 183, followed by Hatzopoulos 1996, 267).

<sup>22</sup> Two fragments of Strabo (*Geographia* 7.20 and 7.22) and Ptolemy (*Geographia* 3.12) have the Haliacmon empty between Dion and Pydna. This is probably an error, but when one realizes that Strabo (7.22) defined Pieria as the area north from the Haliacmon to the Axios and then announced that Pydna is Pierian, but Alorus (north of Pydna) is Bottiaean, one loses faith in the accuracy of the sources, whether the origin of the inaccuracy lies in the manuscript tradition or the original ancient author.

<sup>23</sup> Faklaris 1994, 612, especially n. 28, questioned the truth of the phenomenon (as does Papazoglou 1988, 134) and noted that Tafel 1841, 48–49, on the basis of the same passage, located Aegae near Edessa, but failed to explain why Theophrastus would not be referring to a town near Olympus and Ossa (named by Theophrastus) rather than one near Mt. Bermium.

<sup>24</sup> Hammond 1972, 157–58.

<sup>25</sup> Faklaris 1994, 613. He noted that no time-frame is given by Diodorus for Argaeus’ march from Methone to Aegae or back again.

<sup>26</sup> Faklaris 1994, 614.

<sup>27</sup> See Papazoglou 1988, 120–24 for a discussion of the evidence for Valla and its location.

<sup>28</sup> See Hatzopoulos 1996, 267, who insisted that Steph. Byz. s.v. “Valla,” does not demonstrate that Valla had such a cult.

<sup>29</sup> Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 1992, 30–31.

<sup>30</sup> Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, the excavator, attributed it to the cult of Zeus Meilichius: Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 1991, 66.

<sup>31</sup> See Faklaris 1994, 614 nn. 44–46; only one of these reliefs has been considered a votive by anyone other than Faklaris. See Hatzopoulos 1996, 267 for further doubts about Faklaris’ interpretation of these votives.

<sup>32</sup> So also Hatzopoulos 1996, 268.

<sup>33</sup> See Faklaris 1994, 614 for references.

<sup>34</sup> Papazoglou 1988, 122 makes this point forcefully. She characterized Valla as “obscure;” Petsas 1986, 447 called Valla an “insignificant town;” and Daux 1987, 626 referred to Valla as “la petite ville antique.”

<sup>35</sup> Rhomiopoulou and Touratsoglou 1970, 387–89; Allamani and Misailidou 1992, 203–15; Allamani 1995.

<sup>36</sup> Faklaris 1994, 614–16.

<sup>37</sup> Gene Borza made this point to me in private conversation.

<sup>38</sup> See Faklaris 1994, 615 nn. 55–56. He reported the length of the building as 106 m., obviously comparable to the 104.5 m. length of the palace at Vergina (Andronikos 1984, 39).

<sup>39</sup> See Faklaris 1994, 615 nn. 58–59 for references.

<sup>40</sup> Allamani 1995, 5 refused to accept any identification of the site and expressed doubts about Petsas' earlier identification of it as Mieza.

<sup>41</sup> Allamani 1995, 9. It was a monumental structure with a stoa and dates to the second half of the fourth century. Another building of similar date, a few meters south-west, is currently being excavated. In addition, yet another complex of buildings has been found in the Valvanis field, involving two houses separated by a street, apparently dating to the late Hellenistic or very early Roman period (Allamani and Misailidou 1992, 202–12).

<sup>42</sup> Allamani and Misailidou 1992, 212.

<sup>43</sup> Allamani and Misailidou 1992; see also Allamani 1995, 9.

<sup>44</sup> Ginouvès 1994, 178 reports seven tombs of the Macedonian type in the neighborhood of Lefkadia and eleven at Vergina. At Vergina is also the Cemetery of the Tumuli, an area of 1 square kilometer with 300 small mounds containing burials from 1000–200 BC (Andronikos 1984, 25).

<sup>45</sup> Allamani 1995, 6.

<sup>46</sup> Ginouvès 1994, 84.

<sup>47</sup> Andronikos 1984, 39; Ginouvès 1994, 87–88.

<sup>48</sup> Andronikos 1984, 49.

<sup>49</sup> The Vergina orchestra is 28.5 m. in diameter, whereas, as Borza notes (1992, 255 n. 5), the typical orchestra size is 19.5 m. in diameter (according to Allamani 1995, 10) or 18 m. (according to Faklaris 1994, 615).

<sup>50</sup> Borza 1992, 255–56.

<sup>51</sup> Three tombs with marble thrones have been discovered at Vergina (Ginouvès 1994, 154); at the time of his writing, no other tombs in Macedonia had been found with a marble throne, but 1993 Greek newspapers reported the discovery of a new tomb at Pella, supposedly the largest yet, with a marble throne. There is an Eretrian tomb with two marble thrones from the mid-third century BC; see Kurtz and Boardman 1971, 278.

<sup>52</sup> Faklaris 1994, 614 doubted that this suits the evidence for ancient Aegae. Papazoglou 1988, 134 noted, however, that there is little evidence for Aegae in the Roman period, much as for Vergina (Papazoglou 1988, 135, n. 66), and the discovery in recent years of a series of late archaic and early classical, very rich, largely female burials near the Rhomaïos tomb (Ginouvès 1994, 35–39; Andronikos 1984, 35–38; *AR* 1987–88, 52; 1988–89, 80; 1990–91, 56; Ergon 1988, 72–80, figs. 62–66) means that the comparative gap in material at Vergina between the archaic period and the fourth century has already narrowed considerably and may soon vanish entirely, much as Andronikos thought it might (1984, 30). Thus, Faklaris' concern about the absence of materials from c. 650–550 BC at Vergina (1994, 614) seems unjustified and, as he himself conceded, likely to be outdated by subsequent finds. Hatzopoulos 1996, 268 noted that Faklaris is undisturbed by a comparatively similar absence of early material from Lefkadia.

<sup>53</sup> *AR* 1983–84, 47; Oikonomedes 1983, 62–64; Andronikos 1984, 49–51; Saatsoglou-Paliadeli, “Vergina. Hiero Eukleias,” *Ergon* (1990) 733–34; *AR* (1990–91) 56; *Ergon* (1990) 83–85 and (1991) 65–68. Hatzopoulos 1996, 268 made a similar argument about the epigraphical evidence.

<sup>54</sup> See Andronikos 1984, 42, who noted that Heuzey found traces of votive offerings in the *tholos* of the palace where the inscription was found.

<sup>55</sup> See Edson 1934, 213–35 and Billows 1990, 15–18. If the palace dates from the reign of Cassander or of one of his sons, as it might, one should note that while the Antipatrids did not, so far as we know, claim descent from Heracles, the sons of Cassander, as grandsons of Philip II, could certainly have claimed Heracles as an ancestor. Their father, building a new palace for his descendants, could have made the claim for them.

<sup>56</sup> Tumulus size and high status were long associated; see Carney 1992b, 9 n. 49 for further discussion, as well as Mylonas 1948, 65. The Great Tumulus at Vergina has often been described as the largest in the Balkans (Hammond 1978, 333) and Andronikos (1980, 171) called it “unique in Hellenic world,” but *AR* (1990–91) 54 terms a mound at Vasilika in central Macedonia (Toumba C) “the largest in the Balkans.” It dates to late Neolithic times. Hammond 1982, 112 n. 3 refers to a mound at Amphipolis which is demonstrably bigger: 140 m. diameter and 20 m. height, compared to 110m. diameter and 15 m. height at Vergina. The Amphipolis mound was built in the Hellenistic period, but, like the one at Vergina, covered burials of a much earlier period. Burstein 1982, 147 more accurately describes the Great Tumulus as “among the largest of such monuments known from the Balkans.”

<sup>57</sup> Andronikos 1984, 56, 82. Hammond (most recently 1991, 78) continued to favor Lysimachus as the creator of the Great Tumulus and to believe that Tomb I was looted after the building of the Great Tumulus rather than before, as most other scholars have believed.

<sup>58</sup> Tomb I, which was looted, will not be discussed at length here, but the quality of its wall paintings (see Andronikos 1984, 86–95) and the thoroughness with which it was looted (suggesting that the grave goods were rich) reasonably conform with expectations about the quality of a royal burial.

<sup>59</sup> Borza 1992, 260–62 considered the hunting scene on the facade of Tomb II and the iron helmet from Tomb II further evidence for the royalty of the occupant.

<sup>60</sup> Andronikos originally found five small ivory heads, identified two as those of Philip and Alexander, and decided that they might be miniature parallels to the chryselephantine statues in the Philippeum (Andronikos 1977, 60), but subsequent finds of further heads (Andronikos 1984, 129 mentions fourteen) have made that argument obsolete, and his identification of individual heads has not always been accepted.

<sup>61</sup> On the use of the star in non-royal burials, see Borza 1981, 81–82, 86–87 nn. 58–61. See Carney 1991, 21 n. 21 for references to some non-royal examples. On the meaning of the star symbol, see Ritter 1981, 159–205; Adams 1983, 1–7; Tripodi 1986, 653–60; Mitropoulou 1993, 843–958. Vokotopoulou, 1996, 152 has argued that the symbol, although not royal, took on an “official” character by the time of Philip II, as indicated by its role on Macedonian shields.

<sup>62</sup> Andronikos 1984, 51 considered the sacrifices critical to a royal identification for these burials, but Miller 1993, 65 n. 31 offered other Macedonian examples.

At Vergina itself, the first burial in the Bella Tumulus had remains of a sacrifice associated with it (Andronikos 1984, 35).

<sup>63</sup> Andronikos 1984, 225 claimed the structure at Vergina was unique, but see Miller 1993, 19–20 and Kurtz and Boardman 1971, 299–301 for references to other examples.

<sup>64</sup> See Miller 1993, 19, especially n. 108 and Kurtz and Boardman 1971, 299–301.

<sup>65</sup> Andronikos 1984, 165–66, figs. 133–4.

<sup>66</sup> Andronikos 1984, 157–58, fig. 108. Andronikos also thought a small gold sheet with an emblem of Heracles' club on it, somehow attached to the back of the ceremonial shield, indicated connection to a Heraclid (Andronikos 1984, 137–40, fig. 94), but it could also have been appropriate for anyone who admired Heracles as a hero.

<sup>67</sup> Green 1982, 151; another example not known until the second century BC.

<sup>68</sup> Andronikos 1984, 171–74, figs. 138–39. See also Vokotopoulou 1996, 167–8.

<sup>69</sup> See Lehmann 1980, 527–31; 1981, 134–44; Calder 1981, 334–35; Fredricksmeier 1981, 330–34; Calder 1983, 102–03; Fredricksmeier 1983, 99–102; Ritter 1984, 105–11; Prestianni-Giallombardo 1986, 497–509; Andronikos 1980, 177–78; Hammond 1982, 117. Borza 1981a, 76 and 1991, 36 argued convincingly that the circlet could be a metallic version of the fillet worn by Macedonian kings as early as Alexander I and that the diadem could easily have been used as early as Philip II. Even if one grants Borza's view, there remains the problem that some evidence suggests that the wearing of such a fillet was not an exclusively royal privilege, or at least was not so prior to Alexander.

<sup>70</sup> Andronikos 1977, 59.

<sup>71</sup> Borza 1987, 115–16.

<sup>72</sup> Borza 1987, 116 suggested the Porus medallion as a model; see Price 1982, 75–88. For Zeus' scepter, see, for instance, the reverse of an Alexander tetradrachm, in Yalouris *et al.* 1983, 108, fig. 18.

<sup>73</sup> E.g., Andronikos himself (1984, 226).

<sup>74</sup> Miller 1993, 5 n. 12. The tombs at Karytsa-Dion (tomb 6 b in Miller's catalogue; see also Gossel 1980, 125–31) and one at Alykes Kitros-Pydna (tomb 25 c in Miller's catalogue; *AR* 1983–84, 42 and 1984–85, 40; Besios and Pandermalis 1984/89, 220–22; Besios 1988, 181–93). The first is a very poor burial of a girl in her early teens with undatable funeral goods. The second contained the remains of a small girl wearing a gold diadem and the remains of eight other females and a male, burials that included considerable quantities of gold jewelry.

<sup>75</sup> A lengthy publication of the finds from the Derveni tombs is finally forthcoming and is much needed because of numerous contradictions in published material about the tombs (for instance, Makaronas 1963, 194 says grave Zeta was plundered in antiquity, but Ginouvès 1994, 187 says all six were found untouched), much of it involving confusion about which of the six tombs contained a given object. Brief descriptions of the finds appear in *AR* 1961–62, 15; 1962–63, 24 and Makaronas 1963, 193–96 and in Vokotopoulou 1996, 200–24. Vokotopoulou and Ninou 1980 nn. 157–268 list and describe many, but not all, items from the burials. Giouri 1978, 1–2 gives a description of the discovery of the first two Derveni tombs. See also Schefold 1979, 112–18; Yalouris *et al.* 1983, 163–71 nn. 123–39; Ridgeway 1982, 49–56; Ginouvès 1994, 187–88.

<sup>76</sup> Barr-Sharrar 1982, 136 n. 12. Andronikos 1984, 70 does note in passing that the group of bronze and silver vessels from Tomb II is comparable to burial groups from Derveni.

<sup>77</sup> Musgrave 1990a, 310.

<sup>78</sup> Makaronas 1963, Ninou 1980, 157–268 and Vokotopoulou 1996 were my primary sources of information for this comparison. Stella Miller-Collet cautioned me against putting much faith in the current attribution of objects to given burials at Derveni.

<sup>79</sup> Andronikos 1987, 9–10 theorized that the need for larger tombs, because of the quantities of grave goods Macedonians liked to leave in burials, led to the development of the vaulted chamber tomb. Certainly tombs like Derveni Beta must have been crammed with goods by comparison to those of the Macedonian type. For instance, in Tomb II at Vergina, the antechamber was 3.36 m. by 4.46 m. and the main chamber 4.46 m. by 4.46 m., both with a height of 5.3 m. (Andronikos 1984, 97) whereas Derveni Beta, the largest of the Derveni tombs, was only 3 m. by 1.5 m. (Makaronas 1963, 193). The smaller area available in the cist burials probably also accounts for the apparent absence of bath vessels from Derveni Beta, whereas four bronze bath vessels were found in the main chamber of Tomb II (Andronikos 1984, 160–62). Similarly, whereas the Vergina burials are believed to have contained items of furniture (Vokotopoulou 1996, 169, 180), the smaller Derveni tombs cannot easily have done so, although it is possible that tomb Alpha did (Vokotopoulou 1996, 216).

<sup>80</sup> Borza 1992, 260, 268.

<sup>81</sup> The Vergina tombs, as we have already noted, contain items which are otherwise unknown in Macedonian burials.

<sup>82</sup> Vokotopoulou 1996, 214 reported two silver vases as well.

<sup>83</sup> See the lengthy description of contents of Tomb III in Andronikos 1984, 198–217, now supplemented by Vokotopoulou 1996, 178–82.

<sup>84</sup> The amount of jewelry in Derveni Beta is quite modest: a simple gold ring, two golden fibulae, and a diadem (Vokotopoulou 1996, 210 attributes all these items to the male). Two *phiales* with remains of make-up, a bronze toilet case and *pyxis*, both also showing traces of make-up, are the only obviously feminine items. The woman buried in the antechamber at Vergina had even fewer conventionally feminine items: the diadem and a pin of the Illyrian type (see Carney 1991, 18, 21). Grave Zeta at Derveni had two gold necklaces, a gold head of Heracles, six golden fibulae, gold earrings and three gold finger rings (Ninou 1980, 253–65). Similarly, a female burial at Sedes also dated to the second half of the fourth century had much more jewelry (see Carney 1991, 18 n. 10 for references).

<sup>85</sup> Andronikos 1984, 119–97 gives a detailed description of the items found in the main chamber and antechamber. See also Vokotopoulou 1996, 151–78.

<sup>86</sup> Archibald 1985, 170 says that the material of this pectoral is unique.

<sup>87</sup> Pfrommer 1990, 8 claims that this item was not a diadem but a “girdle” and asserts that it was found with a small girdle buckle. The Illyrian pin – if that is what Pfrommer refers to – was not found with the diadem (which was inside the *larnax*), but outside, on top. Vokotopoulou 1996, 172 suggests that the pin was used to fasten the ends of a *chlamys*. In any event, the item in question makes an unlikely girdle because of its three-dimensional delicacy.

<sup>88</sup> Some obvious examples which seem to confirm this conclusion: the gold wreath with myrtle leaves and blossoms from Derveni Beta (Ninou 1980, 239, pl. 31) and the myrtle leaf and blossom wreath from the antechamber of Tomb II (Andronikos 1984, 193, fig. 154); the diadem from Derveni Beta (Ninou 1980, 236, pl. 30) and the diadem from the antechamber of Tomb II (Andronikos 1980, 196, figs. 158–59); the

pectoral from Derveni Beta (Ninou 1980, 228, pl. 30) and the gold pectoral from the antechamber of Tomb II (Andronikos 1984, 188, fig. 151. However, the iron pectoral from the main chamber in Tomb II [Ninou 1980, 98, no picture] is less impressive than that from Derveni Beta); the silver strainer from Derveni Beta (Ninou 1980, 187, pl. 29) and the silver strainer with gilded decoration from Tomb II (Andronikos 1984, 148, fig. 108) or the bronze strainer with goose heads from Derveni Alpha (Ninou 1980, 170) and the silver goose-headed strainer from Tomb III (Andronikos 1984, 211, fig. 178) and the lanterns from Derveni Alpha (Ninou 1980, 33, pl. 33) and Tomb II (Andronikos 1984, 162–64, figs. 162–63). Vokotopoulou 1996, 217 compares the workmanship of the Derveni lantern unfavorably with that found in Vergina II.

<sup>89</sup> As Borza 1992, 269 notes, the closest parallel is a silver ossuary from Amphipolis (Ninou 1980, pl. 55), but it pales by comparison. The workmanship of the *larnakes*, however, is hardly on a par with that of the great krater.

<sup>90</sup> Ancient literature is full of stories about the luxurious life-style of the Macedonian elite (Ath. 549f; Ael. *V.H.* 9.3; Polyæn. 4.3.24). Alexander supposedly did much to increase the wealth of those close to him, so much so that Olympias is said to have reproached him for making many of the elite (and sometimes ordinary soldiers) his equals in wealth (Plut. *Alex.* 39.1–5; Curt. 9.3.21) and even Alexander worried about their devotion to luxury (Plut. *Alex.* 40.1–41.1). Archaeology confirms the literary evidence; even early Macedonian burials contain much richer grave goods than those of southern Greece, with many more objects. Barr-Sharrar 1982, 123, 132.

<sup>91</sup> Some difficulties relating to the identification of the bones with individual Argeads, apparent contradictions between historical and archaeological information, persist. See discussion in Carney 1991, 117–18 n. 4. None of these difficulties, however, threaten the conclusion that these were Argead burials.

<sup>92</sup> Ginouvès 1994, 84.



## AFTERWORD

I have always been troubled by the fact that (see chapter four) the first two tombs under the Great Tumulus at Vergina had barely been discovered when they were proclaimed to be royal and Tomb II the tomb of Philip II. This early categorization and identification have complicated our understanding of the tombs and helped to generate the abiding controversy about them. I wrote this article not because I seriously doubted that the occupants of the tombs were indeed members of the royal family, but rather to force myself to find specific support for my instinctive reaction, one that many but not all scholars shared. The article was ready for publication in 1997, but the illness and death of the original editor and ultimate demise of *Archaeological News* delayed publication until 2001. As a consequence, as I note briefly at the end of the article, I was unable to update my Vergina/ Derveni comparisons by making use of Themelis and Touratsoglou 1997, an extensive study of all the Derveni burials, that should now be used as a reference, especially for the contents of individual Derveni burials. Moreover, Barr-Sharrar 2008, a study of the famous krater from tomb Beta at Derveni, also appeared after the article took more or less final form.

Since we know that the Argead kings were buried at Aegae, one cannot reflect on whether the tombs are royal burials without first deciding whether Aegae was indeed located in and around the modern village of Vergina. The great majority of scholars (in addition to works cited in this article, see Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 1996) continue to accept the Vergina/Aegae identification first advanced by Hammond, but in addition to Faklaris' arguments discussed in this article, Touloumakos (2010) also argued that Vergina is not ancient Aegae (he returns to the identification of Aegae with Edessa), though he concedes that there may have been a royal residence at Vergina and believes that later it was occupied by a member of the Macedonian elite, returned from Alexander's campaigns. His arguments are interesting but not persuasive. Moreover, roof tiles with the image of a goat's head stamped on them and a silver coin with a goat's head (Drougou 2011, 254–5) offer more support for the Aegae identification (Fischer-Bossert 2007 does not really compromise this point).

Themelis and Touratsoglou (1997, 15 n.51, 202) argue that the Vergina burials cannot be assumed to be royal simply because of the rich grave offerings or the elaborate cremation burial. Certainly size alone cannot be a criterion. The excavation of the looted Tomb of Amphipolis (or Kasta Tomb), first discovered in 2012, has uncovered a tumulus with a diameter of more than 158 meters (<http://www.theamphipolistomb.com/>), much larger than the 110 meter diameter of the Great Tumulus at Vergina.

Inevitably, granted the rapid growth of archaeological activity in Macedonia, some statements in this article are now literally outdated or require some modification. Though a number of items from Tomb II still seem unique (e.g. the solid gold *larnakes* or the Argive tripod), two other male "diadems" have been found and they have been interpreted as signifying priestly office, and the one in tomb II as referring to the priestly duties of Macedonian kings (Tsigarida 2002). Granted that many do not accept the later dating of the Derveni burials advocated

by Themelis and Touratsoglou (e.g. Hatzopoulos 2008, 102), dating that supported an identification of Philip Arrhidaeus as the occupant of Tomb II, there remains controversy about the degree of overlap in time between the Vergina burials and Derveni burials and thus about how far the royal offerings were models for the non-royal rather than absolutely contemporary with each other (see, for instance, Guimier-Sorbets 2005 and Morizot or Nicgorski 2005 or Rolley 2006). As more comparanda are known and studied (see, for instance, Tsigarida 2010 on myrtle wreaths), it is easier to put the Vergina burials in a broader context, despite the problem of dating. While there is not yet proof, a number of scholars have embraced the possibility that gold-rich Macedonia had gold-working workshops of its own and possibly produced the gold ornaments marketed to Thracians and Scythians (e.g. Neverov 1990; Miller Collet 1996, 37; Tsigarida 2010, 305). Rolley (2006) puts an interesting stress on the role of silver vessels as defining the royal and very top elite burials and assumes that directly or indirectly, the king controlled access to silver.

## PART II

### CONSPIRACIES REAL AND ALLEGED

#### 6

#### ALEXANDER THE LYNCESTIAN: THE DISLOYAL OPPOSITION

Since the life of Alexander the Lyncestian has never received individual treatment,<sup>1</sup> his character has been taken for granted and the curious nature of his career largely ignored. Why did the Lyncestian Alexander, one of the sons of Aeropus, survive nearly six years of his royal Macedonian namesake's reign, instead of dying with his brothers when Alexander son of Philip took the throne? Any answer to this question must come from an examination of the Lyncestian's background and career.

No source states that the son of Aeropus was a member of the Lyncestian royal house, but this is generally assumed.<sup>2</sup> We do know that he was Lyncestian (Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Curt. 7.1.5, 8.8.6) and that his father was called Aeropus (Arr. 1.7.6, 17.8).<sup>3</sup> He had two brothers, Heromenes and Arrhabaeus, who were executed soon after Philip's death because of alleged complicity in the assassination (Arr. 1.25.1; Just. 11.2.2). Alexander the Lyncestian was married to one of Antipater's daughters (Curt. 7.1.7; Just. 11.7.1, 12.14.1). These are the meager certainties about the Lyncestian's background.<sup>4</sup>

There are good reasons for thinking that he was a member of the Lyncestian house. The tendency of the 'vulgate' sources to call him 'the Lyncestian'<sup>5</sup> and the fact that his brother's name, Arrhabaeus, had dynastic significance<sup>6</sup> are both persuasive. More impressive still are the relations of the sons of Aeropus with Alexander of Macedon. At least one, if not all three, was killed because he was believed to have sought the throne for himself; all three seem to have been executed on charges of plotting against

the life of the reigning king. They acted and were treated the way members of the Lyncestian house had historically acted and been treated.<sup>7</sup>

If then they were of Lyncestian royalty, what did membership in that family signify? Philip II had accomplished the long-desired annexation of Lyncestis into the Argead realm. Any Lyncestian who wished to continue traditional opposition to Argead rule had to do so within the much closer confines of direct Macedonian control of Lyncestis and the other upland kingdoms. Yet the two factors which had so long protected previous Lyncestians might, even in the era of centralized Macedonian power, help the current Lyncestian scion: aid from foreign powers interested in creating disunity in Macedonia and the periodic contractions of Macedonian royal power.

Whether the sons of Aeropus considered a claim on the Macedonian throne part of their heritage and could realistically have expected support for such a claim (especially one based on a plot against the incumbent's life)<sup>8</sup> is unclear. Since the beginning of the fifth century the Argead dynasty, with the exception of Ptolemy Alorites usually granted,<sup>9</sup> had had an apparent monopoly on the throne of Macedonia. Nevertheless, several facts suggest that the three brothers were indeed considered contenders for the throne. We know that the Lyncestian dynasty had always been hostile to the Argeads, despite considerable intermarriage among all the upcountry dynasties and the Argeads.<sup>10</sup> I would add that there may well have been a Lyncestian usurper on the Macedonian throne, a certain Aeropus who reigned *ca* 398/7–*ca* 395/4. Aeropus seized the throne by murdering his ward Orestes, son of Archelaus (Diod. 14.37.6). Many would deny that Aeropus was Lyncestian, but their arguments are unconvincing and often circular.<sup>11</sup> It is possible, therefore, that the Lyncestian princes of the later fourth century had a recent model for the seizure of the Macedonian throne by a Lyncestian prince.

However this may be, in Macedonian politics, traditional yet fluid, an ambitious man at an opportune moment might dare the unprecedented. According to tradition, the Argeads initially had seized their own realm (Thuc. 2.99). When there were no more Argeads, the Macedonians accepted other dynasties. It is quite another matter whether a Lyncestian, possibly acting without precedent, could expect support and success in an attempt to seize the Macedonian throne. And because our extant narratives are of Roman date, it is possible that the reported designs of the Lyncestians on the throne are nothing more than anachronistic interpretations of writers long conditioned to imperial contenders of distinctly non-royal backgrounds. Yet we know that contemporaries found the ambitions of the brothers plausible.<sup>12</sup> All three were eventually executed, almost certainly for plotting

to take the life of the king and in the case of Alexander, we are told that he was involved in such a plot as a pretender.

Although the Lyncestians apparently were plausible pretenders in the eyes of their contemporaries, they would not ordinarily have been viable ones. So long as there were adequate Argead heirs and relative stability in Macedonia, Lyncestian pretensions would have seemed uninteresting. But after the death of Amyntas son of Perdiccas in 336, the only remaining Argead heirs were the king himself and his mentally deficient half-brother Arrhidaeus. There seems also to have been Persian support for plotters and pretenders, especially Lyncestian ones, and there was growing resentment, particularly within the Macedonian aristocracy, of Alexander's increasingly innovative, anti-traditional kingship.<sup>13</sup> We should expect that the remaining senior Lyncestian, Alexander, became a more important man, or perhaps a more important tool,<sup>14</sup> after the death of Amyntas.

But let us turn to the actual role of the Lyncestian house in the years 336 to 330, and first to the assassination of Philip and the alleged involvement of the sons of Aeropus. Both Arrian (1.25.1–2) and Curtius (7.1.6–7) allude to Philip's death and to the Lyncestian brothers while narrating the arrest of Lyncestian Alexander, an event which occurred considerably later. Arrian says that Heromenes and Arrhabaeus had a part in the murder of Philip, but that the third brother Alexander managed to escape the *aitía* (either accusation or guilt) of murder because he was the first of the friends of Alexander, son of Philip, to go to his side, put on his breast-plate, and accompany him to the palace. Curtius says it was certain that Lyncestian Alexander had plotted the death of Philip with Pausanias, but because he was the first to salute Alexander as king and because of the influence of his father-in-law Antipater, he escaped punishment if not guilt. Justin (11.2.2) says that the king had those guilty of his father's death killed at the tomb (that is, those other than the assassin Pausanias), but that he spared one brother because he greeted him first as king. The remaining literary sources are vaguer: Plutarch (10.4) says that Alexander punished the guilty; Diodorus says much the same (17.2.1), despite the fact that his previous narrative (16.94.4) had implied that Pausanias alone was guilty.<sup>15</sup>

Currently three different candidates or sets of candidates are cast for the part of chief murderer: Pausanias alone, in search of personal revenge;<sup>16</sup> the Lyncestian brothers, infuriated by Philip's apparent desire to remove his son Alexander, supposedly the Upper Macedonian candidate, from the line of succession;<sup>17</sup> and Alexander himself, to salvage his now endangered chance at the throne.<sup>18</sup> While Alexander and Olympias, and probably Antipater, still appear the most likely group to lie behind Pausanias, it

cannot be certain; there is, however, considerable agreement that the Lyncestians were unlikely to have been involved.

What is most curious in the aftermath of the murder of Philip is the pardon of one son of Aeropus, Alexander, and the execution of the other two. Whether the king killed them because they had really threatened the throne, because they were troublemakers and possible supporters of rival claimants, because he needed scapegoats, or some combination of these factors, the son of Philip obviously found it convenient to be rid of them.<sup>19</sup> Why did he not find it convenient to be rid of the third brother as well? The influence of his father-in-law Antipater<sup>20</sup> is not a sufficient answer. In-laws were rather expendable among Macedonian aristocrats, as the careers of Parmenio, Coenus, Cleander, and later Antipater himself amply demonstrate. We must have it the wrong way round: Lyncestian Alexander was not saved by Antipater's influence, but he must have married Antipater's daughter because he had influence.

The answer to the survival of Lyncestian Alexander must lie with the other reason given for the young king's pardon of the one son of Aeropus: his support of the prince at a crucial moment, a support which seems to have been both political and (according to Arrian) military. Sparing the life of a man widely believed to be guilty of Philip's murder – let alone promoting him as Alexander later did – must have been very embarrassing and therefore very necessary. So Alexander of Macedon compromised: he eliminated two of the troublesome Lyncestians but allowed the third to buy his survival. Apparently the continued support of Lyncestian Alexander was also valuable: he was first governor of Thrace and later commander of the important Thessalian cavalry (Arr. 1.25.2).<sup>21</sup>

The détente between the two Alexanders may have begun to fail almost as soon as it was made. Considerable evidence exists to tie the Lyncestian house to an apparent attempt by Amyntas son of Perdiccas to replace his cousin as king. Amyntas was executed not long after the death of Philip (Curt. 6.9.17; Just. 12.6.14). A series of inscriptions, now dated to this period, suggest that Amyntas son of Perdiccas, Amyntas son of Antiochus, and Aristomedes of Pherae were soliciting support for the Argead Amyntas in Thebes and apparently demanding that Amyntas be given the title of king.<sup>22</sup> Both the son of Antiochus and Aristomedes later deserted to Darius, most probably because of their involvement in this conspiracy (Arr. 1.17.9; Curt. 3.9.3).

Two pieces of evidence link the Lyncestians to Amyntas' attempt: a statement of Plutarch (*Mor.* 327c) that after the death of Philip "all Macedonia was festering and looking toward Amyntas and the children of Aeropus,"<sup>23</sup> and a passage in Arrian (1.25.3) which reveals that when Amyntas son of

Antiochus deserted to Darius he carried with him a letter from Lyncestian Alexander, in response to which Darius offered the son of Aeropus the throne of Macedonia in return for the death of the incumbent.<sup>24</sup> Thus the separatist Lyncestians appear to have supported a rival Argead claimant to the throne. Lyncestian Alexander's own chances for the throne were much improved by the death of the son of Perdiccas. But the son of Aeropus managed to escape immediate implication in the conspiracy, despite the great likelihood of his involvement or at least complicity.

Lyncestian Alexander's remarkable success and early prominence in Alexander's reign proved transitory: he was deposed, arrested, and ultimately executed. Our sources disagree not only about the date of the Lyncestian's arrest but also about the reasons for it.

Arrian (1.25.1–10, apparently followed by Just. 11.7.1–2) says that Lyncestian Alexander was arrested around Phaselis in the winter of 334/3 because of information received from Parmenio. Parmenio had intercepted a Persian messenger, Sisines, and sent him on to the king. Sisines revealed that Darius was soliciting the son of Aeropus to kill the king, offering in return the throne of Macedonia and a thousand talents. Darius' intercepted message would appear to be a response to a letter from the Lyncestian sent *via* Amyntas son of Antiochus. Arrian never directly states that the original letter was treasonous, but the implication is strong. Diodorus (17.32.1–2) places the arrest in fall 333, not long before the battle of Issus, and blames it on a warning from Olympias. Curtius knew both versions: he says (7.1.6) that Lyncestian Alexander was killed in 330 in the third year of his captivity (*i.e.*, Diodorus' date), but he seems to have recounted the arrest prior to 333, in one of his lost books.<sup>25</sup>

The idea that both stories, with minor adjustments, are true – that Lyncestian Alexander was merely relieved of office in 334 and arrested in 333 – remains the best solution to this puzzle,<sup>26</sup> despite serious objections to this solution.<sup>27</sup> There is no inherent reason to value the testimony of one source over the other, and indeed Diodorus himself implies that the Lyncestian's position worsened only gradually: “There were many other compelling factors combining to support the charge, and so the Lyncestian was arrested” (17.32.2). It is not surprising that Diodorus considered Olympias' vague warning unlikely to have been the only precipitant of such dramatic action. Thus in the nine to ten months from winter 334 to fall 333, the position of the son of Aeropus worsened, because of both Parmenio's and Olympias' actions. By the fall of 333 the son of Aeropus was without honor and in chains.

Arrian's version is full of mysterious melodrama. The messenger himself is forwarded under guard; a meeting of the king's close associates reveals

that they had long considered the son of Aeropus dangerously untrustworthy as a man of high rank; Craterus' brother Amphoterus is sent in disguise to Parmenio bearing a message from the king too explosive to entrust to writing. Only after all this is the Lyncestian arrested. It is unlikely that this story is fiction.<sup>28</sup> The probable plot of Amyntas son of Perdiccas and its connection, *via* Amyntas son of Antiochus, to Lyncestian Alexander hold out the possibility of independent corroboration, corroboration which Diodorus' story lacks. The extreme caution and secrecy with which the king and his friends proceeded and their fear of the Lyncestian's ability to cause a revolt confirm the supposition that the son of Aeropus was a very important man indeed. The implication seems strong that the son of Aeropus, now arguably the most plausible available pretender, was at least considering Darius' offer.

Diodorus' version is most notable for its vagueness. He too stresses the high status and the position of trust the Lyncestian enjoyed.<sup>29</sup> Olympias' well known enmity to Antipater and his family makes the story plausible. Finding Olympias and Parmenio on the same side of a quarrel is surprising, but this may testify more to the Lyncestian's importance than to any cooperation between the two. Parmenio always had reason to be wary of any friend of Antipater.

Just as Alexander son of Aeropus had earlier managed to survive the executions of his brothers, in some curious manner he managed to survive the ruin of his career and was killed only years after his arrest (no matter which date is preferred). He was executed in 330, in the midst of the crisis over the fall of Philotas. Arrian omits mention of his execution,<sup>30</sup> and Justin (12.14.1–2) refers to it only in passing. Diodorus (17.80.2) and Curtius (7.1.5–9) give similar accounts, although Curtius' is more elaborate. Lyncestian Alexander is brought forward just after the death of Philotas, proves all but speechless, and is immediately killed by nearby soldiers. Diodorus attributes the long delay between arrest and execution to the influence of Antipater;<sup>31</sup> Curtius (7.1.7) says vaguely that resentment against him had been growing and that the present danger revived memory of the past danger; and Justin (11.7.2) mentions fear of revolt as the initial deterrent for execution.

Why did Alexander's death not happen four or three years earlier and why did it finally come in the midst of the purge of Parmenio's faction? The need for Lyncestian support and only secondarily the influence of Antipater had saved the Lyncestian's life in 336; the same factors, but in reverse order of importance, prolonged his life until 330, when the declining significance of both factors made his execution possible. By 330 the king, far away in Asia, could end the calculated risk he had taken in preserving



the Lyncestian's life: no special necessity required Lyncestian support. The king did continue to require the cooperation of Antipater, but much less than in 336. Darius was dead and Agis, king of Sparta, too; the great victories were won. The king still needed the reinforcements Antipater could provide, but fear of Greek and Macedonian revolt no longer loomed large. Just as it has been argued that the king felt strong enough in 330 to do without Parmenio, so it can be said that Alexander no longer had special cause to do favors for Antipater.<sup>32</sup> Nor is there reason to think that this particular son-in-law would have had any further usefulness for the old man. Yet the death of Lyncestian Alexander must have troubled Antipater in much the same way as the death of Parmenio doubtless did, not because of his affection for either man but because of what their deaths implied about the changing order and particularly about Antipater's deteriorating relations with the king (Diod. 17.118.1; Just. 12.14.1–2).

The connection of the death of Lyncestian Alexander to the "conspiracy" of Philotas is only indirect. The son of Aeropus was unlikely to have been the chosen figurehead of Parmenio's faction, for it is unlikely that Parmenio was planning anything which required a figurehead. The king took the occasion of the trial of Philotas, and the general alienation in the ranks of the aristocracy which it attempted to check, to remove the most obvious candidate of any group wishing to vent its anger against the king.<sup>33</sup> The Lyncestian may have been eliminated as a preventive measure, a measure now taken with little risk. The removal of the Lyncestian ought to be seen in the context of the more general change in relations between the king and his nobles signaled by the trial of Philotas and the murder of Parmenio.

Alexander son of Aeropus remains a shadowy figure. We do not have enough information to be sure of his motivation and intentions. He seems to have eluded dishonor and destruction by very quick and clever action; he may have flirted with the idea of taking the throne himself, and that possibility proved his downfall. It was years, however, before the king deemed his death unlikely to produce serious repercussions. Even after years in chains, the Lyncestian apparently was judged safer dead. By then he was either too bitter or too demoralized to defend himself; he knew it would not have mattered. We may not know enough about him to solve with certainty the problem of his improbably long survival, but once it is not taken for granted, his importance and influence seem unquestionable.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Geyer 1930, 79–82 and *passim*; Hammond 1979, 14–17 and *passim* for Lyncestian history. There is no extensive study of Lyncestian Alexander (see however Berve 1926b, 7–19), but Bosworth 1971, 93ff, deals with Alexander and his brothers as part of his discussion of the murder of Philip; cf. Rubensohn 1977, 409–20.

<sup>2</sup> Bosworth 1971, 96 is the only serious doubter. Green 1974, 111 and Brunt 1976, lx are less than certain. Beloch 1923, 77; Berve 1926b, 17, 80, 169; Geyer 1930, 82; Badian 1960, 336, and 1963, 248; Welles 1963, 207 n.2; Wilcken 1967, 61f; Hammond 1979, 15 all assume that the sons of Aeropus were members of the royal house of Lyncestis. See also Habicht 1977, 511–16.

<sup>3</sup> This was not the Macedonian king of that name, who had a son capable of ruling in 393 BC (Beloch 1923, 77; Berve 1926b, 17; Geyer 1930, 82). Whether the Aeropus exiled by Philip (Polyaen. 4.2.3) is identical with the father or the three brothers is difficult to say. Lane Fox 1973, 37 believes this identification and suggests that his exile may have been a motive for revenge by the three brothers. See further Droysen 1877, 83 and Kirchner 1893, 679 *s.v.* “Aeropus 6.”

<sup>4</sup> If the sons of Aeropus were members of the royal family of Lyncestis, they may have been related to Eurydice, mother of Philip, and to Leonnatus. The ancestry of Eurydice is controversial. See most recently Habicht 1977, 512; Hammond 1979, 14–16, *contra* Geyer 1930, 138.

<sup>5</sup> ὁ Λυγκηστῆς: Diod. 17.32.1, 80.2; Curt. 7.1.5, 8.8.6; Just. 11.7.1. Arrian refers to him by the patronymic. Bosworth 1971, 96 n.5 argues against the ‘vulgate’ usage as evidence, citing as parallel Ptolemy ‘Alorites’. But in the case of Ptolemy, who was the son of an Amyntas but not the Amyntas who had been king, the possibility of confusion of patronymics would necessitate some other form of reference. Not so in the case of the Lyncestian, whose patronymic was sufficient to distinguish him from the king.

<sup>6</sup> Bosworth 1971, 96 and Hammond 1976, 20 maintain that by the middle of the fourth century the name Arrhabaeus was common outside the royal house of Lyncestis (there was a Lyncestian king of that name in 424/3), but their examples, particularly Bosworth’s, are unconvincing. Berve 1926b, 80; Geyer 1930, 82; and Habicht 1977, 513 consider the name persuasive evidence

<sup>7</sup> The sources say that Arrhabaeus and Heromenes were culpable in Philip’s death (Arr. 1.25.1; Just. 11.2.1), and that is almost certainly the official reason why they were killed (Diod. 17.2.1; Plut. *Alex.* 10.4). Lyncestian Alexander was at least suspect in the murder of Philip (Arr. 1.25.2) and probably regarded as guilty (Curt. 7.1.5 ff; Just. 11.2.1). Arrian (1.25.3) implies that he wanted to be king himself. Arrian’s story about the Thebans mistaking the son of Philip for the son of Aeropus (1.7.6) gives some suggestion of the Lyncestian’s status. So does the elaborate care surrounding his arrest (Arr. 1.25.1–10) and Diodorus’ stress on his importance (17.32.1).

<sup>8</sup> Berve 1926b, 80; Badian 1960, 325 and 1963, 248; Welles 1963, 121 n.3, 350 n.1, 207 n.2; Wilcken 1967, 62; Fears 1975, 130 n.63, all conclude that the sons of Aeropus must have been possible pretenders to the throne. Bosworth disagrees (1971, 96f), citing Harpalus and Perdikkas as examples of scions of other princely houses who were not rivals. This would be more convincing if we knew more about the history of each princely house. Griffith (1979, 686) explicitly denies that the sons of Aeropus could have been contenders, but this assertion would seem to contradict Hammond

(Hammond 1979, 16), who says that the royal house of Lyncestis and that of Macedonia were so closely bound together that Leonnatus' presumed membership in the Lyncestian house accounts for his being styled "royal" after the death of Alexander (Curt. 10.7.8). This last remark is particularly relevant to the later period, in which there was a dearth of Argeads.

<sup>9</sup> The usurper Ptolemy Alorites, ca 368–ca 365 BC: Hammond 1979, 182 views him an Argead, but this is contrary to the usual view: see Geyer 1930, 128–29.

<sup>10</sup> See Bosworth 1971, 99–102; Hammond 1979, 14–16.

<sup>11</sup> I hope to develop this argument in greater detail elsewhere. The most recent discussion is Hammond 1979, 134–36, 170. Hammond denied that the usurper Aeropos was Lyncestian, as did Beloch 1923, 65; Geyer 1930, 107; *contra* Abel 1847, 5; Droysen 1877, 77; Kaerst 1893, 679 *s.v.* "Aeropos 5;" Green 1974, 11.

<sup>12</sup> See Berve 1926b, 80.

<sup>13</sup> Berve 1926b, 385–86 for Arrhidaeus. Arrian (1.25.3) reports Darius' offer of the throne for regicide. Arrian also (2.14.5) has Alexander son of Philip claim in a letter to Darius that Darius had publicly taken responsibility for Philip's death (for discussion of the authenticity of the letter see *infra* n.24). See Badian 1960, *passim*, for growing aristocratic resentment of Alexander's kingship.

<sup>14</sup> Green 1974, 112 n.4 makes the point that Darius' standards in Macedonian pretenders might be different from those of Macedonians; the plausibility of a pretender varied with time and self-interest.

<sup>15</sup> P. Oxy. XV 1798 (*FGrH* 148), a fragment of an epitome of an Alexander historian of unknown date and identity, gives another kind of testimony. Beginning inside the theater where Philip has apparently just been killed, it mentions the execution of someone for murder. Bosworth 1971, 94 n.1, believes the epitome refers to Pausanias; Green 1974, 524 n.65 and Ellis 1976, 223 n.59, think that it refers to the Lyncestian brothers; Hammond 1978, 348, identifies the person executed as a "diviner."

<sup>16</sup> Kraft, 1971, 32ff; Fears 1975, *passim*; Ellis 1976, 226. The personal motivation of Pausanias is strengthened, but the possibility that he was a tool is not thereby weakened.

<sup>17</sup> Bosworth 1971, 93–105. His arguments have not been accepted. See Lane Fox 1973, 504; Green 1974, 525 n.73; Ellis 1976, 223 n.59; Fears 1975, 132 n.69; Griffith 1979, 688. Exchanging an heir with some Epirote blood for one with merely Lyncestian and Illyrian would not seem sufficient motive for an Upper Macedonian conspiracy.

<sup>18</sup> Badian 1963 *passim*; Kraft 1971, 32 ff; Ellis 1976, 226. The personal motivation of Pausanias is strengthened, but the possibility that he was a tool is not thereby weakened.

<sup>19</sup> Bosworth 1971, 105 and Ellis 1971, 24, think Alexander was foolish to risk Upper Macedonian unrest by the executions. However, whether or not Alexander was responsible for his father's death, he needed plausible scapegoats, and plausible candidates were likely to be important. It was a calculated risk which paid off.

<sup>20</sup> Badian 1963, 248, suggests that Lyncestian Alexander's quick act of homage to the king was the result of Antipater's prior warning; Green 1974, 112 attributes it to shrewd character evaluation. Fears 1975, 130 n.62 prefers to think they really were friends.

<sup>21</sup> Bosworth 1971, 103 remarks that whatever Lyncestian troubles there were when Philip was murdered would have involved only the nobility, not the rank and file.

Arrian (1.25.5), however, implies that Lyncestian Alexander had considerable appeal to the common soldiers, not Lyncestian in this case. The sparing of Lyncestian Alexander may also have been an attempt to retain the appearance of fairness, paralleling the king's later treatment of the sons of Andromenes (who also had an influential in-law) after the elimination of Philotas. See Berve 1926b, 26f, 92f, 322, 353f for references.

<sup>22</sup> Ellis 1976, 16–19 and *passim*, first dated these inscriptions to the period after the death of Philip. This view has been challenged by Hammond 1979, 651 n.1, Griffith 1979, 703–04, but Ellis' view seems more persuasive.

<sup>23</sup> Badian 1963, 249 n.26, Griffith 1979, 686 attribute this information to rhetorical invention, based on inference about the executions of the three men. But see Hamilton 1969, xxxiii, for the view that the facts in this speech, as opposed to the interpretation, are likely to be correct.

<sup>24</sup> Arrian (2.14.5) and Curtius (4.1.12) also mention a letter of Alexander to Darius in which he claims that Philip was murdered by men suborned by Darius, as Darius himself claimed. See Fears 1975, 112 n.4 for references to the debate on the authenticity of this and other letters. Even if the letter is genuine, it shows only that the Persian king took advantage of an obvious propaganda opportunity, and so did Alexander. See n.27 for the possibility that a nephew of Lyncestian Alexander was involved in the candidacy of Amyntas.

<sup>25</sup> Curtius may have conflated the two versions: see Brunt 1976, 520–1.

<sup>26</sup> Berve 1926b, 18 and 29 separates the demotion and arrest in order to resolve the seeming contradiction. Both Diodorus (17.32.1) and Curtius (10.1.40) imply that more than one factor caused the Lyncestian's arrest.

<sup>27</sup> Brunt 1976, 521 argues against rejection of Arrian's arrest date of 334 (1.25.10). He sees no reason for Ptolemy or Aristobulus to conceal or distort, and he doubts Berve's attribution (1926b, 29f) of Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus to the Lyncestian family, and therefore doubts that this man's continuation in high command for some time after winter 334/3 proves that Lyncestian Alexander was not yet under arrest. Granted that the identification of Amyntas and Neoptolemus (a man who fled to Darius possibly because of the conspiracy of Amyntas son of Perdiccas: Arr. 1.20.10, Berve 1926b, 273) as the sons of Arrhabaeus and brothers of Alexander is not certain (so Bosworth 1971, 96 n.4 as well), it is, nonetheless, reasonable and usually accepted (Droysen 1877, 102; Ellis 1971, 22; Lane Fox 1973, 147). Arrian or his sources may have simplified a complex situation. Arr. 1.25.10 is less than clear: why was a return messenger to Parmenio necessary before the arrest?

<sup>28</sup> Green 1974, 112 n.4 and 220 suggests that either the Persians or Parmenio could have fabricated the whole incident. He imagines that Parmenio resented the appointment of Lyncestian Alexander to the command of his favorite Thessalian cavalry and that he trumped up charges to remove this son-in-law of Antipater. Green's suggestion is possible but not likely, and would certainly have involved considerable risk to Parmenio. We do not know that the Lyncestian was not his choice.

<sup>29</sup> 17.32.1, where φρόνημα may refer to his arrogance or presumption.

<sup>30</sup> An interesting omission: Brunt 1976, 520–1 is unconvincing in denying that this is suppression by Ptolemy or Aristobulus.

<sup>31</sup> He actually gives the name Antigonus, but this is almost certainly a mistake for Antipater: cf. Welles 1963, 350 n.1.

<sup>32</sup> See Badian 1960, 328ff, for Parmenio. Ellis 1971, 23f underestimates the importance of Antipater in the years 334–330, but may be correct in surmising that the king feared to exacerbate the existing tensions in Upper Macedonia.

<sup>33</sup> Berve 1926b, 19, Welles 1963, 350 n. 1, Hamilton 1969, 138, Habicht 1977, 513–14, all agree about Alexander's dangerous eligibility for the role of figurehead; see in contrast Badian 1960, 336 and Heckel 1977, 21. Despite Green 1974, 349, the use of the Lyncestian in this manner by Parmenio is unlikely; cf. Badian 1960, *passim*, and Heckel 1977, 9–21. On the Atarrhias whom Curtius (6.8.19; 7.1.5) names as a party in the arrest of Philotas and as the man who requested the “trial” of Lyncestian Alexander, see Berve 1926b, 90.

## AFTERWORD

This 1980 article argued that the Lyncestian should be understood in his own right, not merely as Alexander the Great's victim or Antipater's underling. My views about Alexander the Lyncestian's career are only slightly changed. I am, if anything, more inclined than I was in 1980 to understand Alexander the Lyncestian as a conspirator. Today I would say that we should not underestimate his agency in the events in which he figured and would point to an understanding of the Macedonian court that involves constant renegotiation of royal power against and with the actions of members of the elite (see Introduction). I continue to believe that Lyncestian Alexander might have seemed to some a plausible claimant to the throne, particularly after the death of Amyntas Perdiccas (see also Müller 2003, 109).

I am, however, less sure than I once was that anyone other than an Argead ruled Macedonia before the deaths of the last male Argeads. Currently I am more inclined than previously to think that both the Aeropus who reigned c. 398/7–c. 395/4 and Ptolemy Alorites were Argeads. Nonetheless, candidacy for throne needs to be understood in situational, not absolute terms. The long and troubled period in Macedonia between the end of the Argead dynasty and the triumph of the Antigonid house demonstrates that once no Argeads were available, any number of people fancied themselves (and were fancied by others) plausible candidates for the throne.

Since this article appeared in 1980, Heckel published two brief overviews of Alexander the Lyncestian's life (1992, 357–8; 2006, 19), Badian (2000, 54–60) remounted and extended his earlier argument denying that the Lyncestian was in any way implicated in plotting against Philip or Alexander and putting the Lyncestian's career in the context of a wider understanding of Alexander's reign as full of conspiracy, primarily conspiracy by the king against others. Heckel (2003b, 210–13) countered, arguing for a limited number of conspiracies and taking seriously the possibility that Alexander, son of Aeropus, did indeed conspire against the king and that his brothers had plotted against Philip as well. Bosworth's commentary on Arrian (1980) is also critical. Müller (2003, 109–12) puts the career of Alexander, son of Aeropus, in the context of Alexander's reign-long attempts to secure his position against the efforts of various opposing factions.

In terms of specific issues, Heckel (2003b) puts considerable weight on Antipater and his faction in explaining why Lyncestian Alexander survived as long as he did whereas I myself, while not denying the importance of his father-in-law to his survival and continued high office, would put greater stress on his early recognition of Alexander as king, particularly on the “symbolic gesture” of putting on the cuirass, embodying his support for the son of Philip. (Cf. King 2010, 386, who points out that Meleager put on his cuirass [Curt. 10.7.14] when he chose to support Philip Arrhidaeus.) Indeed, as this gesture indicates, Alexander the Lyncestian appears to have significance of his own; he did not become important simply because he married a daughter of Antipater; it is as likely that he married a daughter of Antipater because he was already important. Müller (2003, 110) makes the interesting point that the melodramatic details about the secrecy and

disguise of the messenger (Amphoterus) Alexander dispatched to tell Parmenio to arrest the Lyncestian much resemble those about Polydamus, the man the king sent to arrange the murder of Parmenio. This similarity, even if the result of literary contrivance, implies not only similarity in royal technique but in the importance of the object of the king's designs. Abramenko's assertion (1992) that the mother of the king whom Diodorus (17.32.1) reports as sending a letter to her son somehow implicating Alexander Lyncestian was actually Ada of Caria, his figurative not his literal mother, is implausible (see Heckel 2003b, 211 n. 159; Carney 2006, 56 n. 99). Indeed, Olympias' influence over her son and knowledge of events and people back on the mainland tend to be underestimated; one needs to understand her as part of court politics and as one of the more useful of Alexander's presumably many sources about his now distant homeland. Attempts have continued to understand the role of Amyntas Perdiccas, perhaps in combination with the Lyncestians, in opposition to Philip or Alexander; these attempts have often focused on a collection of inscriptions relating to him and his possible supporters (Prandi 1998; Pafford 2011). Badian (2000, 58) based much of his argument about Alexander the Lyncestian's supposed innocence of plotting with Darius against Alexander on Badian's assertion that the intercepted royal messenger Sisines could not speak Greek and so, via an interpreter, his "testimony" could be invented. Heckel (2003b, 212) rightly rejects this view; elite Persians and Macedonians and Greeks had dealt with each other and lived in each other's courts for generations and this particular man may well have spent time in the court of Philip. We cannot simply assume he knew no Greek.





## THE DEATH OF CLEITUS

At the end of a long drunken quarrel, Alexander, king of Macedonia, murdered Cleitus, co-commander of the aristocratic Companion cavalry. The dispute took place at a banquet in Maracanda, in Sogdiana, late in 328 BC.<sup>1</sup> There has been a tendency to treat this event briefly, and not to explore at any length the motivation of the two combatants. Because the killing of Cleitus was clearly an unpremeditated act, it has suffered neglect, probably because of comparison with the elimination of Parmenio and Philotas in 333, an act of policy, calculated and judicially justified. While Cleitus' killing was not an act of policy, it was both more personal and more political than has previously been seen.

Of Cleitus' career before the quarrel in Maracanda little is known, and much of what is known can be interpreted in several ways. Cleitus, son of Dropidas, was the brother of Lanice, Alexander's beloved nurse (Arr. 4.9.3; Curt. 8.1.21; Just. 12.6.10). Cleitus served with distinction under Philip (Curt. 8.1.20). He commanded the Royal Squadron, the elite unit of the Companion cavalry, from the beginning of Alexander's reign, and possibly earlier (Arr. 3.11.8). His territorial origin is unknown, but we do have some more information about his family, or at least that of his sister. We shall return to his sister's family below, but here it is enough to say that, including Cleitus, at least three members of the clan were on nearly familial terms with the young king. Cleitus' early prominence undoubtedly reflects the importance of this royal friendship.

Because several accounts of the quarrel blame it, in part, on tension between the older Macedonians, represented by Cleitus, and the young ones, led by Alexander, it would be helpful to know Cleitus' age. The evidence, however, is too vague.<sup>2</sup> Cleitus' previous apparently long service under Philip (Curtius 8.1.20) and his high command early in Alexander's reign suggest that he was older than the king, but not how much older. As events were to demonstrate, Cleitus identified strongly with Philip (and possibly Parmenio and Philotas). Yet he need not have been an old man to do so, but only politically sympathetic to these men.

In Asia, Cleitus fought at both Granicus and Gaugamela, in command of the Royal Squadron (Arr. 3.11.8; Diod. 17.57.1; Curt. 4.13.26). While

stationed on Alexander's immediate right during the battle at Granicus, Cleitus saved the king's life by killing a Persian who attacked Alexander from the rear.<sup>3</sup> Cleitus became ill while at Susa and, after his recovery, met Alexander in Parthia, bringing with him, as ordered, troops left behind in Ecbatana (Arr. 3.19.8). As a consequence of the Philotas affair, Alexander divided the former command of Philotas, the Companion cavalry, assigning half to his friend Hephaestion and half to Cleitus. Arrian (3.27.4) tells us that the king did not want any one person to have so prestigious and powerful a position again.<sup>4</sup>

This promotion signified that Cleitus had become an even more powerful and important officer. Because Hephaestion had been deeply implicated in the destruction of Parmenio and Philotas, and was part of Alexander's inner circle, while Cleitus, whatever his age, belonged to a more veteran group, the choice of Cleitus has often been considered a measure of conciliation, meant to neutralize and appease whatever group Cleitus represented and Hephaestion did not, and to ease the panic of the army immediately after the deaths of Parmenio and Philotas. It is quite possible, as Badian suggested, that Cleitus was in a sense paid off to gain his acceptance of the new state of affairs.<sup>5</sup>

While the execution of Philotas and the murder of Parmenio must have disturbed and disaffected some individuals and groups within the army, and while Cleitus' new position may indeed have been meant as a conciliatory gesture to such groups, their identity, make-up, and character remain obscure. The assumption that the gesture was directed toward the older members of the Macedonian establishment rests primarily on hindsight from what Plutarch and Curtius give as the cause of the quarrel between Alexander and Cleitus. It is just as likely that Cleitus' new command was the result of the king's determination to play his leading officers off against one another, thus preventing them from uniting against him.

From the time of his promotion in 330 until the last days of his life at Maracanda, our sources do not mention Cleitus. He may have become too old for active service, but this seems unlikely. His disappearance from the center stage may parallel Alexander's later dealings with other generals: having granted Cleitus the honor of his position, Alexander may then have prevented him from acquiring much glory through it. Certainly the appointment did not require that the king treat his two Companion cavalry commanders with equal affection or honor.

Curtius provides a unique item of information, if it is true. He claims (8.1.19) that just before the fatal banquet, the king had appointed Cleitus satrap of Sogdiana and Bactria but that Cleitus had not yet taken up his duties when he was killed. Some have doubted the reliability of Curtius'

information but their views are not convincing.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, even if one accepts the satrapal appointment as genuine, its significance remains uncertain. Nomination to a satrapy did not necessarily signal royal favor or automatically confer great power. Many satrapies went to insignificant men, certainly not royal intimates. Relegation to a remote and troublesome satrapy might easily function as a kind of respectable demotion, ominously similar to Parmenio's relegation to the baggage train. Yet satraps often acquired great wealth and controlled large numbers of troops, though they moved off center stage. Quite possibly one might trust an experienced man like Cleitus with a military and administrative post of some responsibility without wishing that he remain part of the court and be capable of making awkward remarks in person.<sup>7</sup>

Thus the appointment, if genuine, provides only ambiguous information about relations between Cleitus and the king just before the banquet. It is not proof that Cleitus was on good terms with the king at the time or even that he and the king had not previously quarreled on the subject of relations with Asians. Neither is it a certain sign of royal disfavor or anger. It does suggest that Alexander did not find Cleitus' presence essential. The number of satraps removed by Alexander upon his return from India<sup>8</sup> might indicate that he gave many satrapies to persons whom he did not trust, or that he trusted no one and yet had to give the satrapies to someone.

Since the significance of the most recent (alleged) event in Cleitus' own career proves problematic, it becomes particularly useful to consider the careers of the rest of his family, in so far as they are known, before proceeding to an analysis of the murder itself. As we have seen, Cleitus' sister Lanice was nurse to Alexander. Two sons of Lanice died in battle before the death of Cleitus (Arr. 4.9.4; Curt. 8.2.8, who says they died at Miletus). Lanice had another son, a certain Proteas (Ath. 129a; Ael. *VH* 12.26), who, long after his uncle's death, was a boon companion of Alexander's and may have been present at Alexander's final drinking party (Ath. 434a). It is probably the same Proteas, called the son of Andronicus, who was active in the naval effort against the Persian fleet in 334/3 (Arr. 2.2.4–5, 20.2).<sup>9</sup> There may have been yet another son of Lanice.<sup>10</sup> Lanice's husband is never named directly, but if, as I have suggested, Proteas the son of Andronicus is indeed Lanice's son, then her husband was named Andronicus. Despite Berve's argument to the contrary,<sup>11</sup> of the two men on the expedition named Andronicus it is almost certainly the son of Agerrus who was Lanice's husband.<sup>12</sup> The other Andronicus was not active until the time of the Successors. The son of Agerrus, as would suit the husband of Lanice, brother-in-law of Cleitus, and father of several sons old enough to fight early in the expedition, was himself active in the campaign.

Andronicus son of Agerrus first appears as commander of a group of mercenaries formerly under service to Darius who had switched their loyalties to Alexander (Arr. 3.24.5). The son of Agerrus is last mentioned as the leader of a mercenary unit in a force under the command of Erigyus which went against Satibarzanes, a Persian rebel who in 330 led the Areians in revolt.<sup>13</sup> We know that Erigyus' expedition was successful, but the sources do not mention Andronicus son of Agerrus again. On his possible fate more will be said below.

Of the banquet at Maracanda in 328 four major accounts survive: Plutarch *Alex.* 50–52.4; Arrian 4.8.1–9.9; Curtius 8.1.19–2.13; Justin 12.6.1–18.<sup>14</sup> As Aymard observed,<sup>15</sup> there are unbelievable elements in the narratives of all extant sources, and thus no reason to follow one to the exclusion of others.

Plutarch's version is certainly not without weaknesses, most particularly in regard to events immediately before and after the crime, but his account of the quarrel itself surpasses the others in the complexity of its motivation and in its apparent knowledge of the inner forces at work in the court of Alexander. One must, of course, concede that some of these qualities may be the result of Plutarch's excellence as a writer. Comparison with the other three sources, however, increases one's respect for Plutarch's version. Justin barely mentions what is really the central event of the episode. What little he does say is given in more detail by Curtius. Arrian includes long and not very perceptive remarks about the ethics of the situation. He implies that a quarrel between Cleitus and the king had been going on for some time, but the terms of the quarrel are not very clear. Arrian's assertion that Cleitus was an angry individual with a personal obsession, rather than a representative of more general grievances shared by many Macedonians, denies any political significance to an act which, on his own telling, arose from an assortment of political tensions (Alexander's Persianizing, his growing absolutism, his scorn for Philip).

Curtius' account has some value – particularly in the background material he provides and the names of the men who tried to prevent Alexander from killing Cleitus – but his main narrative is so incoherent as to be nearly useless. The narratives of both Curtius and Plutarch display knowledge of court politics (especially those of the king's inner circle), tensions within the court, and also tend to attribute the crime to these tensions. It is this sort of knowledge, especially when contrasted with Arrian's frequent dependence on an apologetic source (probably Ptolemy), that gives these two sources such authority and plausibility.

Differences in the surviving accounts, however, should not obscure the essential similarity of all these explanations of the motivation of the quarrel

and killing. Whether they attribute the incident to a struggle between the older and more traditional elements at court and the younger and more innovative, to resentment of Alexander's claim of divine sonship, to strife between supporters of Philip and those of Alexander, or to hatred of the new Persian ceremonial, the sources are agreed that the quarrel arose because of the changes Alexander was trying to make in Macedonian kingship, particularly in his relations with the Macedonian nobility.<sup>16</sup>

Yet reasons other than Cleitus' well-known political differences, or his possible irritation because of the supposed satrapal appointment, may have motivated Cleitus' anger. Plutarch (*Alex.* 50.4–5) blames the start of the fatal argument on satirical verses about a recent defeat suffered by some of Alexander's generals. According to Plutarch the older guests at the banquet objected to the verses, but Cleitus was particularly incensed by the humiliation of Macedonians in front of "barbarians and enemies." Alexander's circle, on the other hand, approved the verses.

Naturally one wants to know why the verses provoked the factional response (especially that of Cleitus) which Plutarch describes. The military disaster mocked in this fashion must have been a controversial event, as both the intensity of the reactions of the Macedonian audience, and the very fact that the Greek authors of the satire expected at least some elements of the Macedonian court to receive such insulting material with approval, demonstrates. Despite some opinion to the contrary,<sup>17</sup> it is usually conceded that the defeat mentioned refers to a massacre suffered the year before on the same spot, Maracanda. This defeat, probably the worst Alexander's troops suffered,<sup>18</sup> was still un-avenged. The disaster was a controversial event: there were questions of culpability, and the sources suggest that it was, in part, the result of tensions between Macedonian and oriental officials. Moreover, as I shall argue, it is quite possible that a member of Cleitus' family was involved in the defeat.

Curtius (7.6.24, 7.7.31–39) and Arrian (4.3.7, 4.5.2–6.2) tell quite different stories about the disaster of 329; because of its romantic and unrealistic nature, however, Curtius' version is usually rejected.<sup>19</sup> Arrian gives two versions of the event: in the first (usually attributed to Ptolemy) disaster is the result of lack of communication between Macedonian officers, but in the second, which Arrian attributes to Aristobulus, Alexander would seem to be responsible ultimately, because of his failure to clarify the chain of command between an Asian officer, Pharnuches, and the Macedonians.<sup>20</sup>

Especially if it is correct to prefer Aristobulus' version (although the other also makes one wonder who was supposed to be in charge), and even if it is not, the incident must have been notorious despite Alexander's

attempt to hush it up (Curt. 7.7.39). Why did reaction to the verses break down into factions in the manner Plutarch describes and why were the verses aired in the Macedonian court at all?

The oddity of their very recitation at a Macedonian social occasion is usually ignored, but ought not to be. Why would jesting about a Macedonian defeat, particularly one so terrible, be acceptable at court (if only to Alexander's inner circle)? Such verses would not ordinarily have been heard with pleasure by a commander who cared about his men, men who had, after all, fallen in battle. Alexander and his coterie must have had no sympathy for the men involved and this lack of sympathy must have been well known. It would seem the defeat at Maracanda was as much a political as a military event. Schachermeyr astutely surmised that the royal circle approved the mockery simply because the generals, not the king, were blamed.<sup>21</sup>

Yet the reactions of the older men in general and of Cleitus in particular are in a way even more puzzling. As already noted, nothing suggests that the three officers named in connection with the expedition were members of the older generation, nor is this necessarily implied by the fact that the older men defended them. The generation of Philip (or, to be precise, his veterans) may have disliked the implication that failure was the fault of individuals, whereas success belonged to the king. Later items in Plutarch's and Curtius' narratives tend to suggest this.<sup>22</sup>

Cleitus' political objections to Alexander's more absolute and Persian kingship – with which, in Plutarch, he connects the royal attitude toward the defeated officers – are well known. It is possible, however, that there was a special reason for his anger and his readiness to come to the defense of those insulted: his brother-in-law Andronicus may have been one of the generals involved in the defeat and may well have died in the massacre.

The evidence is scant but suggestive. As we have seen, Andronicus son of Agerrus was very probably the husband of Lanice. He is last mentioned as leader of a mercenary unit in a force which, under the command of Erigyius, went against Satibarzanes, the Persian who led Areia in revolt in 330 (Curt. 7.3.3; Arr. 3.28.2). Caranus and Artabazus were fellow officers on this expedition. We know that the expedition was successful, but the sources do not mention Andronicus again.

I suggest that he may have led part of the 1500 mercenary foot which went on the fateful expedition against Spitamenes, just as Caranus again led his mercenary cavalry.<sup>23</sup> Like the more important officers, he probably died at Maracanda. Andronicus is not named by Arrian or Curtius, but then Arrian omitted his name from the force sent against Satibarzanes and Curtius names only the commander of the force and none of the other

officers. The column sent against Spitamenes was part of the same sort of effort, with some of the same elements of the army that were sent against Satibarzanes. If Andronicus was a member of the massacred column, his disappearance from the sources in 329 and Cleitus' anger become more intelligible.

If this hypothesis is correct, then Cleitus' anger at the king – the precipitant in most versions of the quarrel – was both political and personal; indeed the two motives are intertwined. The king's contempt for a dead family member will have seemed a vivid example of his growing absolutism to which, we are told, Cleitus objected. No clear distinction may be made between personal and political aspects of life in the Macedonian court. The scene which formed the prelude for the death of Cleitus, a long and drunken banquet, is typical of the society in which such distinctions are impossible. In earlier years the violent and sometimes disastrous results of Macedonian drinking habits had already been demonstrated: Philip nearly killed Alexander at such an affair (Plut. *Alex.* 9.5); it would be hard to say whether Philip's attempt was more political or personal in nature. Alexander set Persepolis afire on another such occasion (Plut. *Alex.* 38; Curt. 5.7.1–7; Diod. 17.72. 1–6); again both political and personal motives are plausible.

Let us turn from the motivation of Alexander's crime to its consequences. The killing of Cleitus would have had considerable moral impact on his contemporaries. Macedonian aristocrats had always had a remarkable freedom of speech. Cleitus was an important man in his world; the daring with which he spoke to the king demonstrates this. In murdering Cleitus, moreover, Alexander violated old Macedonian usage which probably expected a trial in the presence of the army before execution (Curt. 6.8.25).<sup>24</sup> Worse yet, Alexander broke Zeus' law of hospitality by killing a guest at his table, and this guest a man who had saved Alexander's life and served the royal family with distinction. In a world where "Homeric" standards were still very much alive, violation of the laws of hospitality was no negligible crime. And yet, the crime itself, and Alexander's violent repentance, are also "Homeric", comparable to Philip's attempt on Alexander's life at the wedding banquet (Plut. *Alex.* 9.5).

If determining the moral impact of Alexander's act on his contemporaries is difficult, the political impact ought to be more obvious. The death of Cleitus had political repercussions, both short term and long; only our ignorance of factional ties makes it possible, though not plausible, to deny this. Whether or not the army actually begged Alexander to give up his "mourning" as Justin (12.6.15–17) and Curtius (8.2.11) say, it was certainly compelled to realize how necessary Alexander was to its continued survival

in remote enemy territory. Badian rightly concluded that the Macedonians had to pardon or at least ignore Alexander's crime because they could not survive without him.<sup>25</sup> It is less certain that they forgot it. Only a few months later there are further deaths after yet another banquet-table confrontation: the *proskynēsis* affair and its aftermath, the plot of Hermolaus (see chapter 8). When the army mutinied on the Hyphasis and Alexander a second time tried the methods that had worked so well after the death of Cleitus (isolated in sorrow, Achilles-like, in his quarters), they failed to have their earlier effect (see chapter 2). In the short term the army accepted Alexander's despotic action: in the long term, it would seem, it did not.

Perhaps the most interesting political repercussions of the murder of Cleitus concern relations between the king and his circle of intimates. Alexander demonstrated to even those most trusted men that they too were expendable (the threat, implied or stated, is especially clear in Curtius, but Plutarch and even Arrian also suggest it), when he announced that they had betrayed him just as Bessus had Darius, and then tried to summon the army against them.<sup>26</sup> His denunciation of the trusted inner circle in this moment of stress may in part lie behind later failures to support the king by members of this circle or those close to it.<sup>27</sup> And, of course, the king had seen his top officers refuse to obey his orders, and then seen their refusal supported by the common soldiers.

Although unpremeditated, the murder of Cleitus is part of the pattern of aristocratic opposition and royal suppression which characterized Alexander's reign. The Philotas affair forced opposition to Alexander's new policies underground, but, with drink and provocation, it surfaced again with Cleitus. Whether Cleitus had any connection to a specific faction (Parmenio, Attalus, and Philip), as Curtius would have us believe (8.1.52), cannot be ascertained.

It is easy to see why Alexander wished to transform the nature of the relatively easy-going Macedonian monarchy and to limit the power of the nobility. He wanted to solve the problem of fitting the monarchy for world rule by changing the basic structure of Macedonian society and by replacing the familial relations between kings and their nobles with a more Persian and subservient relationship. As Welles observed,<sup>28</sup> "he was no longer merely one of themselves." Nobles independent of his power were gradually replaced with those who had power largely through him.

What is ironic about the murder of Cleitus is that the very vehemence of Alexander's desire to free himself from the limitations of the domestic Macedonian court caused him to commit an act which could only prove how Macedonian it remained. The murder of Cleitus was the sort of thing his father might have done, a Macedonian domestic tragedy. In the end it



was an argument about power, how much the king should have and how much a man like Cleitus and his family should have, an argument which precipitated a very political murder.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Maracanda may not be equivalent to modern Samarkand. See Engels 1978, 99 n.1 and 103 n.16. There are difficulties about the date. Despite Tarn 1948a, I 73, Brown 1949, 236, and Hamilton 1973, 103, favor autumn 328, and Berve 1926b, 207, puts the date as late as mid-winter 328/7.

<sup>2</sup> Justin (12.6.3) calls Cleitus an old man, but Seneca (*De ira* 3.17.1) says that Cleitus grew up with Alexander. Berve 1926b, 206 suggests a birth date of 365, but Griffith 1970a, s.v. "Cleitus (1)," says ca. 380. Neither gives arguments. Lane Fox 1973, 309, asserts that Cleitus was in late middle age because his sister was old enough to be Alexander's nurse; this need not be so.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. 1.15.8; Curt. 8.1.20; Diod. 17.20.7; Plut. *Alex.* 16.5. Berve 1926b, 206 makes the suggestion that a portrait Cleitus commissioned of himself (Plin. *N.H.* 35.93) may have commemorated this incident; Arrian and Curtius (Arr. 4.8.7; Curt. 8.1.20) report that he kept boasting about the incident, so it was important to his self-image.

<sup>4</sup> It is usually thought that Alexander divided the cavalry into eight sections after the death of Cleitus, probably for mainly political reasons (Brunt 1963, 31), but Schachermeyr 1973, 358–61, 363 n.437, suggests that the reform predated the death of Cleitus and was occasioned by military exigencies. To accept this earlier date, one must believe that all our sources fail to mention that Cleitus had recently been demoted at the time of the quarrel.

<sup>5</sup> Badian 1960, 336, and Schachermeyr 1973, 363, who believes that Cleitus' command must have meant that Alexander had, at least temporarily, secured his acquiescence to the deaths of Parmenio and Philotas. Lane Fox 1973, 291 goes further and says that Cleitus' cooperation was vital because of the 6000 men under his command (An. 3.19.7), a force which could have given Parmenio a greater number of troops than Alexander, had Cleitus sided with him.

<sup>6</sup> Badian 1965b, 177 n.3, suggests that Curtius' interest in rhetorical effect led him to elevate Cleitus' position so as to make his downfall more dramatic; McQueen 1967, 29, believes that the appointment is an invention contrived to build continuity between the retirement of Artabazus and the Cleitus episode. Neither suggestion convinces: the rank of co-commander of the Companion cavalry would provide height enough for any downfall, and McQueen's examples of other points where Curtius supposedly sacrificed truth to continuity are less than persuasive and not necessarily parallel (none seems to involve outright invention). Berve 1926b, 206, Cauer 1894, 57, Schachermeyr 1973, 363 n.437, all accept Curtius' information as valid. Schachermeyr connects the appointment to the supposed cavalry reorganization.

<sup>7</sup> Schachermeyr 1973, 364 points out that the next satrap of Sogdiana and Bactria was a man never mentioned previously and apparently without any experience of major commands. One need not conclude that satrapal appointments were all unimportant, but clearly such positions had limitations. It seems likely that if the appointment was genuine, it was a disappointment for Cleitus, though not necessarily

a major one. See *contra* Lane Fox 1973, 310–13, who believes that the once-mentioned satrapal appointment was the primary reason for the quarrel between Alexander and Cleitus.

<sup>8</sup> See Badian 1961, 16ff.

<sup>9</sup> Berve does not, on balance, make this identification (1926b, 328–29). He gives the friend and drinking crony of Alexander one number (665) and another (664) to the naval commander, but concedes that possibly the two men were one and the same and that Proteas, like Hegelochus, transferred from the naval to land forces.

<sup>10</sup> A certain Theodorus, who had a brother named Proteas (Berve 1926b, 176). Plutarch (*Mor.* 760c) mentions a Theodorus to whom Alexander wrote offering 10,000 talents for a girl musician, on the condition that Proteas did not love her. If true, this story would indicate that both brothers were intimates of the king. Berve suggests that Theodorus held office already under Philip (*SG* 243D.31).

<sup>11</sup> Droysen 1877, I.1<sup>2</sup> 384 n.2 first suggested that the son of Agerrus was Lanice's husband. Berve 1926b, 39 apparently wished to refute him, as his n.3 suggests, but unfortunately a typographical error on the same page has him appear to say, in contradiction to the n.3, that the son of Agerrus was indeed the father of Lanice's son: in the section on the son of Agerrus, his son is numbered 665, the number of Lanice's son, clearly a mistake for 664.

<sup>12</sup> It is difficult to believe that Andronicus the Olynthian was the father of Lanice's son because of his very late prominence. More difficult is the problem, mentioned above, of whether there were two men named Proteas or only one.

<sup>13</sup> Arrian (3.28.2) does not mention him by name as Curtius (7.3.3) does, but Berve 1926b, 39 argues that Curtius is correct.

<sup>14</sup> Diodorus' version is lost. Two brief references to the Cleitus episode are found in Seneca, *Ep.* 83.19; *De ira* 3.17.1. One asserts that Alexander killed his dear friend Cleitus while drunk; the other attributes the murder to Cleitus' refusal to flatter Alexander and to give up free speech for Persian servility.

<sup>15</sup> Aymard 1949, 48f, especially n.3. See also Green 1974, 550, who argues that it is dangerous to depend on Plutarch alone in this incident. Lane Fox 1973, 311, 501–02, prefers a combination of Curtius and Justin to the Greek sources because he favors their emphasis on personal motivation for the quarrel.

<sup>16</sup> See Hamilton 1969, 90, 120, 127f, 132ff, for references to Alexander's increasingly Asian kingship and Macedonian resentment of it.

<sup>17</sup> Milns 1968, 190, assumes that the defeat must have involved Cleitus, and so concludes that the verses cannot have referred to the Spitamenes affair. Green 1974, 362 assumes that Cleitus must have been one of the officers involved because of his anger and because of Alexander's remark that Cleitus was defending himself when he called "cowardice" only "misfortune" (*Plut. Alex.* 50.6). Though our sources would almost certainly mention a recent military misfortune of Cleitus, as an obvious explanation for the behavior of Alexander and Cleitus, they do not. Hamilton 1969, 141 and Schachermeyr 1973, 365f give the standard view.

<sup>18</sup> Engels 1978, 104 and Hamilton 1973, 99 both call it the army's most severe loss.

<sup>19</sup> On the problems with Curtius' account, see Berve 1926b, 256; Jacoby 1962, 2B, 2 516; Pearson 1960, 168. Arrian's first version ascribed to Ptolemy: Berve 1926b, 381, Jacoby 1962, 2B, 2 515; Pearson 1960, 167. Arrian names Menedemus (unknown before this appearance), Caranus, leader of the mercenary cavalry (see Berve

1926b, 200–1: he appeared late in 330 as a cavalry leader against Satibarzanes), and Andromachus (Berve 1926b, 38: first mentioned at Gaugamela commanding mounted troops, in 330 in Media he commanded mounted foreign troops). Pharnuches is unknown before this incident. The relatively modest and late appearance of these officers does not suggest that they were older men.

<sup>20</sup> See discussion in Jacoby 1962, 2BD, 2 516 – ἐπιτάσσει in 4.3.7 can mean either ‘put in command over’ or ‘appoint in addition to’. Despite Pearson’s denial (1960, 167), Ptolemy’s version is clearly apologetic. See Errington 1969, 233 ff., for an examination of Ptolemy’s habits of suppression.

<sup>21</sup> Schachermeyr 1973, 366. Green 1974, 362 and Milns 1968, 192 believe that Alexander purposely provoked the quarrel in order to gauge the depth of dissension. Such intentional provocation seems implausibly dangerous.

<sup>22</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 51.5) has Cleitus quote the first line from a passage of Euripides’ *Andromache* (693–96) which implies this. Curtius (8.1.27–29) indirectly cites the whole passage. See Aymard 1949, 45, Hamilton 1969, 144, Instinsky 1961, 253, for discussion of the function of the quotation. On the age of the officers see *supra* n.19.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Berve 1926b, 200; Caranus’ force was probably reinforced from six to eight hundred.

<sup>24</sup> See Lock 1977, 95–97, and Errington 1978, 86 ff., for discussion of the accuracy of Curtius’ statement.

<sup>25</sup> Badian 1964, 198. Curtius (8.2.12) actually says that the Macedonians decreed that Alexander, in killing Cleitus, acted *iure*. Errington 1978, 108 assumes that the leading Macedonians actually made this decision, and thereby limited what was a “potentially damaging affair,” and in a sense turned it into a successful test of the king’s prestige.

<sup>26</sup> See Curt. 8.1.45–49, 8.2.4; Plut. *Alex.* 51.3–4; Arr. 4.8.7–8. All these passages seem to suggest that Alexander was about to call the *hypaspists* against the *sōmatophylakes*; see Hamilton 1969, 143 and Schachermeyr 1973, 368 n.44 *contra* Berve 1926a, 123, and Berve 1926b, 69.

<sup>27</sup> Coenus’ opposition to Alexander in the Hyphasis mutiny (Curt. 9.2.1–3.19; more generally suggested by Plut. *Alex.* 62 and Arr. 5.15.1–29.1); Craterus’ curious failure to obey Alexander and relieve Antipater (Arr. 7.12.3–4; Diod. 18.4.1, 12.1; Justin 12.12.8–10); Leonnatus’ supposed mockery of *proskynēsis* (Arr. 4.12.2), if this is not a doublet for similar stories about Polyperchon (Curt. 8.5.22–6.1) and Cassander (Plut. *Alex.*

<sup>28</sup> Welles 1970, 40.

## AFTERWORD

Though this 1981 article was not quite my first to appear in print, it was the first I wrote for publication. My dissertation (Carney 1975) had devoted a chapter to the death of Cleitus; in fact, a seminar paper on the topic inspired me to write a dissertation on Alexander's general dealing with the elite. Young scholars have to publish rapidly (even more so now than when I was an untenured assistant professor) and so the question that often arises when a journal is willing to consider publishing an article but wants changes is particularly painful: should one send it elsewhere or make the revisions requested?

In this particular case, the anonymous readers thought what seemed to me minor issues (for instance, whether or not Cleitus was related to one of the officers killed in a massacre apparently – at least in Plutarch – mocked by Greek poets who made Alexander and his friends laugh) were more important than two points I considered of central significance, points somewhat muted in the article. In my dissertation, I read the incident as a kind of domestic tragedy, “The guests at the banquet functioned...as a domestic unit and Kleitos’ end resembles that most common of modern murders, the Saturday night domestic tragedy, which occurs when strong words and too much liquor push people, usually on intimate terms, past the limits of self-control” (Carney 1975, 139). My dissertation also argued that the Cleitus episode was significant because it demonstrated “the difficulty inherent in the assumption of a dichotomy between the personal and the political aspects of life in the court of Alexander.” (Carney 1975, 139). The published article seems drier to me than I had intended, though I do continue to think that Cleitus had some sort of personal connection to the defeat the poets mocked at the banquet. Holt (1988, 78, n. 118) suggested that the defeat at issue was not the one I and others had assumed, but a later one. Nonetheless, Holt concludes that the song “...was at the expense of Macedonian pride, and ample cause for Cleitus’ bitter complaints.” He goes on to entertain the possibility that Cleitus was himself involved in this later defeat and notes that, granted that he had been chosen to stay on in the region as satrap, he had “reason to be touchy” about the event (*contra* Heckel 2003b, 222).

Since the article appeared, considerable work has been done on the sources for the incident: Bosworth’s commentary (and other discussions of the passage) on Arrian (Bosworth 1995, 51–68), Baynham’s discussion in her book on Curtius (Baynham 1998, 85–90; see also Braccisi 1987; Ripoll 2009), and some important articles on Plutarch’s treatment of the death of Cleitus have appeared. Mossman (Mossman 1988) focuses on the “tragic patterning and imagery” of Plutarch’s life (Mossman 1988, 85) and Whitmarsh (2002) examines Plutarch’s reading of Alexander’s Hellenism as it played out in the Maracanda symposium and elsewhere.

Virtually all recent work on the extant sources reflects the interest – epitomized by Spencer 2002 – in understanding these sources in their Roman-era context. Müller 2009 sees depictions of Alexander’s drinking generally and particularly the narratives of the death of Cleitus as so embedded in Graeco-Roman discourse about tyrants as heavy drinkers, corrupted by eastern ways, as to be virtually

unusable as historical sources; she even questions whether the death happened at a symposium (Müller 2009: 218). That stereotypical thinking about tyrants, Alexander, and Macedonian drinking generally influenced all our narratives seems undeniable. All narratives are constructs and this particular construction seems particularly obvious, but I see no reason to reject the idea of quarrel and death at a banquet, whatever the specifics of the argument were. It is certainly correct to point out that Alexander's fear of conspiracy as manifested in some of the accounts of the banquet fits other depictions of tyrants (Domitian inevitably comes to mind), but granted that Alexander's father had been murdered and so had a number of other Macedonian kings, and that there had apparently been some actual conspiracies against Alexander, Alexander's reported fear may have been both real and stereotypical. People do, after all, tend to plot against tyrants.

Scholars have tried to build a better understanding of the cultural context of the death of Cleitus than was possible in 1981. Since "The Death of Cleitus" first appeared a tremendous amount of work has been done on the symposium and its role in Greek and Roman culture. Symptotic standards and virtues changed over time and varied from place to place; unfortunately Whitmarsh's discussion of symptotic ideals accepts the bland Atticizing of the ideal symposium found in Plutarch as a universal standard. (See chapter 12 and its update for full bibliography on the symposium.) Hammond (1991b, 1994, 1995) and Bosworth (1995; 1996a; 1996b) published a series of competing discussions of the meaning of the scene in Plutarch (*Alex.* 51. 4) in which Alexander, reacting to the attempt of his bodyguards to prevent him from attacking Cleitus, cried out in Macedonian to the trumpeter to summon the *hypaspists*; Plutarch explains that this action of Alexander's was an indication of upset.

While Bosworth's analysis of this moment is generally far more convincing than Hammond's elaborate construction of multiple groups of Macedonian guards, some of whom did not know Macedonian, I am less sure than Bosworth that the king (and others) didn't often shout at banquets, particularly because Macedonian symposia tended to be larger than Athenian ones, less intimate. Drunken people tend to be noisy. While I don't doubt that commands typically were given in Macedonian, the fact that Plutarch specifies that this particular one was, must have signified something but certainly not that it was a prearranged signal. I would be more inclined to suggest that Plutarch was, subtly, stressing the Macedonian nature of the entire scene.

Alonso 2007 offers a compelling explanation for the focus on Lanice, Alexander's wet nurse and Cleitus' sister, in the king's remorse: the critical ethical and emotional relationship between nurse and child especially in terms of moral obligation. Tritle 2003 attempts to understand Alexander's violent actions at Maracanda in terms of the current recognition of the dynamics of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). His discussion intrigues, but suffers from several limitations: it is not clear why Cleitus was not just as likely as the king to suffer from PTSD; Tritle forgot that battle is not the only source of PTSD and in the case of Alexander, his father's own drunken attempt on his life (and other political threats) surely could have produced PTSD; Tritle's discussion of the role of drinking by soldiers pays little or no attention to the central role of the drinking

## *Chapter 7*

party at the Macedonian court and instead tends to treat Alexander's and Cleitus' drinking as solely a product of the campaign, typical of soldiers of all eras. On the other hand, Tittle's approach has the great virtue of humanizing Alexander and his companions, making them seem more like real people, less like plaster images.

## REGICIDE IN MACEDONIA

Whether on the battlefield or at the hands of an assassin or assassins, Macedonian kings tended to die with their boots on. What evidence survives – largely from the reigns of Philip and his son Alexander – suggests that regicide, or at least attempted regicide, was a commonplace event in Macedonian political life. But why did killing the king, or trying to, become a nearly traditional Macedonian pursuit?

Clearly the relative frequency of regicide in Macedonia tells us something about the nature of Macedonian kingship. Although Macedonian kings did perform various religious duties,<sup>1</sup> the quasi-sacramental kingship of medieval and early modern western Europe (the sort of conceptualization of kingship which made even regicides fear for their immortal souls)<sup>2</sup> did not take shape in ancient Macedonia.

Not only was a regicide a less-than-terrifying prospect, but Macedonian practice about succession to the throne tended to act as an incentive for regicide, at least under certain circumstances. Although the Macedonians generally chose the eldest son of the last reigning Argead as king, primogeniture was anything but an iron-clad institution, particularly if the heir were a minor. Macedonia was a frontier society; a child on the throne with a regent in temporary control was always a risk.

One form of regicide, therefore, which appears frequently in Macedonian history is usurpation. In this sort of assassination plot the prime mover (and sometimes, perhaps, the actual assassin) was a member of the royal family who killed the reigning king in order to seize the throne for himself. For instance, according to Diodorus (14.37.6), Aeropus, the guardian of Orestes, the son of Archelaus, killed the youth and took the throne for himself. Similarly, Diodorus (15.71.1) reports that Ptolemy Alorites killed his brother-in-law Alexander and ruled for himself, only to be killed in turn by a second brother-in-law, Perdiccas, who then succeeded to the throne.<sup>3</sup> Of course, foreign powers took advantage of the rather fluid Argead succession by sponsoring their own candidates, for their own reasons.

By no means all royal Macedonian victims of assassination were eliminated by would-be usurpers. Another kind of assassination plot

known in Macedonia involved conspiracy, but did not include a member of the royal family, at least overtly. Accounts of this kind of conspiracy tend to refer to male lovers, often wronged or betrayed, and often seeking revenge. The participants are always members of the Macedonian aristocracy, usually closely associated with the king personally. It is this sort of regicide which is the primary concern of the present study.

Since members of such conspiracies did not appear to wish to seize the throne for themselves and often seem to desire only the removal of the present king and nothing further, their motivation is unclear, as is the political significance of their act. Are these aristocratic conspiracies (like the usurpation variety) linked to the nature of Macedonian kingship, are they more closely tied to Macedonian aristocracy itself, or are they, primarily, a product of the nature of the relationship between the king and his ruling class? In order to answer this question, I shall begin by considering four aristocratic assassination plots aimed at Archelaus, Philip, and Alexander respectively. Naturally, I shall attach particular significance to any similarities revealed in the study of these several plots.

Evidence suggests that Archelaus, ruler of Macedonia from 413–399 BC,<sup>4</sup> was assassinated. Diodorus (14.37.6) does say that Archelaus, while hunting, was accidentally killed by his lover Crateuas (variously known as Crateras, Crateuas, Crataeus), but Aristotle (*Pol.* 1311b) insists that Crateuas deliberately killed Archelaus and that two other men, Hellanocrates of Larisa and a certain Decamnichus were also involved. Aristotle's version is more usually accepted, in somewhat emended form.<sup>5</sup>

According to Aristotle, Crateuas acted both because of his sexual relationship with Archelaus and because Archelaus had promised him one of his daughters in marriage, but then gave her to another. Aristotle adds that resentment of the sexual relationship was his primary motive. Hellanocrates, another of Archelaus' lovers, was angry because the king failed to restore him to his country from exile, and because he therefore concluded that Archelaus had begun the affair not out of passion, but from a desire to insult him. The third plotter Decamnichus (not said to be a lover of Archelaus) and, according to Aristotle, the instigator, wanted revenge because Archelaus had Euripides flog him. Supposedly Decamnichus had insulted the playwright by telling him that he had bad breath!

Personal insult, especially the betrayal of a sexual relationship, seems to have triggered the assassination. Note that Aristotle insists that this attack was personally motivated, though his narrative mentions factors more political than personal: the denial of a royal marriage and the failure to restore someone from exile. In fact, this passage occurs in the context of



Aristotle's discussion of rulers, tyrants or kings, killed for personal reasons (revenge) rather than political ones (ambition). In this same passage, Aristotle discusses the tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and the murder of Philip. We shall return to Aristotle's curious failure to draw any significant distinction between the hereditary monarch and the tyrant.

In accounts of Philip's assassination some similar features recur and some new ones appear. Philip's death has, of course, become antiquity's most famous 'who-done-it', but all accounts agree that the actual assassin was Pausanias, the former lover of Philip, who, feeling himself rejected by Philip, took revenge on Philip's new favorite, only to be sexually abused by the new favorite's friend and Philip's in-law, Attalus. When Pausanias sought redress from Philip, he was denied.<sup>6</sup> Aristotle is virtually the only ancient source who assumes that Pausanias acted for personal reasons alone, and even Aristotle may have felt that Philip's assassin had political motivation as well; the context in which Aristotle mentions Philip's death would make a political discussion irrelevant.<sup>7</sup> Most other ancient sources blame not only Pausanias, but various other hostile interests as well: Alexander or Olympias or both (Just. 9.7.1–11; Plut. *Alex.* 10.4); the sons of Aeropus (Arr. 1.25.1–3; Plut. *Mor.* 327c may also imply their guilt); and the Persian king (Arr. 2.14.5; Curt.4.1.12).<sup>8</sup>

As with two of the assassins of Archelaus, sexual insult and betrayal of a sexual relationship motivate the assassin (though in this case Philip is somewhat less directly involved). Since our sources, with the exception (perhaps only apparent) of Aristotle, assume that sexual insult alone was not sufficient motive and tend to expect to discover political motives as well, there is another similarity to the accounts of the assassination of Archelaus. Here, however, sexual insult is downplayed and political motivation stressed.

A number of plots against the life of Alexander the Great are mentioned by our sources, but about some we know so little that even their motivation remains unclear and indeed whether a real plot ever existed may be uncertain: Lyncestian Alexander's activities and the plot alleged against Philip the doctor fall into this category.<sup>9</sup>

The best known of the conspiracies of Alexander's reign is the one associated with the fall of Philotas. Most ancient and modern authors agree that Philotas himself was involved in this conspiracy only to the extent that he failed to inform the king of its existence.<sup>10</sup> The members of the plot included two lovers, Dimnus and Nicomachus. Nicomachus revealed the plot to his brother Ceballinus, who then told Philotas (Diod. 17.79.1–80.1; Plut. *Alex.* 48–49). In Curtius' version of the affair (6.7.11–11.40; 7.1.1–2.38), the story is slightly different. None of our accounts make clear why

Dimnus and his lover wished to kill the king (it may be significant that this seemingly important question is ignored by our sources), though it seems reasonable to assume some sort of grievance. Certainly all accounts of the conspiracy center on the two lovers.

In his account of the conspiracy of Hermolaus, Arrian (4.10.1–14.4)<sup>11</sup> explains that Hermolaus was publicly flogged by the king because the youth had dared to kill the boar that the king had marked out for himself. Hermolaus and his lover Sostratus formed a plot against the king's life, in order to gain revenge. Other members of the Royal Youths or Pages, to which both belonged, joined the conspiracy, although none of the other Youths had suffered any personal wrong at Alexander's hands. Pure bad luck prevented the success of their plot. Subsequently, one of the conspirators, Epimenes, told his lover Charicles about the plot. Charicles told his lover's brother, who in turn informed the authorities (see also chapter 11).

Arrian denies that the plot of Hermolaus and his friends had any connection to Callisthenes, *proskynēsis*, and Callisthenes' objections to Alexander's kingship, but he includes a speech attributed to Hermolaus (4.14.2) which indicates that Hermolaus objected to Alexander's new and more absolute kingship. Plutarch, on the other hand, mentions no motivation for the plot of Hermolaus (*Alex.* 53–55) but does imply that its intent was in some way anti-tyrannical. Curtius' version (8.5.5–8.23) also centers on Hermolaus and Sostratus as lovers, but he has the talkative Epimenes tell his brother directly instead of via his lover. Also present is a speech, much like that found in Arrian, which is anti-tyrannical in sentiment.

Here again, in the Hermolaus plot, familiar features reappear. A personal insult, though not a sexual one, sparks the anger of those who form the conspiracy. Several pairs of lovers are involved, though none of them have been spurned by the king. Once more personal and political motivation have been blurred: it is unclear whether the Royal Youths are trying to kill a personal enemy or a tyrannical king or both.

All four conspiracies share two traits: some sort of homosexual theme and a blurring of political and personal motivation. Further and more detailed similarities are not obvious. In particular, does the importance of homosexual relationships in connection to certain kinds of political thinking appear again and again in these aristocratic conspiracies because of the importance of such relationships and values in Macedonian court life, or is it possible that these features are somewhat artificially reproduced? In short, how much and in what way might our accounts be colored by certain preconceptions related to the best-known model for ancient tyrannicide, the plot of Harmodius and Aristogeiton?

The story of this famous pair of “tyrannicides” is well-known and much studied;<sup>12</sup> in the context of this discussion, it is necessary only to summarize the major points of their story, using the accounts of Thucydides (1.20.2; 6.54–59.1) and Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 18.1–6), supplemented by Herodotus (5.55). As is well recognized, the two major accounts differ substantially.<sup>13</sup>

In 514/13, Hipparchus, younger brother of the Athenian tyrant Hippias, desired Harmodius. Harmodius resisted Hippias’ advances and told his own lover Aristogeiton about them. The two lovers then planned to kill both Hipparchus and his older brother, the chief tyrant, but foiled in their attempt on Hippias, they managed to kill only Hipparchus before they themselves were taken.

It would be a mistake, despite Thucydides’ assertions, to assume that the sexual and social affront to Harmodius constituted the only motivation for their attempted tyrannicide. Both Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 18.2, 4–5) and Thucydides (1.20.2; 6.57.2) tell us that others than the two lovers participated in the plot. At first their participation seems puzzling, but if one recalls that the original plan called for the deaths of both brothers and that in Aristotle, though Hippias is the main and dominant brother, the other brothers were involved as well (*Ath. Pol.* 18.1),<sup>14</sup> there is at least a partial solution to the puzzle. Even the grievance attributed to the pair by Thucydides (6.54.3) had a political aspect. He says that Aristogeiton plotted to overthrow the tyranny because of his fear that Hipparchus might have Harmodius taken by force. Although Thucydides insists (6.54.1, 6.59.1) that the cause of the plot was only a love affair, his own narrative demonstrates that personal and political motivations were inextricably interwoven.<sup>15</sup> As Gomme observed, the relationship of lovers was often considered inspiring and ennobling, something which could lead to great deeds (e.g. the famous ‘Sacred Band’). He further notes that the idea that a tyrant’s lust might bring about his destruction was fairly common, especially since one of the common arguments against tyranny was that it allowed tyrants to indulge their desires with no regard for the wishes of other individuals.<sup>16</sup>

Clearly, no single Macedonian plot is an exact duplicate of the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, but equally clearly there are features shared by all plots, in some cases a remarkable number. Let me sum up the major features of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story and then compare these features to those found in the Macedonian accounts. No member of the ruling family is involved in the plot, whether acting in his or her own interest or in that of another member of the family. The object of the plot is the removal of the ruler as an end in itself rather than his replacement by some more favored member of the ruling family. At least one homosexual

relationship is central to the motivation of the plot. Revenge is sought for some action perceived as a personal affront, often sexual in nature. Some of the people involved in the plot have suffered no such affront themselves nor are they said to be connected to the family of those affronted. Sources will tend to insist that the motivation of the conspiracy is entirely personal, yet their own narratives will offer evidence to the contrary. Not only sexual, but social and political affronts may inspire the desire for revenge. At least one pair of male lovers is either the major instigator of the plot or significant in its dénouement.

If we check accounts of the Archelaus assassination against this list we find two differences: nothing suggests the involvement of anyone other than those personally offended and, though several lovers are mentioned, there is no founding or significant pair involved in the development of the plot. Similarly, there is no founding pair in Philip's assassination story, and lack of evidence makes it difficult to determine whether members of the royal family or other outsiders were involved. Obviously, one could argue that Philip's death was the result of a usurpation plot, and not part of my second category of regicide at all.<sup>17</sup> The plot associated with the Philotas affair is never given any motive, sexual, political or otherwise. The Hermolaus plot matches all eight features of the tale of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

Granted the considerable similarities in all these conspiracy accounts, we must return to the problem of accounting for them. Is there a causal relationship between the Macedonian accounts and the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story? In any literary sense, the answer must be 'no': Harmodius and Aristogeiton do not constitute a literary *topos* affecting Macedonian regicide accounts. There is no reason to assume that the names of the conspiring lovers were not real – the young men involved are prominent – and of course such affairs were a significant part of Greek and Macedonian social life. While there are similar features contained in all accounts, they relate to content, not to narrative structure or to style. Perhaps only in some details of the Dimnus and Hermolaus plot should one consider literary resemblances; in both there is a lover who feels compelled to reveal the plan to his brother.<sup>18</sup>

Clearly the relationship between the Harmodius and Aristogeiton tale and Macedonian plots is much closer in matters of content and political values. But here again, I would argue, the relationship is not demonstrably causal. Nothing suggests that Macedonian regicides had Harmodius and Aristogeiton in mind when they made their plans. The similarities arise because of a shared political and social tradition. That the Athenian tyrannicides are late-sixth-century phenomena while the Macedonian plotters belong to the fourth century is explained by the typically old-

fashioned, and archaic nature of Macedonian society.<sup>19</sup> Just as the initial American expectation about political assassinations was, and in good part still is, that the murder would be the work of a single madman and not of some group, so the expectation in ancient Macedonia (and in some degree in the Greek world in general) was that the assassination would be the work of the kind of group described above, and that the motivation would be some personal or sexual injury.

Both expectations are founded in considerable degree on historical reality: the past experience of assassination in each society. And yet such culturally conditioned expectations may affect the judgment of witnesses or authors even more than hard evidence. They are in many ways self-fulfilling. In the Greek and Macedonian tradition the tendency will be to see such attempts only in personal terms and to ignore political interests; in an American context, madness will tend to exclude politics as motivation.<sup>20</sup>

Granted that the tale of the Athenian tyrannicides cannot explain the frequency of Macedonian assassinations or their nature (though Harmodius and Aristogeiton may well have had indirect influence), we must return to our initial problem: why is the attempt at regicide so frequent and why are the attempts so similar? The solution lies in all three areas I mentioned at the beginning of this study: the nature of Macedonian monarchy (particularly the way in which the power of the king was perceived); the nature of the Macedonian aristocracy; and the relationship between the king and the aristocracy.

All the plotters shared the assumption that the ruler's power was personal in origin rather than institutional. This explains why elements of the Harmodius and Aristogeiton story reappear, despite the rather narrow and formulaic perception of problems of political power exemplified by that account. Taylor correctly observed that the famous pair did not act out of a desire for "public liberty."<sup>21</sup> Yet they were certainly concerned about *personal* liberty and much the same could be said about most of the Macedonian plotters, in so far as their motivation is preserved. It is not surprising that our sources tend to insist on the preeminence of personal over political motivation, yet consistently include – when discussing attempts on the lives of the rulers – factors ordinarily regarded as political. Aristotle's odd blurring of lines between hereditary kings and tyrants, which we observed earlier, is typical.<sup>22</sup> Certainly before Philip, and arguably after, Macedonian kings had very little power institutionally; the personal ability of the monarch determined all.

So one reason for the frequency of assassination in Macedonia is directly tied to the nature of its government: personal monarchy. Thus abuse of personal liberty – to us both a political and a personal issue – is conceived

of exclusively in personal terms (especially those of individual honor, *timē*) because the power of the abusers was conceived of in personal rather than political terms. The statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton stolen by Xerxes in 480 were ordered to be returned by either Alexander or one of his Successors.<sup>23</sup> A monarch could embrace (and indeed propagandize about) these supposed assassins because they were not seen as symbolic of opposition to an institution but to individual abuse of it.

Clearly the nature of aristocracy, particularly in its dealings with the king, also helps to explain the number of attempts on the lives of Macedonian rulers. As is well known, the Macedonian aristocracy was powerful, and traditionally not much separated its members from the king: the monarchy had little ceremony and often relatively little political power. Relationships between the king and the nobles were often intimate, and rather familial; political life was still closely tied to the clan. The importance of homosexual relationships in this hot-house atmosphere was great. Court life would seem to have produced dangerous tensions and relatively easy chances of resolving these tensions by violent means.

In addition to the general milieu of the Macedonian court, a specific institution may be related to many of the attempted regicides. We know that Hermolaus and his friends were Royal Youths and that he was able to persuade other members of this group to join him in an attempt to remove Alexander; the Dimnus plot may well also have involved members of that group. Quite possibly Archelaus' assassins were either Royal Youths themselves or recent alumni;<sup>24</sup> the same may apply to Pausanias. Certainly Hammond has argued that the institution existed well before Philip.<sup>25</sup> Many of these men may have begun relationships with the king, or with others, while still Royal Youths, and continued them as they became important members of the *hypaspists* and later, perhaps, royal bodyguards. In short, the institutionalized pederasty of the Macedonian court may have had something to do with "institutionalized" regicide.

The frequency with which attempts were made on the lives of the Macedonian kings is the result of more than the general weakness of Macedonian monarchy and more than the general violence of Macedonian society. Attempted regicide was common because primogeniture was insecurely established, because the king's power was perceived as essentially personal rather than institutional, and because the Macedonian court preserved a rather explosive relationship between monarch and young aristocrat which often led to violence.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Hammond 1979, 155 for most recent discussion. See also Berve 1926b, 85–86; Fredricksmeier 1966, 179 ff.; Edson 1970, 12–24, especially n. 22; Edmunds 1971, 363–91. See also Curt. 4.6.10; 10.9.11–12; Arr. 7.25.2.

<sup>2</sup> Mousnier 1964, 242–8, distinguishes the relative approval of regicide or tyrannicide in ancient sources from medieval and early modern views where there is the belief that the king is God's parallel on earth and the king is sometimes considered the incarnate image of God on earth. Walzer 1974, 1–18, remarks that prior to the Gregorian reform, coronation was seen as a sacrament and popular belief also held kingship to be sacred.

<sup>3</sup> Many pretenders were, of course, backed by outside powers, including Athens. The situation in 359 was not unusual.

<sup>4</sup> See Beloch 1923, 62 for regnal dates.

<sup>5</sup> See Hammond 1979, 167–8, for the most recent discussion of these passages. See also Geyer 1930, 103 and Cloché 1960, 89. Hammond also rejects as an embellishment the notion that Crateuas took the throne for several days.

<sup>6</sup> See Badian 1963, 244–50; Bosworth 1971, 93–105; Ellis 1971, 15–24; Fears 1975, 11–35; and most recently, Griffith 1979, 675–98 and Bosworth 1980, 159 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Badian 1963, 247 n. 20, concluded that Aristotle could not have believed that political factors were at work as well. However, Fears 1975, 117, n. 19, believes that Aristotle may have considered political motives important, too, but that he chose not to mention them in this context. Fears also suggests that Diodorus 16.93–4 (which mentions no plot) and 17.2.1 (which does) may be parallel rather than contradictory.

<sup>8</sup> See Fears 1975, 112 n. 4 for references to discussion concerning the authenticity of the letter which mentions Darius' claim.

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter 6 and Bosworth 1980, 159–64, on Lyncestian Alexander. On Philip the doctor, see Berve 1926b, 388–89 for references. The story of Philip could easily be one of the many stories generated about Parmenio's bad advice.

<sup>10</sup> For references and the most recent discussion of this and other problems concerning the deaths of Philotas and Parmenio, see Bosworth 1980, 359–67.

<sup>11</sup> See Chapter 11.

<sup>12</sup> See Taylor 1981. Mr. Taylor was kind enough to allow me to read the manuscript of this work prior to its publication and has been helpful in many ways. See Taylor 1981, 199–201, for a list of literary references to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. See also Fornara 1967, 291–5; 1968, 400–24; 1970, 155–80.

<sup>13</sup> For discussion on these differences in narrative, see Lang 1954–55, 395–407; Fitzgerald 1957, 275–286; Gomme 1956, 137 and 1970, 318 ff.; and Fornara 1968, 400 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Gomme 1970, 318, plausibly concludes that it was the elimination of the oldest brother which attracted the other participants. It could, of course, have been ties of loyalty to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Perhaps all belonged to the same group or social club. See discussion of these Athenian clubs and their political aims in Calhoun 1913, 10–24 and Connor 1971, 25 ff. This may parallel the situation found in the plots involving the Macedonian Royal Youths.

<sup>15</sup> Taylor 1981, 2, follows Thucydides in asserting the primacy of political motivation. See Podlecki 1966, 129–41, Taylor 1981, 90, 188 n. 2 for a discussion of

possible specific political connections between the act of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (as well as the later commemoration of it) and various factions.

<sup>16</sup> Gomme 1970, 322–3 and Dover 1978, 191 both discuss the inspiring character of such relationships. A passage in the *Symposium* (182a–c), spoken by “Pausanias”, suggests that in Ionia such relationships were disapproved because they were seen as a threat to tyrants because of the love, loyalty, and ambition they engendered (“Pausanias” goes on to cite Harmodius and Aristogeiton as examples of his point). Dover 1978, 82 says that this passage should not be taken seriously.

<sup>17</sup> Green 1974, 529 n. 69 notes a parallel between the story of Pausanias’ assassination of Philip and the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton: “...here again homosexual jealousy was neatly harnessed to political ends.” Green, however, does not pursue the parallel or speculate upon reasons for the similar motivation.

<sup>18</sup> In Diod. 17.79.1, Nicomachus, lover of Dimnus, tells his own brother Ceballinus; so also Curt. 6.7.2 and Plut. *Alex.* 49.3. In the conspiracy of Hermolaus, Curtius (8.6.20) says that Epimenēs, lover of Charicles, tells his brother Eurylochus about the plot. In Arrian (4.10.1–14), Epimenēs tells Charicles who tells Epimenēs’ brother. In any event, this seeming doublet relates to Alexander narratives, not to the Harmodius and Aristogeiton narrative.

<sup>19</sup> Fornara 1968, 405 observes that one of the problems with Thucydides’ account of the motivation of the tyrannicides is that it is based on ideological considerations not imagined until Thucydides’ own day and is therefore anachronistic.

<sup>20</sup> For instance, Lee Harvey Oswald’s connection to the Communist Party and John Hinckley’s to the American Nazi Party tend to be regarded as insignificant (or examples of their madness), whereas their mental problems are emphasized.

<sup>21</sup> Taylor 1981, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Pol.* 1310b–1313a, in his discussion of the reasons for the destruction of tyrants and kings, certainly initially distinguishes between the two, but then proceeds to consider their assassination essentially under the same heading. Fornara 1968, 405–406 n. 22 would seem to agree with him and, like Aristotle, blames tyrannicides on the hubris of tyrants.

<sup>23</sup> Arrian 3.16.7 would seem to imply that Alexander arranged that the statues be sent back on his first visit to Susa, whereas Arrian 7.19.2 suggests the later date. Pliny *N.H.* 34.70 also attributes this act to Alexander, but other sources attribute it to Antiochus (Paus. 1.8.5) or Seleucus (Val. Max. 2.10 ext. 1). See Bosworth 1980, 317, who sensibly deduces that Alexander may have decided upon their return, but that it was accomplished during the joint reign of Seleucus and Antiochus (292–81 BC).

<sup>24</sup> Hammond 1979, 167–68.

<sup>25</sup> Hammond 1979, 167–8 n.1. It is interesting to note that flogging as a public humiliation requiring revenge is an element in both the story of Archelaus’ assassination (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b) and in Hermolaus’ attempt at assassination (Arr. 4.13.2; Curt. 8.3.7). If Hamilton 1969, 154, is correct in surmising that Hermolaus’ flogging was a typical punishment for members of the Royal Youths, then the flogging of Decamnichus may be further confirmation that Archelaus’ assassins were indeed Royal Youths.



## AFTERWORD

Having worked on the conspiracy of Hermolaus, I began to wonder why regicide seemed so common in the history of Argead Macedonia and tracked two sorts of regicide conspiracies: those involving members of the ruling family which intended to replace the current ruler with another candidate from the Argead clan, and those which involved members of the elite but attempted simply to kill the existing ruler and seemed to be indifferent as to who or what replaced him. This 1983 article noted a number of common features in conspiracies of the second type, particularly a “blurring of political and personal motivation” and “some sort of homosexual theme.” I worried that the importance in extant narratives of relationships I then called homosexual, rather than being a reflection of the importance of such relationships in court life, might instead derive from a *topos* related to the story of the Athenian “tyrannicides” Harmodius and Aristogeiton. I concluded that the Athenian story did not explain the frequency of regicide nor the sexual relationships so often featured in narratives of these plots but rather the understanding of monarchy and the relationship between king and court, and possibly the institution of the Royal Youths.

In this article I suggested that our past expectations about political assassination color our understanding of current events; eerily, I delivered an oral version of this article in early April of 1981, just days after the attempt on President Reagan’s life. I had said that Americans expected assassinations to be the work of single madmen and I did indeed hear television journalists make that very assumption about the man who tried to kill Reagan, well before anything was known of his identity or motivation. Since September 11, 2001, this expectation in terms of US political experience may no longer apply. The same kind of sea change might apply to Antigonid Macedonia, where attempted regicide was virtually unheard of, doubtless because of changes in the nature of monarchy and the court.

In 1983, there had been virtually no discussion of sexuality in Macedonia: for instance, scholars often used euphemism to describe the gang rape inflicted on the man who became Philip II’s assassin (see “The Politics of Polygamy” in this volume) and the study of sexuality in the ancient world had really just begun (K. J. Dover’s *Greek Homosexuality* appeared in 1978). Of course, this has now become a huge field for scholarly activity (Skinner 2005 provides a helpful overview). In the years since, Alexander’s sexuality has gotten considerable attention (see Ogden 2011 and its bibliography) but less attention has been paid to that of the court more generally. An early article of Ogden’s on homosexuality in Greek warfare (1996) is helpful, but Mortensen’s 2009 piece on “Homosexuality in the Macedonian court and the death of Philip II” still broke new ground and caused tremendous upset in Greece in 2007 when Mortensen delivered the oral version of the paper (see Ogden 2009, 203 n.3). In 1983, though I noted other causes as well, I concluded that one reason for the frequency of regicide was “a rather explosive relationship between monarch and young aristocrat which often led to violence.” Indeed, the violence at the Macedonian court rooted in sexual tensions there can perhaps best be understood as a kind of honor killing, in which male honor and family honor led to murder and attempted murder.



## THE POLITICS OF POLYGAMY: OLYMPIAS, ALEXANDER, AND THE MURDER OF PHILIP

We should not treat the murder of Philip II as a puzzle to be solved – a Macedonian Agatha Christie with stock characters – but as a real crime, one experienced by people with very different values and expectations from our own. Yet scholarship on the subject of the murder has often assumed that either the participants or the sources or both share the values of the scholars. Since analysis of criminal motivation depends on evaluation of the personality, goals and values of suspects, all culturally based judgments, we must be more sensitive to the social as well as the political setting, if we are to understand the events at Aegae in the late summer or early fall of 336 BC.

I do not propose to conduct a general reconsideration of the evidence for, and scholarship on, the murder of Philip<sup>1</sup> but rather to examine the more limited problem of Olympias' possible involvement in the murder and to place this examination in the context of the overall role of royal women in the Macedonian court. After scrutinizing Olympias' situation throughout Philip's reign, I shall turn to the period of the murder and establish her possible means, opportunity and motivation for the crime. I shall conclude with a look at the source problems involved in considering Olympias' role in the murder.

Recognition of the nature of the institution of marriage in the Greek world and of Macedonian royal polygamy is critical to an understanding of Olympias' career, yet many have filled in the gaps in our knowledge of her early years with culturally inappropriate material, derived, apparently unconsciously, from twentieth-century western expectations about the nature of marriage, despite the obvious differences between the institutions as experienced in our own culture and in the classical Hellenic world.<sup>2</sup> The purpose and nature of Greek marriage in general was not personal satisfaction and happiness for the bride and groom, as in our own world, but rather the production of children; royal marriages, and certainly Philip's, also served a variety of political purposes. His marriage to Olympias marked an alliance with her homeland, Molossia. Arguably it was the most important of his marriage alliances. We should recognize

Plutarch's insistence that the marriage was motivated by *erōs* (*Alex.*2.1) for the fairy tale it is and prefer the implication of the testimony of Satyrus (ap. Ath. 557b–c): Philip's marriages were made for political purposes.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the personal feelings of either Philip or Olympias about each other were irrelevant both to the creation of the marriage and to its perpetuation. This is just as well, since we don't know how Philip and Olympias really felt about each other. There is virtually no evidence about their possible feelings at any point in their marriage – not surprising granted their society's assumptions about the nature of marriage. Certainly the well-known passage in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* (9.3–4) is not proof: there is discussion of the troubles produced by many wives and loves, of how the supposed ill-nature of Olympias made existing quarrels between Philip and Alexander worse,<sup>4</sup> and of the quarrel initiated by Attalus, but nothing about the feelings of Olympias and Philip for each other and certainly nothing suggesting deterioration (that commonplace of scholarship) but rather that the polygamous situation of Philip's court was always troubled. The only "evidence" about their feelings comes from another passage in the same work: in the context of tales about predictions of Alexander's great future, Plutarch recounts that Philip, having seen a snake sleeping next to Olympias, lost sexual interest in her (2.4). We later learn (3.1) that the snake was really Zeus. Although, remarkably enough, many have taken this tale to be historical truth, it is patently not.<sup>5</sup>

Philip's marriage to Olympias differed from modern marriages not only in its motivation but in its context: it was polygamous. Olympias was neither the first nor the last of his seven wives.<sup>6</sup> The fact that she was one of many wives affected Olympias' situation (and that of her son) in innumerable ways. Moreover, whereas Egyptian pharaohs, although even more enthusiastically polygamous than Macedonian monarchs, had chief wives so designated by title, no evidence confirms the existence of any such title or formalized position for a royal Macedonian wife.<sup>7</sup> A variety of factors may have affected the status of royal wives, including the prominence of a woman's family and the importance of the alliance which had caused her to become a wife, but the single most important factor was the production of male children.<sup>8</sup> Indications that a royal father was treating a woman's son as heir would dramatically enhance her status. By 340,<sup>9</sup> and perhaps by as early as 342, we know that Philip (although not obliged to, either by primogeniture or any other clearly-established pattern of succession) had begun to make such indications about Alexander and continued to do so until the time of Philip's last marriage in midsummer or early fall of 337.<sup>10</sup>

The significance of this information is often ignored. The evidence merely indicates that, in all probability, Olympias enjoyed more prestige

than any of Philip's other wives for only three to five years of her roughly twenty-one years of marriage. Even in this brief period, neither her position nor that of her son was institutionalized. Scholars often refer to Alexander as "crown prince", but no ancient evidence suggests the existence of an equivalent term in ancient Macedonia or any formal recognition of status as heir, such as that of the United Kingdom's Prince of Wales. Similarly, nothing indicates that Olympias was any more or less a queen than Philip's other wives. Olympias lived her entire married life in a fluid situation in which her standing was determined by her interpretation (and that of the rest of the court) of royal actions and gestures. Although we have failed to recognize it, the chronic insecurity of the position of mother and son colored their political perceptions and determined many of their actions and reactions.

While Philip may have begun to indicate that he considered Alexander his heir somewhat earlier than our first extant evidence demonstrates, it is unlikely to have been much earlier than the beginning of his son's teens. Only then would Philip have been able to make a reasonable judgment about Alexander's potential for rule. Moreover, Philip had another, probably slightly older son, Arrhidaeus, and many years may have passed before it became evident that Arrhidaeus was capable of performing little more than ceremonial tasks and was not able to rule on his own. Since Arrhidaeus' continued healthy existence threatened her son's position and thus her own, Plutarch's charge (*Alex.* 77.5) that Arrhidaeus' disabilities resulted from Olympias' poisoning deserves some, if limited, credence.<sup>11</sup> So, despite the fact that she had rapidly produced a son, Olympias' status as mother of the probable heir to the throne may have remained in doubt much longer than is usually noted and was always fragile by nature.

Other factors would, for Olympias, have contributed to prolonged uncertainty about her status. She had only one son. In an age of high infant and childhood mortality, she must have worried constantly about his health. During all this period there was always the chance that Philip might produce other sons by other wives and prefer one of them. This would have been a particular concern early in Olympias' marriage, when such sons could have been close in age to Alexander. That such fears were not realized would not have prevented them from affecting Olympias and her son. There is absolutely no evidence that Olympias had any influence on Philip; arguments from silence are undependable, but the contrast between her obscurity in Philip's reign and her prominence in Alexander's is suggestive.<sup>12</sup> Although the status of Alexander and therefore Olympias rose as he entered his teens, their period of uncertainty was long and their period of apparent predominance brief.

In 337 Philip married his last wife. Cleopatra was his second Macedonian bride and the ward of a noble called Attalus.<sup>13</sup> Why did Philip marry yet again, just before the great Asian invasion? It would be more reasonable to ask why not. He had only one viable son and a nephew, Amyntas; he may well have planned to take both young men with him to Asia. If a Macedonian king had only a few sons, he risked having no heirs.<sup>14</sup>

Why this particular bride? While some ancient sources speak of the marriage being a love match (Plut. *Alex.* 9.4; Sat. *ap.* Ath. 13.557d), this should be rejected: Plutarch (*Alex.* 2.2) also claimed that Philip's marriage to Olympias, clearly a political alliance, was a love match. Those who have accepted Plutarch's judgment about Philip's motivation have done so primarily because it offers an irrational explanation for something they consider an irrational act.<sup>15</sup> In fact, there is no good reason to believe Plutarch or to judge the marriage to Cleopatra inexplicable in rational terms. The trouble began (see below) not with the marriage, but with the quarrel after the wedding, with Attalus' interpretation of the marriage and with Philip's apparent acceptance of that interpretation.<sup>16</sup> Philip had previously married for political reasons, usually to foreign brides. Attalus leaps to sudden prominence with this marriage. He may have been a man whose support Philip wanted to curry, or it may be that Philip chose Attalus' ward because she belonged neither to Antipater's nor Parmenio's family: she was a noble Macedonian and, so it seemed, a safe choice. We should not underestimate the incentive of having children by a Macedonian woman.<sup>17</sup>

Initially Olympias and Alexander had no reason to view this last marriage any differently from earlier ones, although the nature of polygamy meant that every new marriage inspired some insecurity. On the face of it, there could be no problems: any son of Cleopatra's would be a generation younger than the nearly adult Alexander. The presence of Alexander at the male drinking party after Cleopatra's wedding, as well as Olympias' continued presence at court demonstrate that no trouble was expected.

Yet the events of the post-wedding drinking party proved unexpectedly explosive. The story is variously told by Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.4–5), Satyrus as cited in Athenaeus (13.557d–e) and Justin (9.7.3–7).<sup>18</sup> In both Plutarch and Athenaeus, Attalus, in the course of the party, somehow questions the legitimacy of Alexander. In Plutarch, when Alexander threatens to turn on Attalus because of the insult, Philip instead of defending his son and presumed heir from this very public insult attempts himself to attack Alexander and fails only out of drunkenness. In Athenaeus, only Attalus and Alexander quarrel, but the narrator notes that after this, Alexander and Olympias leave court: obviously the implication of their departure is that

Philip did nothing to alleviate the insult. In Justin, Philip joins the quarrel with Alexander on Attalus' side and nearly kills his son: Justin specifically says (*quamobrem*) that mother and son depart because of the incident. Thus the tradition, despite its variations, is generally that Attalus somehow publicly insulted Alexander, probably in terms questioning his legitimacy; that Philip either did nothing to help his offended son or actively supported Attalus; and that Alexander and his mother reacted to the incident by departing the kingdom.

Taken in these general terms, the incident must be genuine. Virtually all the powerful men in Macedonia would have been in attendance. That Philip let the man who insulted Alexander go unpunished would not be forgotten; nor would Alexander's self-imposed exile and that of his mother. Merely a year or so later such a story could not have been invented and believed – far too many people would have known the truth, and these the very ones some would have us believe the supposed fiction was meant to influence.<sup>19</sup>

If, then, the story is roughly true, what are we to make of it? Most scholars have, rightly, refused to believe that Philip purposely endangered the succession so close to his departure for Asia, with as yet no replacement available other than his obscure nephew.<sup>20</sup> Let us begin by assuming that he did not intend to precipitate the series of events set in motion at the banquet.

There is nothing very puzzling about Attalus' views. Naturally he hoped that his ward would produce not only a future king but the next king: such an eventuality might easily have made him regent. We need not believe Attalus entertained genuine doubts about Alexander's legitimacy. His primary purpose would have been to assert the primacy of any children of Cleopatra's. His insult referred to Olympias' Epirote roots: her sexual fidelity was not in serious doubt. Attalus doubtless hoped some xenophobic Macedonians would prefer an heir born of a Macedonian mother.<sup>21</sup> Whether he had intended all along to create the confrontation or whether drink precipitated the assertion of his ambitions is impossible to know.

Philip's reaction is more significant and more puzzling. He either countenanced Attalus' offense (Ath. 13.557e) or actually attacked his own son when Alexander responded pugnaciously to the insult (Plut. *Alex.* 9.5; Just. 9.7.4). Why would Philip allow the succession to be questioned at so critical a juncture? Previous attempts to understand the behavior of Philip have often been too rationalistic and also failed to recognize that his options in reacting to Attalus' actions were quite limited. He could ignore the situation, or he could punish Attalus, the man he was about to send off

to Asia, an action which would have caused all sorts of problems; anything short of eliminating him would have been risky. Since Attalus was a guest of Philip's (or perhaps Philip was the guest), punishing him on the spot would violate *xenia*. All concerned had been drinking heavily and Philip may have been incapable of determining an appropriate rapid response to Attalus' surprising action. If Philip did actually threaten his son, then his sense that *xenia* was involved and that Alexander was making a bad situation worse may have had something to do with it. His promising son's imminent adulthood may have created in Philip something like the same antagonism and rivalry Philip's great success and continued good health did in his son (see below). It might seem unreasonable to expect his son to exercise restraint rather than be angry when Philip himself did not exercise it, but human beings, especially very drunk ones, are often unreasonable. Sober, Philip was a clever and calculating man, but virtually no reading of this incident makes it possible to believe that he handled it well, at least by our standards.

The difficulty is that the confrontation with Attalus occurred in a context very alien to that of our political experience, yet Borza argued persuasively that drunken and explosive symposia like this were at the center of Macedonian court and political life:

The symposium...was the ground on which one's relationship with the king and others was constantly tested. Thus beneath the overlay of feasting, drinking, and entertainment was a serious side, which marked the symposium as yet one more arena in which were played out the deadly games of ancient Macedonia.<sup>22</sup>

Alexander's possible reaction to the scene appears even more circumscribed in this competitive atmosphere: could the young man who had until this moment been treated as heir countenance such a fundamental insult and expect to have Macedonian troops obey him or to command the loyalty of the aristocracy? Think of Achilles and Agamemnon. This incident resembles their famous quarrel and festered for similar reasons – the τιμή/*timē* (honor) of all concerned. Just as Agamemnon would not be consoled by promises of future compensation for his immediate public loss and perceived insult (*Il.* 1.121–9), so Alexander would not easily be convinced that Attalus really had not meant it or that it did not matter if he had. Even if Alexander did not believe that the insult signified a serious threat to his succession – something we cannot know – his choices were to swallow a public insult to his status and accept the political consequence of such behavior or to respond in kind. Even if we assume Philip simply stood silent, his son was doubtless angry that his father did not defend him. It is



difficult to see how Alexander, young and probably also affected by drink, could have acted differently.

Of course, Olympias wasn't there (respectable women, let alone royal wives and mothers, did not attend such events), yet she is often pictured as the source of the trouble here, thanks mainly to Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.3). The incident began and was played out in a male context, the sexually segregated world of the drinking party, and had in the end to do with male honor. Olympias could not have known what would occur; the standards that governed Alexander's possible reaction to these events do not have their origin in the women's quarters but in the ἀρετή/*aretē* (excellence) ethic, in Homer, and all that came after.<sup>23</sup> Heavy drinking exaggerated the tensions of a viciously agonistic society; once the remark had been made, each participant was more or less locked into a culturally defined response.

Alexander's self-imposed exile was probably not lengthy: Philip had *before his departure* to stabilize the succession. If he had never intended to jeopardize it, a speedy reconciliation would be expected. This public reconciliation relates to diplomacy, not necessarily to feeling. A quarrel begun by chance can acquire genuine gravity. In every monarchy, as a son reaches the brink of adulthood, an increasing element of implicit competition appears. For instance, if Philip commanded the Asian expedition, then Alexander would not. We know that Alexander remained throughout the rest of his life almost pathologically competitive. Both men inhabited a world in which excellence was not so much an absolute as a series of demonstrations of superiority to specific individuals or groups. In some sense, as Alexander hovered on the brink of adulthood, promising to show skill in those very things at which his father excelled, he limited his father, and his father, by continuing to be an extraordinarily able statesman and fearless commander, inevitably prevented his son from doing the same.<sup>24</sup> Attalus' public reference to the fact that Philip, thanks to the messiness of Macedonian patterns of succession, did not have to treat Alexander as heir, brought to the surface feelings which could and would necessarily be concealed again, but doubtless continued to trouble both father and son.

Olympias, as part of the formal reconciliation, had probably returned to Macedonia by the time of her daughter's wedding to her brother, Alexander of Epirus. While the evidence is poor,<sup>25</sup> the reasons that had led Alexander to take Olympias with him when he departed were the same ones that would have demanded her ultimate return: his legitimacy had been questioned and thus his mother's τιμή and his own; the only way Philip could reestablish his son's legitimacy and end talk about the succession would be to bring Olympias back. The quarrel had been between father and son, not between husband and wife; Philip had no

reason to object to her return, particularly since it could help. The only reason more scholars have not reached this obvious conclusion is that so many have been distracted by the imaginary scenario of a marriage created and defined by personal emotions rather than one dominated by social and political expectations. Philip did not need to *like* Olympias to need her back – he may never have liked or loved her nor she him – nor did she need to care about him to want to return.

The probability of Olympias' relatively rapid return from exile becomes even greater when one considers the point of view of her brother, whose role in these events is usually ignored. The royal quarrel must have complicated things immensely for this other Alexander. On the one hand, he was Philip's subordinate ally; Philip had put him on the throne and was even rumored to have been his lover.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, the insult at the banquet threatened his family's honor (particularly if it was intended as an ethnic rather than a sexual slur) and put him in a situation similar to that of his nephew: ignoring it lost him face. Whether or not he liked his sister or whether or not he had any real desire to take action against Philip, he found himself in a position where not acting would suggest that he was swallowing the insult, which had, after all, gone unpunished. Justin's assertion (9.7.7) that Olympias was urging her brother to go to war against her husband, un-provable but certainly plausible, is not terribly relevant. Her brother would have been worrying much more about other people's opinion than about hers.

Philip's arrangement of a marriage between Alexander of Epirus and Philip's daughter by Olympias certainly saved face for Alexander of Epirus, as it was doubtless meant to do. His family was honored and the importance of the Epirote alliance reestablished. The great to-do Philip made over the wedding, although serving other propaganda aims as well, could only further enhance Alexander of Epirus' somewhat sullied prestige. It is unimaginable that his sister, the mother of the bride, would not have been present, primarily because her absence would have caused more of the talk both Philip and his son-cum-brother-in-law would have wished to quash. Although some have interpreted the marriage as an attempt to side-step Olympias by using her daughter to recreate or reconfirm the Molossian alliance, it is more plausibly interpreted as a gesture of reconciliation, directed at both Philip's son and his son's mother, Olympias.<sup>27</sup>

The Pixodarus affair seems to speak volumes about the real as opposed to the formal situation between Alexander and Philip. Only Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.1–3) preserves an account of the incident. When Alexander hears that Pixodarus, satrap of Caria, was arranging a marriage between his daughter and Alexander's half-brother Arrhidaeus, he is encouraged by his friends

and mother to believe that the marriage signaled Philip's intention to make Arrhidaeus his heir. Alexander therefore attempts to replace Arrhidaeus as groom and when Philip hears of these machinations he upbraids his son severely and banishes four of Alexander's close companions. It is too odd a tale to invent and no plausible reason for inventing it occurs.<sup>28</sup> While the incident appears to provide evidence for continuing troubles between father and son,<sup>29</sup> the chronological relationship of this affair to the saga of quarrel and reconciliation remains unclear and thus the significance of this evidence is uncertain.<sup>30</sup>

Although Alexander was not necessarily isolated by the exile of his friends the Pixodarus affair precipitated,<sup>31</sup> Philip's treatment of Alexander must be characterized as fairly severe. Plutarch's narrative implies that the actions and views of Olympias and of Alexander's friends were malicious, but they may not have been. Although their interpretation of Philip's motives may not have been correct, it was not particularly unbelievable: Philip had given no public recognition to Arrhidaeus until now. While Pixodarus was not a major figure, his role in the invasion could have been pivotal. Granted that Olympias and Alexander judged their status at court by studying Philip's actions, the Pixodarus arrangement may have signified to them that Philip was not entirely ruling Arrhidaeus out of the succession. They may also have read it as a kind of reminder to Alexander that he had misbehaved. If so, Alexander's reaction may indicate not that he feared for his succession but rather that he was responding in kind to what he perceived as a slap on the wrist from his father. Thus the incident remains ambiguous; it may signify over-confidence or under-confidence in Alexander; it suggests continuing father-son tension, but how much more than would be inherent in their relationship is difficult to say. Alexander and his mother and friends certainly misjudged the consequences of his intrigue; whether they also misjudged the meaning of Philip's initial action is another matter.<sup>32</sup>

## **The assassination of Philip II**

Our sources for the assassination of Philip are generally poor. Moreover none can have known of a certainty whether anyone other than Pausanias was involved in the murder of the king.<sup>33</sup> Nor do the sources clarify Philip's plans about Alexander's role on the Asian expedition; our ignorance on this point limits our ability to judge the motivation of Alexander (and Olympias), since their motivation would, in good part, have depended on their expectations about Alexander's immediate future.<sup>34</sup>

Pausanias, the man who actually administered the wounds which killed Philip, makes a very plausible assassin, a very Macedonian one. Analysis of

Pausanias' motivation has typically focused on the date of the offense which provided his motive (current *communis opinio* rightly favors the view that it was recent)<sup>35</sup> and scholars have discussed the offense itself – in reality a brutal gang rape engineered by Attalus to humiliate young Pausanias – with some embarrassment and a tendency to mimic the vague and euphemistic language of the sources.<sup>36</sup>

The consequence has been to lend an air of unreality and abstraction to discussions of Pausanias' actions, which need to be put back into their Macedonian and human context. Once this is done, several things seem clear. Concern about the date of the rape is not terribly relevant: victims of rape do not forget in a year or two; they brood; the experience tends to affect them for the rest of their lives.<sup>37</sup> This particular rape was not merely a crime of violence, but also an act of political revenge. Philip's failure to redress Pausanias' injury was also a political response, and Pausanias' reaction to this betrayal by his former lover was political too. His crime fits into the tradition of regicide in Macedonia and has elements in common with other such crimes: concern for masculine sexual honor; a mixture of motives both political and personal but characterized by ancient sources as personal alone; a desire merely to eliminate the ruler, not necessarily to replace him with any particular candidate.<sup>38</sup> Scholars often assume that Pausanias was a madman,<sup>39</sup> despite the fact that no ancient source so describes him and that regicide in Macedonia was an old political tradition. We must reject this assumption about madness, itself the consequence of modern political tradition about assassinations, if not of modern political reality.<sup>40</sup> As the waiting horses indicate (Diod. 16.93.3), although Pausanias willingly risked his life to avenge his honor, he at least attempted to preserve that life.

Plutarch reports that Olympias and Alexander were suspected of involvement in the assassination at the time (*Alex.* 10.4) and Justin (9.8.1–14) directly implicates Olympias. Even if she had not returned to Macedonia at the time of the murder, it would not have been impossible for Olympias to arrange matters for Pausanias from a distance: her subsequent career offers many examples of long-distance intrigue.<sup>41</sup> Olympias would surely have known the story of the rape and of Philip's affairs with the two Pausaniases: it would have been her business to know about other enemies of Attalus. Pausanias had some reason to hope she could protect him (particularly outside Macedonia). She had both means and opportunity.

Did she have motivation? Perhaps. Many assume that Olympias was sexually jealous of Cleopatra. This assumption, for which there is no evidence, rests on modern, thus monogamous expectations and ignores

the reality of Macedonian royal marriage. Olympias had been married to a man with many wives (at least one of them married after Olympias)<sup>42</sup> for roughly twenty years, a man notorious for his affairs with men and women. Neither Olympias nor Philip would have associated sexual fidelity on his part with marriage. Polygamy often creates jealousy and rivalry among wives, but that rivalry is by no means always of a sexual nature. At this stage in Olympias' marriage to Philip, jealousy of another sort makes more sense and has more support in the sources. Cleopatra, Attalus and Philip had dishonored Olympias and threatened to displace her from her position as mother to Philip's heir. She may have believed they threatened her son's succession. Moreover, a royal woman generally had more power during the reign of her son than during that of her husband; certainly Olympias did. She had reason to think that she would benefit by her husband's demise.

Having established that Olympias in all probability had means, opportunity and motive for the murder, let us now assemble the usual suspects and see how her situation compares to that of the others. Too little attention has been paid to the timing and place of the murder. Its timing suggests that the murderers were either indifferent to the fact that the murder might jeopardize the Asian expedition as well as Macedonian domination of the Greek peninsula or that they placed other considerations first. It may even imply a desire to humiliate Macedonia and the royal family. The public setting of the murder could suggest that those involved had no private access to Philip.<sup>43</sup>

The usual suspects, in addition to Olympias (and/or Alexander): some or all of the sons of Aeropus; Amyntas son of Perdiccas; the Persian king; Pausanias all by himself. A comparison of motivation immediately creates difficulties. Many of the candidates have identical motivation: the throne of Macedonia or independent rule of some kind. Rather than looking solely at how the murder might benefit someone, we should also consider what would have happened to a given candidate if the murder had not occurred and what sort of risk they ran by involvement in an assassination plot. Of course the culprit was not necessarily the person who has the strongest motivation in our judgment.

The sons of Aeropus, whether one believes them to be descendants of the Lyncestian house or, as Hammond thought, members of the Argead house, or otherwise motivated,<sup>44</sup> had little to gain by killing Philip at this particular moment: he might so easily die in battle and a rebellion raised behind his back would have been easier to carry off. Thus they had some incentive to wait and nothing much to lose by doing so.

The same objection applies to Philip's nephew.<sup>45</sup> Amyntas had an excellent chance of succeeding Philip if Alexander died on the expedition.

His marriage to Philip's daughter Cynnane should have reassured him. Humiliating Macedonia and risking the possible loss of control of the peninsula could only damage his personal interest. He was likely to have had easy private access to his uncle.

The Persian king (whom Alexander may have accused of the crime at a later date; Arr. 2.14.5; Curt. 4.1.12) makes a much more plausible choice than either of the "in-house" candidates so far discussed, yet the possibility of Persian support for Pausanias has never been taken seriously.<sup>46</sup> The Persians had long used their gold to influence events in Greece. Persian aristocrats and the Macedonian court were not unknown to each other; the matter of Pausanias' grievance was probably widely known. The Persians could certainly promise Pausanias protection and sanctuary after the murder. Where else could he have fled and hoped for more than temporary sanctuary?<sup>47</sup> The timing and situation of the murder speak strongly for them: the assassination did in fact significantly postpone the invasion. Unlike the other candidates, the Persians risked nothing by the attempt and did not have easy access to the person of the king.

Olympias, on the other hand, had a tremendous amount to risk. Even if she were still in exile, the odds were very high that her son would inherit the throne and quite possibly soon, granted Philip's age and proclivities in battle. But if her role in the murder became known, her life might have been in jeopardy and certainly she would never have gotten to play queen mother. Alexander might have been able to save her life but he could hardly have allowed her to play any role in Macedonia. If she had decided to eliminate Philip, the public approach of Pausanias seems particularly unlikely to have been her choice because of the considerable possibility that he would be captured and reveal his backers, and unnecessary because she surely had easy access to more private and less risky ways of eliminating her husband. While she personally may have been indifferent to Macedonian concerns, she would not have wanted to complicate matters for her son by creating the situation of a troubled succession. Those who believe that Olympias, crazed by a mad desire for revenge, ignored her own self-interest and that of her son, will find little evidence for this belief in her subsequent career (see below).

We must consider the possible role of Alexander in any plot of Olympias'. It is virtually impossible that Olympias arranged Philip's death without Alexander's knowledge:<sup>48</sup> she could hardly risk the chance that people would believe he had known nothing. And when one considers the rapid flow of events on the day of the murder, it is apparent that things might have gone differently – that is why, for instance, the support of Lyncestian Alexander was critical (Curt. 11.2.2). If Olympias planned the

murder of Philip or had knowledge of it, she almost certainly would have had to tell Alexander about her plans. Neither she nor her son could afford surprise.

While virtually any plausible scenario involving Olympias in the death of Philip requires the active or at least passive participation of Alexander, his participation is even less likely than Olympias'. The timing of the real crime was nearly disastrous for him, yet he could easily have arranged Philip's death in battle and avoided such upset. Moreover, while Alexander was ruthless and might, at least on some occasions, be described as murderous, and while Philip may have given him cause to fear him or at least been so perceived by his son, Alexander's involvement in his father's murder at any level is difficult to accept because of his traditional religious beliefs.<sup>49</sup> Had the murder been committed in the heat of the drunken moment, like Alexander's killing of Cleitus (Plut. *Alex.* 50–52.4; Arr. 4.8.1–9.9; Curt. 8.1.19–2.13; Just. 12.6.1–18), Alexander would make a more believable patricide. Pausanias, quite possibly with some foreign help, remains the most obvious choice for chief murderer.

Despite the weak case against her, many have believed that Olympias was the culprit, and even when they have rejected the idea of her complicity, have heaped much opprobrium upon her.<sup>50</sup> Why have so many ancient and modern writers blamed Olympias for the death of Philip? The answer to this question lies in two areas: the hostility of virtually all the surviving ancient sources to Olympias as an individual and the hostility of many sources to monarchy, Macedonian monarchy, royal polygamy and the role royal women played in Macedonian political life.

The source tradition about Olympias is encased in layer upon layer of prejudice; recovery of her personality is impossible. Tarn suggested that a propaganda campaign waged by Cassander in order to excuse his murder of Olympias was the origin of the hostile tradition about her;<sup>51</sup> many have accepted this idea, but alone it does not explain the truly vicious portrait of Olympias.

A number of other factors contributed to the hostile source tradition on Olympias and thus to modern historians' tendency to leap to the conclusion that she was responsible for the death of her husband. The sources portray her as a trouble-maker, a difficult woman. Typically Olympias demonstrates this "difficultness" by involving herself in public affairs, often by unsuccessfully attempting to influence her son.<sup>52</sup> Anecdotal material about Alexander's dealings with his mother may reflect his (or the sources', if the anecdotes are not genuine) desire to seem Greek by taking the pose of the conventional Greek male.<sup>53</sup> Curiously, though virtually all scholars writing in recent years would reject ancient Greek views about

women's nature and behavior, most have failed to note that the judgments about Olympias found in ancient sources derive from cultural values they do not share and have simply accepted those culturally-assigned judgments as valid.<sup>54</sup>

Another aspect of the source tradition about Olympias appears to deserve more belief. She is said to have committed various savage, even sadistic acts, among them the murder of Cleopatra and her baby, the torture and murder of Philip Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice, and the elimination of some hundred supporters of Cassander.<sup>55</sup> Those who attribute the murder of Philip to Olympias, whether or not they directly say so, do so in good part because of their belief in her involvement in these later crimes, both because they demonstrate Olympias' willingness to murder and because they suggest that she was a person whose pleasure in inflicting pain may have led her to act against rational self-interest.

A lengthy examination of the evidence for these supposed actions of Olympias is not appropriate or necessary here. A brief summary of analysis of these crimes should suffice. The murders committed by Olympias resemble actions committed by other members of the court and royal family; murder was often the weapon of choice in the pursuit of dynastic success.<sup>56</sup> Men were more often the originators of such royal crimes, but Olympias is not even unique in being a female murderer.<sup>57</sup> While some ancient sources suggest that Olympias derived sadistic pleasure as well as political benefit from these crimes, it is difficult to assess the veracity of these implications and even more difficult to know, if true, how such motivation might compare to the motivation of Macedonian males who murderously eliminated the competition.<sup>58</sup> Granted the quality of our evidence it is impossible to justify the conclusion that Olympias was so crazed a killer that her desire for sadistic pleasure led her to ignore self-interest. At later stages in her career, both Eumenes and Polyperchon placed considerable faith in her judgment; whether they were well-advised to do so is difficult to say, but it does suggest that neither man believed they were dealing with an irrational or mentally-disturbed person, but rather with a public figure of some prestige and acumen.<sup>59</sup> In fact, our sources display attitudes characteristic of many cultures' views about women in politics: they are disruptive, savage, idiosyncratic, and likely to bring private motivation into the public arena.<sup>60</sup>

In addition to our sources' hostility toward Olympias in particular, it is likely that they also entertain prejudices about monarchy, particularly polygamous monarchy, and the role royal women played in monarchy. Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.3) prefaces his account of Philip's marriage and the troubles it incurred by an assessment of the broader causes of these



troubles. Although Plutarch puts the blame on Philip, his assessment really constitutes an attack on polygamy, particularly because of the role women played in the succession politics of monarchy. He observes that Philip's marriages and love affairs caused troubles in Philip's *oikos* (household or royal house) so that the *basileia* (kingdom or perhaps monarchy) suffered from the same ills as the women's quarters and many grounds for quarrels and differences thus developed. While Plutarch then proceeds to an attack on Olympias' ill-nature, what he has made is a classic statement of Greek views about women and men, about public and private: women and private matters go together and belong at home; men and politics belong to public life – any mixing of the two is pathological.<sup>61</sup>

Plutarch puts it bluntly, but his attitude would be common to virtually all our non-Macedonian sources. To some degree the personal, private nature of monarchical power lies behind Greek general discomfort with monarchy. That Macedonian monarchy was polygamous exaggerated problems with the mixing of what Greeks believed should not be mixed – the more wives, the more possibility for contamination. Greek accounts of the last years of Philip's reign which suggest that his last marriage somehow precipitated his murder do so because of prejudice against polygamy.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance, however, of Greek antipathy to the role royal women played in Macedonian public life. In Athens, respectable women were, if possible, not even named in public,<sup>62</sup> yet Athenian politicians named Olympias, without even adding a patronymic (Hyp. *Eux.* 25; Aesch. 3.233). Shopping trips done for her sake (Aesch. 3.233) and acts of piety she performed (Hyp. *Eux.* 19) became matters of public discussion. In the world of the classical city-state women were not public figures and private and public did not mix. If they did, there was bound to be trouble.

Although relations between Philip and Alexander and Olympias were genuinely troubled during the last years of Philip's reign, these troubled relationships were not the cause of his assassination. Macedonian royal polygamy shaped the political perceptions of Olympias and her son; at the same time it so offended Greek public opinion that it came to seem an explanation in itself for the Macedonian mystery of Philip's death. We have compounded this original cultural misunderstanding by attributing, to inhabitants of a very different culture, motivation better suited to our own, and yet, paradoxically, have failed to note our shared prejudices.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> On the murder of Philip, see: Badian 1963, 244–50; Bosworth 1971, 93–105; Fears 1975, 11–35; Ellis 1976; Griffith 1979, 675–701; Hammond 1980b, 166–75; Develin 1981, 86–99; Ellis 1981, 99–137; Heckel 1981, 51–57; Ellis 1982, 69–73; Carney 1983, 260–72; French and Dixon 1986, 73–86; Carney 1987a, 43–48; Bosworth 1988; Fredricksmeyer 1990, 300–15; Borza 1992, 208, 227.

<sup>2</sup> On Olympias' career, see Berve 1926b, 283–88; Macurdy 1932, 22–45; Strasburger 1939, cols. 177–82; Carney 1987a, 35–62. Develin 1981, 92–99; Heckel 1981, 51; Walcot 1987a, 12–31; Bosworth 1988a, 21, all simply assume that the marriage was established for emotional satisfaction, as modern marriages are, rather than the procreation of children or some other pragmatic purpose, as ancient marriages were (see below, n. 3).

<sup>3</sup> On Greek marriage, see Lacey 1968, 110–7; Pomeroy 1975, 64ff.; Walcot 1987b, 6. On Philip's marriages and their purposes, see Ellis 1976, 211–17; Tronson 1984, 116–26. On the marriage to Olympias as a political alliance, see Hammond 1967, 533; Ellis 1976, 61; Griffith 1979, 215.

<sup>4</sup> Even this statement is not a clear assertion that Philip and Olympias did not care for each other, but rather that some things she did or said worsened the situation by encouraging her son in his apparently already existing quarrels with his father. If the statement is true, it might only mean that Olympias urged her son on in pursuing his advantage over that of others at court. In any event, the difficulty here is that Plutarch presents a series of personal judgments about Olympias, preserved from whatever single source or combination of sources, which like any assessment of personality and motivation can only be extremely subjective; it means that someone found Olympias troublesome, but it is not an absolute fact in the same sense that asserting that Olympias did a certain action is. One might add that many of the most hostile and critical anecdotal stories about Olympias come from Plutarch, whether because he frequently used a source hostile to her or because he preferred such stories.

<sup>5</sup> Hamilton 1969, 4–6, 117; Griffith 1979, 677 n. 3; Develin 1981, 92; Heckel 1981, 52; Fredricksmeyer 1990, 300 n. 3 treat this story as serious evidence for relations between Philip and Olympias. Forgetting for a moment the fiction of a divine snake lover (reason enough for rejecting the anecdote out of hand), another problem with the tale is that it imagines a scenario in which Philip felt compelled to explain why he was no longer sleeping with Olympias, a circumstance in itself unimaginable. The entire story is certainly a product of the period after Siwah when Alexander's divine sonship began to be asserted.

<sup>6</sup> On the order of Philip's marriages, see discussions in Ellis 1976, 211–7; Martin 1982, 67–69; Tronson 1984, 116ff.; Borza 1992, 207–208. There is no consensus on whether the order of Ath. 13.557c–d should be accepted or rejected.

<sup>7</sup> Carney 1991b.

<sup>8</sup> See Greenwalt 1989, 19–43. Most now accept the view that Macedonian kings practiced polygamy, but see Green 1982, 138ff, apparently followed by Errington 1990, 44, 60, for *contra*. Greenwalt 1989 convincingly refutes Green's arguments. On the status of royal wives: Ellis 1976, 213 and Prestianni Giallombardo 1976–77, 96. While Ellis 1976, 254 n. 96, explicitly denies that a wife had any intrinsic status because of family rank, Greenwalt 1989, 25 ff. argues convincingly that, in a situation where several wives produced sons, the status of the family of the wife is relevant.

<sup>9</sup> In 340 Alexander served as regent for his father while he was campaigning against Byzantium (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1.). Isocrates' letter (*Ep.* 5), c. 342, suggests that Alexander was widely regarded as heir by this date. We are not talking about an absolute, a title or position, but rather the accumulation of significant gestures. Critical to the nature of Alexander's and Olympias' position was the absence of any clear pattern of royal succession: see Greenwalt 1989, *passim* and Borza 1992, *contra* Hatzopoulos 1986, 279–92.

<sup>10</sup> For discussions of the date of the marriage, see Ellis 1976, 210–11, 302 n. 4. Heckel 1979, 385 ff., makes a convincing argument for a date in late summer or early fall.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 77.5), implies that Arrhidaeus was of considerable age before any problems developed; whether this information or the charge that Olympias caused his problem deserves credibility is debatable. A number of medical problems might well take years to develop or to become noticeable. See Greenwalt 1985b, 74–6, for a review of evidence about the nature of Arrhidaeus' problems; see also Carney 1987b, 499 n. 9. He is usually, but not always, assumed to be the elder brother: so Ellis 1976, 225 n. 96; Griffith 1970, 23 and 1979, 225 and Prestianni-Giallombardo 1976–77, 98, *contra* Ehrhardt 1967, 297.

<sup>12</sup> On Olympias' lack of influence during Philip's reign, see discussion and references in Carney 1987a, 42–3. See discussions of analogous polygamous situations in Wood 1979, 14ff.; Stafford 1978, 79–100 and 1983, 60–92. See Greenwalt 1989, 40 for a brief discussion of the implications of a polygamous situation for Alexander and Olympias.

<sup>13</sup> Berve 1926b, 213–14,

<sup>14</sup> Greenwalt 1989, 29–43; Borza 1992, 208.

<sup>15</sup> Cawkwell 1978, 178; Bosworth 1988, 21; Borza 1992, 208; Fredricksmeyer 1990, 301, favor the idea of a love match.

<sup>16</sup> Fredricksmeyer 1990, 301 sees the marriage itself as an insult, something Olympias “took hard”, and believes that both Alexander and his mother were angry at Philip's “shabby treatment” of Olympias prior to the insult at the wedding. Not only is there no evidence for this interpretation, but also it contradicts what we know about royal marriage, the source of Olympias' status, and the implication of Alexander's presence at the banquet.

<sup>17</sup> On Attalus, see Berve 1926b, 94. See Greenwalt 1989, 39 n. 80, on this point.

<sup>18</sup> See discussion of variation of sources in Ellis 1981, 100–2; Greenwalt 1989, 41, but see Develin 1981, 88 n. 4, for some cautionary remarks.

<sup>19</sup> Ellis 1981, 110–1, 135. See Develin 1981, 94 for refutation. Ellis' arguments require rejection of so much of the tradition about the period of Philip's death as to be implausible. The murder by Olympias of Cleopatra and her child, for instance, is robbed of much of its motivation.

<sup>20</sup> Ellis 1981, 118; Borza 1992, 208.

<sup>21</sup> Greenwalt 1989, 42.

<sup>22</sup> Borza 1983, 55; 1992, 241–2, suggests that it had a quasi-constitutional role in that, instead of a formal council, this was the king's opportunity for consultation.

<sup>23</sup> Walcot 1987a, *passim* and especially 20–22, blames the timocratic quality of much of Greek society on vicariously ambitious mothers (prevented from realizing their own ambitions because of the narrow role allotted women, they goaded their sons

into fulfilling their own frustrated goals) and specifically attributes Alexander's character to his mother's drive. Neither his general thesis nor his treatment of Alexander persuades: aggressive women like Olympias may have embraced the agonistic ideals of their society and encouraged their sons to emulate them, but rather than being the source of these values, they would simply have assisted in perpetuating them. Fredricksmeier 1990, 304 n. 18 rightly notes that this is an area where Olympias and Philip would have agreed.

<sup>24</sup> The fairly common current tendency to emphasize similarities rather than differences in the policies of father and son (e. g. Errington 1990, 40; Borza 1992, 248–252), a tradition that goes back to Hogarth 1897, implicitly intensifies this circumstance. Fredricksmeier 1990, 300–315, puts the Homeric aspect of the relationship between Philip and Alexander very persuasively. His interpretation of the competitive nature of the relationship concentrates exclusively on its Homeric quality and on its effect on Alexander, whereas I would add that the nature of royal Macedonian polygamy and the absence of a defined succession pattern also contributed significantly to competition, and I would also note that Philip, as well as his son, naturally felt the rivalry. Many of the anecdotes told about Alexander's youth (especially Plut. *Mor.* 178e–f) imply competition between father and son. Philip's own jealousy of his son may have had something to do with his puzzling behavior at the wedding banquet.

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch (*Mor.* 179c) says both mother and son were reconciled and thus implies that Olympias returned (Badian 1975, 53 is unconvincing in rejecting this passage). Justin 9.7.6 has been read as evidence for her return (Develin 1981, 94). Badian 1963, 249, followed by Hamilton 1969, 28; Fears 1975, 126 and Griffith 1979, 685, argue that she did not. Kraft 1971, 19; Green 1974, 104, 524 n. 63; Ellis 1976, 217 and 1981, 217; Prestianni-Giallombardo 1976–77, Heckel 1981, 53, Develin 1981, 98, argue convincingly that she did return.

<sup>26</sup> On the career of Alexander of Epirus, see Berve 1926b, 19 f.

<sup>27</sup> See Badian 1963, 246; Fears 1975, 128; Griffith 1979, 682 for the former interpretation, and for the latter, see Macurdy 1932, 30–31; Ellis 1976, 219, 304 n. 32; Heckel 1981, 53. The latter is the more plausible view because it puts the marriage into the general context of the necessary reconciliation.

<sup>28</sup> Ellis 1981, 135–6 and Hatzopoulos 1982, 59–66, argue unconvincingly for its rejection. Fredricksmeier 1990, 303 doubts it but does not reject it out of hand. See *contra* Develin 1981, 95; Bosworth 1988, 22.

<sup>29</sup> Badian 1963, 245.

<sup>30</sup> The chronology of this period is notoriously troubled but such troubles do not necessarily require rejection of the incident; see French and Dixon 1986, *passim* and Bosworth 1988a, 25–28 for some alternative solutions. Fredricksmeier 1990, 303, argues that the exile of Alexander's friends occurred earlier, prior to the Pixodarus affair; his rejection of the order of Plutarch, the only source preserving an account of both the exile and the Pixodarus incident, is not persuasive. It is, however, dangerous to depend on chronology here to explain the death of Philip; the evidence is too poor and the Pixodarus affair may, however genuine, be less significant than it would if we could be certain that its entire length occurred after the formal reconciliation.

<sup>31</sup> Badian 1963, 246 speaks of isolation, but notes Antipater's continued presence; Heckel 1986, 302 points to the many remaining friends of Alexander at court.

<sup>32</sup> Fredricksmeyer 1990, 303 interprets the incident's significance in a somewhat similar manner. He believes that Alexander, increasingly troubled by competition with his father, was disposed to cross him and expected to get away with it, but fails to consider Philip's possibly similar reaction to Alexander (thus the first prominent role for Arrhidaeus as a warning to Alexander) and tends to underestimate the trouble Arrhidaeus' marriage might have caused Alexander. Fredricksmeyer also assumes that if we accept Plutarch's account of the incident, we must also accept his interpretation of it, that Alexander's friends believed that the marriage meant that Philip had absolutely decided on Arrhidaeus rather than Alexander as heir.

<sup>33</sup> Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1311 b, which says that Pausanias killed Philip for reasons of personal revenge, is often given great credence because of Aristotle's knowledge of the Macedonian court. Aside from the possibility that the Aristotle passage does not rule out the contingency that he believed others with different motives were involved but that such considerations were not relevant to this discussion (so Fears 1975, 117), the problem with putting much weight on Aristotle or on any other contemporary testimony is that one must assume that the source knew in an absolute sense who was involved. Aristotle could not have done so, even if he were an eyewitness. On the sources for the assassination (Diod. 16.93–94; Just. 9.6.4–7.14; Arist. *Pol.*, 1311 b; P. *Oxy.* 1798), see discussions in Hamilton 1969, 27–28; Fears 1975, 117ff.; Parsons 1979, 97–101; Ellis 1981, 102–7; Develin 1981, 87–88. (See Chapter 8 on the motivation of Macedonian regicides.)

<sup>34</sup> Ellis 1981, 119, simply assumes that Philip intended to take Alexander with him; there is no evidence for this assumption and theories dependent upon it lack foundation.

<sup>35</sup> Current consensus has returned to the earlier view that the rape was quite recent: see discussion and references in Fears 1975, 120–3; Ellis 1981, 134; Develin 1981, 88 n. 6.

<sup>36</sup> Ellis 1981, 103, uses the verb “abuse” to describe the accounts of Pausanias' rape in the narratives of Diodorus and Justin and in his own text uses the phrase “suffer insult.” Fears 1975, 112 refers to “gross outrage” but he does term it “rape” on the next page (113), and later refers to the “sordid scenario of rape, murder and revenge” (Fears, 1975, 123). Griffith 1979, 684 is more direct but avoids the term rape and says instead that Pausanias was handed over “to the sexual appetites of his [Attalus'] stable lads”. The ancient sources' terminology varies: Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.4) describes Pausanias as ὑβρισθεὶς by Attalus and Cleopatra; Diodorus (16.93.7–8) says that Attalus gave the drunken Pausanias' body to the muleteers for εἰς ὕβριν καὶ παροινίαν ἑταιρικὴν (sexual outrage and drunken treatment of him like a hetaira); Justin (9.6.5–6) that Pausanias had suffered a “stuprum” at the hands of Attalus; Aristotle (*Pol.* 5.8.10, 1311 b) also says that Pausanias was ὑβρισθῆναι. Dover 1973, 60–61, notes the euphemistic tendency of Greek prose literature in dealing with sexual topics, and the growth of this tendency in the fourth century. Interestingly, while *hubris* can have the connotation of a specifically sexual outrage in Greek (see Dover 1978, 36), modern scholars have preferred to translate the term in a very general way. As a result, analyses of Pausanias' motivation have acquired a rather unreal quality.

<sup>37</sup> Most of the voluminous literature on rape in modern society deals with men raping women and little attention has as yet been paid to the long-term effects of the crime on the victim, but see D. G. Kilpatrick, P. A. Resick, L. J. Veronen 1981,

105–22 for demonstration that victims continue to exhibit changes in behavior for a year or more, particularly flash-backs and nightmares. Social science recognizes “Rape trauma syndrome”, and divides it into short and long-term phases (e.g. Burgess and Holmstrom 1977, 315–28).

One can only assume that several factors would have tended to make Pausanias’ reaction to his rape even more severe and long-term than that of many modern victims: it was a crime committed specifically to humiliate him; the agonistic nature of Greek and Macedonian society would make his violation seem particularly acute (he had lost first to the other Pausanias in *erōs* and then to Attalus and company in public honor); the homosexual context of both the crime and the relationship between Pausanias and the king involved male honor and such situations had led to political violence in the past. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1311 b) clearly associates the two in his discussion of the incident. Modern studies indicate a tendency on the part of male rape victims to react more violently and aggressively to their rape than women victims, who often turn their anger inward (see Hilberman, Rieker, and Mills 1988, 33–35).

<sup>38</sup> Carney 1983, 261.

<sup>39</sup> Fears 1975, 124 refers to Pausanias as a “psychopath” and as “demented”; Ellis 1981, 137, speaks of “the solitary mind of a lunatic.” Develin 1981, 89 n. 9 rightly rejects these assumptions.

<sup>40</sup> Carney 1983, 270 n. 20.

<sup>41</sup> Certainly those who reject Olympias’ involvement in the murder of Philip on the grounds of her supposed absence from Macedonia (so Hamilton 1969, 28), have a weak argument: she may, in fact, have been in Macedonia (see above, n. 25) and a long-distance plot, although more difficult, is not an impossibility. In her later career, Olympias conducted various intrigues from a distance: the attempt to seize Harpalus; marriage alliances for her daughter; the quarrels with Antipater, *inter alia*. On the other hand, the majority have rightly doubted Justin’s assertion of Olympias’ unbelievable actions: see Ellis 1981, 225 *contra* Develin 1981, 92.

<sup>42</sup> See above, n. 6, for discussion of the order of the marriages. Plutarch, *Mor.* 141 b–c, is anecdotal, but portrays Olympias as alert to the addition of other women to the court, but by no means automatically jealous. It is particularly significant that the Cleopatra marriage came late in Olympias’ marriage.

<sup>43</sup> Some would connect Pausanias’ supposed recent promotion (Diod. 16.93.9) to the assassination. Whether or not the promotion is a reality, the choice of the location of the crime seems peculiar if Olympias and Alexander were involved. Whether present or absent, Olympias certainly had knowledge of, and connections in, Philip’s domestic world, as did Alexander. The public setting of the assassination certainly created greater risk that the attempt might fail and it is therefore difficult to believe that those who had other options would not have preferred them. See Borza 1992, 227 for a similar argument.

<sup>44</sup> Hammond 1980c, 457–9, followed by Hatzopoulos 1986, 289. On the sons of Aeropus and their possible role in the assassination, see Carney 1980, 23–28 (Chapter 6). The view of Bosworth 1971, 3–105, has not won acceptance; see refutation in Ellis 1981, 120–121.

<sup>45</sup> On Amyntas, see Berve 1926b, 30–31. His activities subsequent to the death of Philip simply show him attempting to take advantage of the developing situation. Plutarch *Mor.* 327c: again refers to the troubled period after the assassination. Amyntas

and the Lyncestians may have proved convenient scapegoats, but that does not mean that their motivation was genuinely compelling, at least at the time and place the murder did occur.

<sup>46</sup> Develin 1981, 98, simply terms the idea “worthless”, but offers no argument. Ellis 1981, 128–9, takes the idea a bit more seriously, but similarly rejects it without argument. The possibility of Persian involvement is an entirely separate issue from that of whether the letter including the accusation against the Persian king was genuine, and if so, whether Alexander believed it or not (see Griffith 1968, 33–48).

<sup>47</sup> Members of the Macedonian and Persian courts were known to each other. Artabazus spent a number of years in exile at Philip’s court, where he was accompanied by his wife and perhaps other women of his family; see discussion and references in Griffith 1979, 484.

<sup>48</sup> So Develin 1981, 99.

<sup>49</sup> Edmunds 1971, 363–91.

<sup>50</sup> Develin 1981, 99 argues for her guilt; Heckel 1981, 57 is less sure but considers it quite possible and applies the term “Teufelsweib” to her; Green 1974, believed that Olympias and Alexander were involved; so also Lane Fox 1973, 22–25.

<sup>51</sup> Tarn 1948, II, 261, followed by Hamilton 1969, 25; Ellis 1981, 106–7.

<sup>52</sup> She quarrels with Hephaestion (Diod. 17.114.3; Plut. *Alex.* 39.5; Plut. *Mor.* 180d, 33a, 340a); she quarrels with Antipater (Arr. 7.12.5; Diod. 17.118.1; Just. 12.14.3; Plut. *Alex.* 39.7; *Mor.* 180d). She intervenes in the Harpalus affair (Diod. 17.108.6); she intervenes in recruitment of troops (Curt. 7.1.36–40). One sign of the hostility of the sources is that the nature of the quarrel between Olympias and other parties often remains unclear; we don’t, for instance, know what Olympias and Antipater quarreled about and of what each accused the other. The point seems to be that quarreling at all was bad for a woman; the implication of virtually all these anecdotes seems to be that she was automatically wrong. This is particularly striking in those stories dealing with Hephaestion, who is not otherwise favorably treated in the sources. Her actions are virtually always treated as interventions in matters a woman should not have been concerned in.

<sup>53</sup> Macedonian and southern Greek opinion were not synonymous. Alexander, in anecdotal material, often plays the role of the civilized Greek who does not indulge in backward Macedonian ways (Plut. *Alex.* 51.2). This pose may relate to anecdotal material about him and his mother; often he reproves her for inappropriate behavior; on one occasion he implies her actions are more typical of Epirus than Macedon (Plut. *Alex.* 39.7; 68.3; Diod. 18.49.4). Whether these anecdotes, if genuine, reflect Alexander’s real views about his mother is anybody’s guess.

<sup>54</sup> While Greek sources would be particularly hostile to politically active women, Roman sources are only slightly less so. See discussion and references in Hillard 1989, 165–82, especially n. 6. Skinner 1983, 273–87 offers penetrating analysis of the career of a political woman about whom the sources are uniformly hostile, much as with Olympias. See also Lefkowitz 1981, 32–40. See Aristotle, *Pol.* 2.9.7 for an example of hostility to female political influence. See Walcot 1987a, 12–31 (especially 20–22 on Olympias), which unhesitatingly accepts as literally true descriptions by Greek males of women they find irritating. Since Justin and Curtius are Latin sources and even Plutarch and Diodorus and Arrian all date to Roman times, Roman prejudices, especially about imperial women, may affect our extant sources.

<sup>55</sup> See Carney 1987a, *passim*.

<sup>56</sup> For instance, the murder of Cynnane by Alcetas (Arrian *FGrH* 156 F 23); the murders of Alexander IV, Roxane, and Heracles by Cassander (Diod. 19.105.2; Just. 14.2.5; Just. 15.2.3); the murder of Cleopatra, daughter of Olympias, by Antigonos (Diod. 20.37.1–2); the murder of Parmenio at the orders of Alexander (see references in Berve 1926b, 305) and the torture of his son Philotas (Curt. 6.8.15, 11.10–34).

<sup>57</sup> Roxane connived at the murder of Stateira and her sister, the daughters of Darius (Plut. *Alex.* 77.4). Adea Eurydice murdered no one, but the evidence seems to suggest that she was trying to cause the deaths of Antipater and several other generals (*FGrH* 156 F 9.31, 11.42,44; Diod.18.39.2–4).

<sup>58</sup> Our sources seem much less interested in the details of murders committed by males. For instance, Diodorus (20.37.5–6) tells us how Antigonos tried to escape the blame for the murder of Alexander's sister Cleopatra, but never mentions how she was killed; Diod. 19.105.2 explains how Cassander attempted to escape blame for the murder of Alexander IV, but leaves undescribed the manner of the murder of the young boy and his mother; the mere fact of the murder of Cynnane, rather than its manner, is reported (*FGrH* 156 F 9.22–23). Yet all these crimes, like those attributed to Olympias, were considered particularly offensive (thus the first two involve mention of concealment and the third precipitated a mutiny). We do not have the evidence for the necessary comparison.

<sup>59</sup> For her later career, see Carney 1987a, 56–60.

<sup>60</sup> Collier 1974, 89–96, contains a useful discussion of common cross-cultural perspectives about women in politics. She notes, “native informants usually explain conflicts between men in terms of culturally recognized rules, women’s quarrels are often attributed to personal idiosyncrasies” (Collier 1974, 89). The following seems particularly applicable to the career of Olympias: “Because almost every woman is perceived to be under the authority of some man..., women’s efforts to control their own and others’ actions necessarily disrupt men’s efforts to exercise their socially legitimated authority. Men thus have every reason to discount women’s role in political life and to attribute women’s disruptive behavior to personal idiosyncrasies or to the general inferiority of the female sex. But there is a deeper reason why natives resist seeing women’s conflicts as structured and recurring aspects of social life. Because women are confined to the domestic sphere, their efforts to achieve power necessarily bring them into conflict with close kin and affines; with those to whom they are bound by moral and ethical ties. Conflicts in such relationships are universally perceived as tragedies,” 91. See above, n. 52, for similar attitudes toward Olympias.

<sup>61</sup> Pomeroy 1975, 79–92.

<sup>62</sup> Schaps 1977, 323–30.



## AFTERWORD

My main purpose in writing this 1992 article was to put the murder of Philip II in its historic context, something I felt had not been done. I was particularly interested in understanding the main players' actions in terms of a monarchy and a court shaped by the polygamy of its kings and the succession patterns that created.

Previous discussions of the motivations and feelings of Philip and Olympias, for instance, had unconsciously assumed the norms of modern monogamous marriage and treated as natural and universal features actually specific to culture and time. I also felt, much more strongly than the text of Chapter 9 implies, that there was something missing in virtually all earlier discussions of the motivation of Philip's assassin Pausanias. A refusal to talk about male rape, specifically gang rape of a male, a marked tendency to euphemism and avoidance characterized virtually all previous work. Scholars expended time and energy worrying about exactly when the event had happened, but not talking about the event itself. It is indeed an ugly topic, but inevitably especially so to men and, of course, virtually all the people writing about this had been men.

There is still, across all scholarly fields, very little discussion of male rape and the problems of its victims, but recently some recognition has appeared that it is and has long been a common weapon of war (Storr 2011), much like the rape of women, an assault not simply on the body but on honor and human dignity. Cohen (2010, 170 n. 23) points out that, cross culturally, homosexual rape is used to humiliate. I think Pausanias' murder of Philip is best understood as a kind of honor killing, his violence being directed not at the perpetrator himself but at the man who was under obligation to Pausanias and did not honor the obligation.

Plutarch asserts (*Alex.* 10.4) that Pausanias was raped at the behest of Attalus and Cleopatra. Plutarch could simply be treating the two as a dynastic unit (Carney 2000, 74), but I think it is more likely that he is literally correct and that she was implicated in clan violence. Antela-Bernárdez 2012 seems to pursue this point, but her discussion is brief and seems to assume Athenian law and sexual practice as a model for Macedonian. Oddly, Cleopatra's involvement in or approval of violence has been either ignored or rejected (Whitehorne 1994, 44) whereas Olympias' possible role in the death of Philip has been treated again and again. This article tried to suggest how much stereotypes about politically aggressive women shaped ancient and modern discourse. (See also Carney 1993a.)

Since the initial publication of Chapter 9, scholarly consensus has developed (Hatzopoulos being the exception) around the idea that Macedonian kings were polygamous and that this in turn shaped succession struggles. Daniel Ogden's work (1999) has been critical in this development; Mitchell (2007) provides a useful overview and update. While Ogden's study illuminates the many problems generated by the practice of royal polygamy, it is not clear that Greek dislike of it (as discussed in this chapter) arose from such practical considerations. Carney 2000 (52–67) offers a more detailed analysis of the order and date of Philip II's marriages and Carney 2006 puts the career of Olympias into both a Macedonian and a Molossian context. Ruzicka (2010) posited that the "Pixodarus affair" began

while Alexander was in self-imposed exile rather than after his return. Granted that Ruzicka places the dénouement of the affair, particularly the exile of Alexander's associates, subsequent to Alexander's reconciliation with his father, the incident, even with his somewhat altered chronology, still demonstrates continued mistrust or hostility between Philip and Alexander, after the official reconciliation.

In the light of current recognition of the many ways in which the Roman imperial date of nearly all the sources for Alexander (e.g. Spencer 2002) and the Second Sophistic (e.g. Asirvatham 2005) affected our extant sources (see discussion in the Introduction), this chapter's treatment of Roman influence on sources it terms "Greek" seems cursory now (essentially only n. 54). That said, reflection on the construction of the image of political women or polygamy in Roman era sources is a topic in itself, one easy to over-generalize about. One can look for and "find" connections between various specific Roman imperial women and depictions of Argead women, but similarity does not in itself prove influence on narrative. Genre and authorial need may play as big a role as period in shaping what our sources describe (see Carney 2006, 132–35 on Plutarch's variable treatment of Olympias in his essays and his *Life of Alexander*). Nonetheless, had this chapter been written today, the topic of Roman influence would now be addressed at some length.

## PART III

### LIFE AT COURT

#### 10

### ELITE EDUCATION AND HIGH CULTURE IN MACEDONIA

Scant direct information about the formal education of the general Macedonian elite has survived. Nonetheless members of the elite demonstrably possessed considerable knowledge of, and interest in, artistic and intellectual pursuits, knowledge and interests they must have acquired by some form of instruction. In order to fill in this information gap, scholars often look at the more abundant information about the education of Alexander (itself probably somewhat idealized) and assume that it applies to his close associates as well. Though this study, too, examines the education and culture of Alexander and other Macedonian kings, it will focus as much as possible on what is known in this regard about the rest of the elite. More specifically, the goal of this paper is to determine what was typically Hellenic about elite Macedonian education and culture and what was peculiarly and distinctively Macedonian.

Alexander's education seems a reasonable model since, as we shall see, the cultural literacy of many members of the elite implies an education comparable to that of Alexander himself. Plutarch observes that many people were responsible for bringing Alexander up and educating him (*Alex.* 5.4). Though there is no direct proof of it, like most very young children male and female, Alexander probably acquired some early education from his mother. Olympias' dynasty claimed descent from Achilles as well as from Helenus, son of Priam (Eur. *Andr.* 1239–49; Pind. *Nem.* 4.51, 7.35–40; Plut. *Alex.* 2.1, *Pyrrh.* 1; Paus. 1.11.1). Alexander's imitation of Achilles, though doubtless encouraged by subsequent teachers, likely had its origin in his mother's tales of ancestral greatness.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps not

coincidentally, in Alexander's early years an austere kinsman of Olympias named Leonidas seems to have been his moral and emotional mentor whereas Lysimachus of Acarnania was his tutor, a man who apparently stressed Homeric values (Plut. *Alex.* 5.4–5). If the story that Alexander had memorized the entire *Iliad* (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 4.39) is even partially true, it would tend to confirm the early and intense nature of his commitment to Homer.

Not all of Alexander's early education was strictly academic. As the story of Alexander's taming of Bucephalus (Plut. *Alex.* 6.1–5) demonstrates, Alexander must have been trained to ride well and probably began to hunt and learn to use the weapons of a cavalryman.<sup>2</sup> However, unlike southern Greek youths, Alexander supposedly disdained athletics (Plut. *Alex.* 4.5, *Mor.* 179d, 331b), although he did, during the long Asian campaign, sponsor occasional athletic competitions as entertainment for his troops. Athletics were probably not a major component in his education.<sup>3</sup> A passage in Aeschines (*In Tim.* 168–9), referring to a period in which Alexander was about ten, is suggestive about the general nature of his education at that age. Aeschines reports that, at a drinking party held for the embassy of which Aeschines had been a member, Alexander entertained the guests by playing the cithara, that he gave some sort of recitation, and that he debated with another boy.<sup>4</sup> The various anecdotes in Plutarch and the incident mentioned by Aeschines all suggest a traditional early education in which the agonistic element was particularly strong, one in which the Macedonian symposium, critical in so many ways to the functioning of the Macedonian court, had already become the venue for Alexander's display of his educational and cultural accomplishments.<sup>5</sup>

For more advanced education, although Philip himself taught his son (most obviously in statecraft) and provided instructors in the arts and other conventional studies,<sup>6</sup> he summoned Aristotle and arranged that the famous philosopher instruct his son away from court, at Mieza. Aristotle tutored Alexander for about three years, from the boy's thirteenth to sixteenth year (Plut. *Alex.* 7.2–3; Diog. Laert. 5.10; Strab. 13.608). Plutarch mentions a number of specific areas<sup>7</sup> in which Aristotle instructed the young Argead: ethical and political thought, medicine, the *Iliad* (Aristotle's recension of the poem he took with him on campaign), and philosophy (Plut. *Alex.* 7.1–8.4). Scholars assume that Alexander was not Aristotle's only pupil at Mieza, but no source says so directly (see further discussion below). Thus, if Alexander's elementary and secondary education can function as a model, if on a more exclusive plane, for that of the elite in general, it seems to have been broad and fairly typical of aristocratic education during the period. Certainly, as we shall see, a number of other

members of the elite demonstrated knowledge and interest in the areas in which Alexander was supposedly instructed.

Though much less is known about the formal education of other kings, their connections to high culture and their patronage of it is fairly well documented. At an early date, Argead rulers became philhellenic. The intensive Hellenization of the Argead court begins with the reign of Archelaus<sup>8</sup> (413–399), but there are some signs before that of royal interest in Hellenic high culture. Alexander I, apart from his well-known interest in Olympic competition, dedicated a golden self-portrait at Delphi (Hdt. 8.121; Dem. 12.20), commissioned an encomium from Pindar (frag. 120), and may have offered patronage and entertainment to other writers (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 2.33; Solinus 9.13).<sup>9</sup> Perdiccas II may have received the poet Melanippides and Hippocrates of Cos at court.<sup>10</sup> Archaeological evidence for Hellenic influence in the Archaic period is present (but not yet extensive), particularly in the surprisingly Hellenic site of Aiani, apparently the residence of the ruling family of Elimeia.<sup>11</sup>

Archelaus probably made Pella, not Aegae, the main royal residence,<sup>12</sup> a luxurious showplace with unprecedented wall paintings, the work of Zeuxis.<sup>13</sup> There is no evidence before Archelaus' palace for Greek houses' having elaborate painted decoration, and it is possible that figured mosaic floors originated with Zeuxis and his royal patron.<sup>14</sup> Archelaus invited major artists in many fields to his court, including the harp player Timotheus of Miletus (Plut. *Mor.* 177b) and the epic poet Choerilus (Ath. 345d; *Suda* s.v. *Χοίριλος*).<sup>15</sup> Archelaus persuaded the Athenian playwrights Agathon (Ael. *VH* 2.21) and Euripides (Ael. *VH* 13.4) to come to Macedonia; while in Macedonia, Euripides wrote at least two tragedies, the *Bacchae* and the *Archelaus*, before he died there.<sup>16</sup> Supposedly, Socrates turned down Archelaus' invitation to visit his court (Diog. Laert. 2.25), but Timotheus and Choerilus did come.<sup>17</sup> Tradition generally reports that they were lavishly supported by the king.<sup>18</sup> It was also Archelaus who founded a dramatic festival, probably at Dium (Diod. 17.16.3–4; Arr. 1.11.1). Material remains are richer and more sophisticated for this period than earlier, suggesting a widening market for sculpture and other items.<sup>19</sup>

Amyntas III's reign was too troubled for much patronage of the arts, but Aristotle's father Nicomachus served him as court physician and friend (Diog. Laert. 5.1). During the reign of Perdiccas III, the older brother of Philip II, Plato's associate Euphraeus stayed at the Macedonian court and supposedly so dominated Perdiccas' choice of Companions that he permitted only those with a knowledge of geometry and philosophy to dine with the king (Ath. 12.508d–e; Plat. *Ep.* 5).

Philip II's court was much more cosmopolitan than his predecessors', partly because of the number of embassies he received. Persian satraps in exile (Diod. 16.52.2–3; Curt. 6.5.2–3) as well as the royal officials sent to pardon them spent time in his court, but so did many Greek ambassadors. Xenocrates, a student of Plato's and later head of the Academy, went to Pella as part of an Athenian embassy, but was supposedly the only one of the ambassadors who avoided the king's banquets and bribes (Diog. Laert. 4.8–9).

Philip's military success and growing wealth meant that major Greek intellectual figures (many of them already hostile to democratic government) competed against each other for his political and financial patronage.<sup>20</sup> His invitation to Aristotle to be Alexander's tutor irritated Isocrates who, apparently angry because Philip had not chosen one of his students for the post,<sup>21</sup> addressed a letter of advice to Alexander (Isoc. *Ep.*5). Many intellectuals wrote to Philip and dedicated works to him (Isoc. *Ep.*3). Theopompus the historian visited Pella and was briefly under the king's patronage, but ultimately went away repelled by the experience.<sup>22</sup> Anaximenes of Lampsacus, another historian, also spent time in Pella.<sup>23</sup> Philip may have considered himself knowledgeable about musical matters.<sup>24</sup> After Chaeronea, Philip had the Philippeum built at Olympia in which were statues (of Philip, Alexander, Amyntas III, Eurydice, mother of Philip, and Olympias, mother of Alexander) by Leochares (Paus. 5.20.10; see Chapter 3).<sup>25</sup>

In Alexander's court, many intellectuals and artists were present. Aristotle's influence on him persisted, although to what degree is unclear (Plut. *Alex.* 8.3–4, *Mor.* 327f–328a).<sup>26</sup> Callisthenes, nephew of Aristotle and official historian, died as a consequence of the king's displeasure (Plut. *Alex.* 53.3–55.5), but had earlier possessed a large following at court (Plut. *Alex.* 53.1–2). Anaxarchus, a Democritean philosopher, also accompanied Alexander and became Callisthenes' rival (Diog. Laert.9.60). As we have seen, Alexander was famously fond of Homer, carrying with him both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (Plut. *Mor.* 327f), supposedly sleeping with the former under his pillow (Plut. *Alex.* 7.2). Alexander asked Harpalus to send him copies of the works of the historian Philistus, the plays of the three great Athenian writers of tragedy, and the poems of Telestus and Philoxenus (Plut. *Alex.* 8.3). Apparently he was particularly fond of Euripides. Alexander supposedly quoted Euripidean lines from memory (Plut. *Alex.* 10.4, 53.2, 3) on several occasions, was so familiar with one passage in the *Andromache* that he realized that Cleitus was about to use it to insult him before he reached the actual lines (Plut. *Alex.* 51.5),<sup>27</sup> and Athenaeus preserves the story that, during Alexander's last symposium, he acted out

from memory a scene from the *Andromeda* (Nicobule *ap.* Athen. 12.537d). At Thebes, Alexander may have spared the house of Pindar, patronized by his ancestor, although he also carted off to Pella a painting by Aristides of a dying woman in a captured town still nursing her baby (Pliny *NH* 35.98).

Like his father before him, but apparently on an even grander scale, Alexander patronized artists of various sorts, including writers of tragedy and comedy and harpists and flautists (Plut. *Mor.* 334e–335a). He was particularly fond of the work of the painter Apelles and the sculptor Lysippus (Plut. *Mor.* 335a–b). Alexander commissioned Lysippus to do a statue group of the twenty-five *betairoi* killed at Granicus; Lysippus created many portraits of Alexander himself (Pliny *NH* 34.63–4; Arr. 1.16.4). Alexander not only patronized the painter Apelles, whom he supposedly made his exclusive portraitist, but also befriended him (Plut. *Mor.* 360d; Pliny *NH* 35.84–7).

Evidence about both education and high culture is poorer for post-Argead Macedonia, though it may well be that Alexander's education became a model for Hellenistic princes in general.<sup>28</sup> Cassander was a great lover of Homer (Ath. 14.620b) and a patron of the fine arts. He commissioned Lysippus to create a special drinking vessel for Mendaeian wine (Ath. 11.784c) and Philoxenus of Eretria to paint a picture of the battle between Alexander and Darius (Pliny *NH* 35.110), the apparent inspiration for the famous Pompeii mosaic. Like other members of the Macedonian elite, Demetrius Poliorcetes was an enthusiastic hunter early (Plut. *Demetr.* 3.1–1), but nothing is known of his academic education,<sup>29</sup> though he was later supposedly particularly protective of the philosopher Stilpo of Megara (Diog. Laert. 2.115; Plut. *Demetr.* 9.5–6). Antigonos Gonatas had an excellent education, presumably because his father chose that he did.<sup>30</sup> He studied with the philosopher, historian and poet Euphantus of Olynthus, who subsequently dedicated an essay on kingship to his former pupil (Diog. Laert. 2.110). Gonatas was especially interested in philosophy and had relationships with a number of philosophers: Cleanthes (Diog. Laert. 7.169); Timon (Diog. Laert. 9.11); Menedemus (Diog. Laert. 2.141–2); Arcesilaus (Diog. Laert. 4.42); and Zeno the Stoic (Plut. *Mor.* 183d, Diog. Laert. 7.6–9, 11, 15).<sup>31</sup> Diogenes Laertius reports that Antigonos Gonatas invited Zeno to his court, that Zeno declined but sent his associate Persaeus instead (7.6, 9). The king hired Persaeus to be his son Halcyoneus' tutor (Diog. Laert. 7.36).<sup>32</sup> The poet Aratus of Soli wrote a wedding hymn to honor Gonatas' marriage to Phila. Hieronymus of Cardia, the great historian, had been under the patronage of Gonatas' grandfather and father and ended his days with Gonatas.<sup>33</sup>

Granted all this evidence of royal patronage of artists and intellectuals it is obvious that the king's Companions frequently had contact with this world. Scattered evidence suggests that some members of the elite became, to varying degrees, part of the Greek intellectual world. During Philip's reign, Parmenio seems to have had little interest in the intellectual world and possibly some hostility to it,<sup>34</sup> but Philip's other general Antipater became a figure of some magnitude in the world of letters. Although a more than competent general, Antipater undertook many diplomatic missions as well and this experience may have been his first entrée into the world of letters, particularly in Athens. He himself wrote a history of the Illyrian wars during the reign of Perdiccas III and also published a collection of his letters (*Suda* s.v. Ἀντίπατρος). He tried to patronize Xenocrates (Diog. Laert. 4.8, 11) and Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.66). Antipater developed a friendship with Aristotle (Paus. 6.4.8)<sup>35</sup> and was the general executor of the famous philosopher's will (Diog. Laert. 5.11–13). He was acquainted with Isocrates and friendly with Phocion (Plut. *Phoc.* 26.4–6, 30.3).

It has generally been assumed that Alexander did not study under Aristotle alone and that other elite Macedonian boys were fellow pupils at Mieza. Evidence about the nature of the Argead court certainly suggests that Macedonian princes were brought up in the context of a group of near peers, following the general royal model of the king as *primus inter pares*. It is, however, important to note that there is virtually no direct evidence of this for Alexander himself, other than the Aeschines passage already noted, which certainly implies that the ten-year-old Alexander had educational peers with whom he competed. Although several individuals are said to have been brought up with Alexander (*syntrophoi*),<sup>36</sup> none of them is explicitly named as a student with Alexander at Mieza. Despite this, one frequently finds specific friends of Alexander's arbitrarily named as students of Aristotle, not all of whom any ancient source labels a *syntrophos* of the king.<sup>37</sup> While it seems likely that *syntrophoi* of Alexander were at Mieza with him, even that is not absolutely certain.

Similarly, one often reads<sup>38</sup> that Alexander's hypothetical fellow students were drawn from or constituted the whole body of the so-called Pages or more properly the Royal Youths or *basilikoi paides* (see Chapter 11).<sup>39</sup> These two assumptions are then extended to create yet a third: those known to have been close to Alexander, or known to have been his rough contemporaries in age, are presumed to have been part of the Royal Youths and thus schoolmates of Alexander, simply because some formal education may have been connected to the group (Curt. 8.6.4).<sup>40</sup> As I have argued, the reverse is more likely true: those known to be Alexander's *syntrophoi* were



probably fellow students, but that does not mean they were Royal Youths<sup>41</sup> and certainly not that they got a semi-royal education because they were. Undoubtedly it is true that Alexander's age during the period in which he was under Aristotle's tutelage is roughly that of the *paides* and there is some evidence that the members of the body were given a liberal education. Nonetheless, granted that the principal duty of the Royal Youths was personal service to the king (Curt. 8.6.2–6; Ael. *VH* 14.48; Arr. 4.13.1), it seems unlikely that many of them would have been separated for any lengthy period from the presence of the king. If Alexander had company at Mieza, it was probably a small and carefully chosen group, a much smaller group than the entire body of the Royal Youths.<sup>42</sup>

Alexander himself, as we have seen, was somewhat disdainful of athletic competition and it seems unlikely that it formed a major aspect of his education. The rest of the elite, probably excluded from international athletic competition at least until late in the reign of Philip II,<sup>43</sup> do not seem to have differed greatly from Alexander, though a few had some interest in gymnastic exercise and perhaps local competition. Athenaeus (539d) and Aelian (*VH* 9.3) claim that both Perdiccas and Craterus were athletic enthusiasts, that they carried with them a large leather fence or screen (possibly for privacy) and exercised wherever the army went, and that their baggage also included a vast amount of sand to be used for a kind of traveling *palaestra*. (Plutarch, *Alex.* 40.1 tells a somewhat similar though less extravagant story about Leonnatus.) Whatever the truth of these reports, the story of the encounter between an Olympic boxing champion named Dioxippus and a Macedonian *betairos* named Corrhagus, in which the Macedonian, dressed in full armor, went down to humiliating defeat against the Greek, oiled as an athlete, may suggest that athletic training and competition had not yet generally become part of Macedonian elite education. This would change in the Hellenistic era,<sup>44</sup> but in Alexander's day Macedonians valued combat-hardened warriors more than athletes whom they viewed as shiftless entertainers (Curt. 9.7.16).

In the group around Alexander were a number of men with intellectual and artistic interests. Alexander sometimes involved his companions in intellectual life, often in the setting of the symposium: we hear of a comparison of favorite verses from Homer (Plut. *Mor.* 331d), a competition of tragic writers in which Alexander made his generals judges (Plut. *Mor.* 334e), and the competition in which he was engaged in recital of scenes from tragedy, on the night he began his fatal illness. Hephaestion, whether or not his student, is said to have corresponded with Aristotle (Diog. Laert. 5.27). The sculptor Lysippus created a portrait statue of him (Pliny *NH* 34.64). Marsyas of Pella, the brother of Antigonus, grew up with Alexander

and wrote a history of Macedonia as well as a book on the education of Alexander (*Suda* s.v. Μαρόν Περσέων). Ptolemy, later king of Egypt, wrote an account of Alexander's campaigns (Arr. 1.1.1). We have already heard of the young Macedonians who were followers or students of Callisthenes (Plut. *Alex.* 55.1). Onesicritus, a Greek who was Alexander's pilot on the Indus, and Nearchus' in the Persian gulf, was a pupil of Diogenes.<sup>45</sup> As we have seen, Cleitus the Black, reputedly a traditional fellow, knew enough Euripides to quote a passage from the *Andromache* at a critical moment (Plut. *Alex.* 51.5; Curt. 8.1.28–9). In happier days, he commissioned Apelles to do a portrait of himself going into battle (Pliny *NH* 35.93). Craterus, also a traditional general, commissioned Lysippus and Leochares to create a bronze statue group which he (or his son of the same name) dedicated at Delphi depicting the lion hunt in which he had come to Alexander's aid (Plut. *Alex.* 40.4). Indeed, many of Alexander's former generals commemorated their role in lion hunts during Alexander's reign by commissioning major works of art.<sup>46</sup> Of course, many of Alexander's associates and their sons later became kings in their own right and enthusiastic patrons of the arts (e.g. Pliny *NH* 35.101–6).

Again, we know less of the elite after Alexander's death, but archaeology now offers ample confirmation, in the graves of many members of the elite from the late fourth and early third century, of the burst of creativity and artistic activity made possible by the wealth the army of Alexander brought back to Macedonia.<sup>47</sup> The pebble mosaics in the private houses of the elite at Pella, perhaps originally inspired by palace art, date to this period and speak to the tastes of the members of the elite who owned these houses, and the images created by the mosaics testify to the heroic or Homeric values of the Macedonian elite.<sup>48</sup>

Some general observations are possible about distinctive aspects of culture and education in Macedonia. In terms of literature, there is a marked preference for Homer, even by comparison to other Greek peoples.<sup>49</sup> Judging by the references to Alexander's fondness for the poet, this preference seems to have derived from Homer's interest in heroic militarism. Homeric burial habits were imitated by the Macedonian elite, probably also because of a fascination with Homeric heroism.<sup>50</sup> The other favorite Macedonian author is, as we have seen, Euripides. Macedonian affection for Euripides may have had its origin in his stay at the court of Archelaus and the performance of at least two of his plays in Macedonia, but it is probably the tone and content of Euripides' oeuvre which created long-term enthusiasm for the poet, most particularly his interest in passion and violence. Much of Macedonian high culture was displayed, in competitive context, at Macedonian symposia. Only in the Hellenistic

period did athletic training and competition become part of elite Macedonian education and culture. Finally, in keeping with a society that was dominated by a small elite, the art commissions we hear of seem largely private in nature and a striking number involve portraiture. The Macedonian court was not a provincial backwater, although Athenians and other southern Greeks could always claim it was or suggest, as Aelian does about Archelaus (*VH* 4.17), that it was only the wealth of the Argeads as patrons that induced prominent artists and writers to spend time in Pella.<sup>51</sup> Doubtless that wealth is why most of these luminaries were willing to live for a time in Macedonia, but the consequence was that the court was hardly dull. There were lively intellectual discussions but these discussions had a competitive edge so sharp that they were often associated with violence.<sup>52</sup> The death of Cleitus, according to Plutarch (*Alex.* 50–2), is a good example. After the usual Macedonian heavy drinking had begun, verses were sung which made fun of recently defeated generals. Rather than condemning these verses, Alexander and his friends encouraged them, but other members of court, most prominently Cleitus, opposed them (see Chapter 7). Alexander then turned to two men and said (ironically) that the Greeks among Macedonians seemed like demigods among wild beasts. An ever more angry Cleitus quoted part of a passage from Euripides that, as we have seen, Alexander knew well enough to recognize as intended to insult him. After Alexander killed Cleitus, two Greek intellectuals, Callisthenes and Anaxarchus, competed in offering the king consoling advice. In some ways this competition was the beginning of the path to Callisthenes' death.<sup>53</sup>

It is not that elite Macedonians lacked high culture but that culture was often put to use to justify their traditionally violent ways.<sup>54</sup> Whether it is literally true that Alexander kept a knife as well as a copy of the *Iliad* under his pillow, figuratively all Macedonians faced the world with this combination of defenses.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Alonso 2000, 23 assumes that his mother, like Greek mothers in general, had a role in her son's early education, but does not consider her possible connection to Alexander's Achilles-imitation and interest in Homer in general. On Alexander's Achilles' imitation and its relationship to the claims of Olympias' dynasty, see Ameling 1988, 57–92, especially 663–4.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter 13 for a discussion of the role of hunting in the Macedonian elite.

<sup>3</sup> On Alexander's view of athletics, see Brown 1977. See Carney 1996, 26 n. 40 for a list of occasions on which Alexander sponsored athletic competition.

<sup>4</sup> Aeschines is, in fact, reporting what Demosthenes, also a member of the embassy, had said. While he criticizes Demosthenes' tone and his use of double entendres that Aeschines finds offensive, Aeschines seems not to dispute that Alexander did these

things. Plutarch (*Per.* 1.5) refers to an anecdote in which Alexander played some unnamed musical instrument well, but was condemned by Philip because it was appropriate for a king to appreciate music but not to perform and be competitive about it. This anecdote is the mirror image of another Plutarch tells (*Mor.* 334d–e) in which Alexander reproaches Philip on similar grounds (see below, n. 24).

<sup>5</sup> See discussion in Borza 198, 45–55 of the central role of the symposium at the Macedonian court. See also Chapter 12.

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 7.1) may suggest that Aristotle was not Alexander's only instructor during this period. However, Dye 1982, 60 n. 16 believes that Isoc. *Ep.* 3 implies that Aristotle was indeed Alexander's sole teacher.

<sup>7</sup> Dye 1982, 60 claims that Plutarch's description is conjectural, based on what Plutarch considered normal and typical, but this need not be so. Sources contemporary to Alexander might well have mentioned aspects of Alexander's course of study, granted the fame of both teacher and pupil.

<sup>8</sup> See Borza 1993, 237–44 for discussion and references.

<sup>9</sup> Hammond 1979, 103 points out that the statue of Alexander I at Delphi must have been among the earliest portraits at that shrine; see also Borza 1993, 130–1. Pindar gives the Argeads a Homeric pedigree by making Alexander I the namesake of Alexander, son of Priam.

<sup>10</sup> For references, see Hammond 1979, 148–9 n. 1, who points to the influence of the three thousand Greek hoplites Perdikkas introduced to Macedonia. See also Borza 1993, 237–8.

<sup>11</sup> See Ginouvès 1994, 28–35. Aiani, in upper Macedonia, was a planned town with an urban grid and impressive architecture. Recently discovered archaic burials at Vergina point to some wealth and sophistication among the elite even this early.

<sup>12</sup> There is no certain evidence, but the majority of scholars believe it was Archelaus who made Pella, rather than Aegae, the main royal residence or capital. Hatzopoulos 1987, 41–4, however, suggested that the change did not come until the reign of Amyntas III. See *contra* Greenwalt 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Aelian *VH* 14.17 says that though people came to Macedonia to see this fabulous dwelling-place, they had, in effect, to be bribed to do so.

<sup>14</sup> So Robertson 1982, 241, who points to the importance of Pella later in the fourth century in the development of pebble mosaic into high art.

<sup>15</sup> See Borza 1993, 237–44 for general discussion.

<sup>16</sup> Borza 1992, 172–3; 1993, 239 points out that Euripides furthered and somewhat improved upon earlier Argead claims to Argive ancestry in his *Archelaus* but possibly also in a second play. Aelian *VH* 2.21; 13.4 seems to include Euripides among the king's hard-drinking *betairoi*.

<sup>17</sup> See Borza 1993, 242 for possibility that Thucydides may have accepted an invitation to Archelaus' court.

<sup>18</sup> Plutarch twice tells the story of a golden cup which Archelaus gave to Euripides rather than to a less deserving man who requested it as a royal favor (Plut. *Mor.* 177a; 531d–e). Athenaeus (345d) cites Istrus for the information that Choerilus got four minas a day from Archelaus. Timotheus supposedly complained of the king's stinginess, but the anecdote Plutarch tells suggests that Timotheus was greedy and not justified in his complaints (*Mor.* 177b).

<sup>19</sup> Ginouvès 1994, 42–3.

<sup>20</sup> See Markle 1976, 80–99.

<sup>21</sup> Merlan 1954–55, 60–1 argued that Philip's choice of Aristotle as his son's tutor was motivated by politics more than philosophy. See also Ellis 1976, 160. Certainly it was upsetting to Isocrates (who supported Philip's policies) that the king chose a student of Plato's rather than one of his. Ellis (1976, 160–1) believed that Theopompus, a student of Isocrates, wanted the post and became hostile when he failed to get it. See also Markle 1976, 93–7.

<sup>22</sup> See Flower 1994, 19–21 for a discussion of the evidence.

<sup>23</sup> See Flower 1994, 21–3 for the possibility that Anaximenes and Theopompus were rivals for royal favor.

<sup>24</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 67f; 179b, 334d, 634c–d where the harpist reproaches Philip when Philip tried to argue technique with him, and it is Alexander who knows that a king should merely appreciate music and be formidable personally in arms rather than music; compare Plut. *Per.* 1.5, where Philip reproaches Alexander for playing the harp too well, saying that it was enough for a king to enjoy the playing of others. The reversal of the personae in this anecdote Plutarch was obviously fond of telling hardly inspires confidence in its veracity, but it does assume a level of knowledge and taste, whatever the moral.

<sup>25</sup> See Ginouvès 1994, 57. This is the period in which very rich burials of the Macedonian elite become common and a number of royally sponsored structures such as the *temenos* at Samothrace were completed.

<sup>26</sup> Ath. 308e claims that Alexander gave Aristotle eight hundred talents to do research on animals; this, presumably, during his own reign.

<sup>27</sup> Instinsky 1960, 251 points out that Cleitus, at least in Plutarch, need only cite the first line of the passage to get a reaction out of Alexander, obviously meaning that Alexander recalled the entire passage. Curtius (8.1.28–30) has Cleitus quote the same passage, but Alexander hears only the tone not the content. See further Aymard 1949; Hamilton 1969, 144. Brown 1949, 238 n. 68 doubts Cleitus' "gift for literary repartee," but there is no more reason to doubt this passage than others that imply that king and courtiers were extremely familiar with Euripides.

<sup>28</sup> So Alonso 2000, 24–5, who argues that princely education had a public, institutionalized quality partly because he associates this education with the communal education of boys who, as adults, would become the prince's advisers and high officials, and partly because he sees such an education as a kind of token of royal legitimacy, recognition of a king's son as an heir.

<sup>29</sup> Wheatley 1999, 5 simply assumes that he and his brother received "the full training of the Macedonian noblemen in the arts of war, aristocratic pastimes, and Greek culture, probably including philosophy and language."

<sup>30</sup> Gabbert 1997, 4; Alonso 2000, 29–30.

<sup>31</sup> See Gabbert 1997, 4–6; Alonso 2000, 29 for discussion and references to debate about exactly how enduring his relationships with philosophers were and how many began in his student days. Athenaeus recounts (13.607d–e) an anecdote from Antigonus of Carystus' biography of Zeno that has Antigonus Gonatas attending drinking parties with the philosopher, but Diogenes Laertius (7.14) tells a version that makes Zeno a less than enthusiastic drinking companion.

<sup>32</sup> Alonso 2000, 30 suggests that Antigonus also initiated a reconciliation of sorts

between the Peripatetics and the Antigonids, as suggested by Gonatas' kindness to the grandson of Demetrius of Phalerum (Ath. 4.167f).

<sup>33</sup> See Tarn 1913, 223–56; Gabbert 1997, 4–6, 69–70; Alonso 2000, 29–30 on the education and intellectual circle of Gonatas.

<sup>34</sup> Carystius *ap.* Ath. 12.508e preserves the entertaining story that when Philip II took the throne, Parmenio killed the irritatingly pompous Euphraeus, who had permitted only those who practiced philosophy and geometry to dine with the king. The story is probably not true since Demosthenes (9.62) reports that Euphraeus committed suicide, but it could have originated in Parmenio's genuine hostility to Euphraeus.

<sup>35</sup> *Suda* s.v. Ἀντίπατρος not only says that Antipater and Aristotle were friendly, but that he studied under him. Diogenes Laertius 5.27 asserts that there were once nine books of letters to Antipater from Aristotle, as compared to four books of letters sent by Aristotle to Alexander. Aelian (*VH* 14.1) seems to quote from a letter of Aristotle's to Antipater.

<sup>36</sup> Heckel 1992, 238 n. 5 includes as *syntrophoi* of Alexander Marsyas (*Suda* s.v. Μαρσύας Περίανδρου), Hephaestion (Curt. 3.12.16) and Leonnatus (*Suda* s.v. Λεοννάτος).

<sup>37</sup> Heckel 1985 argues that the group of men sent into exile because of their role in the "Pixodarus affair" were not, as is usually assumed, his boyhood friends, but older advisers and that Philip was particularly angry with them because he had chosen them as his son's *betairoi* to give good advice and they gave instead (from his point of view) bad. Heckel's caution that not all *betairoi* are *syntrophoi* is useful and may be applied also to a similar assumption about the Royal Youths and *syntrophoi*.

<sup>38</sup> For instance, Ellis 1976, 161.

<sup>39</sup> See Carney 1980–81, 227 for an explanation of why this term is preferable. The best and most recent discussion is Heckel 1992, 237–44. See also Berve 1926a, 37–9 and Hammond 1990, 261–90. Heckel 1992, 241 considers the official term παῖδες, though he grants they can also be βασιλικοὶ παῖδες and lists some other variants. I am less sure that our sources have preserved the official term and, in any event, think that, in cases where youths are called simply παῖδες, we cannot determine whether a source refers to the Royal Youths, or simply youths. Similarly, I am not certain that Royal Youths are synonymous with the youths educated with Alexander; see below.

<sup>40</sup> For instance, Chroust 1973, 125 calls Marsyas "a fellow-student of Alexander's." Hammond 1994, 41–2 says that Ptolemy and Marsyas "attended the School of Pages"; *Suda* s.v. Μαρσύας Περίανδρου says only that Marsyas was *syntrophos* (brought up with Alexander). See further Heckel 1980, 444–5, especially n. 4. The evidence for Ptolemy is even more indirect: he was one of the five Companions of Alexander sent into exile after the Pixodarus affair (Plut. *Alex.* 10; Arr. 3.6.5). Hammond apparently assumed that this meant that they were boyhood friends, must have studied together, and that Ptolemy must have been one of the Royal Youths. While Curtius (3.12.16) does say Hephaestion was brought up with Alexander, no source says he was a Royal Youth, but Heckel 1992, 66 assumes he was. Ellis 1976, 161 suggests that Hephaestion, Ptolemy and sons of Antipater were there. Again, there is no evidence. Hammond 1990, 279–85 imagined a very formal arrangement, "state education," with service by leading philosophers, perhaps because he, like Berve 1926a, 38, believed that Alexander appointed Callisthenes the tutor of the Royal Youth. Berve cites Arr. 4.13.2, but this passage simply says that Hermolaus was fond of philosophy and spent time with Callisthenes.

<sup>41</sup> Alonso 2000, 23 n. 6 rightly complains that Hammond 1990, 261–90 fails to make a clear distinction between *syntrophoi* and Royal Youths.

<sup>42</sup> Heckel 1992, 238 n.5 points to Diodorus 19.52.4 which reports that Cassander took away from Alexander IV the Youths who customarily were brought up with him (συντρέφεσθαι) and that he was no longer to have a Royal ἀγωγή but only that of a private person. The Youths (*paides*) concerned may have been Royal Youths since Alexander IV was a king and so had them and bodyguards as well (IG II<sup>2</sup> 561; see Habicht 1973; Burstein 1977; Heckel 1980), but they may simply have been the elite youths with whom he was being brought up. The problem is that ἀγωγή can mean “education” but it can also signify “way of life or conduct” so that one cannot tell if Cassander was denying him a royal education or a royal entourage (or both).

<sup>43</sup> See Badian 1982, 34–5 on the very limited participation of even Macedonian kings prior to Philip II in international competition such as the Olympics.

<sup>44</sup> No areas for practice and competition at Dium have yet been discovered (though, as Borza 1992, 173 observes, Dium is so extensive a site that this is not yet a significant lacuna); building V at the palace at Pella has recently been identified as a *palaestra* (AR 1997–98, 87; AEMTH 10, 105–42); at Amphipolis (a Greek foundation) a *palaestra*/gymnasium complex is well documented (see Ginouvès 1994, 102–4: the complex seems to have been built in the late fourth or early third century BC and continued in use until the first century AD) and recent discoveries of royal inscriptions and other items suggest that in the Hellenistic period gymnastic activity on at least this local level became a more significant part of Macedonian life. Inscriptions record a decree of Philip V directing supervisors to record a gymnasium’s code of rules relating to the conditions held for entering games held by Macedonian cities and a lengthy Ephebic law dealing with procedures for games, administration of oaths for competitors, conditions for winning, etc. (AR 1984–85, 48; AR 1986–87, 41–3; AEMTH 1, 313–36; Ergon 1989, 79–88). There was a Hellenistic era gymnasium at Edessa (AR 1983–84, 47).

<sup>45</sup> On Onesicritus, see Pearson 1960, 83–111.

<sup>46</sup> Palagia 2000, 167–206 for extensive discussion.

<sup>47</sup> Themeles and Touratsoglou 1997, 223–4 suggest that many of the rich elite burials and other luxurious material remains date from the period 320–280 (when many members of the elite brought home the wealth they had acquired in the Asian campaigns) and they stress the importance of the reign of Cassander.

<sup>48</sup> Robertson 1982, 246; Ginouvès 1994, 117; Cohen 1995, 491–8.

<sup>49</sup> See Marrou 1956, 29–34 for the central role Homer played in education in Greece. See also Cohen 1995, 487, especially n. 34, On Homer’s greater importance in Macedonia, see Cohen 1995, 487–8.

<sup>50</sup> Themeles and Touratsoglou 1997, 202 caution against considering the Homeric aspects of the Vergina burials as an indication that they were royal burials, noting that “Homeric type” pyres accompanied by rich offerings are found over a wide area in the Hellenic world, from the eighth century on. However, the number of such burials in Macedonia is striking.

<sup>51</sup> Borza 1993, 243 suggests that Archelaus’ patronage may have become a philosophical issue in Athens, partly because of the jealousy of those not chosen for one of his generous stipends, partly out of genuine dislike for a man judged to be an unscrupulous despot who murdered his way to the throne (e.g. Plat. *Gorg.* 471 a–d).

## *Chapter 10*

<sup>52</sup> Borza 1981, 78 sees these arguments as both relief from campaign tension and as outlets for mental energy.

<sup>53</sup> See Borza 1981b on the competition for the king's favor between these two figures. Callisthenes in this case failed to flatter as his rival did, a decision that cost him reputation at court and may help to explain his subsequent move to outright disagreement with the king.

<sup>54</sup> Hammond 1979, 149; Borza 1993, 238 makes the point that Macedonians in the elite admired and adopted many aspects of Greek culture, but that these adoptions changed nothing in their political and social structure.



## AFTERWORD

Since this 2003 article appeared, Psoma (2006) published a survey of education of all sorts in ancient Macedonia. Much of it focused on the Antigonid period and it included a brief discussion of the education of young women. Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2011) wrote a survey of court culture and propaganda in Macedonia in the period before the reign of Alexander. She stressed the importance of royal dedications at international shrines.

Adams published a series of articles on athletics in Macedonia and the Macedonian court (2003a, 2007, 2009, 213); he generally (and persuasively) dated Macedonian athletic interest earlier than I did in this chapter. Moreover, he argued that the stories about Alexander's disdain for athletics were simply that. It remains true, however, that archaeological evidence for athletic competition in Macedonia is of Hellenistic date. Adams (2003a, 210) notes a story about Philip II preserved in Polyaeus 4.2.6 in which Philip contends in a palaestra with a pancratiast; the appeal of athletic competition and its integration into the daily life of the elite probably began to increase in the reign of Philip and dramatically so in the reign of Alexander, particularly because of the many athletic displays Greek and Macedonians who served with Alexander were treated to (Adams 2007, 129–38). By the Hellenistic period it had clearly become the norm, as elsewhere in the Greek world.

My discussion in this chapter of the influence of Homer and the figure of Achilles on Alexander now seems to me somewhat narrowly conceived. Quite apart from the issue of whether Alexander actually imitated supposed actions of Achilles or whether the imitation theme is entirely a construct of our Roman era sources (see Introduction), it is important to recognize that Alexander's mother's dynasty claimed descent from Achilles, something that was an important part of their dynastic identity (see Carney 2006, 5–6).



## THE ROLE OF THE *BASILIKOI PAIDES* AT THE ARGEAD COURT

I return to a topic on which I published at the beginning of my academic career, in 1981. In the years since, important work in Macedonian studies has been done on sexuality at the Macedonian court, on hunting and banqueting, and on rites of passage. Much of this work has been shaped by Borza's attempts to craft an understanding of the cultural roots of Philip II and Alexander III, the father and son who changed the course of Greek and ultimately Mediterranean history. I would like to re-evaluate the institution of the *basilikoi paides*<sup>1</sup> in the light of recent scholarship, focusing my discussion of the institution, as in my early article, on the conspiracy of Hermolaus.

Anglophone scholarship has long referred to Hermolaus and other members of his group as "Pages" and the conspiracy that he led or inspired has been termed the "Pages' Conspiracy". This terminology is inappropriate because medieval pages were younger than most of the members of the Macedonian group, not an exclusively royal institution, and because the term in no way reflects the language of our sources. It is true that our sources use a variety of terms (which may or may not reflect actual Macedonian terminology) to refer to members of this group, but Arrian's diction may well replicate the Macedonian, so his usage – "*basilikoi paides*" or simply "*paides*" – seems to be the best way to speak of them rather than to employ any English translation.<sup>2</sup> "Boy" in English does have the advantage of replicating the Greek word's ability to refer to either a slave or a male child, but, particularly in the plural, it seems oddly reminiscent of Peter Pan's friends. Once I suggested employing the phrase "Royal Youths", on the grounds that this usage provided a more accurate indication of the age of the *paides*,<sup>3</sup> but it too has no literal basis in extant ancient usage.

The importance of the *basilikoi paides* to the Macedonian monarch and the elite has rarely been doubted. According to Arrian (4.13.1), they were responsible for the general care of the king, guarded him while he slept, took horses from the grooms to the king who then mounted in Persian fashion,<sup>4</sup> and they shared the rivalry of the hunt with him.<sup>5</sup> Curtius, in addition to the tasks already mentioned, adds serving the king at banquets

(although the *paidēs* also dined, seated rather than reclining, with the king), discreetly bringing concubines to the king, and accompanying the king in battle (5.1.42, 8.6.2–6). Some have doubted that this last duty is historical,<sup>6</sup> although the ability of the *basilikoi paidēs* to guard the king implies that they were armed and able to use weapons. Indeed, Aelian (*VH* 14.48) indicates that they had military training and something like battle readiness.<sup>7</sup>

Another area of dispute has been the origin of the *paidēs*. Arrian (4.13.1) says that it was a practice going back to the reign of Philip that the adolescent sons of Macedonian officials be enrolled for personal service to the king.<sup>8</sup> Arrian's statement does not necessarily mean that Philip invented the institution and some ancient sources speak of the *paidēs* simply as a Macedonian custom.<sup>9</sup> Dietmar Kienast, however, argued that Philip II modeled the *basilikoi paidēs*, as well as many other court and army practices, on a similar practice at the Persian court.<sup>10</sup> Since the Argeads had intimate connections with the Persian court as early as the days of Alexander I (Hdt. 5.21.2; Justin 7.3.9), the institution of the *paidēs* certainly could have had Persian origins that considerably predated the reign of Philip II. Nonetheless, the mere fact that Argead and Achaemenid practices resembled each other in some respect is not necessarily proof of Achaemenid influence on Macedonia.<sup>11</sup> The *basilikoi paidēs* may have been an expansion of the old practice of having cup-bearers, one likely the work of Philip II as part of his general effort to centralize authority.<sup>12</sup> Kienast's suggestions were not so much wrong as simplistic,<sup>13</sup> both in respect to the number of cultures he considered as the source of possible borrowing and in terms of his understanding of the nature of cultural influence. The Macedonian court borrowed from many cultures, including the Persian, both before and after the conquests of Alexander. It is distinctly possible that some borrowing was indirect rather than direct and that the "borrowing" was not so much a matter of copying and creating out of whole cloth an institution previously completely unknown, as it was a more subtle exchange in which, for instance, already existing customs were rationalized and given a certain non-native cultural tone. The consequence was often something neither traditionally Macedonian nor a duplication of foreign custom; in this case the resulting institution endured until the end of Macedonian monarchy.<sup>14</sup>

The question of whether Philip invented the *paidēs* out of whole cloth or streamlined and generalized an existing practice is related to the purpose of the group. The institution served a variety of needs. Curtius (5.1.42) observed that the duties of the *paidēs* functioned as the training of important governors and leaders, and elsewhere (8.6.6) described the institution as a

kind of training school or nursery for leaders, governors, and kings-to-be. He also believed that the *paides* were given some formal education (8.6.4).<sup>15</sup> Aelian (*VH* 14.48) emphasized the importance of their military training.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the institution served to tie the elite to the king (and his son)<sup>17</sup> and, in effect, to centralize the elite.<sup>18</sup> Perhaps it did so, in part, by threatening members of the elite into obedience because their sons were, in effect, hostages.<sup>19</sup> In turn, the families of the *paides* may have utilized them as their representatives, agents, even their spies at court.<sup>20</sup> From a social science point of view, the service of the *Paides* at court was itself a kind of rite of passage between childhood and full military adulthood.<sup>21</sup>

Evaluating the purpose of the institution is connected to the age of its members and to their numbers. No source clearly states the age range of the members of the *basilikoi paides* and some scholars have thought they were quite young, between thirteen to fifteen years old,<sup>22</sup> but a number of factors suggest that they were older, in their mid to late teens.<sup>23</sup> Two of the sources employ language that fits the later teens.<sup>24</sup> More indirect evidence also supports the idea that the *paides* were not in, or at least not all, in early adolescence. Their duties were vital, as Alexander's near death when they conspired against him demonstrates. Defense of the person of the king would not have been consigned to children. Moreover, Alexander and Philip treated the *paides* seriously; supposedly both had one or more of the *paides* executed (Ael. *VH* 14.48; Curt. 8.8.20; Arr. 4.14.3). Alexander himself, after all, had led the cavalry charge at Chaeronea when he was eighteen and taken the throne at barely twenty. Some of his friends were equally young when Philip exiled them. In Macedonia, maturity came early, especially for the prominent. Thus *opinio communis* now suggests that the boys became *basilikoi paides* around thirteen or fourteen and graduated from the group at the age of eighteen.<sup>25</sup>

It is difficult to know whether virtually all males in the Macedonian elite served as *paides*, or only one for each family,<sup>26</sup> or whether the group was considerably more select. This uncertainty is partially a consequence of the fact that we do not really know how many *paides* served at a given time. At one point in Alexander's reign, there must have been more than fifty,<sup>27</sup> but we do not know how long boys tended to remain members of the group.<sup>28</sup> Surely the number of *paides* must have fluctuated and changed over time. Whether or not Philip invented the institution, since he centralized control over Upper Macedonia and dramatically expanded the area he controlled and the size of the elite, the number of *paides* must similarly have increased greatly during his reign. Obviously, our lack of certainty about the overall size (both absolute and relative to the rest of the population) of the elite only compounds the problem. Granted the

state of the evidence, it seems best to assume that many in the elite had served as *paides*, but unwise to assume absolutely that all did.

In various ways, the *paides* seem to have been a kind of focus of tension at court, partly because, being younger than the rest of those in regular attendance at court, they felt and acted more intensely than their elders without embracing particularly different values from the rest of the court. But youthful enthusiasm is not the only reason the group seems to have caused tension. The kind of personal services that the *paides* provided the king was, as Curtius (8.6.2) specifically points out, not very different from the service performed by slaves, despite the fact that the *paides* came from the most distinguished families in the kingdom. The *paides* were, more or less by definition, an ambiguous group.<sup>29</sup> Aelian (*VH* 14.48) observes that Philip accepted this personal service from elite youths, not, he said, to insult (ἐνυβρίζων) nor to hold them cheap, but to train them. Aelian then proceeds to recount stories of punishments by flogging or death for seemingly minor infractions. Both authors, in short, see the slavish nature of the *paides*' duties as an implicit threat to the honor and status of the young men. Aelian's choice of a verb whose root involves *hubris* (outrage), so often a euphemism for rape and always an action that challenges individual liberty, may be significant (see Chapters 8 and 9). The potential threat to honor may have been understood as sexual, or partially sexual.

Although we have no certain knowledge that any Macedonian king took a member of the group as an *erōmenos*, we do know that there were pairs of lovers among them.<sup>30</sup> Probably there were also sexual relationships involving *basilikoi paides* and older members of the army and court. As we have seen, unlike other youths of their age, the *basilikoi paides* regularly attended royal symposia, serving the king at table as well as dining themselves. In general, in the Hellenic world, attendance at symposia signified adulthood, most especially sexual adulthood (see Chapter 12).<sup>31</sup>

From the Greek point of view, the thing that made sexual relationships between older and younger youths a good thing was that the relationships inspired both partners to do noble and great things, particularly in terms of battle, as in the famous instance of the Theban Sacred Band. On the other hand, we also know that great care had to be exercised in terms of actions and understanding so that sexual relationships did not compromise masculine honor for either partner. The *paides*, by their presence alone but also by the nature of their duties and the nature of the king's power over them, generated sexual tension, a sensitivity about honor and infringements against it, and a degree of hostile competition that led to explosions of violence.<sup>32</sup> By inventing or expanding this institution, Philip succeeded in gaining several advantages, but in doing so he also assumed a number of risks.

While it is possible that *basilikoi paides* were involved in earlier attempts at regicide, most notably the assassination of Archelaus, this is hardly a certainty (see Chapter 8).<sup>33</sup> What is certain is that in 327 a group of the *paides*, associated with Hermolaus, planned to kill Alexander. Callisthenes,<sup>34</sup> the expedition historian and Aristotle's nephew, had recently refused to perform *proskynēsis* to Alexander, though the king very much wanted his Macedonian and Greek courtiers to perform this gesture, just as his Persian courtiers already did. Callisthenes' resistance led to the failure of Alexander's effort. Though not generally popular with the Macedonians at court, Callisthenes was much respected by members of the *basilikoi paides* and may or may not have functioned as a kind of tutor to them. Although Alexander used the discovery of the conspiracy against him to eliminate Callisthenes, it was primarily a Macedonian affair (see Chapter 8).

Like so many other events, one could make a distinction between the immediate, short-term cause of the conspiracy and the more long-term, underlying cause. As is widely recognized, after the death of Darius, Alexander had begun to adopt aspects of Persian kingship and increasingly the Macedonians, particularly the elite, resisted these alterations in traditional kingship. Perhaps all the *paides*, and certainly fifty of them, joined Alexander's campaign as part of the reinforcements brought by Amyntas, son of Andromenes in 331/330.<sup>35</sup> Soon after their arrival, Philotas, a close associate of Amyntas, was accused of plotting against the king and executed; his famous father Parmenio was also killed. Amyntas, so recently their leader, stood trial, essentially because of his association with Philotas. He was acquitted, but clearly fell from favor. A year or two later Alexander killed Cleitus at a symposium; both were drunk, but Cleitus' major grievance was clearly objection to his Persianizing ways (see Chapter 7). Within months of Cleitus' death, Alexander married his first wife, a Bactrian, and tried but failed to impose *proskynēsis*, a gesture for Persians simply indicating the recognition of social superiority but one that Greeks and Macedonians performed only to deities.<sup>36</sup> Soon after this failed attempt, a group of the *paides* conspired against Alexander. Thus the broad context of the conspiracy was the resistance of the Macedonian elite to changes in kingship.<sup>37</sup> Support for this resistance must have been particularly strongly felt by youths who had not been present for the great victories of the early campaign but had arrived, fresh from traditional Macedonia, just in time for the imposition of Alexander's innovations, for growing dissent because of these innovations, and for the difficulties of what had become a kind of guerilla war. Thus, even though the conspirators may have been only a few years younger than some of the men of

Alexander's inner circle, their experience would have been quite different and thus their common values sometimes differently applied.

A specific incident, rich in cultural meaning, triggered the conspiracy. According to Arrian (4.13.2), a wild boar charged Alexander and Hermolaus struck it before Alexander could. Alexander, having missed his chance at the kill, was outraged and in his anger commanded that Hermolaus be flogged in front of the other *paides* and deprived of his horse. In Curtius' version of the incident (8.6.7), the boar does not charge the king; Hermolaus simply is first to attack a boar the king had intended to pursue. Curtius mentions only the one punishment, flogging.<sup>38</sup> In Arrian's narrative (4.13.3–4), Hermolaus tells Sostratus, his age-mate, another member of the *paides*, and his *erastēs*, that life would not be tolerable until he had taken vengeance on Alexander for his act of *hubris*. Not only Sostratus, but Antipater son of Asclepiodorus, Epimenes son of Arseus, Anticles son of Theocritus, and Philotas son of Carsis joined the plot. In Curtius's account (8.6.7–11), Sostratus is the instigator of the conspiracy (Curtius even speculates that, apart from the dishonor to his lover, Sostratus may already have been angry with Alexander for some other reason). Like Arrian, Curtius names Antipater, Philotas, Anticles, and Epimenes, but he also includes Asclepiodorus, Aphthonius, and Nicostratus. Members of the *basilikoi paides*, by definition, came from important families; based on the spotty information extant about the fathers of the conspirators, one must conclude that their families were not unimportant, but not part of the small circle of great Macedonian clans.<sup>39</sup> When by chance or warning Alexander failed to appear on the evening slated for the assassination, the delay led to the revelation of the plot. Arrian says (4.13.7–14.3) that those named were arrested and tortured. Arrian summarizes a speech (reported by several sources, he notes) that Hermolaus supposedly gave when summoned before the Macedonians; afterwards, he and the other conspirators were stoned to death. Curtius' lengthier account includes the supposed speech of Hermolaus as well as the speech Alexander gives in response. Curtius also mentions torture, but it happens after the assembly and speeches, as part of the execution of the conspirators (8.6.20–8.23).

We must now consider the motivation for this conspiracy. Unfortunately, our sources are, in a direct way, of limited use for motivation. They do, however, make fairly clear that Callisthenes, even if one pictures him as the official tutor of the *paides* and a close associate of Hermolaus, was not a significant factor. Arrian (4.14.1–2) notes that while Ptolemy and Aristobulus claimed that Callisthenes had inspired the conspiracy, other authorities say that Alexander simply used the conspiracy as an excuse to get rid of the man he now so detested, taking advantage of Callisthenes'



supposed closeness to Hermolaus. Other accounts (Plut. *Alex.* 55.2–3; Curt. 8.6.24–25) also support the notion that Callisthenes was either innocent or only indirectly involved. In terms of understanding why the conspiracy happened, Callisthenes is a red herring.

Though Callisthenes' story is a sad one, my interest here is the motivation of the teenaged Macedonians who plotted to kill Alexander.<sup>40</sup> The closest Plutarch comes to an explanation is the highly dubious story that Hermolaus asked Callisthenes how to acquire the greatest glory and Callisthenes told him to do it by killing the one who had the greatest glory (*Alex.* 55.2). Arrian (4.13.3–4), as we have noted, reports that Hermolaus considered the king's treatment of him to be *hubris* and wanted vengeance. The perception that what Alexander had done was hubristic presumably explains why the other *basilikoi paides* joined in, although Arrian certainly does not say this directly.<sup>41</sup> Arrian reinforces this understanding of Hermolaus' motivation when he has the youth tell (Arr. 4.14.2) the Macedonians who were trying him that a free man could not endure the king's *hubris* and has him connect his own experience to that of Philotas, Parmenio, Cleitus, the king's adoption of Persian dress, *proskynēsis*, and Alexander's drinking and sleeping habits.

Curtius says that Hermolaus was angry because of ignominy (8.6.7), and later has Hermolaus give a defense speech (8.7.1–15) full of rhetoric about political liberty and a laundry list of grievances. Hermolaus says Alexander treats them like slaves not free men, lists those Alexander has killed despite the great services rendered by them, claims Alexander has punishment administered by social inferiors, turns against his former supporters, rewards the long-suffering Macedonians with punishment, makes the victors submit to the conquered, has tried to make the Macedonians perform *proskynēsis*, and has rejected Philip in favor of Zeus Ammon. Like Arrian, Curtius does not address the reasons for the participation of the other *paides* (except for his presumption that Sostratus' inspiration was entirely personal), but the speech would imply that the conspirators shared Hermolaus' political complaints.

While the speeches paraphrased or recounted in Arrian and Curtius do not inspire much confidence, the perception that Alexander's initial punishment of Hermolaus somehow typified what was generally wrong, that it exemplified his tyranny because of its *hubris*, seems common to both accounts and is, in itself, not implausible. One must, however, then ask why Alexander's punishment was understood as hubristic. Apparently, the king traditionally had the right to have *paides* flogged for infractions (Curt. 8.6.5, 8.3–4).<sup>42</sup> Flogging was not just painful but demeaning. Curtius (8.8.3–4) has Alexander claim not only that Macedonian kings imposed it on the

*basilikoi paides*, but that it was something done to students by their teachers, by husbands to their wives, and even by slaves to boys of their age. More generally in the Hellenic world, flogging was associated with the other sort of *paides*: slaves, and children.<sup>43</sup> The punishment highlighted the fact that the person upon whom it was inflicted was not a free adult male. Thus, Hermolaus and the others would not have seen the punishment itself as hubristic, but one merited only by a grave infraction and they must have considered the incident with the boar inappropriate for its imposition. Alexander, clearly, thought otherwise.

One possible reason that Alexander could have had for viewing the offense so seriously was that Hermolaus had somehow violated the rules of royal hunts (see Chapter 13).<sup>44</sup> Although Persian court practice supposedly required that no one attack a hunting quarry before the king, there is no evidence that this was also Macedonian practice. Certainly neither Curtius nor Arrian makes such a claim. The Macedonian court had not generally been one characterized by elaborate rules and regulation. One could conclude that Alexander had recently chosen to impose this particular Persian royal custom on his courtiers, but the content of the speech attributed to Hermolaus by both ancient authors contains only general objections to Alexander's Persianizing ways. It is hard to believe that they or their sources would have omitted the Persian context of Alexander's actions if they believed there was one. Moreover, the reaction of Hermolaus and his friends implies that they had no expectation of such rules, Macedonian or Persian. Arrian's choice of words (4.13.2) implies that the king acted on impulse, out of personal anger (*orgē*), rather than in response to the violation of court rules, old or new. The pursuit of honor, so characteristic of Alexander and the rest of the elite, often led to anger because of competition for *timē* (honor). Alexander, notorious for his emulation of Achilles, not infrequently replicated his supposed ancestor's characteristic wrath. Alexander, at least, would have understood his anger as heroic, not despotic.<sup>45</sup> Of course, whatever Alexander's personal motivation (let alone his own understanding of it), Hermolaus and the rest, even if our sources have failed to realize it, might have understood the king to be adopting yet another practice of Persian monarchy, but this would relate to *their* motivation, not to Alexander's. Alexander's motivation seems clearly related to the competitiveness of the court in all matters and particularly in hunting. Macedonians risked life and limb in pursuit of success at the hunt. Those who stepped between the king and his intended quarry, even if they did so because they believed the king was in danger (as we have seen, the accounts of Arrian and Curtius offer varying views of whether Hermolaus was so motivated), risked royal anger. A king who

needed to be helped was, to some degree, compromised, another man's *timē* increased, the king's decreased. Lysimachus was not flogged but suffered considerably for his attempt to assist Alexander in the hunt and he was far more than a mere member of the *paides*:<sup>46</sup> Alexander flogged Hermolaus for reasons arising from the values of the Macedonian elite, not because of Persian practice.<sup>47</sup>

Similarly, the motivation of Hermolaus and the rest had a specifically Macedonian origin, one I failed to notice in 1981.<sup>48</sup> Macedonians could not recline at the symposium – the mark of adulthood in the Hellenic world – before they had speared a boar without using a net; until then they had to continue to sit at banquets, like children, no matter how old they were (*Ath.* 18a).<sup>49</sup> Alexander's action in punishing Hermolaus for killing the boar was literally emasculating him;<sup>50</sup> in effect he punished him for trying to reach manhood and he reinforced the point by inflicting a punishment dealt out only to those who were not free adult males.<sup>51</sup> In addition, as we have seen, Arrian mentions that Hermolaus was not only flogged but that his horse – surely a symbol of his elite status, vital to both battle and the hunt<sup>52</sup> – was also removed.

This denial of status was doubtless what Hermolaus and the rest found hubristic and tyrannical. Tyrants threatened the honor of other males and thus, as in the case of the assassins of Archelaus, tended to precipitate acts of vengeance meant to reestablish the *timē* of those so offended. Indeed, Archelaus' assassins, like Hermolaus, may have acted because they perceived that the king, by various acts, was denying them adult status (see below). In any event, it is this motivation that explains why other *paides* joined Hermolaus and Sostratus: the king's punishment threatened the honor of all of them because it demonstrated his willingness to refuse them deserved adult status.<sup>53</sup> It would be a mistake to insist that an honor killing in Macedonia was merely a personal act;<sup>54</sup> central to the workings of the Argead court is the absence of a line between the personal and the political.

While I think this offense against *timē* was the primary motivation of the conspirators, other factors may also have played a role. The relative youth of the conspirators doubtless made them more hotheaded than older members of the expedition. They may have heard complaints about Alexander from their fathers and other adults, but, unlike their elders, they acted rather than merely complaining.<sup>55</sup> The sexual relationships in the group probably contributed to sensitivity to honor; Harmodius and Aristogeiton, directly or indirectly, should be considered models (see Chapter 8).<sup>56</sup> Some of the conspirators may have cherished individual grievances.<sup>57</sup> Hatzopoulos has argued that Hermolaus and the other *paides* were older than *basilikoi paides* would ordinarily have been. He believes that,

lacking new members of the group because he had received no reinforcements from Macedonia, Alexander prolonged their service as *paides*, forcing them to remain, functionally, children when ordinarily they would have passed on to service in the Companion cavalry.<sup>58</sup> Obviously, in this circumstance, both the king's punishment of the very act that ordinarily conveyed social adulthood, and his imposition of flogging as a punishment, would have been particularly inflammatory. Hatzopoulos' argument is highly speculative and is, of course, not directly confirmed by any of our sources, but it is intriguing. Nothing more is heard of the *basilikoi paides* until Alexander's death (Curt. 10.5.8), possibly indicating that the king had temporarily abolished the institution, perhaps in recognition that the remaining members of the group were indeed too old to perform their quasi-servile role.

The Hermolaus conspiracy demonstrates not only that aristocratic resistance to Alexander had come to involve members of the elite from all generations, but that understanding the resistance as hostility to Persians and Persian customs is, minimally, an over-simplification. Elite objections to Alexander's Persianizing and the series of recent confrontations at court formed the background for the Hermolaus conspiracy. But in the foreground was the apparent hatred of Hermolaus and the others for the king because he had become the kind of ruler who liked customs that seemed to threaten their personal and political identities. Archelaus and Philip II were killed because their assassins likewise believed that they were rulers who threatened the honor of members at their court. The desire of a Macedonian king to rule more absolutely, and the resistance of the elite to that, were not new in the reign of Alexander, or necessarily Persian. As someone given to acts of *hubris*, a king could inspire his subjects to implement the glamorous tradition of tyrannicide, one followed not infrequently in Macedonia.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For his most comprehensive views, see Borza 1992 and 1999. For general discussions of the *basilikoi paides*, see Berve 1926a, 37–39; Hammond 1990, 261–90; Heckel 1992, 237–44; Koulakiotis 2005, 167–82. See also Carney 1980–81a, 223–31; Carney 1983, 260–72 (Chapter 8), and Hatzopoulos 1994, 87–110.

<sup>2</sup> Berve 1926a, 39 argues for the terminology of Arrian on the basis of the authority of Arrian's main sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. See references to more variants and a useful discussion in Heckel 1992, 241, who wonders if there really was a "term" or official Macedonian usage for the group.

<sup>3</sup> Carney 1980–81a, 227.

<sup>4</sup> See Bosworth 1995, 92–93. This method of mounting, not necessarily actually

Persian in origin, was recommended for the old and infirm; while one might not put Philip in either category, he had, of course, suffered a serious wound to his thigh. Briant 1994, 300–01, argues convincingly that this passage is not as good evidence for the Persian origin of the *paides* as Kienast 1973 had said it was; Briant observes that the method of mounting a horse is copied because, in the absence of stirrups, the problem of mounting is the same for any heavy-armed cavalryman.

<sup>5</sup> Hammond, 1990, 262–63, believes that only *basilikoi paides* and princes hunted with the king because of the dangers of assassination. He bases his conclusion on Andronikos 1984, 117, who identified the participants in the Hunt frieze from Tomb II at Vergina as the *paides*, accompanying Alexander and Philip. Since the identity of the lion hunt participants is widely disputed, this is dubious; see, for instance, discussion and references in Hatzopoulos, 1994, 93–94, and Palagia 2000, 27, who concluded that the scene shows both *paides* and older members of court. During Alexander's reign, we also have evidence that Craterus (Plut. *Alex.* 40.4) and Lysimachus (Curt. 8.1.14) – neither of them princes or *paides* – hunted with the king.

<sup>6</sup> So Bosworth 1995, 93, who points out that they are never mentioned in battle and suggests that Curtius drew a false inference from his source. Heckel 2003b, 206 n. 40 thinks that they did “occasionally” go into battle.

<sup>7</sup> This passage refers to the disciplining of two individuals by Philip for infractions of military discipline, but it is not clear whether the two individuals named are *paides* or whether Aelian has made a transition from talking about this group to discussing Philip's general discipline. Koulakiotis, 2005, 172, views the accounts of the institution by all three authors as based on anti-Macedonian (ultimately Athenian) sources, although only Aelian actually seems hostile. Curtius 8.6.3 notes the similarities between their duties and those of slaves, but it is not clear that he is being anything more than objective; their duties did include many tasks ordinarily performed by slaves. Unease rather than hostility seems to be the reaction of these Greek authors.

<sup>8</sup> Arrian 4.13.1 describes the fathers as Macedonians ἐν τέλει. τέλος can refer to either civil or military office.

<sup>9</sup> Curtius simply describes the institution as customary (8.6.2), and Valerius Maximus 3.3. ex. I, refers to it as already an old Macedonian custom in the days of Alexander the Great. Hammond, 1990, 262 suggests that the source for both Roman authors' statements was the Macedonian author Marsyas of Pella. Aelian (*VH* 14.48) merely reports that Philip had such an institution and does not comment on its origin. Berve, 1926b, Kienast, 1973, 265; Ellis 1976, 161 believe that Arrian's statement must mean that Philip invented the *paides*, but Griffith 1979, 401; Hammond, 1990, 261–64; and Koulakiotis, 2005, 169, do not. I find the latter view more persuasive.

<sup>10</sup> Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.9, 3–4) describes the Persian equivalent of the *paides*. Kienast, 1973, 255 argued that the creation of not only the *paides*, but the *sōmatophylakes*, the *hypaspists* as well as changes in the *betairos* body were all done on a Persian model.

<sup>11</sup> Briant, 1994, 284; see Briant, 1994, 298–302 for a convincing refutation of Kienast's arguments and for the conclusion that the *paides*, like the similar Persian institution, had their origin in local not borrowed custom. Borza 1992, 249 and Heckel 1992, 239 find Kienast's argument persuasive.

<sup>12</sup> Koulakiotis, 2005, 170. Bosworth, 1995, 90–99 notes that Arrian's diction is compatible with the idea of Philip systematizing an earlier, irregular practice. Even as late as Alexander's reign Macedonian kings had cupbearers. Iolaus, son of Antipater,

was Alexander's cupbearer (Diod.17.118.1; Arr. *Anab.* 7.2.7; Just. 12.14.9) and so, perhaps, was his brother Philip (Just. 12.14.9). Bremmer 1990, 140–41 interprets these northern Greek cupbearers as the continuation of older, even Homeric ways but, as we have noted with other Macedonian Homeric customs, the institution may not have been preserved, but created in self-conscious imitation of Homer. Bremmer also notes that both Iolaus and Pyrrhus' cupbearer are said to have had lovers or been pursued by lovers, so the sexual tension the presence of the *paides* clearly generated (see below) was part of the older role of cupbearer and, as Bremmer rightly notes, went all the way back to the stories of Ganymede. Heckel, 1992, 293 believes that the cupbearers were also members of the *paides* although they held a more defined position than the rest.

<sup>13</sup> Koulakiotis, 2005, 168 sees the institution as influenced by a blend of factors: Philip's desire for a more modern education for the elite, archaic custom, and possible foreign influence from Persia or Thebes (see also a discussion of a possible Spartan model: Birgalias 1991, 143–52).

<sup>14</sup> Hammond, 1990, 271–72. When Perseus fled to Samothrace after the battle of Pydna, he was accompanied by *basilikoi paides* (Livy 45.6.7).

<sup>15</sup> See below on Callisthenes' possible role in this formal education. Heckel, 2003, 206 believes that not only Callisthenes but Aristotle was tutor to the *paides*. Koulakiotis, 2005, 168 n. 4 puts the institution in the context of reorganization of education in the fourth century.

<sup>16</sup> Here I assume that Aelian *VH* 14.48 refers exclusively to Philip's disciplining of the *paides* (see above, n. 7). Koulakiotis, 2005, 170–71 stresses the military character of their training as characteristic of the military nature of the wider court.

<sup>17</sup> Heckel, 2003, 206 especially n. 41.

<sup>18</sup> Berve, 1926a, 37; Kienast, 1973, 30, followed by Heckel, 1992, 240, see it as fostering stability at court and in general.

<sup>19</sup> Wilcken 1967, 33; Kienast, 1973, 266; Carney, 1980–81, 227.

<sup>20</sup> Schachermeyr 1973, 68.

<sup>21</sup> Hatzopoulos, 1994, 94–95; Roisman 2003a, 303; Koulakiotis, 2005, 171. Roisman points out that typically, in a rite of passage, the young play roles opposite to those they will fill as adults. *Paides* may have had a distinctive dress: see discussion and references in Koulakiotis, 2005, 171 n.16. Much depends on interpretation of the controversial hunting fresco on the façade of Tomb II at Vergina (see above n. 5).

<sup>22</sup> Hammond 1979, 168; Lane Fox 1973, 326.

<sup>23</sup> See Carney, 1980–81a, 228 on the ages of the *paides*, as well as Bosworth 1995, 91, who, unaware of Carney's earlier discussion, reaches a similar, if less specific conclusion: they were between puberty and military age (presumably eighteen).

<sup>24</sup> Arrian (4.13.1) says they were those of the elite ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακιδεύοντο. *LSJ* says that this verb means, “to reach puberty” and cites this very passage as a source, but defines ἡλικία as “manhood or the mature, useful years, military age.” Curtius (5.1.42, 8.6.2) refers to the *paides* as *liberos adultos* or *adultos liberos*, a phrase more suggestive of late than early teens. Curtius (8.6.25) has Callisthenes say to Hernolaus and the others after Alexander had flogged him that they were now men. The passage is hardly likely to report Callisthenes' actual language but does offer evidence about Curtius' understanding of their age. On the other hand, Curtius (8.6.5) lists among the honors given to members of the group that they could dine with the king sitting,

a piece of information that presumes that, at least as a group, they had not yet all killed their first boar (see discussion of the importance of killing a boar below).

<sup>25</sup> See n. 23 above. Hatzopoulos, 1994, followed by Koulakiotis, 2005, 170–71, believes that this age range is certain, based on non-royal Hellenistic practice.

<sup>26</sup> Griffith, 1979, 401 doubted that more than one brother from the same family would have served at the same time (apparently because he believed that families would have been unwilling to risk more than one) and supposed that sixty or seventy families were, therefore, represented in the body of *paides* at any given moment.

<sup>27</sup> Diodorus (17.65.1) and Curtius (5.1.42) both note that a new draft of fifty *basilikoi paides* from Macedonia arrived to serve in Alexander's expedition in 331. Hammond 1990, 265–68 argued that this was the first group of *paides* to serve Alexander (apparently followed by Koulakiotis 2005, 170, who simply states that there were in total fifty), but Bosworth, 1995, 92 points out that Diodorus (17.36.5) refers to *basilikoi paides* who prepare a bath and a meal for the king after the battle of Issus in 333. He rightly rejects Hammond's summary dismissal of Diodorus' testimony. Berve, 1926a, 37 n. 3 suggests about one hundred total members; Griffith, 1979, 401 estimates an overall membership around eighty-five (a number Heckel, 1992, 240 n.13 considers too low); Hammond 1990, 266 assumed a figure of two hundred. See Griffith 1979, 401; Hammond 1990, 265–68; and Bosworth, 1995, 91–92, for differing discussions of the possible frequency with which *paides* were replaced or rotated out of the unit.

<sup>28</sup> Hammond 1990, 266 imagined various stages in the careers of *basilikoi paides* and that they fought in battle only in the last year; the evidence is too thin to support his rather broad assertions, although, as guesses or estimates, they are not implausible.

<sup>29</sup> Roisman 2003, 302.

<sup>30</sup> Hermolaus and his lover Sostratus (a boy of the same age: Arr. 4.13.3); Epimenēs and his lover Charicles (Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.7), who may or may not have been a *basilikos pais* himself (see Heckel 1992, 290).

<sup>31</sup> See discussion in Bremmer 1990.

<sup>32</sup> Since my early discussion of sexual tensions at the Macedonian court, particularly in relation to regicide (Chapter 8; Carney 1980–81a, 262–72), there has been much more work: Ogden 1996, 107–68 and 2009, 2003–17; Mortensen 2011, 371–87; Reames-Zimmerman 1999, 81–96.

<sup>33</sup> As we have seen, it is not known if the institution existed yet and the extant sources on the death of Archelaus (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b; Diod.14.37.6) do not refer to the assassins as *paides*. Hammond 1990, 263 assumed they were because he believed that only they and the king's sons hunted with the king (see above n. 5 for the problems with this assumption). The lover of Archelaus, said by Diodorus (14.37.6) to have killed the king accidentally while hunting, could have been a member of the *paides*, but his presence at the hunt does not prove it, *pace* Hammond. Hatzopoulos, 1994, 96 agrees with Hammond, not only because of the assassins' role in the hunt but also because some were *erōmenoi* of the king and because flogging (see below) was used against one of them.

<sup>34</sup> See Heckel 2006, 76–77 for discussion and references.

<sup>35</sup> See n. 27. Hammond 1990, 265–68, pictured arrivals of fifty in each subsequent year (see below on the feasibility of further reinforcements). As Bosworth 1996b, 113 n. 71 notes, if Hammond's suggestion is correct, then some of the *paides* would have

been very newly arrived and so even more shocked. Like Bosworth (followed by Koulakiotis 2005, 175), I doubt that Hammond's surmise is correct. Bosworth also, however, suggests that Antipater (one of the conspirators along with Hermolaus) may only have arrived in Bactria with his father in 329/8. Bosworth also assumes that the *paides* took no part in the campaign against the Sogdian rebellion and so were witness to the failed attempt at *proskynēsis* but not to the death of Cleitus.

<sup>36</sup> On these events, see Bosworth 1988a, 108–18.

<sup>37</sup> Koulakiotis 2005, 175 n. 26 suggests that Alexander's suspicion that people were plotting against him (and his willingness to act on the suspicion without evidence, or at least much evidence) resembled paranoid fears of slave uprisings or conspiracies.

<sup>38</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 55.2–3) does not even refer to the hunting incident in his brief account of the conspiracy. Instead, he seems to believe it was inspired only by Callisthenes' rhetoric (see below).

<sup>39</sup> Badian 2000, 70 considered them unimportant; Heckel 2003, 223 n. 97, points out that Antipater's father was a former satrap and generally argues that they were men with a certain prominence. Curtius (8.8.18) claims that Alexander, abandoning Macedonian tradition, not only did not kill the kin of the conspiring *paides*, but did not demote them either. The truth seems mixed or at least unclear: Sopolis' career may have suffered and so may Asclepiodorus'; nothing is certain (see Chapter 9 (Carney, 1980–81a, 229 nn. 26–28, cf. Heckel, 2006, 58). On the fathers who can be identified, see discussion and references in Heckel 2006, 253 (Sopolis), 57–58 (Asclepiodorus); and Heckel 1992, 295 (Carsis).

<sup>40</sup> See Chapter 9 (Carney, 1980–81a) and Carney, 2002, 59–80.

<sup>41</sup> See below for further discussion of reasons why others joined the conspiracy. Koulakiotis 2005, 173 suggests that in this and other court conspiracies, ties of *philia* – always understood to involve the notion of reciprocity – contributed to group action. Moreover, presumably many of the boys were age mates who had grown up together, quite possibly from a date well before their entry into the *paides*.

<sup>42</sup> Hammond 1990, 262 understood Curtius (8.8.3) to say that the flogging of *basilikoi paides* for infractions was an ancestral custom practiced by the most ancient Macedonian kings. Curtius' statement, however, does not clearly say that; his phrase about ancestral custom could as easily apply simply to the punishment, flogging. It is not clear evidence for the existence of the *paides* in much more ancient times, or for flogging as a punishment uniquely limited to them, or for flogging as a punishment specifically for insolence at hunting by members of the group. Thus, I cannot agree with Hammond (1990, 263) that Decamnichus, whom Archelaus had flogged for insulting Euripides (*Arist. Pol.* 1311b) must have been a *pais*, although he certainly could have been (Carney 1983, 271–2 and Heckel 1992, 238, both consider it possible but do not, as Hammond did, treat it as undisputed fact).

<sup>43</sup> Roisman 2003a, 303, especially n. 63. See also Golden 1985, 91–104.

<sup>44</sup> For recent discussions of hunting at the Macedonian court, see Carney 2002; Koulakiotis 2005. See also Barringer 2001.

<sup>45</sup> Harris 2001, 235–37, makes the connection between Achilles' anger and Alexander's, but Harris' analysis of the role of anger in Homer and the heroic code (2001, 131–56) tends to oversimplify Homer's view of the exercise of anger by Achilles and other heroes. Harris, in his discussion of Alexander, recognizes the ambivalence of many about Alexander but discounts that ambivalence in



terms of anger in general. He also seems to ignore Philip II's wrathful qualities (1990, 240).

<sup>46</sup> While Curtius' version offers little support for the view that Hermolaus acted to save the king, Arrian's version allows for that interpretation. The situation is similar to the hunting incident involving Alexander and Lysimachus, an incident that led to punishment as well, but a far less severe one. Craterus had a more positive experience in a similar situation. See discussions in Palagia 2000, 184; Carney 2002, *passim*, and 64 n. 60; Roisman 2003a, 316.

<sup>47</sup> Koulakiotis 2005, 179–82 simply assumes that Alexander's actions speak to Persian custom, as part of his growing absolutism. While this is possible, this interpretation makes the central point of the conspiracy something our sources do not indicate at all. On the role of hunting at the Macedonian court and the importance of competition, see discussion and references in Chapter 12 (Carney 2002); Roisman 2003a, 313–17.

<sup>48</sup> Here I differ considerably from my earlier views, when I described the motivation of the conspirators as “fairly obvious” (Carney 1980–81a, 230). As I have tried to indicate, I now see their motivation as a complex interaction of several factors.

<sup>49</sup> See Carney Chapter 12 (2007, 129–80) for discussion and references to the role of sympotic activity in Macedonian elite life.

<sup>50</sup> Koulakiotis 2005, 177, attempts to argue that physical violence was somehow only a masculine trait; the violent acts, real and alleged, of a number of royal Macedonian women indicate that this was not the case. A better case could be made for gender affecting the type of violence that was employed.

<sup>51</sup> Vidal-Naquet 1984, 362–3; Hatzopoulos 1994, 97–100; Koulakiotis 2005, 176; Briant 1994.

<sup>52</sup> Koulakiotis 2005, 176.

<sup>53</sup> Roisman 2003a, 316, is unconvincing in suggesting that it was the punishment itself that led to group action (see above) and that they were simply reacting to simple unfairness.

<sup>54</sup> So Koulakiotis 2005, 176.

<sup>55</sup> Heckel 2003b, 223, considered the hunting incident “relatively trivial” and mainly attributed it to the adolescent nature of the conspirators; more plausibly he also concluded that the boys' violent action may have reflected views their fathers held but had not acted upon.

<sup>56</sup> Chapter 8 (Carney 1983). See also Bosworth 1996b, 112–113, and Monoson 2000, 42–51.

<sup>57</sup> Hermolaus's father Sopolis may recently have been passed over for promotion; see Lane Fox 1973, 327; Heckel 2003, 223; but see Chapter 8 (Carney 1983, 228) n. 24.

<sup>58</sup> Hatzopoulos, 1994, 96–98, who also argued that Archelaus did much the same to the young men who became his assassins. Two of them were lovers of Archelaus and so, as we have seen, sensitive to threats to their honor and in the case of the third, Archelaus allowed Euripides to flog him (Scullion 2003, 389–400, questions the historicity of Euripides' stay at Archelaus' court). See further Chapter 8, for discussion and references. Hatzopoulos 1994, 97, makes a similar argument for the killing of Amyntas II by Derdas. The values or motives of the assassins do seem fairly similar, but it is not clear that they had literally been denied adult status and, as we have seen, we do not know if they were *paides*.

## AFTERWORD

In the 1980–81 article, “The Conspiracy of Hermolaus,” I argued that the said conspiracy (then often referred to as the “Pages Conspiracy”) was important, not simply as an excuse for the execution of Callisthenes, but because it demonstrated that opposition to Alexander’s innovations in kingship had begun to come not only from the older generation of the Macedonian elite but also from the youngest (at least on the campaign). I suggested that the “Pages” were better termed “Royal Youths” and were just under standard military age. (See also Chapter 8, on patterns of regicide in Macedonia, including discussion of the regicide attempted by the *paides*). I understood (and still understand) that politics motivated the *paides* (*contra* Heckel 2003b, 223, who terms their motivation “relatively trivial” and suggested they acted simply out of “wounded adolescent pride.”) While I do think that sexuality and sexual relationships were involved in the conspiracy in the sense that a pair of lovers were central to the development of the conspiracy, I see no evidence that it had anything to do with Alexander’s possible personal sexual use of some of the *paides* (*contra* Will 1986, 138–39; see Müller 2010, 244, n. 22).

In 2008, this article (Chapter 11) appeared, intended as update to the 1980–81 piece, though one somewhat more focused on the institution of the *basilikoi paides* (simply transliterating the Greek term now seemed to me a somewhat better solution than employing the English phrase “Royal Youths”). In the earlier article, I had been comparatively uninterested in the incident that had triggered the conspiracy: while the king and *paides* were hunting, Hermolaus killed a boar Alexander himself had singled out and the king had him publicly flogged. I did recognize that Alexander’s insistence on a royal first shot resembled Persian court custom and that Hermolaus and his friends might have been objecting to the implementation of yet another aspect of Alexander’s Persianizing rather than to the severity of a punishment for which there was some precedent. I now consider it likely that Alexander had recently implemented this practice, quite possibly because he liked the way it focused attention on himself. Greek sources suggest that this first strike rule was a Persian custom (see Seyer 2007, 112), but Müller 2010, 28–29 has argued that the notion of Persian origin may simply be an invention of our sources. Spawforth (2012) has recently suggested that Alexander did borrow another aspect of Persian/Near Eastern royal hunting tradition, hunting with a bow from a chariot.

Though I knew that a Macedonian male could not recline at a symposium until he had killed a boar without a net (Ath. 18a), I failed to recognize until 2002 (see Chapter 13) what Pierre Briant (1994, 306) so astutely pointed out, that Alexander threatened, by refusing Hermolaus his kill, to deprive him of his manhood. Arrian’s account (4.13.2) allows for the possibility that the boar was about to attack Alexander and that Hermolaus acted to protect the king. If so, one could understand Alexander’s wrath in the context of other occasions in battle and the hunt when someone tried to protect the king and earned his anger rather than his favor (see article on hunting). Koulakiotis (2005, 176) and Müller (2010, 27–28) have argued that it was not so much Hermolaus’ inability to get his boar that enraged him and the other *paides*, but rather that, in addition to the comparatively

traditional punishment for *paides* of flogging, Alexander also had Hermolaus' horse taken away (Arr. 4.12.2). Müller notes the central importance of the horse to the Macedonian elite in terms of both hunting and fighting and very plausibly puts the incident and the conspiracy it prompted into a more general discussion of how, after Philip's death and Alexander's innovations, the image of Philip (himself rather absolutist) was transformed into that of the perfect traditional Macedonian ruler, an image opponents to Alexander's policies utilized in a variety of ways (Müller 2010, 25–32).

Coppola 2010, 139–41 sees a degree of similarity in the “literary pattern” of the stories of Hermolaus and Alexander and Artaxerxes and Megabyzus that I don't recognize, though she is certainly right to note an apparent doublet between the sophist's (i.e. Callisthenes') advice to Hermolaus and that given by a sophist to Pausanias (mistakenly termed “Perdiccas”: in Coppola). Recognizing rhetorical coloring delivered via details in the narrative like the sophist's advice does not require wholesale rejection of the “historicity” of the conspiracy, as Spawforth 2007, 188 suggests, apparently exaggerating Coppola's relatively limited point, and failing to note a considerable body of relevant scholarship, as does Coppola. Apart from the always dubious speeches, I see no reason to doubt that the conspiracy, roughly as described by Curtius and Arrian, happened. Indeed, Bosworth 1995, 93 considered the conspiracy “uncontroversial” in the sense that the extant sources do not disagree and that likely Ptolemy and Aristobulus did not substantially disagree either.



## SYMPOSIA AND THE MACEDONIAN ELITE: THE UNMIXED LIFE

Demosthenes insisted that there was no room at the court of Philip II of Macedon for the man who practiced *sōphrosynē* (moderation) and who could not bear the daily *akrasia* (literally “unmixedness,” figuratively excessiveness) of Philip’s life. While *akrasia* specifically refers to wine that is unmixed with water, Demosthenes went on to associate it not only with drunkenness but also with lewd dancing and excess in general (Dem. 2.18–19). Demosthenes, in short, implied that the way of life of Philip and his court was excessive, an excess exemplified by the drinking habits of the Macedonian elite. Indeed, the conscious display of *truphē* (luxury) at the Macedonian court, including but not limited to sympotic luxury, generated a curious mix of envy and condemnation among southern Greeks. Internally, the interaction between the king and the rest of the elite at symposia played a critical role in the creation of royal style, and that style, in turn, functioned to limit the absolute nature of Macedonian monarchy.<sup>1</sup>

Any attempt to place the fourth-century Macedonian court symposium in its appropriate political, social, and sexual context must first cope with the problematic character and quality of relevant sources. The difficulty is certainly not lack of information. Writers contemporary with Philip II and Alexander make frequent reference to the drinking customs of the Macedonian court. The narrative sources that deal with Macedonian events often allude to Macedonian drinking practices. Athenaeus preserves many snippets (e.g. Ath. 4. 128a–130c; 10. 438c) from earlier ancient authors about Macedonian drinking customs. Archaeological evidence from palaces, houses, and tombs relevant to Macedonian symposia abounds. All these sources indicate that symposia played a critical role in the lives (and sometimes deaths) of the Macedonian kings and elite. The problem has not been scarcity of evidence but rather its interpretation. Before, therefore, we turn to analysis of Macedonian sympotic ways, it is necessary to discuss the source problems that complicate analysis.

Uncertainty about the dating and chronology of Macedonian material makes it difficult to know how far drinking habits changed over time. Delays in publication of archaeological material as well as continuing

excavation contribute to dating difficulties.<sup>2</sup> About the date of many tombs and structures no clear consensus has developed. Though the most notorious disagreement about dating has arisen in terms of Tomb II at Vergina,<sup>3</sup> the impact of this argument is broad since the date of many other tombs has been tied to the date of that tomb. As a consequence, the chronology of the structural development of Macedonian-type tombs and customs associated with those tombs remains somewhat uncertain. Recently revisions in the dating of the Derveni burials (rich in objects associated with drinking, objects obviously relatively comparable to those in Tomb II),<sup>4</sup> of the palace at Vergina, and of a section of the palace complex at Pella have further complicated interpretation.<sup>5</sup> Thus, while literary material about Macedonian drinking habits is generally datable and tied to specific reigns (Philip II, Alexander III, and, to a lesser degree, the period of the Successors), archaeological material relating to Macedonian drinking, though probably derived from the same general chronological span, often cannot be connected with certainty to a particular reign, or even divided between material produced before or after the conquests of Alexander. The disputed dating of so much relevant material makes it both less accessible to, and less usable by, non-archaeologists.

Uncertainty about date is particularly worrying when dealing with the court elite of fourth-century Macedonia because, at least in the second half of the century, this was a society in rapid change, change that often spread from the court outward since it was often instigated by the king himself. Philip II began a process that ultimately led to the development of urbanization over much of the kingdom. By conquest he dramatically enriched himself and the country at the same time as he expanded both the country and the elite. His larger court and its social life became a venue for international display of royal style. Alexander, of course, further enriched himself and the country. While much of this wealth, and the court life-style it made possible, traveled east with the conqueror, it gradually made its way back to the Macedonian homeland too.<sup>6</sup> As the last Argeads were eliminated, members of the court elite moved toward themselves becoming kings and began to establish their own courts and customs, imitating recent Argead practice but also innovating, often inspired by competition with rivals. Persian court practice almost certainly affected court events throughout this period, particularly during the reign of Alexander, whose Persianizing was more overt and unapologetic than that of his father.<sup>7</sup> Customs once unheard of became the practice of royalty, then of the court elite, and ultimately of local elites as well.<sup>8</sup> The target of analysis for any social practice must always be a moving one, but in the case of the reigns of Philip II and Alexander, this target was moving with tremendous speed.

Symposia at court, even at exactly the same date, would have varied to a degree our sources tend to mute. Most we hear about were hosted by the kings themselves, but not all. Some occasions were intimate affairs, others state occasions, often elaborately staged ones like the celebration at Dion in honor of the Muses held within Alexander's tent with a hundred dining couches (Diod. 17.16.4), or the mass wedding banquet at Susa (Plut. *Alex.* 70.2). (Whereas one could attribute various aspects of the Susa affair to the influence of Persian custom, the festivities at Dion happened before Alexander left for Asia. If the Dion symposium, with its gigantic scale, indicates Persian influence rather than court preference for sympotic gigantism, then it was Persian influence that predated Alexander's campaign.)<sup>9</sup> Even at such grand and public affairs, however, a small inner circle may have enjoyed more personal and individual conversation not audible to the larger group of attenders. One suspects that symposia were more frequent during Alexander's expedition than when the king and court were home in Macedonia.

Our sources do not always specify the nature of the occasion for a symposium and, even when they do, one wonders to what degree, at this distance in time and culture, we can understand the operating social norms. For instance, today in the U.S., one would expect one sort of behavior and drinking pattern from participants at the sexually segregated parties for the bride and for the groom the night before the wedding, and quite a different sort of pattern for the same people in the context of the banquet held after the wedding. Behavior perfectly acceptable, perhaps even expected, for one event would be considered outrageous and uncivilized at the other, even though many of the same people would attend both affairs and only a day or two might separate the two events. I am not confident that we can recover the Macedonian equivalent of our own idiosyncratic expectations about drinking. Thus, though it is difficult not to speak of the "Greek symposium" or the "Macedonian symposium," it is important to remember that these are useful, even inevitable, generalizations, but only that. There was not one symposium or one sympotic practice; there were many.

Another critical problem confronting those who wish to understand the role of drinking in ancient Macedonian society derives from the origin of the great majority of the surviving literary evidence. Most of this ultimately comes from southern Greece, primarily Athens, from the period during which the Macedonians were establishing their domination of the Greek peninsula. Many Greek writers used discussions of drinking habits at the Macedonian court to vent their hostility against the Macedonians. Indeed, drinking at the Macedonian court was, in a variety of ways, linked to the monarchy itself, so criticizing sympotic practice at court was connected to

dislike of monarchy, particularly the Macedonian brand. Broader cultural prejudice almost certainly compounded this political hostility. Greeks often interpreted or constructed any variation from their own practice as uncivilized, not simply different but opposite. They sometimes read into cultural practices which arose from practical considerations a moral significance: customs derived from the scarcity of certain food items in southern Greece were transformed into an ideology of abstinence and restraint (not necessarily its practice), while more extravagant use of food and drink, derived from the greater abundance of these items in the more fertile regions of northern Greece, was read as “greed” and lack of restraint.<sup>10</sup> Implicit or explicit assertions of moral superiority in our Greek sources may well mask simple jealousy, whether political or material or both. If a writer cannot himself practice such luxurious display, he can, at least, afford to condescend to those who can, while secretly envying them.<sup>11</sup> These prejudices in our sources almost certainly led to some self-serving exaggeration of the degree of difference between Macedonian and general Hellenic drinking ways.<sup>12</sup>

However much our sources suffer from this assortment of prejudices, one should not automatically assume that all differences ascribed are the consequence of bias. Though Macedonian ethnic identity, in ancient and modern times, has remained notoriously contested, discussion has generally centered on how Greeks perceived Macedonians. Less has been said about how the Macedonians – other than the kings – saw themselves.<sup>13</sup> If, however, evidence supports the maintenance of some distinctive, non-Attic, practices by the Macedonian elite, in drinking and in other matters, this implies that they may have embraced some distinctions between Greek and Macedonian rather than avoided them. Moreover, perceptions of ethnic identity changed over time as did the degree of difference between Macedonian and southern Greek practice: Macedonian dining habits were sometimes adopted rather than rejected.<sup>14</sup> What one generation resented, the next might emulate.

Literature about symposia abounds. Such literature has its own rhetoric and artifice. Since sympotic events were always occasions for display, those who wrote about them were inclined to exaggerate or at least stress the luxury of the symposium. Of course, writers are much more likely to mention symposia where arguments occurred and violence erupted.<sup>15</sup> This focus on the colorfully negative naturally distorts our sense of norms for symposia and sympotic behavior.

Another more accidental aspect of our literary accounts on Macedonian drinking makes analysis of the drinking habits of the elite in general difficult: most writers were only interested in Philip II and Alexander.



Reference to the behavior of other members of the elite at symposia tends to happen only because their actions relate to those of the kings. For instance, had Cleitus the Black had a drunken argument with someone other than Alexander, we would probably not know about it. Similarly, had the death of Alexander's closest friend and probable lover Hephaestion not precipitated famous public grieving on the king's part, we would not be aware that heavy drinking could have contributed to his death (see below on both these incidents). Inevitably, the sources' fascination with the kings leads one to conclude that the monarchs drank much more than the rest of the elite. This conclusion may, in fact, be correct, but one must recall that comparative evidence is often lacking. It is important to recognize that the sources never describe the kings as drinking alone: Philip and Alexander drank with other members of the elite. Moreover, the sources are far more likely to comment when Philip or Alexander drank heavily than when they did not. Thus, though literary sources provide considerable evidence about the social context of Macedonian drinking, they can tell us comparatively little directly about its frequency<sup>16</sup> and about the Macedonian norm.

Indeed, whether or not literary references about Macedonian drinking focus on Alexander and Philip, the great majority of passages relate to anecdotes and certainly have no statistical base. Doubtless, one should always remain skeptical about anecdote; in essence anecdote by its very nature constructs or reinterprets an experience by giving it a plot, and often seems to prize plot or meaning over event or context.<sup>17</sup> However, when one assesses social behavior such as drinking, even the most supposedly statistical sources for modern practice have their own implausibilities. Social science about current or recent drinking habits, for instance, usually depends on self-reporting, and may also entail essentially circular definitions of alcohol abuse. Ultimately, any sort of evidence about social practice contains an element of over-generalization.

This daunting collection of source problems doubtless contributed to a situation in which the subject of Macedonian drinking habits was largely ignored outside of specifically Macedonian scholarship. Until about a decade ago, commensality scholarship – already inclined to focus on southern Greek drinking habits, with little discussion of Macedonian practice – largely ignored relevant scholarship on Macedonian drinking, even though Tomlinson and Borza had published discussions of the symposium in Macedonia<sup>18</sup> before most sympotic scholarship appeared. While this attitude has begun to change, Borza's reading of the symposium at the Macedonian court as quasi-constitutional remains largely unacknowledged in most scholarship on the symposium, despite the fact that

his argument obviously relates to other discussions of the connection between the symposium and political developments.<sup>19</sup> O'Brien's work on Alexander's drinking,<sup>20</sup> though centered on Alexander's personality and issues of addiction, also contains germane social material that has not been utilized.<sup>21</sup> One wonders whether cross-cultural studies of royal banquets and their palatial settings, however intriguing, do not risk prizing the generic at the expense of the particular. After all, the likelihood that Philip's dining practices were influenced by the Hecatomnid or Achaemenid courts does not preclude the possibility that he or his son and their associates were selective in their borrowing and imitation, tailoring their practice to their own needs and their own monarchic tradition.

Other sorts of "gaps" between scholarly fields have also caused problems. Many discussions about drinking utilize largely literary evidence, whether because of comparative ignorance of the rapidly accumulating but not easily accessible archaeological evidence relevant to drinking or because scholars reject its viability as useful evidence (see below, for instance, for a discussion of the significance of the scarcity of *kratērs* in Macedonian tombs). On the other hand, Vokotopoulou produced a survey of Macedonian symposia<sup>22</sup> that concentrated on archaeological material (and, to a much lesser degree, on literary sources) and neither cited nor discussed the work of Tomlinson, Borza or sympotic scholarship in general. The coincidence of simultaneously published work has, by chance, also prolonged this failure to appreciate other scholarship.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the inability or unwillingness of various kinds of relevant scholarship<sup>24</sup> to intersect or cross-fertilize has compounded the limitations of the ancient sources.

Apart from some of the other factors already discussed that make analysis of extant evidence problematic, one suspects that sympotic scholarship long paid comparatively little attention to Macedonian material because some scholars unconsciously adopted the prejudices of their ancient sources or because Macedonians combined practices both similar and antithetical to those of southern Greeks, making them hard to categorize. Scholars who did mention Macedonian material sometimes seemed to treat the Macedonians as failed Athenians. If, as I shall argue, Macedonian practice is likely to have differed to some degree from Athenian, this difference cannot have arisen from ignorance. Certainly the court elite embraced many other Attic tastes and customs. Rather than assuming that Macedonians imperfectly mimicked or replicated southern Greek practice, one must instead wonder whether elite Macedonians chose to be different in their drinking habits.

Another factor making it difficult to interpret Macedonian drinking

practices is our own attitude towards the use of alcohol. Scholarly literature<sup>25</sup> has sometimes viewed drinking as a straightforwardly beneficial social habit, thus de-emphasizing issues of addiction.<sup>26</sup> Such an approach tends to slight evidence for the darker side of drinking,<sup>27</sup> an aspect much in evidence in Macedonian material, or to attribute abuse of alcohol largely or solely to non-Greek cultures, or those understood as only marginally Greek.<sup>28</sup>

Let us bear these difficulties in mind as we turn to an analysis of Macedonian drinking practices in the context of general Hellenic practice. Granted the difficulties already noted, it seems wise to place greater confidence in literary and archaeological material contemporary with the symposia described than in evidence from later works, despite the obvious political bias of contemporary sources. However manipulative Demosthenes and Theopompus and others may have been, they did indeed have considerable familiarity, some of it first hand, with actual Macedonian practice.

Two major features of wine-drinking in epic were long replicated in Hellenic practice.<sup>29</sup> Banqueting in Homer was an important way in which a leader built support, and Greeks in Homer's poems<sup>30</sup> sometimes mixed wine with water (e.g. *Od.* 3.390).<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless, it was not until the archaic period<sup>32</sup> that the Greek symposium became such a prominent and central feature of Hellenic culture<sup>33</sup> and assumed its standard form. Whereas Homer's heroes had banqueted sitting up, at symposia guests reclined.<sup>34</sup> Food might be consumed at a symposium, but the focus was now on wine. The symposium in the archaic and classical periods was a largely male gathering (with females present only for sex or entertainment) that began in the late afternoon. It was held in a comparatively small room of the private house of a member of the elite, a room specifically designed for this purpose (the *andrōn*).

The ideal was one of order and moderation, necessary because, although wine was understood as a divine gift, its dangers were also acknowledged.<sup>35</sup> For instance, Cleomenes, king of Sparta, was said to have gone mad because he drank unmixed wine (*Herod.* 6.84). Athenaeus provides an intriguing collection of quotations from various Greek writers about the benefits and dangers of wine. Two of these citations are particularly memorable. Mnesitheus says (*ap.* *Ath.* 2.36a–b) that the gods revealed wine to mortals as a great good, but for those who use it in a disorderly way it will be the reverse. Those who drink daily in moderation will have a good frame of mind, but those who are excessive in their consumption of wine are prone to violence. In a play of Eubulus (*ap.* *Ath.* 2.36b–c) the wine god himself, Dionysus, advocates an ideal of moderation and limits in terms

of wine. Dionysus says that he himself will mix only three kraters for the right thinking or moderate; after that they should go home. He even spells out, krater by krater, specific bad things that happen to symposiasts who exceed three kraters. (Dionysus' remarks seem to assume a certain number of guests as a norm; otherwise the number of kraters would vary simply because of the size of the symposium.)<sup>36</sup> Though they saw dangers in drinking, and spoke of famously big drinkers, Greeks lacked any understanding of problem drinking as addictive.<sup>37</sup> From their point of view, problem drinking was a matter of moral excess, a philosophical problem, not one involving physical compulsion or disease.

In keeping with the ideal of moderation, an elaborate set of rules for symposia evolved, although any one of these rules might be broken on occasion.<sup>38</sup> A symposiarch decided the proportion of water to be mixed with the wine, how many kraters would be consumed, how many toasts would be drunk, how big the cups would be, and what topics might be discussed. After the tables had been cleared away, drinking began with a libation (an offering of unmixed wine), which was then passed around for each guest to sip. Then the wine was mixed. The guests entertained themselves with games and conversation, but professional entertainment might be provided as well. The symposium was often a locus for erotic relationships,<sup>39</sup> whether between various male guests or between male guests and *hetairai* hired for the evening. Probably because of this aspect of the symposium, most Greek communities had conventions about the age at which a youth might begin to attend drinking parties regularly. Participation in symposia generally marked passage into manhood, although chaperoned younger boys sometimes attended but did not recline.<sup>40</sup> The evening could end with a drunken *kōmos* through the streets.

Some scholars have associated the symposium with the political culture of the archaic period, and have linked it to, among other things, the gradual domination of hoplite warfare and the consequent disappearance of an aristocratic monopoly on the business of fighting. In this view, the symposium developed as a compensatory response to these changes, as a symbol of aristocratic luxury and leisure, a way for the elite to bond and to demonstrate their superior wealth and taste by conspicuous consumption. According to this interpretation, in the classical period, as the fifth century went on, symposia became even more politicized as aristocratic resistance to democracy intensified. This luxurious aristocratic life-style was not only resented by the *dēmos*, but understood as a political threat, as anti-*polis*.<sup>41</sup> Hammer has now mounted an effective attack on this political interpretation of the symposium, arguing, among other things, that it depends on too polarizing a reading of luxury.<sup>42</sup> Hammer suggests that

while aristocratic sympotic luxury may have been resented at times, it was also increasingly emulated by non-aristocratic groups.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, legislation attempted to make the holding of symposia open to as many as possible.<sup>44</sup> Nonetheless, the well-to-do could hold more luxurious symposia and hold them more often, in more splendid quarters.

Further changes to sympotic ways followed in the fourth century, as private and domestic ostentation grew more common.<sup>45</sup> Yet more change came in the Hellenistic period. The relatively clear distinction between the eating and drinking portions of the evening blurred.<sup>46</sup> The setting for symposia was no longer the square-shaped *andrōn*, and ultimately not a purpose-built room.<sup>47</sup> The use of the krater apparently declined.<sup>48</sup> Macedonian practice may have shaped these changes or simply reflected them. Nonetheless, many of the ideals of the symposium continued to have resonance and some were revived.<sup>49</sup>

Some Macedonian drinking practices seem similar if not identical to those of the city-states<sup>50</sup> and sometimes suggest that Macedonians may have continued practices that had earlier died out or become less common in the south. As in southern Greece, the Macedonian symposium could be the occasion for the initiation or continuation of erotic relationships between male guests. Judging by literary evidence alone, male Macedonians, like southern Greeks, did not allow ordinary women to participate in drinking parties, although, again as in the south, there is ample evidence for the presence of flute players, entertainers, and *hetairai*.<sup>51</sup>

Some have found archaeological evidence more ambiguous. Hoepfner has suggested that the double *andrōn* pattern found in the palace at Vergina/Aegae and in private houses at Pella and in a number of late classical and early Hellenistic Macedonian structures may have been intended for separate but parallel male and female symposia.<sup>52</sup> If, however, female sympotic activity was as institutionalized as he surmises, one wonders why elite Macedonian women were not buried with drinking sets similar to those of males.<sup>53</sup> The “Palmette Tomb” (also known as “Anthemion Tomb” or “Rhomipoulou Tomb”) has a painted scene in its pediment depicting what the excavator described as “a mature couple in a reclining position.”<sup>54</sup> If this scene represents mortals, it could signify that elite Macedonian women sometimes banqueted with men.<sup>55</sup> Recently, on the basis of archaic female burials at Vergina believed by their excavators to be those of royal women, it has been suggested that such women may sometimes have attended or appeared at certain symposia, though this would have been exceptional behavior.<sup>56</sup> Thus no clear-cut evidence demonstrates that Macedonian drinking practice relating to women was different from that elsewhere in Greece (ordinarily women took part in

family feasts and all-female celebrations, but did not ordinarily attend male feasting),<sup>57</sup> but the possibility remains that it was, at least at court.

Like their southern peers, elite Macedonians often did recline to eat and drink. Macedonians, however, apparently mixed the two dining and drinking postures. For one thing, in Macedonia, a man could not recline to drink and dine until he had killed a boar without a net. Supposedly Cassander, thanks to a failure to accomplish this hunting feat, continued to sit at dinner into his mid-thirties (Ath. 1.18a).<sup>58</sup> In addition to those who sat rather than reclined because of bad luck at hunting, many royal symposia would also have included youths who were expected to sit rather than recline (see below). Duris (*ap.* Ath. 1.17f) observes that the heroes (presumably in Homer) sat instead of reclining and that this happened once at Alexander's court on an occasion in which he entertained six thousand officers; some reclined but many sat on stools.<sup>59</sup> Fondness for Homeric practice (always appealing to Macedonians) may also help to explain continued comfort with non-reclining drinking postures. Possibly Macedonians began to recline later than southern Greeks did. While literary evidence indicates that males at the Macedonian court reclined to dine and drink by the end of the fifth century BC,<sup>60</sup> archaeological evidence confirms the continued use of chairs for banqueting in some areas of Macedonia during the fifth century,<sup>61</sup> and presents no clear evidence for reclining until the reign of Philip II, and possibly not until the reign of Alexander.<sup>62</sup>

Macedonian kings retained the old Greek custom of employing young boys as cupbearers<sup>63</sup> and Royal Youths (the so-called Pages) would also have been present (Curt. 5.1.42).<sup>64</sup> As we have seen, boys did sometimes appear at Greek symposia accompanied by their fathers, but the presence of such children was not systematized as at the Macedonian court, thanks to the institution of the Royal Youths. Aeschines (*In Tim.* 168–69), referring to a drinking party Philip II held for the embassy of which Aeschines himself was a member, indicates that Alexander, then about ten, entertained the guests by playing the cithara and reciting.<sup>65</sup> Although Alexander does not seem to have reclined and Aeschines explains that he personally did not speak to Alexander because of his youth, Alexander's mere presence at a symposium generated sexual innuendos in hostile Athens.<sup>66</sup>

Other practices associated with drinking parties in the Macedonian court resemble Greek symposia, but on a much larger and more splendid scale. Sometimes the difference in degree is so great that it becomes a difference in kind.<sup>67</sup> The *andrōn* was virtually the only room in the classical Greek house with a defined use. It had immediately recognizable features: the entry door would be slightly off-center; the room would be bordered by a somewhat raised platform for the dining couches; the central area of the

floor was often covered by a mosaic appropriate to drinking parties; the room would be square and comparatively small (room for seven to eleven couches, at least in the Archaic period), meant for an intimate social event.<sup>68</sup> Fourth-century examples of the Macedonian *andrōn* survive in elite houses at Pella<sup>69</sup> and in the Vergina and Pella palaces. The Macedonian examples resemble those of southern Greece except in size and shape; some Macedonian *andrōnes* were huge (some allowing thirty five couches)<sup>70</sup> and rectangular. The dining tent that Alexander first used at Dion could hold a hundred couches, so presumably two hundred guests (Diod. 17.16.4; Ath. 12.538c, 539d). Other *andrōnes*, however, were smaller, closer to Greek norms.<sup>71</sup> The large rooms were not meant for intimate gatherings and conversation could not have been general. The structure of these rooms fragmented the drinking party into small groups (leaving some unlucky guests with virtually no one to talk to). Perhaps guests could all hear or see professional entertainment. Certainly many of these rooms seem to have been built for public occasions.<sup>72</sup>

Archaeological remains demonstrate the importance of the drinking party among the Macedonian elite and the need of the king to entertain his followers. The symposium determined the structure of these rooms: they were built with raised borders and mosaics (they may have been put to additional uses, as well).<sup>73</sup> The large courtyards that characterized the palaces at Vergina and Pella may also have been employed for outdoor symposia.<sup>74</sup> Once it was thought that *andrōnes* filled up the entire ground floor of the Vergina palace,<sup>75</sup> recent discussions suggest that, granted the extant evidence, this was something of an exaggeration.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, the usage of specific rooms remains in dispute.<sup>77</sup> Nonetheless, dining rooms of varying sizes occupied much of the ground floor. The different sizes of these *andrōnes* in the Vergina palace probably reflect the hierarchical nature of the Macedonian court and thus the need to entertain groups of varying size and composition.<sup>78</sup> Some private houses at Pella also had multiple *andrōnes*.<sup>79</sup>

The decoration, furniture, and vessels used for the Macedonian symposium resemble those found elsewhere, but the materials utilized were much more luxurious and expensive, as attested by literary sources and archaeological remains. Duris (*ap.* Ath. 4.155d) told a story about a valuable gold cup Philip supposedly took to bed with him, implying that the cup was a unique item. (Athenaeus sees a contrast between this story and the extravagant use of gold by Alexander and his court.) Even if we take Duris' story literally, Philip was certainly able to enjoy a luxurious lifestyle in the later years of his reign.<sup>80</sup> Ephippus (*ap.* Ath. 4.146d) claimed that Alexander spent a hundred minas every time he dined. Duris (*ap.* Ath. 1.17f)

mentions six thousand silver stools for drinking guests, each covered with purple. Agatharchides (*ap.* Ath. 4.155d) reported that when Alexander's friends entertained him, they served desserts wrapped in gold, wrapping that was then simply tossed away in order to impress spectators with the wealth of the hosts. Chares (*ap.* Ath. 538b–539a), describing the symposium Alexander gave for the mass marriages at Susa, mentions a hundred silver couches worth twenty minae (Alexander's own couch was made of gold), each with special coverings and costly drapery, rugs, and decoration.<sup>81</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 70.2) reveals that, on this occasion, Alexander gave each of the nine thousand wedding guests a gold *phiale* for the libation. The custom of gifting wedding guests with drinking vessels made of precious materials also appears in an account of another Macedonian wedding symposium. Athenaeus (4.128c–130e) preserves a description, attributed to Hippolochus, of the amazingly splendid wedding feast (c. early third century BC) given by a Macedonian named Caranus,<sup>82</sup> an affair which left the twenty attenders each with a fortune: silver cups, golden tiaras (or strigils), bronze and silver platters, gold and silver containers of perfume, and ivory baskets (as well as a superfluity of elaborate foodstuffs). The narrative of the banquet concludes (130e) with a rhetorical question: what Greek banquet could compare to this Macedonian symposium? Even if Caranus' banquet is less than literally historical, the representation of the banquet is that of Macedonian *truphē*.

Although Macedonian drinking parties associated with weddings may have been particular occasions for display, and all our sources may exaggerate the extravagance of the events to some degree, the literary evidence for Macedonian sympotic extravagance – which might otherwise have been taken to suffer from an extreme degree of exaggeration – has largely been confirmed by archaeological evidence.<sup>83</sup> Elite Macedonian tombs and burials, as well as those now believed to be royal, have preserved the remains of elaborately decorated couches of gold and ivory (sometimes more than one couch was used in the same burial),<sup>84</sup> traces of gold and purple fabric,<sup>85</sup> and standard sets of roughly twenty drinking vessels, sometimes of gold, more often of silver or bronze.<sup>86</sup> The number of metal vessels found in Macedonian burials speaks to the wealth and ostentation of their owners.<sup>87</sup> The images of the symposium from the fresco on the Macedonian tomb at Agios Athanasios seem to confirm the elite interest in display: a cupboard showing off sympotic vessels, including what looks like a silver hydria, appears in the scene.<sup>88</sup> While the great majority of these tombs and offerings probably date to the period immediately following Alexander's conquests and the wealth they brought to some members of the Macedonian elite, some rich offerings derive from later and



earlier periods.<sup>89</sup> *Truphē* was not a new development at the Macedonian court, though Alexander's conquests probably made a new level of luxury achievable.<sup>90</sup>

The hosts of symposia in southern Greece offered professional entertainment on occasion, but much of the amusement at these affairs was amateur: the guests entertained each other with conversation, games, and songs. Macedonian symposia did not entirely lack amateur entertainment. Macedonian males liked watching and participating in dancing, even sexually suggestive dancing. Philip II's brother Alexander II was killed while watching a dancing performance (Diod. 15.71.1; Ath. 14.629d), and Theopompus (*ap.* Ath. 260a) mentions a courtier of Philip who supposedly won favor and military office by dancing at Philip's drinking parties. Demosthenes (2.18–19) twice mentions lewd dancing at Philip's court, and the courtier alluded to by Theopompus may also have been dancing suggestively since the dancing is associated with laughter. Athenaeus (4.155b) reports that it was the habit of Antiochus the Great and his *philoī* to dance under arms at dinner. He adds (4.155c) that when Polyperchon was drunk, though rather old and distinguished, he would dance continuously, clad in saffron tunic and fancy slippers. The guests sometimes provided more intellectual entertainment. For instance, Alexander supposedly acted out from memory a scene from Euripides' *Andromache* at his last symposium (Ath. 12.537d).<sup>91</sup>

But Macedonian symposia seem to have offered more professional entertainment, much more of it. We have long lists of the kinds of entertainment offered<sup>92</sup> and, as we have noted, the scale and shape of some of the rooms suggest more professional (and louder) entertainment. Even discussions had a professional, competitive edge; Alexander, like Hellenistic kings after him, seemed to use his largely imported court literati as combatants in a kind of intellectual cock fight.<sup>93</sup> Typical of the kind of nasty competition that could take place were the verses composed by some Greeks that made fun of a recent defeat suffered by some of Alexander's generals; in Plutarch's account of the death of Cleitus (*Alex.* 50.4–5) this was the beginning of the fatal confrontation (see Chapters 7 and 10).

Thus far we have found the drinking habits of the Macedonian court either identical to Greek practice or, at least, somewhat similar, but characterized by significantly greater and more regular *truphē*, by material excess.<sup>94</sup> Macedonian symposia, however, differed fundamentally from Greek symposia in two important ways. Whereas the Greek symposium was supposedly a formal, orderly affair, sources report that the Macedonian court drank in disorderly fashion (Ephippus *FGrH* 126F 1 = Ath. 3.120e; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 225 = Ath. 260d).<sup>95</sup> The nature of this disorder

is not entirely certain since, despite the numerous and often detailed descriptions of Macedonian drinking, no surviving account clarifies whether the elite generally followed the order of events at Greek symposia or whether they retained the custom of a symposiarch.

One might, at first, assume that Macedonians were considered unruly drinkers because it was their common practice to drink wine unmixed. Until recently, many scholars assumed that this was their practice.<sup>96</sup> In fact, however, no ancient source makes a general statement that Macedonians drank their wine *akratos*,<sup>97</sup> although there are such general assertions – whatever their literal truth – about other peoples the Greeks considered uncivilized. For instance, a number of Greek authors claimed that drinking wine unmixed was a Scythian custom.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, literary evidence certainly suggests that individual elite Macedonians drank unmixed or barely-mixed wine. For instance, Proteas, one of the guests at Caranus' symposium, gulped down a very large cup of unmixed wine. When Caranus rewarded him with this very cup, a competition in drinking unmixed wine arose among the other guests, each eager for his own reward (Ath. 4. 129e–f 130c).

Doubtless the belief that Macedonians habitually drank unmixed wine originated in the many references to Macedonian kings who drank wine *akratos*. Demosthenes (2.18) associates Philip II with drunkenness and unmixed wine and Diodorus (16.87.1) reports that, after his Chaeronea victory, Philip drank unmixed wine with his friends and joined a *kōmos*.<sup>99</sup> More stories of this sort, however, deal with Alexander's behavior and that of his court. Chares (*FGrH* 125 F 19=Ath. 10. 437a; *Plut.* Alex. 70.1) says that Alexander instituted a contest in drinking unmixed wine, in honor of the memory of Calanus, offering huge prizes, and that forty-two of the contestants died. Athenaeus (10. 434d), citing Chares, Lynceus and Aristobulus as his sources, says that Callisthenes pushed aside a cup of unmixed wine at a drinking party of Alexander. Diodorus (17.117.1) reports that at a *kōmos* of Medius, Alexander drank too much unmixed wine and then the supposedly fatal cup in memory of Heracles.<sup>100</sup> Ancient authors, however, did not necessarily assume that even the heavy-drinking Alexander always drank his wine unmixed. Justin (12.14.9), in his narrative of the supposed poisoning of Alexander by his cupbearer Iolaus, son of Antipater, explains that Iolaus used to taste the king's wine and temper it by adding water to it; when he poisoned it, he put the poison in the cold water.<sup>101</sup> *Akratos* drinking by kings likely served as a model for their courtiers (see further below).

Archaeological evidence supports the conclusion that Macedonians did sometimes mix their wine with water, but that the mixing of wine with

water may have been less common there than elsewhere. Kraters have certainly turned up in tombs in Macedonia, but they do not as often, compared to other drinking vessels, figure among the otherwise elaborate collections of drinking equipment preserved in the tombs of the elite.<sup>102</sup> Other vessels could have been used to mix wine,<sup>103</sup> including the *situla*, which appears more frequently in Macedonian burials than the krater.<sup>104</sup> Macedonian preference for the spouted *situla*, however, is suggestive, since *situlas* with spouts could not have been good for mixing wine.<sup>105</sup> Kraters, however, are less common everywhere in the fourth century and Hellenistic period. Moreover, Kottaridi<sup>106</sup> has suggested that the Macedonian court practice, by the time of the burial of the occupant of Tomb II at Vergina, involved individualized serving of unmixed wine to guests, along with the vessels for mixing, rather than collective mixing in large containers. The change to individualized mixing is also reflected in Athenian pottery shapes, but happens significantly later than either date usually attributed to Tomb II. Nonetheless, kraters continued to be used to some degree and were depicted in *Totenmahl* scenes.<sup>107</sup>

Even if the Macedonian elite did not always drink *akeratos*, the frequent reference to Macedonian imbibing of pure wine – particularly by the kings – hints at a Greek tendency to associate Macedonian culture with the barbaric or semi-barbaric. Of course, southern Greeks sometimes also drank unmixed wine, so it is not possible to speak of absolute polarities of behavior here.<sup>108</sup> The issue of whether or not it was frequent Macedonian practice to mix wine with water is hardly trivial, granted the importance that Greeks placed on the mixing of wine. It became an important cultural marker defining the supposed difference between Greek and barbarian. In theory, only barbarians drank their wine *akeratos* (unmixed).<sup>109</sup> Indeed, Greeks might describe as *akeratos* wine that actually had been diluted by water, but simply not as much as usual.<sup>110</sup> Why Greeks began to mix substantial quantities of water with their wine is unknown,<sup>111</sup> but ancient wine was more uneven in quality than modern vintages.<sup>112</sup> Mixing wine in water made the water safe to drink, an attractive feature for armies on the move.<sup>113</sup> Adding water to it improved the taste, reduced expense, and moderated the effects of alcohol. In a culture that idealized moderation, the krater was seen as a kind of metaphor for balance, civilized behavior, and for the communal experience of the symposium.<sup>114</sup> Perhaps more striking than the Greek view is the apparent indifference of the Macedonian court to it. No source directly explains why the Macedonians so often preferred pure wine (and other drinking practices the Greeks considered disorderly). It is likely that, as Borza has argued,<sup>115</sup> unlike southern Greeks, elite Macedonians had no practical need to dilute the wine: they did not need to

save money (indeed, they probably wished to expend it conspicuously) and the wine available in the north may have tasted better, making dilution less necessary or attractive.<sup>116</sup>

Moreover and more importantly, Macedonians lacked the ideology of *sôphrosynê* which was part of the attraction to other Greeks of mixing wine. Dalby has spoken of the “culture of generosity” of Macedonian kings,<sup>117</sup> but the entire Macedonian elite demonstrated a taste for conspicuous display, of which their heavy drinking, their luxurious couches, and splendid collections of drinking vessels formed a part. Nor did the Macedonian king and elite have to worry, as did citizens of southern city-states, about an ideology of equality.<sup>118</sup> As we have noted, Demosthenes (2.18) tellingly referred to the daily *akrasia* of Philip’s life.

There are a number of indications, however, that Macedonian elite drinking was not only symbolically but actually disorderly. Many elite Macedonians drank to get drunk and were inclined to be *philopotēs* or *polupotēs*. Indeed, Ehippus (*FGrH* 126 F 1) associated Macedonian disorderly drinking not with unmixed wine but rather with the quantity of wine they drank, beginning at an earlier stage in the evening than other Greeks. Philotas, son of Parmenio, while drunk and boasting to his mistress, compared his own accomplishments favorably to those of the king, thus contributing to his ultimate execution (Plut. *Alex.* 48.4). Plutarch’s entire portrait of Philotas (*Alex.* 48.1–5) is one of a man given to love of luxury and excess even in his virtues. In a sense, he is a kind of exemplum for the more generic complaints of Theopompus, Ehippus and others about elite Macedonian excessive behavior and taste. Cleitus (see below), while drunk, embroiled himself in a fatal quarrel with Alexander. Hippolochus termed Cleitus’ nephew Proteas (the grandfather of the man of the same name said to have attended Caranus’ wedding symposium) *polupotēs* (*ap.* Ath. 4.129a) and other references refer to the titanic quantities consumed by this drinking companion of Alexander.<sup>119</sup> Alexander’s closest companion Hephaestion, apparently in the context of royal symposia at Ecbatana, consumed great quantities of wine, though whether his heavy drinking caused or was in response to his ultimately fatal illness is not clear. The prejudices of the sources make it impossible to determine the degree to which alcohol contributed to Hephaestion’s death, much as they do for the death of Alexander.<sup>120</sup>

Thus in respect to quantity and other matters, Macedonian drinking habits were disorderly and excessive by Greek standards, whether or not Macedonians regularly drank unmixed wine. Macedonian kings and courtiers started drinking earlier than other Greeks, drank late into the night and on until daybreak, drank all day long, and slept off the after-

effects of heavy drinking (Ath. 10.438c),<sup>121</sup> sometimes for entire days (Ath. 434b). Since Greeks associated heavy drinking with the use of larger, deeper cups,<sup>122</sup> it would be interesting to know if collections of drinking vessels found in Macedonian tombs generally indicate a predominance of such vessels. Some literary references suggest a fondness for the larger cups,<sup>123</sup> but archaeological evidence is less clear. The popularity of the small but deep silver *kylix* cup is ambiguous.<sup>124</sup> Kottaridi has stressed the small size of the drinking vessels in Tomb II at Vergina.<sup>125</sup> However, apart from the problem of the date of this material, the smaller size of these vessels seems part of a general trend.<sup>126</sup> In any event, the use of smaller vessels for wine hardly precludes heavy drinking, as the existence of many Victorian heavy drinkers certainly demonstrates, though the typical 19<sup>th</sup>-century wine glass was smaller than modern examples.

Elite Macedonians demonstrated habits in relation to the food consumed at symposia that other Greeks, especially Athenians, would also have seen as excessive.<sup>127</sup> Macedonians often combined their drinking parties with elaborate many-course dinners (Ath. 3.101e–f), whereas contemporary Athenians did not drink at all until eating was done. Macedonians made more use of plates (another opportunity for conspicuous display of wealth) than Athenians, who often omitted plates and simply used the table. Similarly, Macedonians combined the eating of bread and meat,<sup>128</sup> consumed far more meat, and offered more courses, with a greater variety of foodstuffs, than Athenians. They also employed metallic spoons for eating, and, if the dinner of Caranus signifies anything about general practice, sent surplus food home with the guests.<sup>129</sup> In keeping with this quasi-theatrical display of disposable wealth, trumpets sounded to signal the beginning and end of Macedonian symposia.<sup>130</sup>

The other critical difference between the drinking habits of Greek and Macedonian elites is the political context of their symposia. Symposia elsewhere often had a political aspect, but their context was the city-state rather than a monarchy. The distinction lies in the different nature of the two political worlds and in how that difference relates to symposia. The Macedonian elite was not threatened or limited by the growing power of the mass of the population.<sup>131</sup>

Whereas most Greek *poleis* lost their kings some time after the Bronze Age, Macedonia retained a form of monarchy in which the power of the king was often checked by circumstance but was little limited by law or custom. Until Antigonid times, Macedonia had a household monarchy in which the elite acquired power by establishing and continuing a personal relationship with the king. All Macedonian symposia held at court, whoever hosted them, were royal events, and the participants needed to curry favor

with the ruler and struggle to improve or maintain their position in the pecking order. They were part of the king's public presentation of himself:<sup>132</sup> much like the royal palaces,<sup>133</sup> royal symposia were meant for display of the king's *truphē* and that of his courtiers. As Borza has so astutely argued, in the absence of a regular royal advisory council, Macedonian symposia had a quasi-constitutional quality. They were the context for decision-making and for the making and breaking of careers.<sup>134</sup> Tension often arose because of the contrast between the casual and open style of monarchs in dealing with the elite and the absolute substance of Macedonian monarchy.

Macedonian royal symposia were different from those hosted by citizens of city states, and Macedonian monarchs were certainly influenced in a variety of ways by other monarchies, most notably the Persian and the Hecatomnid. However, even when influence is undeniable, it would be a mistake to treat royal banquets as generic.<sup>135</sup> Indeed, even in the same dynasty, different monarchs could use banquets and banqueting spaces in very different ways.<sup>136</sup> Philip II and his son Alexander (and their predecessors) all constructed a public image that had shared elements relating to dynastic and even ethnic claims (for instance Heraclid ancestry) but also elements peculiar to each individual ruler's personal preferences and long- and short-term political goals. Royal banquets for both large and small groups would have reflected those changing and varied elements. Perhaps the chance survival or disappearance of sources has created a false impression, but events such as the Dion symposium or that connected to the mass marriages give the impression that Alexander was more concerned (and probably more able) to demonstrate his banqueting *truphē* in terms of size and, perhaps, greater formality.<sup>137</sup>

It is easy and probably dangerous to over-emphasize the hierarchical quality of Macedonian court symposia, particularly when one is not talking about large and apparently formal affairs such as the one related to the mass marriages. For relatively minor guests at such affairs, the social picture was doubtless dramatically asymmetrical and the giving of gifts via the sympotic experience important, but for smaller occasions involving the group immediately around the king, even if others were present in the background or at a distance, only a more subtle social asymmetry remained. In this more intimate setting, the competitiveness that so often led to quarrels within the inner circle played out and crossing the line became something easy to do exactly because the line – what was appropriate to do or say to a king or in his presence – was so unclear: Cleitus, Callisthenes, and Alexander himself, before his father's death, all experienced this. At these symposia the elite sharpened themselves, their minds and

sometimes, one suspects, their knives, on each other. The king's presence was central, but he could not simply lord it over those present; he had to show, by his drinking and his wit, that he was better than they, and they, in turn, had to compete with him and those around them, demonstrating their worthiness.<sup>138</sup>

This distinctive Argead background explains why Macedonian symposia were so viciously competitive in both a literal (e.g. the drinking contest after Calanus' death) and a figurative sense (for instance, the argument between different groups at the symposium where Cleitus died; see Chapter 7 and its afterword). Elite competition at Macedonian symposia could be innocent but tended to turn violent.<sup>139</sup> Literary sources preserve two stories about early royal Macedonian symposia that are probably fictional,<sup>140</sup> but nonetheless suggestive of historical patterns. Herodotus (5.17–21) tells a tale about a royal symposium given by Amyntas I for the Persian king's ambassadors that turned deadly: it ended with the murder of the ambassadors by the king's son and by other members of his court. Plato (*Gorgias* 471 a–c) claims that Archelaus entertained his (Archelaus') uncle Alcetas and his uncle's son, got them quite drunk, and then did away with them, in order to gain the throne. Regicide and conspiracy, often in symposium settings, were, however, certainly real enough. During Philip's reign, two violent incidents with major political consequences took place in a sympotic context. When Philip's new in-law Attalus began to quarrel violently with Alexander, Philip sided with Attalus and only his drunkenness prevented him from killing his son (Plut. *Alex.* 9.4–5; Satyr. *ap.* Ath. 13.557d–e). Attalus, desirous of punishing Pausanias for an injury done to a friend, invited Pausanias to a banquet, offered him unmixed wine, and then arranged his rape by muleteers (Diod. 16.93.7–8) or by his fellow symposiasts, including Attalus (Just. 9.6.6–7; see Chapter 9). Similarly, Alexander killed Cleitus at a drinking party because of a long, drunken argument with him.<sup>141</sup>

One feature of Macedonian symposia seems to have fascinated and repelled Greeks: in a court full of heavy and competitive drinkers, Philip<sup>142</sup> and Alexander, the greatest of Macedonian kings, seem also to have been the greatest of Macedonian drinkers.<sup>143</sup> Aelian (*VH* 12.26) actually claimed that Alexander was the greatest drinker ever. Alexander, at least, had apologists about his drinking habits though theirs was not the predominant view. Arrian (7.29.4) insisted that Alexander's drinking parties were long, not because he wanted to drink a lot of wine but because of his friendliness toward his Companions. Plutarch (*Mor.* 623d–624a) mentions the common view that Alexander did not drink much but simply spent too much time drinking, but ultimately he accepts an

attribution of *poluposia* (much drinking) to Alexander.<sup>144</sup> Curtius (5.7.1) and Justin (9.8.15) agree.

Indeed, as we have already noted, it is difficult to know how to assess Greek testimony about the kings' drinking habits and those of their courtiers. We need to be particularly suspicious of accounts that suggest that either Philip or Alexander drank so heavily that they could not function; their great and largely consistent military success is proof of their general clear-headedness.<sup>145</sup> Many passages by Greek authors dealing with drinking at the Macedonian court have the feel of ethnic stereotyping, even though no general assertions are made about Macedonian preference for unmixer wine.<sup>146</sup>

Political hostility and political agendas have so compromised accounts of some incidents relating to the drinking habits of Philip and his son Alexander as to make them unusable in any literal way. One of these incidents happened after Chaeronea. Differing versions of Philip's actions after his great victory survive, some stressing his post-battle restraint and others his lack of it. One can reconcile some but not all of these differences by concluding (as do some of the sources) that his behavior was at first excessive and later more restrained. However, in some sources his behavior is restrained out of political calculation and in others it is the result of genuine feeling. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F236 = Ath. 435b–c) said that Philip invited the Athenian ambassadors to a banquet; after they had withdrawn, he sent for his Companions and various musicians and those who regularly drank with him; after drinking all night, he again reveled with the Athenian ambassadors. Theopompus' Philip is very drunk but is not said to have done anything specifically offensive to the dead or the defeated. In Plutarch Philip's actions are far more offensive but also more changeable. In Plutarch's *Demosthenes* (20.3), after the victory, Philip grew excessive in his joy, full of hubris, made a *kōmos* through the bodies of the slain and, being drunk, began to make fun of Demosthenes. Later, he sobered up and realized that the power of the orator had forced him to hazard his kingdom. In this account, there is no regret for his general behavior but simply for that directed at Demosthenes. In the *Moralia* (715c) Philip sobers up quickly too, but not because of Demosthenes or because of his feelings about the dead,<sup>147</sup> but rather because the offer of a treaty forces him to focus on the practical. Diodorus (16.86.6–87.1) also has Philip act in hubristic fashion (though the *kōmos* in Diodorus insults the captives rather than the slain) and also has Philip's behavior change, but the circumstance is quite different. In Diodorus, Demades' criticism of his behavior immediately renders Philip regretful and humane in his treatment of the defeated; he instantly sobers up and the narrative seems to imply



that he cannot have been as drunk as he appears to be in Plutarch. Aelian (*VH* 8.15) specifically denies that Philip, although encouraged by his victory, became arrogant or excessive.<sup>148</sup> (Elsewhere, Aelian [*VH* 6.1] describes Philip as politically overbearing after his victory,<sup>149</sup> but says nothing of personal excess.) Justin (9.4.1–3) says that Philip behaved modestly after Chaeronea and did not engage in a *keōmos*, but he attributes this behavior to shrewd calculation, not to sympathy for the defeated.

The contradictions in the surviving tradition about Philip's post-Chaeronea behavior, combined with the tremendous political importance of Philip's triumph, should give us pause. If a Macedonian victory was an inescapable fact of life, then it might be more bearable if it were attributed to an uncivilized lout; the Greeks experienced military but not cultural defeat, as the Demosthenes and Demades stories suggest. Of course, for Philip's contemporaries, such stories could function as tools used by his enemies in an attempt to undermine his victory and the support it could generate. His supporters had good reason to offer opposing versions. Since both traditions transparently served some contemporary end, neither inspires much confidence.

Similarly (see above), neither version of Alexander's drinking behavior at the time he began his fatal illness deserves credence. We have already discussed the vulgate's "Cup of Heracles" theme, obviously meant to blame Antipater and his clan for the death of Alexander and to make clear that it was not a natural death. The various versions of the *Ephemerides*, with their reports of unusually heavy daily and nearly continuous drinking, are equally dubious since they appear to have been constructed in order to exculpate members of the elite from charges of involvement in his death.<sup>150</sup> Accounts of Alexander's drinking in association with the burning of Persepolis are also suspect, though for a different reason: Alexander may have used sympotic drunkenness to disguise policy.<sup>151</sup>

In the case of both Philip and Alexander, evidence relating to other less suspect episodes in their lives does permit analysis and merits more belief. Moreover, one must recognize that not all ethnic or political stereotypes are necessarily absolute fabrications. Sometimes outsiders exaggerate actual cultural traits rather than inventing them wholesale. That may be the case with Theopompus' picture of Philip as regularly drunk (see above); Theopompus had, after all, visited his court. He didn't, for instance, accuse Philip of parsimony or sexual incompetence. One must conclude that drinking was the king's vulnerable area, one where exaggeration could be used with enough plausibility to generate belief. Two anecdotes about Philip's fondness for drink serve no obvious political purpose though they may well trade in character rather than ethnic stereotyping. In one a woman

indirectly complained about his lack of sobriety at the time he made a decision about a case in which she was involved and the king, recognizing the truth of her complaint, reversed himself (Stob. *Flor.* 13.29; Val. Max. 6.2 ext. 1).<sup>152</sup> In another (Carystius *ap.* Ath. 10.435d), Philip announces that it is time to drink, that it is enough that Antipater is sober. Stories like these picture Philip as a “genial drunk” capable of modifying his behavior when necessary.<sup>153</sup> They fit into a more general image of Philip as a larger-than-life but likable ruler. But the most believable information about Philip’s drinking relates to the symposium held for his last wedding (see above). According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.4–5), a drunken Attalus, guardian of the bride, toasted the possibility of a legitimate successor. When Alexander challenged his statement and threw a cup at him, Philip tried to attack his son but was prevented by a fall he took, thanks to his anger and his consumption of wine. Plutarch characterizes the entire affair as *paroinia* (drunken behavior or violence). Quite apart from Plutarch’s explicit testimony, the fact that Philip’s actions ran counter to his own interest in securing the succession also confirms the idea that his actions were affected by how much he had drunk.<sup>154</sup>

Even if we discount references to Alexander’s drinking at the time of his fatal illness or at Persepolis, a number of other more trustworthy references to his heavy drinking survive. As we have already noted, his actions, like those of his father and Attalus, may have been affected by the amount of wine he had consumed at the time of the wedding quarrel.<sup>155</sup> But the most famous and most credible incident in which our sources say Alexander drank to excess is the symposium during which he killed Cleitus, co-commander of the Companion cavalry and a man who had saved Alexander’s life in battle. While the sources vary considerably as to the degree of provocation that the argumentative Cleitus gave to the king and the degree to which provocation was given to Cleitus, consensus exists<sup>156</sup> that Alexander was drunk at the time and that his drunkenness was critical. Plutarch (*Alex.* 50. 1), for instance, attributes Alexander’s actions to “anger and drunkenness” (Arrian 4.9.1 echoes this view) though Plutarch also refers to general drunkenness of the guests (50.4) and to that of Cleitus (50.5). Quite apart from his murderous violence, Alexander’s actions seem those of someone seriously inebriated (and, as is often noted, like Philip’s at his wedding): he throws an apple at Cleitus, attempts to find his sword, and tries to have the alarm sounded (Plut. *Alex.* 51. 3–4).

Many other references to Alexander’s symptomatic drunkenness exist. He escaped the assassination plotted by the Royal Youths (the so-called Pages) because he prolonged his drinking party to daybreak or past (Curt. 8.6.12–17; Arr. 4.13. 5–6). Often the king led a Dionysiac *kōmos* of his Companions. For instance, once a drunken Alexander guided a group

of his fellow guests to crown the statue of a local celebrity with garlands (Plut. *Alex.* 17.5).<sup>157</sup> Symposia and *kōmoi* were part of the general pattern of discipline and indiscipline in the army of Philip and Alexander: after making extreme demands on their men, the kings often allowed extreme release.<sup>158</sup> The sources always depict Alexander as the leader in drinking, as, in effect, the dominant drinker.

Some sources suggest that Alexander drank heavily with greater frequency over time, paralleling his increasing absolutism and paranoia.<sup>159</sup> Arrian (4.8.2), for instance, introducing his account of the death of Cleitus, comments that Alexander had begun a new pattern of “more barbaric” drinking, thus “othering” heavy drinking (or, granted the belief that barbarians drank *akeratos*, perhaps indicating more drinking of unmixed wine). Alternatively, one might wonder whether Alexander actually drank more than he had before or whether he had simply become more unpredictable, nastier while drunk. Others do not focus on change. Plutarch, though insisting that Alexander was not as given to drinking as some say (*Alex.* 23.1), nonetheless reports that when he drank he often became arrogant, boastful and generally obnoxious and he would often sleep till noon or even much later on the following day (*Alex.* 23.4–5).<sup>160</sup> Curtius (5.7.1) sees Alexander’s otherwise good character as fouled by his excessive love of wine.

Macedonian symposia, like Greek symposia generally, had a religious aspect. As we have seen, many accounts of drinking refer to Dionysus and Dionysiac *kōmoi*. While modern authors tend to slight the story of Alexander’s reported omission of an annual sacrifice to Dionysus (Arr. 4.8.2, 9.5; Curt. 8.2.6)<sup>161</sup> as a mere excuse for his sympotic killing of Cleitus, whatever one thinks about Alexander’s personal view,<sup>162</sup> the “wrath of Dionysus” explanation suggests that it had meaning for his contemporaries. Dionysus was about violence and its containment, about moderation in the use of wine (see above) and excess as well.<sup>163</sup> Indeed, the god was not simply the giver of wine to human kind but was the wine itself; those who poured a libation to the gods poured Dionysus (Eur. *Bacch.* 284–285). Worship of Dionysus took many forms, not all connected to wine.<sup>164</sup> The relationship between Dionysus and Macedonian symposia may not have been limited to his role as a wine god but also connected to Macedonian beliefs about the afterlife.<sup>165</sup> Judging by the tombs of the elite, Macedonians took hope of an afterlife more seriously and literally than southern Greeks.<sup>166</sup> Banqueting scenes in relationship to tombs (*Totenmahl* scenes) appear all over Greece,<sup>167</sup> but in Macedonia, Dionysiac imagery is extremely prevalent in funerary contexts: many tombs refer to symposia in some way and funerary *klinai* are the single most common furniture item in Macedonian tombs.<sup>168</sup> A striking example of this general phenomenon is a tomb discovered in 1994 at Agios

Athanasios in tumulus E. Though fragments of ivory decorations of a *klinē* were found, the tomb is remarkable for well-preserved painted scenes in a narrow frieze above the door: a torchlight procession appears on the left, a symposium in the central scene, and soldiers in helmets on the right.<sup>169</sup> A connection between drinking and death<sup>170</sup> in Macedonia seems clear, but the nature and significance of the connection is difficult to determine.<sup>171</sup>

Royal drinking habits at symposia were linked to Macedonian kingship itself. Philip and Alexander drank on a heroic scale reminiscent of their ancestor Heracles, quite possibly in conscious imitation of him.<sup>172</sup> The titanic drinking capacity of Macedonian kings had more than mythic resonance. Their drinking helped to bind the Companions to them; it was part of being king.<sup>173</sup> The heavy drinking of Philip and Alexander probably got them as much admiration as their bravery on the field. From a Macedonian point of view, both were admirable and appropriate in a king. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 162 = *Ath.* 6.260b–c) was incensed that the Thessalians, heavy drinkers like the Macedonians, were won over by Philip's drinking and entertaining. Though Theopompus sees Macedonian habits from a negative point of view, the reaction he attributes to the Thessalians works just as well for the Macedonians themselves. That is not to say that the Macedonian court had no sense at all for limits about royal drinking behavior; it seems clear, for instance, that Alexander stepped over some line in the Cleitus incident, not so much because he killed Cleitus as because he nearly turned on his friends (*Curt.* 8.2.7).<sup>174</sup> Still, just as the Macedonian king had to show himself the best at the hunt and those who, whatever their motive, threatened to compromise the king's predominance risked royal wrath,<sup>175</sup> so also the king had to dominate the symposium and not only drink with but outdrink his Companions. In this as in all else, the king had to demonstrate his *aretē*, but the context for this demonstration was his interaction, often volatile, with the rest of the elite. Royal symposia offered a venue for the king's display of his power but also presented opportunities for other elite Macedonians to assert themselves, whether against the king or others. The king was chief drinker, but he was also a fellow drinker. Royal symposia embodied the intimate but competitive world of the Macedonian court.

Granted the increasing Hellenization of the court and the dramatic increase in the number of courtiers of Greek origin, the distinctive nature of the Macedonian symposium was hardly the consequence of ignorance of southern Greek practice. It represented, rather, a willful refusal to abandon practices that defined both the style and the substance of Macedonian monarchy and, at the same time, by their excess, confirmed Macedonia's wealth and power.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Carney 2002 (Chapter 13) for a similar argument applied to another kind of interaction of king and elite: hunting. *Akasia*, the critical word in Demosthenes 2.18–19 has two different meanings. In this passage, I think it means “unmixed, badly mixed” and the middle alpha is long. The other meaning, with the middle alpha short, has to do with lack of control. In terms of the general meaning of the passage, there is comparatively little difference but the second reading robs my argument of the metaphor. Since *akrasia* is immediately followed by a reference to drunkenness, my view is supported. Trevett 2011, 48, however, translate *akrasia* as “loose-living”, thus preferring the second meaning. Peter Green, in private conversation, wonders if Demosthenes perhaps hoped that his listeners would think of both meanings.

<sup>2</sup> Etienne 2006, 106.

<sup>3</sup> Some date Tomb II to 336 and ascribe it to Philip II and others to 316 or 315 and ascribe it to Philip III. Though many continue to accept the view propounded by Andronikos that the male occupant of Tomb II was Philip II (see references in Carney 1991), the identification of the occupant as Philip Arrhidaeus (best articulated by Borza 1987) has gained increasing support because of recent reexamination of the occupant’s physical remains utilizing new technology (Bartsiakas 2000), reflection on the appropriate art historical context of the fresco on the facade of Tomb II (Palagia 2000), and the realization that military paraphernalia found in the antechamber of Tomb II, once thought to be limited to the area of the threshold of the door to the male burial in the main chamber, was more extensive in nature and distributed throughout the antechamber (making an identification of the female occupant as anyone other than Adea Eurydice, wife of Philip Arrhidaeus and a female warrior, an unlikely choice (Carney 2004). See also Chapters 4 and 5 and their Afterwords.

<sup>4</sup> Themelis and Touratsoglou 1997, 202–24 dated the Derveni tombs, once typically placed in mid 4<sup>th</sup> century, in the reign of Philip II, to the late 4<sup>th</sup> century and suggested that the majority of rich Macedonian burials, funded by wealth from Alexander’s conquests, derive from the same period, late 4<sup>th</sup> to early 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC.

<sup>5</sup> The palace at Aegae had conventionally been dated to the reign of Cassander (very late 4<sup>th</sup> century), but a number of scholars have argued for an earlier date, during the reign of Philip (see Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2001, 210 n.33 for references). Similarly, some scholars date Buildings I and II at Pella to the reign of Philip II (see Hatzopoulos 2001, 192 for references).

<sup>6</sup> Themelis and Touratsoglou 1997, 222–24 believed that the newly acquired wealth is reflected in Macedonian burials of the late fourth and early third centuries, but we have less comparable information prior to this period. Moreover, Philip’s reign had already increased Macedonian wealth significantly so one must not exaggerate the difference between the reigns.

<sup>7</sup> Murray 1996, 20 speaks of the resemblance between Alexander’s larger banquets in Asia and Persian royal feasting of retainers. See Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1995, 295–8 on the Persian royal feasting tradition and Vössing 2004, 72, who cites, among many passages, Plut. *Alex.* 20.6–8. The resemblance, however, between this passage and Hdt. 9.80–93 – here the tent of Darius, there the tent of Mardonius (see below, n. 9) – should give us pause.

<sup>8</sup> Kottaridi 2004, 71.

<sup>9</sup> Kienast 1973 argued that Persian influence on the court of Philip II was extensive.

While some Persian influence seems undeniable, Kienast tended to assume that similarity automatically signified influence. The topic merits further discussion.

<sup>10</sup> Dalby 1993, 153.

<sup>11</sup> A classic example of this phenomenon is offered by stories about the Spartan general Pausanias. Viewing the splendor of the captured tent of Mardonius and its elaborate dining apparatus, Pausanias comments that the Persians have come to steal the poverty of the Greeks (Herod. 9.80–83). Yet Thucydides (1.128–30) claims that this same Pausanias could not resist the luxurious lifestyle of the Persians and sold out to them.

<sup>12</sup> For instance, some suspect that Theopompus' condemnation of Philip, his court and Companions (*FGrH* 115–F224, 225a, 225b) resulted from the king's failure to choose him as his son's tutor (see references in Carney 2003, 52 n.21).

<sup>13</sup> See recent discussion and bibliography of the "Macedonian question" in Hall 2001. Badian 1982, 42–43 argued that we have no way of knowing what the Macedonians thought, though he found some things suggestive, such as Alexander's decision not to integrate Greeks into Macedonian units.

<sup>14</sup> Dalby 1993, 152. See below for discussion of the possible Macedonian model for a change in Attic practice in the serving of wine.

<sup>15</sup> Paul 1991, 157–9, who warns that historiographic tradition tended to make accounts of symposia or *deipna* cautionary tales.

<sup>16</sup> *Contra* O'Brien 180b, 100 who noted that the sources offer details about fifteen of Alexander's symposia over the eleven-year period of his reign and that drinking and drunkenness is mentioned in terms of fourteen of the fifteen, and apparently found greater significance in these figures than I do. One can hardly doubt that many, many more than fifteen symposia occurred, but we have no way of knowing whether the king was drunk at most of them.

<sup>17</sup> A classic example: Plutarch tells an anecdote about Philip II, Alexander, and a harpist on five occasions. In four of the five (*Mor.* 67f, 179b, 334d, 643c–d) Alexander warns his father that a king should only appreciate music, not practice it, but in the fifth (*Per.* 1.5) it is Philip who reproaches Alexander. If anything, it is the exceptional version that makes more sense in context.

<sup>18</sup> Tomlinson 1970, 308–15; Borza 1983, 45–55 and 1990, 241–42.

<sup>19</sup> General discussions of Greek symposia sometimes cited Tomlinson, but long ignored Borza's work. This has begun to change. Murray 1996, 17 n. 8, cited Borza in passing but ignored his general thesis. (Vössing 2004 did much the same.) Nielsen 1998, 102 paid more attention.

<sup>20</sup> O'Brien 1980a; 1980b; 1992.

<sup>21</sup> O'Brien 1980b, 84, for instance, stressed the necessity of considering "social factors" in understanding a person's drinking habits, and commented that though Alexander was an excessive drinker even by Macedonian standards, his drinking "becomes credible within the context of his personal background and society."

<sup>22</sup> Vokotopoulou 2001.

<sup>23</sup> For instance, Murray 1996 and Rotroff 1996 appeared at the same time; neither could benefit from discussion in the other work.

<sup>24</sup> See Murray 1990a; Slater 1991; Murray and Tecusan 1995; Davidson 1998.

<sup>25</sup> Murray 1991, 84–85; Davidson 1998, 37–38.

<sup>26</sup> It has taken on a point of view borrowed from some anthropological work. In extreme cases, alcoholism itself is sometimes viewed as a modern, western

construct. So, for instance, Douglas 1987b, 3–4, and Dalby 1996, 17, who seemed to conflate the absence of a conceptualization of addiction with the absence of addiction itself. As Murray 1990b, 3, observed, such an interpretation not only appeals to modern perceptions of the world but also reflects ancient ones.

<sup>27</sup> McKinlay 1949b, 289 complained about the way in which scholarship tended to see the Greeks “as having solved the drinking problem remarkably well”. Obviously, this tendency involves ignoring a great deal of contradictory material and an uncritical willingness to believe that those who preached moderation always practiced it.

<sup>28</sup> See McKinlay 1949b, 289–315 for a collection of stories about the heavy drinking of people from non-Attic Greek states, among them Macedonians, Thessalians and Byzantines. McKinlay, however, uncritically accepts the literal truth of these references.

<sup>29</sup> Wardle *et al.* 2001 used archaeological evidence to discuss Macedonian drinking practices in the Bronze and early Iron Age. They noted (2001, 641) a greater frequency of the krater and cup in Macedonia in that period than in southern Greece and suggested that even then drinking “was particularly important” and probably connected to “social or ceremonial drinking,” though they hypothesized that Bronze Age Macedonians made a transition from drinking from a communal cup to the use of individual ones.

<sup>30</sup> Murray 1983a, 258–60; 1991, 99.

<sup>31</sup> Wright 1996, 303–305 points out that while there are many Mycenaean kraters, no firm evidence associates mixing with Bronze Age Greece.

<sup>32</sup> Murray 1991, 95 supported a date in the eighth century, but most scholars say it was the seventh.

<sup>33</sup> Paul 1991, 166 comments that a “properly conducted symposium was an index of civilized behavior.”

<sup>34</sup> The custom was apparently imported from the Near East: Murray 1990b, 6–7. Berquist 1990, 77–78 made the important point that far from everyone reclined to eat: adult, free males with some wealth and sophistication were the ones who generally did so. See also Booth 1991, 106.

<sup>35</sup> See Lissarrague 1990, 1–19. See Murray 1991, 88 for a discussion of Plato’s defense of the use of wine in moderation (Plato *Laws* 637d–e). Paul 1991, 160 pointed out that Plutarch put particular emphasis on the importance of order and moderation in the symposium and is, therefore, bothered by its absence.

<sup>36</sup> If one takes 7–11 couches as a kind of classical norm (e.g. Tomlinson 1970, 309–10; Davidson 1997, 43–44), then the typical symposium would involve 14–22 guests.

<sup>37</sup> Davidson 1998, 135–55.

<sup>38</sup> Davidson 1998, 44–48 offers the clearest description of the ideal symposium.

<sup>39</sup> See Bremmer 1990, 135–48

<sup>40</sup> See Bremmer 1990, 137–140; Booth 1991, 105–20. Aristotle (*Pol.* 7.15.9), in the course of a discussion of the need to protect children from various dangers, remarks that they should not be allowed to hear lampoons or comedies until they reach the age at which it is proper to recline in company and to drink (or perhaps become drunk), when they will have had sufficient education to protect themselves. This remark certainly implies that boys did not regularly attend. Xenophon (*Symp.* 1.8) mentions the attendance of a youth at a symposium, but notes that he sat by his father, whereas the rest reclined. In some Greek communities, boys seem to have been present to serve wine (as in Homer), but did not recline. See below for Macedonian version of this custom.

<sup>41</sup> See Murray 1983a, 263–68, 1983b, 1990b, 1995. His views were expanded by Morris and Kurke. See also Dentzer 1982. For further reference and discussion, see Hamer 2004.

<sup>42</sup> Hammer 2004.

<sup>43</sup> Hammer 2004, 492, n. 46, 497–99. On the spread of sympotic behavior, see also Rotroff 1996; Fisher 2000, 361–71.

<sup>44</sup> Westgate 1997–1998, 100.

<sup>45</sup> Westgate 1997–1998, 104.

<sup>46</sup> Villard 1988, 447 pointed out that in the Hellenistic period, drinking in company with a meal became more common and yet more so in the Roman era. Paul 1991, 158 deduces that because of this, the distinction between a symposium and a banquet was blurred.

<sup>47</sup> Dunbabin 1991, 122 noted that the physical nature of the room where people banqueted changed in the Hellenistic period: it was no longer square and was more open, reflecting a decline in the understanding of the symposium as an activity that required its own physical setting, an understanding that allowed for a more multipurpose use of the space.

<sup>48</sup> Rotroff 1996, 10–12, discussing Athenian evidence.

<sup>49</sup> Dalby 1996, 23.

<sup>50</sup> For instance, as Murray 1996, 16 noted, the Macedonians employed a different musical instrument to signal the libations marking the end of the *deipnon* and beginning of the symposium.

<sup>51</sup> Herodotus (5.17–21) tells a famous story about the women of the family of Amyntas I and Alexander which stresses the point that Argead women would not ordinarily have been present at such an affair. Despite the dubious historicity of the tale and its transparent propaganda intent (i.e. the Argeads acted like Hellenes), later and more trustworthy accounts do not contradict the idea that this was indeed practice at the Macedonian court. For instance, neither Satyrus nor Plutarch mentions the presence of the bride (let alone of Olympias) at the drinking party celebrating the wedding of Cleopatra to Philip II (Plut. *Alex.* 9.4–5; Satyr. *ap.* Athen, 13.557d). No royal women are reported to have been present at any of the many Macedonian drinking parties. Thaïs, the Athenian *hetaira*, was prominent in the drinking party that led to the burning of Persepolis (see Berve 1926b, 175 for references) and Lamia, a favorite *hetaira* of Demetrius Poliorcetes, hosted a drinking party (Ath. 4.128a–b).

<sup>52</sup> Hoepfner 1996, 13–15, impressed by the increasing public role of royal women and apparently unaware of relevant literary information. Etienne 2006, 113 expressed doubts but suggested that women could have been present, but sitting rather than reclining. He cites Andronikos 1993, 150. However, Andronikos refers only to the *Totenmahl* funerary scene, not real-life practice.

<sup>53</sup> Although, as Vokotopoulou 2001, 732, 737 observed, female burials do often contain some drinking items, such as *phialai* and *stephanoi* (which she seems to associate with symposia, but did have other uses and significance), they do not have the large sets (see below) of drinking vessels found in male burials. This is true even of the female burial in the antechamber of Tomb II at Vergina.

<sup>54</sup> She compared the woman in the scene to the women in the “Macedonian Royal Family” Boscoreale painting (Rhomiopoulou 1973, 90).

<sup>55</sup> Mantis 1990, 35 has interpreted the couple as Persephone and Hades; Brécoulaki



2006, 52 concurred, but with reluctance, bothered by the mature depiction of the female figure and some aspects of the male, and admitted that the figures may represent those buried in the tomb. The grey hair of the male, the rather matronly figure of his companion, and the key, possibly a sign of priestly office, that the male holds in his hand make the Persephone and Hades identification, in my view, less convincing than that of Rhomiopoulou. Alternatively, this might be yet another *Totenmahl* scene. If so, as with other such scenes, the connection to everyday reality is unclear. My anonymous reader observes that the two figures recline in order to fit the triangular space in which they are placed, much like reclining figures in the Parthenon pediment.

<sup>56</sup> Kottaridi 2004, 69.

<sup>57</sup> Dalby 1993, 171–87 reviewed general Hellenic evidence.

<sup>58</sup> Murray 1996, 16 saw this as a mere variation of the Greek practice of having underage youths sit with their fathers. The custom is doubtless historical but its application to Cassander is probably political propaganda: see Briant 1991, 225; Carney 2002, 71 n. 45; Vössing 2004, 68.

<sup>59</sup> Tomlinson 1993, 1498 believed that Greeks would have been unwilling to make such an exception. Their position may simply have been a result of the need to save space when 6,000 dined.

<sup>60</sup> Aelian *VH* 13.4 tells a story about a banquet Archelaus gave for his Companions in which Euripides and Agathon embraced after Agathon reclined on the same couch with the playwright. (Scullion 2003 argued, not very plausibly in my view, against the historicity of Euripides' stay in Macedonia.) Tomlinson 1993, 1496 suggested that the change could have happened as early as the reign of Archelaus or even Alexander I. Many references from Alexander's day refer to elite Macedonians as reclining.

<sup>61</sup> At Sindos in late 6<sup>th</sup>, early 5<sup>th</sup>: see Tomlinson 1993, 1498; Vokotopoulou 2001, 731.

<sup>62</sup> Tomlinson 1993, 1495–98. If the palace at Vergina, with its clearly defined spaces in multiple drinking rooms for many couches, or if Tomb II at Vergina dates to the reign of Philip II (see above), this would be certain evidence. Many Macedonian graves contain *klinai*, but the dates of these graves (see above) are not certain. The custom linking reclining to success at hunting implies that reclining at meals was not a new habit.

<sup>63</sup> Many sources mention Iolaus, the cupbearer of Alexander the Great, because of suspicions that he was involved in his father Antipater's alleged plot to poison Alexander (Diod. 17.118.1; Arr. 7.27.2; Just. 12.14.9). Another northern Greek kingdom, Molossia, apparently also retained the practice; Pyrrhus had several cupbearers, one of whom was unsuccessfully approached to poison the king (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.3–5).

<sup>64</sup> On the Royal Youths, see Carney 1980–81, 227–8; Hammond 1990; Hatzopoulos 1994, 87–111 and Chapters 8 and 11.

<sup>65</sup> Aeschines actually said that Demosthenes reported all this to the *boulē*. Though Aeschines rejected Demosthenes' innuendos about Alexander's presence, he seemed to confirm the description of Alexander's actions. The passage mentions that Alexander interacted with another boy, so he cannot have been the only one present.

<sup>66</sup> Significantly, references to the two cup-bearers mentioned above have erotic aspects: Iolaus is said to be the lover of Medius, giver of the feast, and Plutarch's narrative about Pyrrhus' cupbearer Myrtilus seems to imply that he was Pyrrhus' lover and that Gelon, the man who tried to persuade him to poison Pyrrhus, also tried to seduce him. See Bremmer 1990, 139–41 on the erotic associations of wine pourers in Greek tradition, starting with Ganymede.

<sup>67</sup> Murray 1996, 17 saw size as a fundamental difference between Macedonian and Greek practice, connecting larger size to an unequal sort of commensality involving many retainers. However, as the varying size of banqueting rooms at the Vergina palace suggests, not all royal banquets, let alone those hosted by other members of the elite, happened in such large and public circumstances.

<sup>68</sup> Berquist 1990, 37.

<sup>69</sup> For instance, the “House of Dionysus” and the “House of the Abduction of Helen”: see Cohen 1995, 492 for references.

<sup>70</sup> See references in Nielsen 1998, 107 n.17. See also Dunbabin 1991, 122.

<sup>71</sup> Nielsen 1997, 157–58 points out that most of the Vergina palace *andrōnes* were of the smaller size, holding fifteen to nineteen couches, only slightly larger than such rooms in non-royal dwellings. See below on the uncertainty, however, of some of the identified uses of those rooms.

<sup>72</sup> So Berquist 1990, 53–54, who made some interesting suggestions about how conversational groups might have broken down into smaller groups and provided some helpful diagrams. Berquist’s discussion of the evidence is excellent, but her scholarship is a good example of the kind of unconscious Athenocentrism found in much of the otherwise fascinating work on symposia. For instance, she called the dining rooms at Vergina “unpleasantly large” (1990, 54) and made an unfavorable comparison between the “old-fashioned, intimate” atmosphere of the Greek symposium and the reveling and display of the Macedonian (1990, 53).

<sup>73</sup> Ginouvès’ (1994, 87) description of these rooms as “multi-purpose meeting rooms” seems unnecessarily apologetic, though Fisher 2000, 360 was probably right to surmise that they indeed were used for many purposes. These were rooms built for a specific purpose, though usable for others.

<sup>74</sup> Nielsen 1997, 142 suggested that the palace courtyards may have had gardens. Tsididou-Avloniti 2006, 326 suggested that the Agios Athanasios Macedonian tomb fresco depicts a symposium in the open air.

<sup>75</sup> Tomlinson concluded that “the main function of the Vergina palace was to accommodate drinking parties” (1970, 315). See also Börker 1983, 18 and Kottaridi 2004, 70 who apparently continued to accept this view.

<sup>76</sup> Whereas the 1981 J. Travlos diagram reproduced by Andronikos (1984, 43 fig. 18) and Ginouvès (1994, 85 fig. 70) showed fifteen rooms in the palace with raised borders, the diagram of the palace shown in Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2001 (201 fig. 1), labeled “After J. Travlos,” showed only nine with this feature. The poor preservation of the northern wing of the Vergina palace has something to do with second thoughts about the number of *andrōnes*, but so too did doubts about whether initial identifications of individual rooms were correct; see further Etienne 2006, 109–110.

<sup>77</sup> The circular room in the Vergina palace has been interpreted as intended for ritual of some sort (Cooper and Morris 1990, 66–85) or for recreational drinking (Miller 1972, 78–79) or understood as a throne room (Andronikos 1984, 42) but is more often viewed as a sanctuary, thanks to the inscription to Heracles the Ancestor found *in situ* (Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2001). It could have served all three purposes. (Lauter 1987, 346; Ginouvès 1994, 86). See also Price 1973, 66–71.

<sup>78</sup> Lauter 1987, 346 suggested that the varying sizes of the many banquet rooms imply status differentiation in use.

<sup>79</sup> Westlake 1997–98, 106 pointed out that two of the elite houses at Pella (House

of Rape of Helen and House of Dionysos) had at least two such rooms, probably three and possibly as many as five, all far larger than those of earlier houses.

<sup>80</sup> Vokotopoulou 2001, 732 took the Duris story literally and thus supposed that it must refer to Philip's early years, prior to his control of the gold of Pangaeus. So also Völcker-Janssen 1993, 187. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 224, 225b=Ath. 166f–167c, 260d–261a), though omitting reference to specific objects, complains of the luxury and extravagance of Philip's court.

<sup>81</sup> Ael. *VH* 8.7; Plut. *Alex.* 70.2 give similar descriptions of the event, all possibly based on Chares.

<sup>82</sup> The account of Caranus' symposium preserved in Athenaeus probably contains considerable exaggeration. See discussion and references in Dalby 1988 (who, as did most scholars, seemed to assume the literal truth of the banquet narrative) and Tripodi 1999 (who warned against taking the account literally, pointed to the difficulties of distinguishing reality from hyperbolic fiction, but also used it as evidence). Vössing 2004, 71–72 took the Caranus account so literally that he suggested that Tomlinson's picture (1970) of couches placed against the wall at Macedonian symposia (based on archaeological evidence) should be modified. One could wonder whether Caranus himself is historical at all, granted the dubious historicity of the Caranus who appeared on the Argead king list (see Greenwalt 1985) and the likely fictional character of the son of that name whom Justin (11.2.3) ascribed to Philip II.

<sup>83</sup> As Tripodi 1999, 1224 n.18 pointed out, if one accepts this account without question, Caranus handed over 460 different pieces to his guests. However, he conceded (1999, 1225) that the conquest of the Persian Empire may have enabled something like the excess described for members of the elite, at least for a few generations.

<sup>84</sup> At Tomb II in Vergina, in front of both the male and female burials was a couch elaborately decorated in gold and ivory (Drogou *et al.* 1996, 55–57). The dead man in Vergina II was cremated on a second gold- and ivory-decorated couch; fragments were found in the remains from the funeral pyre (Drogou *et al.* 1996, 103). Another such couch was placed in front of the burial of the young male in Tomb III at Vergina (Drogou *et al.* 1996, 66–67). In looted Tomb IV at Vergina, a tiny fragment of yet another ivory-decorated couch was found (Drogou *et al.* 1996, 45). A late-fourth-century Macedonian tomb in the Thessaloniki-Phoinix area (*AR* 1988–89, 71) preserved remains of several burials, one of which involved a funerary couch decorated with ivory. At Agios Athanasios (*AR* 1997–98, 77), a Macedonian tomb from the late fourth or early third century had traces of an ivory-decorated funerary couch.

<sup>85</sup> Whereas banquet accounts tend to mention such fabric in association with the decoration of interiors or couches, fabric preserved in tombs typically appears as the wrapping of cremated remains, housed in a *larnax* or some other container used for burial. The prevalence of the remains of such rich fabric, however, speaks to its wide accessibility within the elite. Traces of purple and sometimes purple and gold fabric have been found in the burials in Vergina Tomb II (Drogou *et al.* 1996, 55–57); the Tomb of the Throne (the “Eurydice Tomb”) at Vergina (Ginouvés 1994, 160); Derveni Beta (Themelis and Touratsoglou 1997, 194); a group of three fourth-century tombs in the Pydna area (*AR* 1988–89, 68); at Agios Athanasios in a woman's burial in a cist tomb from the late fourth, early third century BC (*AR* 1997–98, 77); and at Pella in a single-chamber Macedonian tomb dating to late in the Antigonid period (*AR* 1996–97, 77–78).

<sup>86</sup> Themelis and Touratsoglou 1997, 210 pointed to the fact that both Vergina II and Derveni Beta had twenty drinking vessels; see also Chapter 5 (Carney 1999, 37) who makes the same point but extends it to a comparison of Derveni Alpha and Tomb III at Vergina. Borza 1990, 260 spoke of “a common Macedonian burial culture” and Vokotopoulou 2001, 735–37 stressed the commonality of Macedonian symposium equipment in this period, even in female burials. She noted the appearance at many sites of golden, silver or gilded *stephanoi*.

<sup>87</sup> Some have contended (Vickers and Gill 1994; Rotroff 1996, 27) that the rich used only metal vessels for drinking and that pottery drinking vessels were second-best imitations, but this connection is controversial. See references and discussion in Fisher 2000, 361–71.

<sup>88</sup> Tsibidou-Avloniti 2002, 95.

<sup>89</sup> See references and discussion in Barr-Sharrar 1999; Sideris 2000; Vokotopoulou 2001. Barr-Sharrar 1999, 108 saw early ownership and retention of metal vessels as display but also as a form of investment in an unstable society. Sideris 2000 argued that older metal vessels buried in later tombs demonstrated earlier wealth and display. Controversy about dating (see above) complicates the matter. Vokotopoulou 2001, 733–37 traced a pattern of buried sympotic wealth: increase in archaic Macedonian burials, decline in the troubled fifth and early fourth centuries, rising wealth from the second half of the reign of Philip II through the first half of the third century, and then more modest equipment from the late third century until the end of Macedonian monarchy. Tripodi 1999, 1226 contrasts the wealth and display of the small elite in the post-conquest years with the worsening economic situation of the majority of the population.

<sup>90</sup> Völcker-Janssen 1993, 187–91 took too literally the alleged earlier simplicity of Macedonian elite life, a theme that sometimes appears in the literary sources.

<sup>91</sup> The fondness of Alexander and other members of his court for the work of the playwright whom Archelaus had once invited to Aegae is well known: see Chapter 7 (Carney 1981), 153, 157; Borza 1983, 51. Even if one accepts Scullion’s argument (2003) that Euripides did not in fact visit the Macedonian court, the fondness for Euripides remains. On high culture at the Macedonian court, see Chapter 10 (Carney 2003).

<sup>92</sup> See Borza 1983, 50–51 for references.

<sup>93</sup> The image of the cock fight, though not applied to Alexander in particular, comes from Murray 1983a, 271. Borza 1983, 51–52, stressed the competitive nature of even intellectual discussion at Alexander’s court. He pointed to the competition between Callisthenes and Anaxagoras (each supported by followers or students), a competition that led, of course, to a deadly end, like so many other quarrels at Macedonian symposia (see below).

<sup>94</sup> Borza 1983; Murray 1996; Vössing 2004, 66–92 all saw Macedonian sympotic practice as different from that of southern Greece, though they differ as to the nature of the distinctive behavior. Borza stresses the quasi-constitutional nature of the Macedonian symposium, Murray (see below), the tendency to violence, and Vössing focuses on *truphē*. Kottaridi 2004 seemed to understand Macedonian symposia as distinctive as well, though she was more indirect in dealing with the issue. My own approach to some degree combines all of these.

<sup>95</sup> Murray 1996, 17 also saw this as a fundamental distinction between Greek and Macedonian practice, though he focused on Macedonian physical violence. My own understanding of Macedonian disorder is somewhat broader.

<sup>96</sup> For instance, Borza 1983, 48; O'Brien 1992, 6–8; Dalby 1988, 44 n. 26. Dalby cited Ath. 427a–c, a passage that refers to the drinking of unmixed wine by Scythians and by Cleomenes, but one that mentions no Macedonians.

<sup>97</sup> Murray 1996, 18 was the first to note this. See also Vössing 2004, 66.

<sup>98</sup> Aelian *VH* 2.41 says that Cleomenes, the Spartan king, was not only a heavy drinker (*polupotēs*), but that he had acquired the “Scythian evil” of drinking unmixed wine. Later in the same passage Aelian mentions a Scythian king visiting Greece who drank heavily and says that he had brought this habit from home, since it was the Scythian habit to drink unmixed wine. Plato (*Laws* 637e) says that the Thracians and Scythians, men and women, drink unmixed wine and let it pour down over their clothes. Herodotus, also discussing Cleomenes, says that he went mad because, keeping company with the Scythians, he learned to drink unmixed wine as they did (Hdt. 6.84).

<sup>99</sup> See below on the accuracy of stories about Philip's behavior on this occasion.

<sup>100</sup> The accounts of the death of Alexander, whether those that mention a suddenly fatal cup or those that depend on the *Ephemerides*, are all dubious, primarily because each version has an agenda. However, many accounts refer to Alexander's heavy drinking at the time, though no others specify that he was drinking unmixed wine. Plutarch, for instance, rejects the cup of Heracles but says Alexander had been having drinking bouts, had been to one held by Nearchus, and then drank again at Medius' symposium (*Alex.* 75.2–4). Similarly, Arrian, who also favors the *Ephemerides*' account, mentions multiple long drinking parties (Arr. 7.23.4–25.1). Justin (12.13.6–8) puts Alexander's death in a similar context, though he accepts the idea of the cup of Heracles. Aelian (*VH* 3.23) also puts his death in the context of heavy drinking at many symposia.

<sup>101</sup> Justin's poisoning story is probably not true but does offer evidence for what he (or Trogus) believed Alexander's drinking practice to have been.

<sup>102</sup> Borza 199, 270 n. 49. He cites five kraters, one of which (Derveni Beta), as he notes, was certainly used as the burial urn. Doubtless kraters were employed as cinerary urns in other burials as well. Derveni Beta, however, also had another krater, not used for burial, as did Derveni Alpha (Themelis and Tourtasoglou 1997, 29, 31, 61). Two of the Derveni *kraters* resemble the *kraters* found in both Vergina II and III (Andronikos 1984, 149 fig. 111; 210 fig. 175). Other *kraters* have been found since the date of Borza's statement: for instance, many pottery *kraters* were found in the burials at Agia-Paraskevi near Thessaloniki (Vokotopoulou 2001, 732 n. 20). Nonetheless, Kottaridi 2002, 80 also considered *kraters* comparatively rare in Macedonia.

<sup>103</sup> Borza 1990, 270 n. 49.

<sup>104</sup> Barr-Sharrar 1999, 109–110 remarks that the “wine container par excellence” in Macedonia was the *situla*, rather than the *krater* type common in Attica.

<sup>105</sup> Barr-Sharrar 1999, 109–110 saw a connection between the preference for *situlas* and Macedonian fondness for unmixed wine. In fact, she suggested (Barr-Sharrar 1982, 130) that the spouted *situla* shape originated in the north and linked it to drinking unmixed wine.

<sup>106</sup> Kottaridi 2004, 71 who saw it as a way to flaunt the wealth of the host; use of a *krater* implies control by the host of the amount of wine drunk.

<sup>107</sup> Rotroff 1996, 22, 27. She dated the change in Athenian vessels to the late third or early second century. This could suggest a Macedonian origin for the new custom,

but it may be that the custom changed as it changed location. Rotroff, for instance, assumed that in Athens guests brought their own wine, at least at times, did not share, and were probably of modest means. The Macedonian practice, clearly that of the court, may suggest more luxurious consumption, if guests were given wine and left to themselves to decide how much to use.

<sup>108</sup> Davidson 1998, 48–49 gave a number of examples of Greeks who drank unmixed wine, among them Alcibiades, whose drunken arrival at a symposium led to the collapse of ordered drinking there. Dalby 1996, 18 unconvincingly insisted that Greeks and Macedonians drank unmixed wine only for toasts, loving cups, and “special contexts.” Similarly, Vössing 2004, 66 insisted that Alexander drank unmixed wine only on special occasions. There was always, doubtless, an occasion; whether it was special is more difficult to determine. If, for instance, one chose to toast frequently, the special would become the regular.

<sup>109</sup> Murray 1990b, 6; Nifas 2000, 466, 469. Wardle 2001, 635 assumed that Homeric heroes always drank unmixed wine but cites no passages.

<sup>110</sup> See Davidson 1998, 48 n. 18, who pointed out that wine called *akeratos* is often not literally unmixed, but “strong,” thus explaining how someone might describe someone as drinking wine “more unmixed” than others. Athenaeus, citing Mnesitheus, warns that even those who mix wine half and half risk madness and those who drink it *akeratos* risk the collapse of their body (Ath. 2.36b).

<sup>111</sup> See Nifas 2000, 466, especially n. 8, 469, for references to explanations, mythic and otherwise, offered by Athenaeus and other ancient sources.

<sup>112</sup> Borza 1983, 48; Davidson 1998, 40. Both note that the taste of the wine was affected by the containers in which it was stored: resin-lined amphoras or goatskins.

<sup>113</sup> Singleton 1996, 75; McGovern 1996, 305. Singleton also pointed out that diluted wine would be more thirst-quenching and yet undiluted – in effect concentrated – wine would be cheaper to transport. Koehler 1996, 330 suggested that concentrated wines may have traveled better, and notes that wines were shipped in varying concentrations.

<sup>114</sup> Bremmer 1990, 197–98; Lissarrague 1990, 19–52, especially 10.

<sup>115</sup> Borza 1983, 48–50. Part of his argument depended on his own high evaluation of modern wine from Macedonian regions and adjoining areas, but Lambert-Gócs 1990, 117–44 is decidedly less impressed by the quality of modern Macedonian wines.

<sup>116</sup> McGovern 1996, 308 claimed that classical sources associate high quality of a wine with the willingness to drink it neat.

<sup>117</sup> Dalby 1996, 153–54, speaking of both Macedonian and Thracian rulers.

<sup>118</sup> Kottaridi 2004, 68.

<sup>119</sup> Aelian (*VH* 12.26) considers him one of the greatest of mortal drinkers. Unfortunately, some references to Proteas’ drinking relate to the dubious (see below) accounts of the beginning of Alexander’s final illness, e.g. Ephippus *FGrH* 126 F3= Ath. 10.434 a–c.

<sup>120</sup> Arrian (7.14.1) mentions the drinking parties, but simply says that Hephaestion became sick at this time; Plutarch (*Alex.* 72.1) also alludes to the symposia, but says that Hephaestion, having gotten a fever, foolishly drank a very large container of wine and ate an entire fowl (perhaps demonstrating that one really should not feed a fever). Diodorus (17.110.6) says that Hephaestion drank too much at the parties, sickened, and died. Heckel 1992, 88 argued that Ephippus of Olynthus, who wrote an

inflammatory piece on the deaths of Hephaestion and Alexander (*FGrH* 126, F1–5), probably exaggerated the role of drinking in Hephaestion's demise, whereas Aristobulus (Arrian's source) went to the opposite extreme. See Reames-Zimmerman 1998, 263–79 for a discussion of the source tradition on Hephaestion's death. See also Borza and Reames-Zimmerman 2000.

<sup>121</sup> Macedonians may have liked heated wine, though the Athenians certainly did not; see discussion and references in Dalby 1988, 43 n. 21. One wonders whether the Greek custom of *proposis* (usually translated as “toast” but perhaps better described as challenge drinking) may have been particularly common at the Macedonian court. On the custom and an interpretation of how it functioned, see Vössing 2004, 33–37.

<sup>122</sup> Athenaeus 11.463f claims that Chians and Thasians (producers of some of the best Greek wine; see above) and Thessalians drink out of large cups, Athenians from small ones. See Davidson 1998, 61–65, who notes especially the *kantharos*, the *rhyton*, the *keras*, and the Spartan *kumbion* (we should surely add the *skyphos*), arguing that the size and shape of cups related to the manner in which the wine in them was drunk: deep cups were drunk bottom up, shallow cups drunk elegantly, slowly. Even small cups with rounded bottoms, whose trustworthiness when full was doubtful, may have been drunk bottom up too.

<sup>123</sup> Both Athenaeus (10.434a) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 623f) associate Alexander with a particularly large cup. Proteas, Alexander's drinking companion, is also associated with large cups (Ath. 10.434a), as was his grandson of the same name, a guest at Caranus' symposium (Ath. 4.129a, e–f). Later in Caranus' banquet, the host offers his guests wine in small cups as an antidote to the unmixed wine in large cups employed earlier (Ath. 4.130c).

<sup>124</sup> Barr-Sharrar 1999, 107–108 considered it the “most prevalent” drinking cup in Macedonia and suggested that this handle-less shape, Achaemenid in origin, may indicate an imitation of Persian drinking customs.

<sup>125</sup> Kottaridi 2004, 71.

<sup>126</sup> Rotroff 1996, 18–22 who traced the trend to the later classical period.

<sup>127</sup> Indeed, Macedonian eating habits seem to have differed from those of southern Greece as much as their drinking habits. See discussions in Dalby 1988, 1993, 152–57 and Tripodi 1999.

<sup>128</sup> Dalby 1993, 153–57 who pointed out that the greater presence of meat in Macedonian (and Thessalian) meals, a consequence of the superior productivity of their land, was nonetheless read by southern Greeks as “greed” and indulgence of “animal impulses.” Thus, much as with their need to mix water with wine of dubious qualities, Greeks turned necessity into a virtue and understood those who lacked the necessity as equally lacking in virtue.

<sup>129</sup> Dalby 1988, 41 nn. 8, 9, 10; 42 nn. 12, 14; 43 n. 17; 44 n. 30. See also Dalby 1993, 152–7 who (followed by Tripodi 1999, 1224) saw the distribution of surplus food as a form of redistribution and the creation of obligation.

<sup>130</sup> Aelian *VH* 8.7; Ath. 4.130 b–c, 12.538d.

<sup>131</sup> Even if one concludes that the development of urban institutions in Macedonia happened earlier than has often been assumed (see discussion and references in Hatzopoulos 2001, 190), there is no evidence that this limited the political power of the elite.

<sup>132</sup> Kottaridi 2004, 69.

<sup>133</sup> See Nielsen 1997 for discussion.

<sup>134</sup> See Borza 1983, 55 and 1992, 241–2. It is interesting that Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F81=Ath. 6.260a), makes explicit the connection between royal symposia and decision-making: Philip is said to have men known for heavy drinking and vulgarity around him and to deliberate with them about great matters.

<sup>135</sup> For instance, Vössing 2004, 69 suggests that Philip II may have dined and drunk on a sort of podium raised above the rest of the room. His evidence is an extremely dubious passage from Hegesander preserved in Athenaeus (7.289 e–f) and his assumption that Philip borrowed the institution of the Royal Youths (see above) from the Persian court. There is no evidence for such a raised podium at Vergina or Pella.

<sup>136</sup> Hellström 1996, 136–38 contains an interesting discussion of the ways in which Idrieus differed from his brother Mausolus in his construction of the *andrōnes* at Labraunda; whereas Mausolus had used his construction to stress his elevation from the rest of the Carian elite and his international status, Idrieus stressed his role in Caria and as a fellow citizen.

<sup>137</sup> Thus the descriptions of the tent at Dium and of the mass wedding stress the numbers entertained (see above) whereas Theopompus' description (*FGrH* 115 F = Ath. 435a–c) of the symposium after Philip's victory at Chaeronea mentions the Athenian ambassadors and, after their departure, some of the king's *betairoi*.

<sup>138</sup> Borza 1983. Vössing 2004, 92 seemed to follow him in making the symposium central to political prestige. Heckel 2002 provided a clear picture of the competitiveness of Alexander's court, although I am less inclined than he to put all the blame on the king himself.

<sup>139</sup> Dalby 1996, 17–18 sees as distinctive the violence and military (armed) aspect of Macedonian symposia.

<sup>140</sup> See discussion and references in Borza 1992, 101–03, 161–62.

<sup>141</sup> Violence at Macedonian symposia did not end with the Argeads. Demetrius Poliorcetes and Cassander's son Alexander V used the occasion of a symposium to plot murder and counter murder against each other (Plut. *Demetr.* 36.3–5).

<sup>142</sup> Whereas Alexander's drinking is frequently discussed, Philip's is less so. See O'Brien 1980b, 91–93 and 1990, 7–8, though he accepted anecdotes which I consider dubious.

<sup>143</sup> Even in post-Argead times, Macedonian kings were hardly teetotalers. Athenaeus (603c), citing Antigonos of Carystus' life of Zeno, reports that Antigonos Gonatas, having come away at daybreak from one drinking party, rushed to Zeno's house and persuaded him to join in another *kōmos* at the house of Aristocles, the harp-player of whom he was enamored.

<sup>144</sup> O'Brien 1980a, 33 noted that Plutarch is apologetic about Alexander's drinking in his life of Alexander but not in the *Moralia*.

<sup>145</sup> Polybius (8.9.5–12), responding to Theopompus' remarks (*FGrH* 115 F282 = Ath. 435a), makes just this point. Davidson 1998, 303–4 is not convincing in suggesting that Theopompus' view is more persuasive.

<sup>146</sup> The mere repetition of similar detail is, therefore, not terribly reassuring, *contra* Flower 1994, 106–7.

<sup>147</sup> In his Life of Pelopidas (18.3), Plutarch seems to suggest that Philip admired the bravery of the Sacred Band, but this sympathy is not referred to in the context of his drunkenness in the other Plutarch passages.

<sup>148</sup> Suspiciously like a Roman *triumphator*, he had a slave remind him of his mortality.



<sup>149</sup> He then lists Greeks who acted in similar ways in similar situations.

<sup>150</sup> See Davidson 1998, 153–9. As he noted, few historians think that the *Ephemerides* were anything more than propaganda, intended to suggest that Alexander died of natural causes.

<sup>151</sup> See discussions and references in Bosworth 1988, 92–93, O’Brien 1992, 107–109, and Worthington 2004, 110.

<sup>152</sup> Plutarch (*Mor.* 178, *Demetr.* 62) tells what may be another version of this anecdote in which Philip is simply inattentive, not drunk.

<sup>153</sup> O’Brien 1992, 7.

<sup>154</sup> Other accounts of the incident make no overt reference to drinking but describe a scene best explained by considerable use of wine by all parties. Satyrus *ap.* Ath. 557d–e, for instance, has both Alexander and Attalus throwing cups at each other and Justin (9.7.3–4) has a nervous Alexander start the incident by quarreling first with Attalus and then with Philip, who attempts to kill his son and is only prevented from doing so by his friends. The element of the irrational is dominant in the entire affair. On Philip’s need to keep the succession stable and the unlikelihood that he intended to change his preference for heir, see Chapter 9 (Carney 1992a). Green 1991, 90–93 argues that Philip did intend to change the succession because he believed, correctly or not, that Alexander and Olympias were plotting against him. Philip may have been suspicious of them, but in all versions of the event, Philip does not initiate the quarrel: it is either Attalus or Alexander himself. Letting the issue of the succession come to a head in such a public circumstance can hardly have been Philip’s plan, whatever his long term intentions. His subsequent reconciliation with Alexander seems to confirm this.

<sup>155</sup> *Contra* O’Brien 1992, 28 who spoke of Alexander as “apparently sober.” None of the sources say that he was drunk, but his actions suggest that he was, though perhaps less so than Attalus and Philip.

<sup>156</sup> Arrian (4.8.1–9.9); Curtius (8.1.19–2.13); Justin (12.6.1–18); Seneca *Ep.* 83.19 and *De ira* 3.17.1 all give accounts of the incident.

<sup>157</sup> The historicity of the story that the entire army reveled through Carmania was accepted by O’Brien 1980a, 39, but was more often rejected or doubted (see Hamilton 1969, 185 for references). One wonders where the supplies for a revel would have come from, granted the army was fresh from the Carmanian desert.

<sup>158</sup> See Chapter 2 (Carney 1996, 26, especially n. 41). O’Brien 1980, 91 observed this pattern, but understood it as merely a personal trait of Philip and Alexander. My own view is that this could have been a broad societal pattern. For instance, Plutarch’s portrait of Demetrius Poliorcetes features the same dramatic fluctuations between drunken excess and high competence (*Dem.* 2.3, 19.3–6), a pattern that broke down only in his final captivity (*Dem.* 52.2). Plutarch interprets this pattern as Dionysiac (*Dem.* 2.3). Griffin 1986, 32–85 discussed this personality type, one he understood as both a literary stereotype and a reality of sorts, partly generated by the stereotype. He saw the figure of Alexander as particularly potent in the development of this “self-reinforcing” tradition (Griffin 1986, 39).

<sup>159</sup> See O’Brien 1992, 101–154 for references.

<sup>160</sup> Hamilton 1969, 58 cautioned that other passages in Plutarch’s works offer different, less negative views of Alexander’s drinking.

<sup>161</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 50.2–4) does not mention Dionysus directly, but says that Cleitus

sacrificed to an unnamed god (who could be Dionysus), but left the sacrifice incomplete because the king summoned him to a symposium.

<sup>162</sup> Pelling 1999, 364 n. 7, observed that the god may be “invading” Alexander by means of making him think in these terms, or that the notion of his wrath is “self-delusion.” Pelling concluded that it is impossible to tell, a typical ambiguous result in matters Dionysiac.

<sup>163</sup> Obbink 1993, 67, 78–79.

<sup>164</sup> See Dodds 1960, 105–6 on the meaning of the Euripides passage. Plutarch (*Mor.* 611d–e) embraces Dionysiac religion related to expectation of an afterlife but is very negative about Olympias’ different Dionysiac enthusiasm (*Alex.* 2.5–6). O’Brien 1980a, 38 assumes that Olympias’ Dionysiac enthusiasm was connected to wine and drinking, but no source connects Olympias to wine. Some scholars believe that the worship of Dionysus as a wine god was an entirely male pursuit but many others do not (see references in Dillon 2003, 148). O’Brien’s interesting discussion of the relationship between wine and Dionysus in Macedonia (1980b, 86–89) was limited by his tendency to subsume all Dionysiac experience under the heading of wine.

<sup>165</sup> McGovern 1996, 246 pointed out that the grapevine can be “a metaphor of the cycle of death and renewal” since it spends the winter dormant and revives in the spring.

<sup>166</sup> Miller 1993, 14, 17–19.

<sup>167</sup> See references in Garland 1985, 70–71.

<sup>168</sup> Miller 1993, 14.

<sup>169</sup> The looted tomb was a single-chamber of the Macedonian type. In addition to the *kelinē*, the contents included a coin of Philip and fragments of weapons. See *AR* 1994–95, 45; 1996–97, 67; 1997–98, 77; *AEMTH* 8, 231–40; 9, 301–10; *ADelt* 453–5; Tsibidou-Avloniti 2002, 2006.

<sup>170</sup> Such linkage is not unique; see Hoffman 1989, 97–98. The Athenian festival of Anthesteria exemplifies this linkage: on the first day the new wine was opened, on the second the spirits of the dead wandered and human beings needed ritual protection, and on the third there was a special meal for the dead. This kind of doubleness seems characteristic of Dionysiac experience.

<sup>171</sup> Miller 1993, 17–19 rightly cautioned that the great variety in external and internal tomb structures in Macedonia cast doubt on generalization about the inspiration for these tombs and thus on their meaning. Though suggestions that the Tomb of Lyson and Calicles was related to royal banqueting tents (see Miller 1993, 17 for references) or that the Great Tomb at Lefkadia and other tombs were modeled on the *andrōn* (Hoepfner 1996, 33) are attractive, they remain extremely speculative.

<sup>172</sup> Villard 1988, 449 points to the similarity. See Huttner 1997, 65–123 for a discussion of the influence of Heracles on the image of both Philip and Alexander.

<sup>173</sup> O’Brien 1980b, 101–102; 1992, 8.

<sup>174</sup> See Chapter 7 (Carney 1981, 159 n.26). Curt 8.1.45–49; Plut. *Alex.* 51.3–4; Arr. 4.8.7–8 all seem to suggest that Alexander was about to call the *hypaspists* out against the *sōmatophylakes*.

<sup>175</sup> See Chapter 13 (Carney 2002, 64).

## AFTERWORD

My views on the role of the symposium at the Argead court have not generally changed since the 2007 article: I continue to think that Macedonian symposia and drinking habits were different from Greek ones, that this difference is not simply a construct of our prejudiced Greek sources. Subsequent work, however, has certainly further complicated how one contextualizes literary reports of elite Macedonian drinking.

On the other hand, Müller 2009 (who had not seen this article) traced out a *topos* that associated rulers perceived to be tyrannical (Philip, Alexander and others) with excess, peculiarly manifested in excessive drinking, and so doubted that accounts of Alexander's drinking can be historically useful (see further in the Afterword on Chapter 7). Though I consider these accounts still useful despite their assorted stereotypes, I agree with her that thinking about Alexander or Philip as alcoholics is un-useful; it imposes a culturally embedded modern construct on a culture with different drinking customs.

Pownall (2010) has argued that southern Greeks not only used their accounts of Macedonian drinking to their own ends, but failed to understand the function of these Macedonian symposia at court. She emphasized the Homeric nature of Macedonian drinking custom, suggesting, among other things, that the "cup of Heracles," the very large cup (not typical of Macedonian drinking cups which were generally small) imitated Nestor's cup (*Il.* 11. 632–37). It is important to note (see Powell 2012), that sympotic behavior in central and southern Greece was itself not infrequently excessive and that symposia there were not exclusively aristocratic affairs, but could involve even lower and "middling" classes (Jones 2014). Recognizing stereotyping of both southern and Macedonian drinking habits in surviving accounts does not, however, prevent one from concluding that there were meaningful differences.

In 2001 Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2001) questioned earlier views that the entire ground floor of the palace at Aegae was devoted to rooms purpose-built for symposia (with the characteristic raised borders). Subsequently Kottaridi and others re-excavated and restored the palace. This led to a number of revised conclusions about the palace. For instance, Kottaridi concluded (2011, 323) that, contrary to Nielsen's suggestion (1997, 142), there was no park or garden with trees in the palace's central courtyard. More relevant to this article is the conclusion from re-excavation that most of the palace was occupied by "banquet halls"; Kottaridi calculated sixteen rooms with space for two hundred twenty four couches (Kottaridi 2011a, 176–7). Moreover, Kottaridi (2011b, 328–9) deduced that the Aegae building had no "space for family life" and was used and intended solely for public and political acts, as a public building, and that the royal family did not reside there. Obviously, these combined conclusions, if anything, confirmed or expanded the importance of the symposium at the Macedonian court. Since the re-examination of the palace also led to the conclusion that it was built by Philip II as part of a grand complex including the theater and further fortifications and much of the Eucleia sanctuary (Kottaridi 2011b, 303), the palace

appears to confirm Philip's use of symposia for his own ends and for the projection of his majesty and power.

As I noted in this chapter, there has been a general presumption that, as in southern Greece, elite symposia of Macedonia did not include royal women, or respectable women of any sort. There is little good evidence one way or the other and it is, as I noted then, somewhat problematic to use evidence from Archaic burials of women Kottaridi believed to be royal, as evidence that royal women did participate, at least on special occasions, in symposia. However, the idea that royal women were sometimes present at court banquets now strikes me as more appealing (Carney 2015), partly because I think I let Attic customs shape my understanding of Macedonian to some degree and partly because there is reason to doubt how much we know even about women at Athenian symposia, particularly if we base conclusions on vase painting. See Burton 1988 and Corner 2012 for varying views about the level of Attic women's participation in sympotic activity. Topper (2012, 105–35) argued that vase-paintings showing women at symposia was intended to mark participants as less civilized and considered these scenes (Topper 2012, 106) part of a “larger discourse about how Athens became civilized by learning to put women in their place, and that they thus promote the exclusion of citizens' wives and daughters from contemporary symposia”. Accordingly, to admit that royal Macedonian women attended court symposia might have fed southern Greek stereotypes. On the other hand, as Topper noted (2012, 128), Athenian vase painters do imagine women as present at heroic banquets, if in a subordinate position.

Zosia Archibald believed (2005, 24) that in Macedonia, female elite burials were given more prominence than elsewhere and concluded that “(some) Macedonian women enjoyed a social prominence of which their more southerly sisters were deprived. “ Her conclusion, particularly in context of the display of wealth the burials indicate, does make one wonder about female participation in symposia, if only because of their prominence in other kinds of Macedonian display.

## HUNTING AND THE MACEDONIAN ELITE: SHARING THE RIVALRY OF THE CHASE (ARRIAN 4.13.1)

Fascination with the pursuit of game was an enduring feature of the life of the Macedonian elite. Though the practice and the ideology of hunting in Macedonia did change, success in hunting constituted the most persistent mark of excellence for the elite Macedonian male. Athletics did not become an important Macedonian pastime until the Hellenistic period<sup>1</sup> and, by the time of Aristotle, killing a man in battle no longer defined masculine adulthood.<sup>2</sup> In contrast, at least as late as the second century BC (Ath.18a), it remained Macedonian custom that a man could not recline at dinner until he had killed a boar without using a net. This rite of passage was particularly significant because it purchased entry to the symposium, an institution of vital importance in the life of the court.<sup>3</sup>

This paper addresses the entire history of Macedonian hunting but it focuses on the late classical and early Hellenistic periods. Since attention has already been paid to the representation of Macedonian hunts and to the role of the king as royal hunter<sup>4</sup> (and to the possible influence of other monarchic traditions on that role),<sup>5</sup> this paper will concentrate upon hunting practice and the interaction between the king and the rest of the elite in the context of hunting.

Highlighting this aspect of hunting helps us to understand an important subject, the nature of Macedonian monarchy. Some continue to assert that Macedonian monarchy was constitutionally limited, but the majority of scholars view Macedonian monarchy as absolute, limited only situationally. Though neither an assembly nor a royal council restricted the power of the king, chronic problems with invasion and regicide did. Although this dispute has been attributed to lack of evidence,<sup>6</sup> the main reason that we find the institution difficult to comprehend is its fundamentally paradoxical nature.

The style of Macedonian monarchy was hardly absolute: a king dressed, drank, fought, hunted and was buried in a manner only slightly different from the rest of the elite. This style, however, was not the substance of kingship in Macedonia. Style or custom could not save a man if the king

opposed him, but situation might. These three conflicting aspects of Macedonian monarchy, style, substance and situation, are the source of much of our puzzlement. The elite had much to do with the first and third of these aspects of royal power. The character of the Macedonian elite shaped royal style because the king's regular interaction with the elite at court provided the context for the display of royal style; hunting was one aspect of that interaction and display.

The cultural context for Macedonian hunting practice and ideology is complex. One hallmark of Macedonian elite culture was its ability to adopt the style of another culture to purposes peculiarly Macedonian.<sup>7</sup> Greek elites since the days of Homer<sup>8</sup> valued hunting as a heroic activity (Xen. *Cyn.* 1.1–17).<sup>9</sup> Alexander I advanced the claims of his dynasty to heroic descent via Heracles, the great warrior and hunter (Herod. 5.22; 8.137–9) and Macedonians, still Homeric in many of their values even in the classical period, are likely to have taken that heroic hunter tradition quite seriously.<sup>10</sup>

Alexander I initiated the royal Macedonian coinage,<sup>11</sup> producing a type that would recur<sup>12</sup> throughout Macedonian history.<sup>13</sup> A number of his larger coins have the figures of a man and a horse on them.<sup>14</sup> This Rider or Horseman type associated the monarchy with hunting.<sup>15</sup> The mounted rider on Alexander I's coins, although Greek in style,<sup>16</sup> clearly imitated earlier Balkan coins<sup>17</sup> and is obviously connected to the so-called Thracian Rider. The Thracian Rider appears in many contexts in Balkan cultures and may well refer to a heroic figure who triumphs over death.<sup>18</sup> Macedonians had many kinds of cultural contacts with Thracian culture. The meaning of the Rider figure on the coins of Alexander I and many subsequent rulers is controversial because so many variations existed. Few would now connect the Rider figure to specific deities or heroes<sup>19</sup> or insist that the figure represented the current king.<sup>20</sup>

Disagreement persists, however, about whether the Rider represents a hunter, a warrior or is a purposely ambiguous figure who could be either or both.<sup>21</sup> On Macedonian royal coins the figure is armed only with spears and sometimes a pike, but no sword. He wears no armor and is dressed (when he is dressed) in a manner more appropriate to the hunter than the warrior.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the presence of a dog between the legs of the Rider's horse on an octadrachm of Alexander I<sup>23</sup> virtually guarantees that we cannot understand the Rider as a warrior.<sup>24</sup> It is not, however, undeniable proof that the Rider is a hunter<sup>25</sup> since the dog appears to be a Melitean,<sup>26</sup> a breed Greek evidence associates only with the role of a pet, never with hunting.<sup>27</sup> This evidence, however, tells us nothing about the dog's role in Macedonia.<sup>28</sup> Many modern breeds now considered lap dogs were once used as hunting dogs: dachshunds hunted not only small prey, but deer

and wild boar.<sup>29</sup> Meliteans may have had a similar history. In any event, since the Macedonian Rider is not a warrior and yet carries spears, he cannot plausibly be identified as anything other than a hunter, whether one understands the occasional appearance of a dog as assistance for the hunt or simply as company.<sup>30</sup>

Users would always have connected the images on Macedonian coins with the government that issued them. Granted its long use, people could have associated the Horseman with monarchy, with general social and religious order, even with specific rulers. The power of this image may have been cumulative.<sup>31</sup>

Two other coin images make likely an understanding of the Rider as a hunter somehow associated with monarchy. The head of Heracles with a lion headdress appeared on many Macedonian coins.<sup>32</sup> These coins have not been understood to associate monarchy and hunting, even though the Argeads and Antigonids claimed descent from Heracles. Heracles appears on these coins wearing a hunting trophy, the head of the Nemean lion, and a royal cult to Heracles the hunter existed by Hellenistic times. Whether these images of Heracles purposefully resembled the current ruler, they certainly associated the monarchy with Heracles and lion hunting.

That association is more explicit in a coin type first issued by Amyntas III.<sup>33</sup> On the obverse of the Amyntas coin a Rider appears and on the reverse is a lion crunching a spear in its jaws. Since this lion is demonstrably being hunted, the coin unambiguously associates the monarchy and lion hunting and may identify the Rider as a hunter.<sup>34</sup> Herodotus (7.126) and Pausanias (6.5.4) report that lions existed in areas of Macedonia in the classical period.<sup>35</sup> Some have seen the coin of Amyntas III as proof that Macedonian kings hunted them.<sup>36</sup>

Other early evidence puts hunting into the context of court life but, unlike the coins, is not exclusively connected to the king. In Greek culture, the pursuit of game had an erotic aspect (game was a typical courting gift and young men tried to impress their lovers by success in this area).<sup>37</sup> In the Macedonian court, always a locus for competition, often of a sexual nature,<sup>38</sup> the erotic aspect of the world of the hunt led to violence or attempted violence. Diodorus (14.37.6) reports that Archelaus was accidentally killed while hunting by his *erōmenos* Craterus. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1311 b), however, claimed that the death was quite intentional. He specifies no context, hunting or otherwise, for Archelaus' death but says that three young men killed him, two of them former lovers. The frequency of later conspiracies, particularly that of the 'Pages' (hereafter termed Royal Youths), which was also related to royal hunting, make it likely that Archelaus was indeed assassinated while hunting, perhaps under the guise

of a hunting accident (see Chapters 8 and 11).<sup>39</sup> Tradition about the death of Euripides, however dubious,<sup>40</sup> offers further proof that hunting was an important court activity.

Arrian (4.13.1) claimed that the sons of the Macedonian elite, going back to the time of Philip, served the king as personal attendants, guards, presenters of horses and assistants in mounting, and that they shared the rivalry of the chase with him.<sup>41</sup> By the time of Philip, the king hunted with a group of courtiers. Arrian's language, his use of *philotimia* (rivalry, ambition), is significant: the royal hunt was a venue for competition between the king and those who hunted with him.

Conquest of beasts can relate to conquest of men.<sup>42</sup> Plutarch (*Alex.* 40.3–41.1) describes Alexander as courting risk and difficulty in fighting and hunting, for exercise and in order to stimulate the *aretē* (excellence) of those around him. Certainly hunting had additionally a practical use for the king and his court since it was considered (Xen. *Cyn.* 1.18; *Eq.* 8.10) a good way to train for battle and to keep in fighting trim during periods of peace.<sup>43</sup>

As we have seen, a Macedonian could not recline at banquets until he had killed a wild boar (possibly the most dangerous of game)<sup>44</sup> without the aid of nets (Ath. 18a; see also Chapter 12).<sup>45</sup> Macedonians did sometimes employ nets in hunting: three of Alexander's courtiers used unusually long ones (Ath. 539d; Plut. *Alex.* 40.1) and the hunting fresco on Vergina Tomb II depicts a man with a net.<sup>46</sup> The most prized success in hunting, however, came when a man defeated his prey without the help of nets, traps, or even other men, using only a few javelins, or even his bare hands.<sup>47</sup> This Macedonian preference is striking since, more than southern Greeks, Macedonians were big-game hunters.<sup>48</sup>

Macedonians hunted both on foot and on horseback and used hounds. Mounted hunting, apparently unheard of in southern Greece in the classical period, was probably more common in Macedonia where horses were more available and the elite fought on horseback.<sup>49</sup> Literary and archaeological evidence demonstrates that Macedonians used Molossian, Laconian and even Indian hounds.<sup>50</sup> Alexander was so fond of his famous horse Bucephalus and his Indian hound Peritas that he named a city after each of them (Plut. *Alex.* 61.2–3; *Mor.* 328f; Strab. 15.1.29; Diod. 17.95.5; Curt. 8.14.34; Gel. *N.A.* 5.2.4.). Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 340) claims that Peritas, for whom Alexander paid a hundred minae, killed a lion himself! Pollux (*Onom.* 5.46) mentions another dog of Alexander, Triakas, given to him by a satrap.<sup>51</sup> Alexander's affection for the animals which presumably aided him in hunting may have been typical of the Macedonian elite. In fourth-century Greece and Macedonia, as the commemorated dead



were increasingly seen as heroic, a dead warrior's tomb might contain images of his horse or hound or both.<sup>52</sup> The close connection to horse and dogs, as exemplified by Alexander, may also have had broader religious connotations, harking back to the enigmatic Thracian Rider.<sup>53</sup>

Anecdotes about hunting at the court of Alexander are far more common than battle anecdotes. Alexander and his Companions repeatedly, perhaps compulsively, risked their lives in hopes of success in the hunt: Peucestas was seriously bitten while in pursuit of a bear (Plut. *Alex.* 41.2); Craterus took a wound to the thigh while hunting an ichneumon (Plut. *Alex.* 41.3) and saved Alexander from the charge of a hostile lion (Plut. *Alex.* 40.4); Lysimachus' encounter with a large lion during Alexander's campaign left him with scars to shoulder and thigh he still proudly displayed years later when he was a king himself (Plut. *Demetr.* 27.3). Alexander himself sponsored hunting competitions (Plut. *Alex.* 4.6) and spent his own leisure time pursuing a variety of game (Plut. *Alex.* 23.2–3). On one occasion, the entire army joined him in a massive hunting party through one of the Persian game parks (Curt. 8.1.14).<sup>54</sup>

So vital was success at the hunt to the Macedonian elite that competition with fellow hunters could result in injury or accidental or even intentional death. The wound Craterus sustained while hunting came not from the animal he pursued but from the lance of Perdiccas (Plut. *Alex.* 41.3). The intense rivalry for success in this arena not only pitted various members of the elite against each other but also led to confrontations between kings and members of court, as they shared that *philotimia* of the hunt. Alexander was so intent on his quarry that those who threatened to get there before him (Curt. 8.6. 7) or even those who thought the king needed help (Curt. 8.1.14–16) could incur the king's wrath and punishment.

Hermolaus and his fellow Royal Youths plotted to kill Alexander after he had him flogged because the young man had set his sights on a boar the king wanted for himself (Curt. 8.6.7–8).<sup>55</sup> Alexander was punishing the youth for trying to accomplish the very thing that, by Macedonian custom, would make him an adult.<sup>56</sup> Since Alexander threatened to deprive them of their manhood, Hermolaus and his friends tried to deal with him as the tyrant they deemed him.

Why did Alexander administer so severe a punishment to Hermolaus? Persian court practice supposedly required that no one attack a quarry before the king,<sup>57</sup> but there is no reason to think that this was Macedonian practice. Neither Curtius nor Arrian, our main sources for the event, says that it was, and Arrian's (4.13.2) diction strongly suggests that the king acted as he did out of personal anger. Moreover, the reaction of Hermolaus and his friends implies that they had no expectation of the imposition of

such a custom. The pre-conquest Macedonian court was not generally a setting with rigid rules of precedence and ceremony.<sup>58</sup> (See further discussion of this issue in Chapters 8 and 11.)

Alexander's anger and that of Hermolaus and his friends may have been generated by the king's attempted imposition of yet another Persian custom on his hostile Macedonian courtiers.<sup>59</sup> Alexander, however, was always selective in his adoption of Persian custom. If he did appropriate this particular Persian habit, he did so because it appealed to him, primarily because of his extreme competitiveness; his anger arose from his growing lack of toleration of those who thwarted his will.

The latter explanation would better fit the varying fate of those who came between the king and his quarry. Although the royal bodyguards such as Lysimachus, the Royal Youths, and to some degree all the *betairoi* were supposed to come to the king's aid if his life were in danger, the line was not easily drawn between aiding and thwarting the king: Craterus saved Alexander from a lion attack while they were hunting without gaining the king's wrath but Lysimachus, in similar circumstances, was not so lucky. When Lysimachus came to his aid, Alexander shoved him aside and mocked him, referring to Lysimachus' earlier and nearly fatal encounter with a lion and announcing that he too could bring down a lion alone (Curt. 8.1.14–16).<sup>60</sup>

Alexander's reluctance to be assisted or protected derived from two separate but mutually reinforcing factors. Those who saved a king's life never forgot it because the action gave them renown. Craterus (or perhaps his son) commissioned a monument at Delphi to commemorate his deed (Plut. *Alex.* 40.4; see below) and Cleitus (who had saved Alexander's life at the battle of Granicus (Arr. 1.15.8; Plut. *Alex.* 16.11; Diod. 17.20.7) boasted that he had done so (Arr. 4.8.7; Curt. 8.1.20) and may, like Craterus, have commissioned a work of art (Plin. *N.H.* 35.93) to memorialize his deed.<sup>61</sup> While Craterus and Peucestas (who saved Alexander's life in the battle at the Malli city) seem not to have angered the king by their acts (Peucestas was clearly rewarded), Lysimachus was penalized and Cleitus was killed, among other reasons, because he could not resist boasting about his action.

In the agonistic Hellenic world, where excellence was not simply a matter of being good but of being *better* than anyone else, one man's success always meant that someone else had failed. For a king it was an awkward business to be saved because it suggested that the king was not as good a warrior or hunter as the one who saved him. Alexander's touchiness in this area is not surprising. Curtius (8.1.23–5) includes in his account the tale, supposedly told by Alexander, that he had saved his father's life during a dispute between two elements in the army and that Philip would never

admit it because he did not want to be in his son's debt for his physical safety. Whether hunting or fighting, a Macedonian king was supposed to be pre-eminent. The army may have wanted Alexander to hunt in company and not on foot (Curt. 8.1.18), but the king could not afford to be saved. Whether a Spartan ambassador actually said that in his fight with the lion Alexander had struggled to see which would be king (Plut. *Alex.* 40.3), the king's *aretē* could only be demonstrated by putting himself at risk. Those who attempted to limit his risk stood in danger of being understood to have compromised his *aretē*.

Thus, by the reign of Alexander the role of the king as chief hunter had become a central aspect of Macedonian monarchy. It is no accident that the elaborate funeral pyre Alexander had built for his friend Hephaestion included a hunting scene (Diod. 17.114.3); we should perhaps recall that Alexander had intended his friend to be a kind of substitute king.<sup>62</sup>

But Alexander's reluctance to share the glory of hunting success was not solely the consequence of Macedonian values. Royal imagery in the Near East going back to the Bronze Age associated kings with lion hunting.<sup>63</sup> Alexander's determination to become the successor of the Persian rulers meant that he imitated aspects of Persian royal hunting practice, most obviously in his use of their game parks.<sup>64</sup> The theme of the royal lion hunt was important for a man who ruled the ancient Near East. Whether he imitated specific protocols of royal Persian hunts is less certain, as we have seen. The intense enthusiasm of the Macedonian elite for hunting and the central role of the king in the royal hunt survived the chaotic period of the Successors and the establishment of the Hellenistic dynasties.<sup>65</sup> Cassander diverted suspicion from his political activities by staging a hunt (Diod. 18.49.3). Demetrius Poliorcetes at first used hunting to keep him in trim when he was under (very spacious) house arrest (Plut. *Demetr.* 50.6, 52.1–2).

Indeed, as Alexander's generals scrambled for ways to justify their assertion of royal status, success at the hunt could demonstrate worthiness to rule. Various Successors associated themselves with famous hunts of Alexander's reign, with particular stress on lion hunts.<sup>66</sup> Lysimachus' daring against the lion was commemorated on his coins once he was king.<sup>67</sup> Simply to compete, Perdiccas had to invent a story about his stealing a lion cub (Ael. *V.H.* 12.39).<sup>68</sup> The famous "Alexander Sarcophagus", completed in the last years of the fourth century, shows the dead man participating in a lion hunt with Alexander.<sup>69</sup> Craterus' Delphic dedication pictured the lion hunt in which Craterus saved Alexander (Plut. *Alex.* 40.5; Pliny *N.H.* 34.64).<sup>70</sup> Seleucus won renown by breaking a runaway wild bull with his own hands (App. *Syr.* 57). Two famous mosaics, one of a stag hunt and

another of a lion hunt, pictured heroic pairs of young men and were displayed on the floors of the *andrônes* in two elite houses at Pella; they may relate to the struggles of the Successors.<sup>71</sup> A boar-hunting group from Vergina seems to belong to this period; there may have been another at Pella.<sup>72</sup> A bronze hunting group was dedicated at Thespieae (Plin. *N.H.* 34.66), probably by Cassander but possibly by Polyperchon.<sup>73</sup> Perhaps the last of this series of works meant to connect hunting skill to worthiness for rule is a late fourth- or early third-century relief from Messene depicting a lion hunt. It was probably dedicated by one of the Successors.<sup>74</sup>

At Vergina, Tomb II had not only a fresco of a hunting scene involving seven men on foot and three mounted figures pursuing a variety of animals<sup>75</sup> but also a chryselephantine couch (in the main chamber), decorated with an elaborate royal hunt scene.<sup>76</sup> The controversy about whether Tomb II at Vergina was the burial place of Philip II or his son Philip III Arrhidaeus (see Chapters 4 and 5) has led to a debate about whether the hunting fresco on the façade of the tomb constitutes proof of a post-Alexander date for the tomb because it depicts (among other things)<sup>77</sup> a lion hunt.<sup>78</sup> Images of lion hunting were absent from Greek art after the seventh century until the Hellenistic period.<sup>79</sup> No explicit Macedonian representation of a lion hunt has been found that clearly predates Alexander's conquests.<sup>80</sup> At issue is not just the date of the tomb but also to what degree the importance of hunting, particularly lion hunting, in Macedonian monarchy is a Persian borrowing.

The question of outside influence on the role of the Macedonian king as hunter is not an easy one to resolve. The royal lion-hunt theme could have reached Macedonia indirectly, prior to the conquests of Alexander.<sup>81</sup> However, although some association between hunting and funerary monuments does appear in Greek and Macedonian art prior to Alexander's conquests,<sup>82</sup> no Macedonian collective funerary hunting scene is known that predates the Vergina fresco,<sup>83</sup> whereas hunting scenes, often collective ones, are common in funerary art in Asia Minor in the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>84</sup> It is unclear whether the Vergina fresco reflects an understanding of the hunt's relevance to the commemorated dead that is more Greek than Asian.<sup>85</sup> Nonetheless, it is likely that the lion hunt theme and the image of the collective hunt in the Vergina fresco are recent, post-Alexander Asian borrowings. Whether the hunt fresco should be understood to be Asian or Macedonian in setting,<sup>86</sup> historical or ideal, the style, the theme and representation of the hunt fresco are demonstrably affected by Asian art, particularly satrapal art. The work of art historians, Bartsiakas' work on the male bones from Tomb II, the conclusions of Touratsoglou and Themelis about the date of the Derveni burials, Rotroff's findings, as well

as the work of Borza and others<sup>87</sup> argue that Tomb II was constructed after the conquests of Alexander, in the late fourth century.

If we are primarily interested in Macedonian hunting rather than art, this conclusion leaves a number of issues unresolved. Although the *representation* of lion hunting reappeared because of Asian influence, *real* Macedonian lion hunts probably happened in this same period and certainly Heraclid Argead rulers had long favored an image for their coins that commemorated their supposed ancestor in his role as lion killer. Should we, then, conclude that the spate of monuments and other objects connecting the Successors to lion hunting and to the hunts of Alexander signifies that the Successors were trying to connect to Macedonian or Persian monarchic tradition or both? Moreover, although hunting continued to be a part of the royal image and court of Hellenistic rulers and certainly of the Antigonid rulers of Macedonia, what are we to make of the fact that the lion-hunt theme seems to die away with the generation of the Successors?<sup>88</sup>

The primary term of reference for the hunting monuments and allusions of the Successors is neither Persian nor Macedonian monarchical tradition, but the career of Alexander and the competitive hunts of his reign. The Successors based their initial assumption of royal title on individual *aretē*,<sup>89</sup> largely leaving to their descendants claims to rule based on descent. The hunts of the Successors connected them to their glory days as young men under Alexander's command and commemorated – in a sense continued – the rivalry with Alexander and the others that had characterized the real hunts. Lion hunting was a focus not so much because of its associations with Asian monarchy but because of its association with Alexander's success, of which his conquest of Asian monarchy was part.<sup>90</sup> Craterus, a Macedonian traditionalist hostile to Alexander's Persianizing (Plut. *Eum.* 6.2), would hardly have commissioned a monument that placed him in the context of Asian monarchy, but he was interested in commemorating an event in which he personally had saved the great Alexander from his most formidable wild enemy. The incident showed his worthiness to play the role that Alexander had played.<sup>91</sup>

Once the new dynasties had been placed on a firm footing, hunting took on a more traditionally Macedonian role in the Hellenistic monarchies, although it continued also to support claims to personal excellence and right to rule. Pyrrhus, for instance, gained royal favor at Ptolemy I's court by his excellence at both hunting and gymnastics (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.4). In Egypt, the Ptolemies combined Macedonian tradition with images of the king as hunter going back to New Kingdom times. Ptolemy II's great procession commemorated royal hunting skill by including gilded hunting

spears and twenty-four hundred hunting dogs (Ath. 201b). Ptolemaic rulers continued to be admired for their skill in hunting (Polyb. 3.3.9).

In Macedonia itself, paralleling general changes in Macedonian monarchy, continuity with Argead hunting tradition was maintained, but hunting practice and ideology seems to have become more institutionalized.<sup>92</sup> The royal cult of Heracles *Cynagidas* (Heracles the hunter) was practiced throughout the country during the Hellenistic period; Philip V made a dedication to Heracles the Hunter at Pella.<sup>93</sup> Tomb IV at Vergina, possibly an early Antigonid tomb, contained figures probably related to a group hunt.<sup>94</sup> In the Antigonid period the kings maintained royal game preserves with royal hunters (Polyb. 31.29.3–5), probably on a Persian model.<sup>95</sup> Poets (*Anth. Pal.* 6.114–16) praised Philip V's success at hunting a wild bull, part of which the king dedicated to Heracles, whose hunting prowess he was said to emulate.<sup>96</sup> Antigonid evidence for hunting is focused on the ruler himself; we hear nothing about his competition or interaction with the rest of the elite. The Antigonids, compared to the Argeads or Ptolemies, preferred a narrower public presentation of the monarchy once they were well established in rule of Macedonia,<sup>97</sup> a presentation more focused on the person of the reigning king.<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the Antigonids demonstrated less interest than earlier rulers in putting the king's excellence at the hunt in the context of the elite.

Success in hunting was critical to the Macedonian elite, particularly to the king. Kings had to demonstrate their hunting *aretē* and, when dynasties failed, new rulers used hunting skill to assert claims to legitimate rule. The Argeads and the Successors presented an image of the royal hunter in the context of sometimes deadly competition with the rest of the elite, just as the king's interaction with the elite generally defined the expression of monarchy and established its limits. The Antigonids, whose power was closer to absolute than that of their predecessors and also more defined, generated an image of the king as hunter that was equally heroic and Heraclid but more solitary, an image defined not by competition with the Companions but by emulation of Heracles (e.g. *Anth. Pal.* 6.114–16) and by the king's control of Heracles' cult as a hunter god.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Although Alexander I and Archelaus (Herod. 5.22; Solinus 9.16: see Borza 1990, 111–12, 174 n.32) may have participated in the Olympics and Philip II certainly did (Plut. *Alex.* 3.8), Macedonians in general probably did not do so. Their exclusion from international competition would have muted their interest. Alexander was contemptuous of such competition, though some of his courtiers did demonstrate some interest in athletics (Brown 1977, 76–88). (See the Afterword of Chapter 10

for my revised views on Macedonian involvement in sport prior to the Hellenistic period.)

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle's (*Pol.* 1324b) description of the custom that tied killing an enemy to adulthood implies that the custom was no longer practiced in his day.

<sup>3</sup> Borza 1983, 45–55; Booth 1991, 105–20; Hatzopoulos 1994.

<sup>4</sup> Briant 1991, 227–36; Lane Fox 1996; Tripodi 1998.

<sup>5</sup> Robertson 1982; Stamatiou 1988; Prestianni-Giallombardo 1991; Tripodi 1991; Reilly 1993; Palagia 1998; 2000; Paspalas 2000.

<sup>6</sup> See discussion, references and conclusions in Borza 1992, 231–48.

<sup>7</sup> Borza 1990, 172.

<sup>8</sup> *Il.* 9.537–46; *Od.* 19.225–35, 428–58. Anderson 1985, 3–15.

<sup>9</sup> Vidal-Naquet 1986, 117.

<sup>10</sup> See Cohen 1995, 491–98.

<sup>11</sup> The date is uncertain: Price 1974, 18; Tačeva 1992, 59.

<sup>12</sup> For variations in the Rider figure, see Price 1974, 22.

<sup>13</sup> Price 1974, 35; Picard 1986, 67–76; Greenwalt 1993, 509–15; Tripodi 1998, 17–18.

<sup>14</sup> On the coins of later kings the male figure is always mounted: Tripodi 1998, 18.

<sup>15</sup> Tripodi 1998; Borza 1992, 127, especially n.68, *contra* Martin 1985, 5–6, whose argument that these coins functioned primarily as a medium of exchange is reductive. Tripodi 1998, 1–4 more plausibly saw the king catering to various agendas and audiences.

<sup>16</sup> Price 1974, 10 contrasted the workmanship of tribal coins with “elegant” Greek work of Alexander I; see also Kraay 1976, 143; Tripodi 1998, 16.

<sup>17</sup> Raymond 1953, 42; Tačeva 1992, 58; Greenwalt 1993, 509–10; Tripodi 1998, 17.

<sup>18</sup> Gočeva 1986, 237–43; Picard 1986, 67–76; Schneider 1989; Tačeva 1992; Greenwalt 1993, 516–17 and 1997, 121–33.

<sup>19</sup> So Raymond 1953, 44–6; Price 1974, 9; Le Rider 1977, 365.

<sup>20</sup> So Raymond 1953, 36; Kraay 1976, 148; Hammond 1979, 110, *contra* Picard 1986, 74–6.

<sup>21</sup> Raymond 1953, 46, followed by Tripodi 1998, 20, 31, 34, argued that the image is purposely polysemic, a figure of an aristocratic warrior-hunter of no specific Greek ethnicity.

<sup>22</sup> Tripodi 1998, 22 did not explain why a cavalryman would have no other weapons or armor.

<sup>23</sup> *JNG* 8, 2 1994 also shows a heavy tetraobol of Perdiccas II with a dog (ANS #53).

<sup>24</sup> Polyaeus 4.2.16 says Philip II used dogs to hunt enemies who were hiding from him, but there is no other evidence for Macedonian use of dogs in war and comparatively little evidence of their use in battle anywhere in the Mediterranean ancient world (Cook 1952).

<sup>25</sup> *Contra* Hammond 1979, 156. See Price 1974, 12, plate v.24, for an issue by a Balkan city showing a hunter hurling a spear; in some examples a hunting dog appears below the horse.

<sup>26</sup> Tripodi 1998, 23, who rightly rejected Hammond's implausible belief that the dog on the coin is a Molossian hound (Hammond 1979, 106). On Meliteans, see Busuttill 1969, 205–8. See Imhoof-Blumer and Keller 1889, II.29 for a tetradrachm issued by Mende in Chalcidice that shows Dionysus reclining on a donkey and under the feet of the donkey a Melitean; and Imhoof-Blumer I.46 for a denarius that shows the Dioscuri galloping with a Melitean underneath the feet of their horses.

<sup>27</sup> Hull 1964, 35. Tripodi 1998, 23 argued that this absence of evidence means that the breed did not hunt, whereas the truth is simply that, if they did hunt, we have no evidence of it.

<sup>28</sup> The references associated the breed with a kind of effiteness difficult to imagine in the context of early fifth-century Macedonia. For instance, Theophrastus (*Char.* 21.9) has the pettily ambitious, small-minded man put up a tomb for his Melitean, emphasizing its high breeding.

<sup>29</sup> Wilcox and Wakowicz 1989, 316; Fogle 1995, 184; Verhoerf 1997, 127. Fogle 1995, 7 noted that virtually all modern small terriers had their origin as hunters of small game or vermin.

<sup>30</sup> So, in effect, Borza 1992, 130 n.13. Price 1974, 5 rightly noted that the “official” nature of the coins makes something amusing or playful in the type unlikely. Cook 1952, 38–42 (followed by Tripodi 1998, 23) suggested that, from an art-historical point of view, dogs are merely appendages to horses and may have no independent meaning. Tripodi 1998, 23 failed to persuade that the dog was extraneous or connected to an ephobic image. Royal coinage would not be the appropriate context for such an image.

<sup>31</sup> *Contra* Martin 1985, 186. Price 1974, 10 suggested that the Rider figure is somehow a representative of the royal house. Tačeva 1992, 64 believed that it personifies links between royal and religious power; Greenwalt 1993, 517–18 asserted that the role of kings as hunters was an important part of Macedonian monarchy, confirming a king’s legitimacy and worthiness to rule.

<sup>32</sup> The type appeared from Archelaus on to the end: Westermarck 1989, 302; Kraay 1976, 145. For examples, see Ginouvès 1994, 41 fig. 37 and 62 fig. 53; Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos 1980, 28; Hammond 1979, 663–9; Edson 1934, 214–16.

<sup>33</sup> Examples by Perdiccas III and Cassander: Westermarck 1989, 308, 314; Tripodi 1998, 59.

<sup>34</sup> If we read the obverse and reverse together: Kraay 1976, 144–5; Greenwalt 1993, 515–16; 1994, 120–2 *contra* Hafner 1980; Paspalas 2000, 215, 217 n.41. Briant 1991, 238–9 is not certain. Even if the two sides are not read together, the lion by itself is a reference to lion hunting.

<sup>35</sup> See also Xen. *Cyn.* 11.1. Though no bones have been discovered (Hull 1964, 102), lions were occasionally encountered and probably hunted; so Anderson 1985, 80; Lane Fox 1996, 137, *contra* Stamatiou 1988, 210 n. 2, who does not review all available evidence.

<sup>36</sup> Anderson 1985, 80.

<sup>37</sup> Dover 1978, 87–8; Schnapp 1989, 71–88; Ogden 1996, 117 n. 84.

<sup>38</sup> See Chapter 8 (Carney 1983, 260–72).

<sup>39</sup> Hammond 1979, 167–8; Chapter 8 (Carney 1983, 262–3); Tripodi 1998, 44. Greenwalt 1993, 518 connects this assassination attempt (and that of Hermolaus) and the royal hunt. Hatzopoulos 1994, 96 argues that the motivation resembles that of Hermolaus and his friends: the king had refused to permit them to accede to adult life, retaining them in a lower status when they believed they had reached adulthood.

<sup>40</sup> See Tripodi 1998, 40–2; Lefkowitz 1981, 96; Fairweather 1974, 231–75.

<sup>41</sup> Arrian’s language (as well as Aelian *VH* 14.48) may mean that Philip merely regularized an older custom, *contra* Hammond 1990, 261–90.

<sup>42</sup> Durand and Schnapp 1989, 60–1 connect conquest to battle against animals.

<sup>43</sup> A similar view was taken by other ancient elites: see Stadter 1980, 51.



<sup>44</sup> Hull 1964, 103.

<sup>45</sup> Athenaeus' source claimed that Cassander was required to sit long into adulthood because he had not taken down his boar. (See also discussion in Chapter 12.) Briant 1991, 225 rightly attributes this anecdote to the propaganda battles of the Successors and observes that the story also demonstrates the importance of hunting exploits in royal ideology. Tripodi 1998, 103–4 suggests that the mounted figure in the Vergina fresco, who seems to be turning from the conclusion of a successful boar hunt to the aid of another figure hunting a lion, is a prince who has just made this transition. Throughout the Greek world, hunting was a common, often an initiatory, activity of young men (Vidal-Naquet 1986, 106–7).

<sup>46</sup> Andronikos 1984, 101–16. See Drogou *et al.* 1996, 4 for a recent reconstruction in color.

<sup>47</sup> E.g. Plato (*Leg.* 7.823e–4a) prohibits use of nets and night hunting. Vidal-Naquet 1986, 118 suggests that the distinction really lies between the “black hunt” of youth (with nets, at night) and adult daylight hunting with a spear, whereas Durand and Schnapp 1989, 61–2 call the running hunt, the “hunt of ephebes”. Both recognize that the standard of no nets and running is more ideal than reality. Briant 1991, 228–30 concludes that Plato may have been thinking of Greek hunting custom versus that of *both* Persians and Macedonians, and of ordinary hunting compared to that shaped by royal ideology.

<sup>48</sup> So Anderson 1985, 80.

<sup>49</sup> Evidence (apart from the disputed Rider coins) for mounted Macedonian hunts does not pre-date Alexander III, but the importance of horses to the elite has led to the conclusion that the Macedonian court began to hunt on horseback in early times (so Hammond 1990, 262; Lane Fox 1996, 141), particularly since Macedonians pursued big game, and horses were necessary for such a pursuit (Tripodi 1998, 48). Curt. 8.1.18 demonstrates that royal hunts had not always been mounted.

<sup>50</sup> Tripodi 1998, 48–9. The Vergina fresco shows both slender Laconian hounds (Reilly 1993, 161) and the more mastiff-like Molossian hound (Reilly 1993, 161–2 recognizes a different type, used as a holding rather than tracking dog, but is apparently unfamiliar with Molossians); on both types see Hull 1964, 29–30; Toynbee 1973, 103–7.

<sup>51</sup> Hull 1964, 105. Whereas dogs were used only for hunting, horses would have been valued for their use both in hunting and in battle. Bucephalus was never specifically associated with hunting. On the eponymous animals, see Hamilton 1969, 169–70; Anderson 1930; Fraser 1953.

<sup>52</sup> Anderson 1985, Rhomiopoulou 1980, 127 notes that the subject of the seated young hunter with dog is known from a large group of Ionic reliefs from Thespieae, Thessaly, and many places in Macedonia, but not Attica. See also Felten 1993, 414–15 pls. 9, 11, 12.

<sup>53</sup> Greenwalt 1997, 131 warned against trivializing Alexander's relationship to Bucephalus and his dogs, connecting the relationship to the role of king as Rider.

<sup>54</sup> Holt 1994, 57 suggested that this massive hunt was not merely recreational, but for food.

<sup>55</sup> See Greenwalt 1993, 518; Carney 1980–1, 223–31.

<sup>56</sup> Briant 1994, 306 makes this astute point, citing *Ath.* 18a.

<sup>57</sup> The king could suspend it: e.g. *Plut. Mor.* 173d; see Briant 1991, 218 and 1994, 302–7. Briant pointed out that just as Alexander was angered by Hermolaus and

Lysimachus for getting between him and his prey but honored Craterus for saving him by attacking a threatening lion, so, despite the “law”, Megabazes was beheaded for getting prey the king had marked out (Ctesias *FGH* 688 F 40) but Tiribazus was honored for saving the king when he was attacked by two lions (Diod. 15.10.3). See further below.

<sup>58</sup> *Contra* Hammond 1979, 156 who simply assumed that the Hermolaus incident relates to long-established practice.

<sup>59</sup> Briant 1991, 218 and 1994, 302–7.

<sup>60</sup> *Contra* Lund 1992, 6–8, I am less certain that the Lysimachus lion tale is entirely a constructed fiction. See Heckel 1992, 268–71 on the variants of the tale; he prefers that of Curtius. Although Lysimachus did not fare as well as Craterus, he did better than Hermolaus; Palagia 2000, 184 suggests that Lysimachus’ greater status may explain the distinction.

<sup>61</sup> Berve 1926b, 206 suggested that his portrait may have commemorated this incident.

<sup>62</sup> Palagia 2000, 168–9. The pyre also had scenes of war. Tripodi 1998, 67 noted that the royal Tomb II at Vergina had allusions to both military and hunting glory, but that aristocratic tombs focused exclusively on warfare. Hephaestion’s pyre thus resembled royal funerary art.

<sup>63</sup> Briant 1991, 219–20; Anderson 1985, 63–70. Palagia 2000, 181 saw Asian royal lion-hunting as a kind of ritual act, one of the duties of the king.

<sup>64</sup> Aymard 1951, 43–6.

<sup>65</sup> Aymard 1951, 47–9; Briant 1991, 221–7.

<sup>66</sup> So Briant 1991, 241–2; see Palagia 2000, 167–206 for extensive discussion.

<sup>67</sup> Lund 1992, 160–1, especially nn. 26–7. Lund thought he made the lion a “personal seal device” as well as a “dynastic symbol”. He named his flag-ship “Leontophoros”.

<sup>68</sup> Palagia 2000, 184.

<sup>69</sup> Stewart 1993, 294; Cohen 1997, 130.

<sup>70</sup> Plutarch’s description of the lost monument mentions images of the lion, dogs, the king fighting the lion, and Craterus coming to assist the king. The epigram that accompanied the monument survives (*FD* III<sup>4</sup> 137; Homolle 1897, 598–600; Paspalas 2000, 211–19). It states, in a passage many have seen as an addition to the original composition, that Craterus’ same-named son erected the monument, but that it was originally dedicated by the elder Craterus himself. When the elder Craterus died, his son was an infant. Paspalas argued (2000, 184–5) that Phila, Craterus’ widow, supervised the completion of the monument soon after her husband’s death, making this monument the one that set the trend.

<sup>71</sup> Anderson 1985, 79 and Cohen 1995, 491–7 doubted that either mosaic commemorates a real hunt. Tripodi 1998, 69 and Palagia 2000, 185–6 argued that the mosaics represent the *mores* of the elite rather than the monarchy. Palagia suggested that the house containing the lion-hunting mosaic may have belonged to the family of Craterus.

<sup>72</sup> See Palagia 2000, 200.

<sup>73</sup> Palagia 2000, 202.

<sup>74</sup> Stewart 1993, 276–7, 427; Palagia 2000, 202–6.

<sup>75</sup> Identification of the figures varies: see Andronikos 1984, 114–18; Tripodi 1998, 57–8; Palagia 2000, 192–9.

<sup>76</sup> Drogou *et al.* 1996, 101.

<sup>77</sup> It also has scenes showing hunters pursuing a wild boar, a bear, and deer. Tripodi 1998, 65–8 noted that the fresco contains both comparatively realistic elements and less realistic ones (e.g. the simultaneous capture of animals of diverse species).

<sup>78</sup> Andronikos 1984, 101–19 understood the hunt fresco as happening in Macedonia, before Alexander's conquest, whereas Robertson 1982, 246 and Borza 1987, 109–10 saw the presence of a lion hunt as a sign that the tomb post-dates Alexander's conquest. Tripodi 1998, 92 suggested the fresco was influenced by Achaemenid models.

<sup>79</sup> Robertson 1982, 246 n.47; Perdrizet 1899, 276.

<sup>80</sup> Palagia 2000, 167.

<sup>81</sup> Briant 1991, 231–4 thought that Macedonians could have known of game parks through Thracian contact and so concluded that the fresco is not decisive for dating Tomb II.

<sup>82</sup> Anderson 1985, 70–1.

<sup>83</sup> Tripodi 1991, 159, 178; 1998, 65–8.

<sup>84</sup> Tripodi 1991, 163–72; Stamatiou 1988, 209–17; Palagia 2000 177–8.

<sup>85</sup> Anderson 1985, 71, 80 observed that the funerary hunting scenes from western Asia Minor refer to the dead man's magnificence and continuing triumph in the world to come, not to the transient nature of human success and thus to the glory of the heroized dead, as do the Greek examples, and concluded that the Vergina fresco signifies a heroic, presumably Greek, understanding of the commemorated dead.

<sup>86</sup> See Palagia 2000, 199–200 for arguments on the setting of the fresco.

<sup>87</sup> Rotroff 1984; Borza 1987; Themelis and Touratsoglou 1997; Palagia 1998; 2000; Bartisokas 2000.

<sup>88</sup> As Palagia 2000, 167 noted.

<sup>89</sup> See Gruen 1985.

<sup>90</sup> Palagia 2000, 184. Paspalas 2000, 213–16 argued that Alexander's lion hunts functioned as a way of expressing Alexander's domination over Asia, and that Craterus' monument could have been intended to emphasize his role in Alexander's conquest as he himself returned to Asia.

<sup>91</sup> Palagia 2000, 185.

<sup>92</sup> See Carney 2000, 199–201.

<sup>93</sup> Edson 1934, 226–9; 1940, 125–36; Hammond 1979, 155–6, especially n. 4; Tataki 1988, 116, 119, 430; Allamani-Souri 1993, 77–107.

<sup>94</sup> Drogou *et al.* 1996, 45–6; Palagia 2000, 174 n. 9.

<sup>95</sup> Roussel 1930, 361–71. Palagia 2000, 177 noted that there is no evidence for their existence in Macedonia prior to the death of Alexander.

<sup>96</sup> Tripodi 1998, 130–40 points out that Samos (author of 6.116) was the king's *syntrophos* (someone who was raised with the king).

<sup>97</sup> Antigonus Gonatas dedicated a dynastic monument on Delos (see Edson 1934, 217–20), but there is no comparable subsequent example.

<sup>98</sup> Carney 2000a, 197–202.

## AFTERWORD

This 2002 paper looked at the pursuit of game in ancient Macedonia and focused on the interaction between the king and the elite while hunting, arguing that it was a way to understand how monarchy and the court functioned. Today I would probably talk about this topic in terms of the negotiation of power demonstrably happening in the context of hunting. This chapter is in many ways a companion piece to my article on Macedonian symposia (see Chapter 12), which made a similar argument about the centrality of drinking parties to king and court.

Since the article appeared, Seyer (2007) published a monograph on the royal hunt in Persia and Macedonia. Seyer's work is an interesting study on the *topos* of the royal hunt, but I am not in sympathy with its major conclusions, among them that accounts of royal hunts are so shaped by traditional *topoi*, that no specific incident – the Hermolaus conspiracy or the attempt on Archelaus' life – should be taken as historical. Seyer also argues that success at the hunt, particularly the lion hunt, demonstrated royal legitimacy and thus was also a way to contest legitimacy. Granted the symbolic force he allots to royal hunts, it hardly seems unlikely that rulers and would-be rulers would manipulate the practice to their own ends whereas he seems to assume that only ancient authors could do that. As a practical matter, if you want to assassinate a ruler (or anyone else), a hunt is an excellent place to do it: the elite have armed access to their potential victim, an individual can be easily isolated, a murder in the context of so significant a royal pursuit will be especially compelling, and the very fact that someone has been assassinated may be concealed as an accident. I also found myself doubting Seyer's monolithic reading of a set of acts and images across so many cultures and so much time. Surely symbols and images are powerful in good part because, unlike a written text, they are more multivalent, often ambiguous. To my mind, for instance, part of the power of the Rider (and likely hunter) on Macedonian coins is its ambiguity.

Koulakiotis 2005, which looked at Hermolaus' conspiracy, has useful material on Macedonian hunting. Graekos 2011 paid little actual attention to hunting in Macedonia itself, but Le Bohec-Bouhet (2011) published a fascinating article about dogs in Macedonia, much of it related to their use in hunting. Barringer 2002 appeared too late for citation in this piece. It contains some references to the representation of Macedonian hunts and argues for a close association between hunting and warfare.

Landucci Gattinoni (2003, 30–43, 56), instead of interpreting as political invective the story of Cassander's inability to recline at banquets because of his failure to bring down a boar, believed the tale; she concluded that this failure led Cassander's father Antipater to prefer Polyperchon to his own son as regent, and argued that the hunt Cassander staged after this rejection was not only, as Diodorus says (18.49.3, 54.2), meant to cloak his organizing against Polyperchon, but also to make up for his bad reputation in terms of hunting.

Debate has continued about whether or not Macedonian court hunting practice was shaped by Near Eastern tradition, particularly Persian, and if so, whether before or after Alexander's conquests. Much of this discussion used or focused on

the hunting frieze from Tomb II at Vergina (see below). Coppola 2010 argued that Alexander's hunting practices, like most of the rest of his court practice, was an amalgam of his own interests and of Macedonian and Persian court practice. Spawforth 2012 used a fragment of Ehippus to suggest that Alexander, during the Asian campaign, broke with Macedonian hunting tradition and began to take up royal hunting traditions from the ancient Near East, hunting traditions of which the Achaemenids were a part. His discussion placed hunting customs within the broader topic of Alexander's (and the Greeks' and Macedonians') adoption of Persian culture and habits, particularly royal ones. Spawforth stressed Briant's understanding (2002, 297) of the Persian royal hunt as a way for king and elite to interact. He also suggested that our sources, mostly of Roman imperial date, exaggerated Macedonian, Greek and Persian cultural antipathy and misunderstood many aspects of Alexander's use of Persian institutions. While I would not necessarily disagree with these broad conclusions, it is easy to exaggerate or oversimplify the degree of Persian influence on Macedonian court practices, before or after Alexander (see further Cohen 2010, 108–10 on the complexities of cultural borrowing and influence, particularly in the context of the royal hunt).

In addition, there have been numerous more general discussions of the hunting frieze on the façade of Tomb II at Vergina (see references and discussion in Palagia 2000; Cohen 2010, 83–90, 237–97; Franks 2012) but, since these often related to the enduring controversy about the identity of the occupants of Tomb II and thus differed as to whether the frieze represents a Macedonian or Persian setting, a real or idealized hunt, see also Chapters 4, 5 and 11 and their respective Afterwords. It is worth noting that images of Macedonians involved in group hunts seem to stress cooperation and some sort of male bonding whereas literary sources, as this article suggests, often stress its agonistic nature and thus disputes and danger (*contra* Cohen 2010, 265).



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### Supplementary abbreviations (in addition to those used in *L'Année philologique*)

|                       |                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>AAA</i>            | <i>Αρχαιολογικά ανάλεκτα ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν (Athens Annals of Archaeology)</i>                                                                  |
| <i>AEMTH</i>          | <i>Το Αρχαιολογικό Έργο στη Μακεδονία και τη Θράκη</i>                                                                                 |
| <i>AM</i>             | <i>Ancient Macedonia (Archaia Makedonia)</i>                                                                                           |
| <i>AnnArchStorAnt</i> | <i>Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli. Seminario di studi del mondo classico. Sezione di archeologia e storia.</i> |
| <i>CA</i>             | <i>Classical Antiquity</i>                                                                                                             |
| <i>FD</i>             | <i>Fouilles de Delphes</i>                                                                                                             |
| <i>FGrH</i>           | <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , Jacoby, F., Berlin, 1923–58                                                         |
| <i>IG</i>             | <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>                                                                                                           |
| <i>JdI</i>            | <i>Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</i>                                                                                |
| <i>JabrbCIPhil</i>    | <i>Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, Supplementband</i>                                                                            |
| <i>SNG</i>            | <i>Sylloge Numorum Graecorum</i>                                                                                                       |
| <i>TAPA</i>           | <i>Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association</i>                                                           |

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